


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THE
HISTORY OF CANADA.

BY
WILLIAM KINGSFORD.

VOL. II.
[1679 - 1725.]

TORONTO, DOMINION OF CANADA :
ROWSELL & HUTCHISON.

LONDON :
TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.
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"WITNESS" PRINTING HOUSE,
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BOOK IV.

FROM THE CLOSING YEARS OF DE FRONTENAC'S FIRST
ADMINISTRATION TO HIS RETURN TO
CANADA IN 1689.

THE HISTORY OF CANADA

FROM THE EARLIEST DATE OF FRENCH RULE.

CHAPTER I.

The quarrel between the Governor, M. de Frontenac, and the Intendant, Duchesneau, remained unadjusted.* So long as the latter considered his position to be in no way subordinate to that of the Governor, and received encouragement to assert this assumption of power, there could be no reconciliation. The support which the Intendant obtained from M. de Laval and the lay and clerical personages whom the Bishop controlled, encouraged him to become the declared opponent of M. de Frontenac; and while admitting in the usual courtly language the official superiority of the Governor, he did not hesitate to advance his claim to independent authority. The population of Canada in 1679 was 9,400 souls. All Ordinances for its government were issued by the Council, and were absolute. There was, however, an occasional reference on matters of trade to the principal inhabitants for the expression of their opinion. It was accordingly in the Council chamber that the dispute assumed its most serious proportions.

M. de Frontenac was by no means one to smooth any disagreement having its origin in an attack upon his authority. His faults were those of a strong mind and a powerful intellect. In his self-assertion he had few scruples of delicacy, and little thought of the consequences to others. He fully felt the difficulties and responsibilities of his position, and his whole career establishes his desire faithfully to fulfil his trust.

* Vide Vol. I., p. 434.

Subsequent events shewed how ruthlessly he could carry out his purpose, and that in defence of the interests confided to him, he considered every policy to be justifiable. He possessed the instincts of a statesman, and there was scarcely a man in France who could with greater ability have met and mastered the crisis in which, a few years later, the colony was placed.

The Intendant was one of those colourless figures in history who would pass unnoticed except for their contact with other and more prominent men. The tool of M. de Laval, he was encouraged to assume a position in which he would be able more successfully to support the Bishop's views. In vain Colbert told him to know the difference between a Governor and an Intendant. Duchesneau persevered in treating the Governor as one holding office jointly with himself. It was not however until the 27th of February, 1679, three years and some months after the Intendant's arrival, that a positive issue was raised which defined clearly this antagonism of feeling. On the meeting of the Council at that date, Duchesneau desired to be informed why an innovation in the entry of the proceedings of the previous meeting had been made, contrary to the orders of the King. The Clerk replied, by order of the Governor; a statement corroborated by the Governor himself. The wording in question described the Governor as Chief and President of the Council; the Intendant as performing the functions of President according to the declaration of the King. There was an extraordinary meeting on the 3rd of March. The Governor stated that some three weeks before, he discovered, on reference to the Register, that the Intendant was disputing his position as Chief and President of the Council, 'contrary to the intentions of His Majesty.' There is scarcely a record of a document of this period to be submitted to the King, in which these dreary words do not occur. Every disputant applied them to his own use and advantage. It was the propitiatory phrase on which every pretension to gain the royal will was based; adulation of the monarch was a portion of the text of every communication. The Intendant replied that "he did not contest the Governor's position as

Chief of the Council," and referred to the meeting of the 30th of September, 1675, when it was agreed that the Governor should be so styled, and the Intendant as performing the duties of President. The Governor had by his sole authority directed a change to be made, to dispute the Intendant's position as President; an office he held on a similar tenure to that of the Presidents of the Superior Courts in France. He therefore felt called upon to ask the Governor on what ground he claimed the position of President, and what new use he designed to make of it; for although as Intendant he was the third person in the colony, he claimed to be "the first President of the Council."

M. de Frontenac would not admit that there was any innovation. What he now claimed ought to have been recognized during the past three years and a half; and if such had not been the case, he was ignorant of the fact. He had not seen the register for two years, since the departure of the clerk for France. Peuvret, that official, had now returned; it was on retaking his place that the question had arisen.

The Governor's view was that the Intendant should act as President in taking the opinions of the members of the Council, and in recording the decision. Duchesneau contended that the change would lessen the attributes of his office. He argued that in his absence the senior Councillor should preside, and that the Governor, although Chief of the Council, could not act as President. His pretensions went to the extent, that while as Intendant, he ought never to call the Council together on extraordinary occasions without stating his reasons for so doing and agreeing with the Governor as to the time; the Governor should equally communicate to the Intendant when he deemed it necessary so to act. The dispute was not for a mere empty title. The privilege battled for, was that the Intendant, whenever he saw fit, should have power to call a meeting independently of the Governor's wish, on notifying him of his intention.

Four days afterwards the argument was continued. De Frontenac pointed out that when on the 23rd of September,

1675, Duchesneau's commission was registered, he had presided ; the Intendant not having been present. Consequently, it was not possible to dispute his position as President. He traced this right to the time of de Lauson, and to the course taken by subsequent Governors, by d'Argenson, d'Avaugour, and de Mézy. Some change had been made by de Tracy, as Commander of the Forces, which de Courcelles had followed. He himself adhered to the early practice ; he assumed to be something higher than an honorary Councillor having no other prerogative than to sit above the Bishop and the Intendant, or in the Bishop's absence, his Grand Vicar. He had found that the Intendant allowed no opportunity to pass of disparaging his position and character, and that courtesy was shewn by words, not by actions. He submitted extracts of despatches from France defining his position, which he desired should be enregistered.

These despatches * were addressed to M. de Frontenac, as "Chief and President of the Council," directing his acceptance of the Councillors named, setting forth his responsibility in matters of police and justice, calling upon him to exercise a good and beneficent influence on the Council, and to summon a meeting of twenty of the inhabitants, to consider the question of the sale of liquor to the Indians.

The Intendant placed a statement on record, that while he was always ready to pay every deference to the Governor, he must continue to avail himself of the Royal declaration ; and he asked the co-operation of the Attorney-General. The latter recommended that the question should be submitted to the King, and that until his decision was obtained, the titles of Governor and Intendant only should be used. This view was accepted by the Council, and two of the body were directed so to state to the Governor.

No such compliance was found in de Frontenac. He requested the Council to reconsider the case, and not oblige him to have recourse to his authority, to which he appealed only when persuasion, mildness and remonstrance had failed.

* 22nd April, 1675 ; 15th April, 1676 ; 12th May ; 24th May, 1678.

On the other hand, the Intendant expressed his readiness to accept the course suggested. Accordingly, the matter was again referred to the Attorney-General; the latter repeated his recommendation that the case should be laid before the King, and this opinion was again sent to the Governor.

But de Frontenac in no way abandoned his pretensions. He maintained in the King's name,* that he must be treated according to the King's declaration. The clerk was instructed to describe him as Chief and President. The prefix of Monseigneur to his name was also disputed; on this point he was prepared to wait the Royal instructions. The Intendant answered, that the Council was only bound to obey the Governor in the event of war, and for the safety of the country. To use force in this instance was to do away with all justice. He appealed to the Council to maintain its authority, and not permit an entry to be made in the registers without authority of its members. But the Governor would not recede; he retorted on the Intendant that he was making trouble in the country, where he was bound to keep the peace. In spite of the demand of the Governor that the Attorney-General should immediately take notice of his communication, the matter was referred for report to the following Thursday.

The meeting at which this altercation occurred took place on the 27th of March, 1679; no meeting was again held until the 14th of August, at a time when de Frontenac was absent in Montreal. The Intendant stated on that occasion, that on the 10th of July last, he had met the Governor in Montreal, who had informed him that de Villeray had been ordered to remain in his residence on the island of Saint Lawrence; de Tilly at the house of his brother-in-law, St. Denis; and that the Attorney-General, d'Auteuil, had been directed not to leave Sillery, until these members of the Council could proceed to France to give an account of their conduct. He had, nevertheless, applied for leave to call a

* Il DECLARE [*sic*] à la compagnie de la part du Roy. Cons. Souv. II., 305.

meeting, to which the Governor had answered that the proceedings of the last Council had been concerted and pre-arranged ; the Intendant, said he, had also asked permission for the Councillors to be present at the meetings, so that the ordinary business could be transacted ; a request the Governor had refused.

Damours laid on the table the report of d'Auteuil. After reciting the grounds on which the respective claims had been advanced, he gave his opinion that letters from the King addressed personally to the Governor, owing to their not having been communicated to the Council, were not binding upon its members, but were special to the party addressed, for by law such letters * could not be held as evidence. It was on these documents only, that the Governor founded his pretensions, while the powers held by the Intendant clearly established his right to exercise and enjoy privileges analogous to those held by the first Presidents of the Courts in France. There could be no more conciliatory mode of settlement than to leave the determination of the dispute to the King. It was not admitted that His Majesty desired the Council to obey the Governor in opposition to the views of the Intendant. He recommended that a member of the Council should be sent to France to represent the matter. The whole tenor of the report was antagonistic to de Frontenac.

The Council passed a resolution asking the Governor to suspend his declaration of the 27th of March, during the submission of the points in dispute, and a deputation waited upon the Governor to solicit the recall of the three absent members. No steps were taken on these proceedings.

The news of Peace with Holland having been notified to the Governor, he assembled the Council on the 16th of October, 1679, in order to read the declaration. It was the first meeting held since August. At the commencement of the proceedings de Frontenac maintained that his title should be written according to the style he claimed. The Intendant

* lettres missives closes. Cons. Souv. II., 315.

interfered, and called upon him to recollect that he, the Intendant, had communicated the King's order on this point; and the Governor had agreed that they should not speak with regard to the matters in dispute between them. De Frontenac expressed his willingness that the business should be transacted, and added he himself would retire from the meeting, the cause of his doing so being recorded. Finally, it was resolved that the Council should meet at a later hour, when it should be simply entered on the minutes that the Council had assembled. The Peace was accordingly registered, with an edict forbidding liquor being carried into the Indian villages remote from French settlement.

The Council recommenced their sittings on the 23rd of October. They passed a resolution that they would meet weekly. On the last day of October the Intendant moved an adjournment until after St. Martin's day, the 11th of November. M. de Villeray also, having stated that he was about to proceed to France, asked to be excused from attendance. On the 29th of November he is mentioned as having left Canada.*

Never was a quarrel more fully recorded. The parties interested placed their views at length on the minutes, in order that ultimately they might be laid before the King. The voluminous extracts sent home must have been the reverse of welcome to those who had to consider their contents. A correspondence which extended over the succeeding two years, gave every opportunity to Duchesneau to make the first † formal attack on de Frontenac. We have difficulty in believing that an Intendant would have so defamed a Governor, unless he was confident of being thoroughly sustained. It is impossible to resist the impression that, previously to being sent, his letters had been submitted in Canada to those pledged to their support, and carefully considered. Duchesneau accused the Governor of being the cause of the continued existence of the *coureurs de bois*, not only largely

* Cons. Souv. II., p. 343.

† 10th November, 1679.

participating in their profits, but likewise having himself organized parties for trade, and that he was even a party to the furs being carried to Albany ; moreover, that he had made himself master of the trade operations in Montreal. Du Luth, the Intendant said, was the principal instrument of de Frontenac, his brother-in-law, de Lusigny, being an officer of the Governor's guards. It is scarcely possible to conceive accusations more depreciatory than those contained in the letters sent to France in the autumn of the two following years.*

What should we think in modern times of a subordinate making gross charges against a superior, and the report remaining unnoticed on the table of a Minister ? The course to take was a plain matter. The truth ought to have been established, and either the Governor or the Intendant removed as the facts required. No such idea of justice prevailed in the French Court ; on the contrary, scandal on all occasions and from all quarters was welcomed as valuable and important political information.

In 1676 the King had written to de Frontenac† that he was not to permit any person invested with ecclesiastical or secular dignity, or any religious community, on any pretext soever, to trade in peltries ; and in 1678, in positively discourteous language,‡ he absolutely prohibited the Governor himself from participation in trade, and called upon him so to act that it should not even be suspected that he did so.

On the 29th of November the Intendant reported the death of the Attorney-General. He had previously written that for three years he had noticed d'Auteuil to be suffering from an ailment of the breast§ and from inflammation of the lungs ; and, fearing he would die or be unable to perform his duties, he had applied for a warrant to be given him in blank for the appointment of a successor, which paper he received at the end of 1677. As d'Auteuil died during this quarrel with the

* 13th November, 1680 ; 13th November, 1681.

† 15th April.

‡ 12th May.

§ Fluxion.

Governor, Duchesneau thought proper to set forth in his letters that he had sunk overwhelmed with the mortifications and inconveniences of his exile.* Before the Council he represented the consequences as a natural result of illness, and desired that d'Auteuil's son, then known as the Sieur de Monceaux, should be named in accordance with the warrant which he produced. The Governor objected to the appointment, on the ground that it was made independently of him as Governor; that the letters patent were invalid from the length of time they had been signed; and that de Monceaux was under the legal age, not being twenty-two. In spite of this opposition the appointment was confirmed by the Council until the King's pleasure should be known, the reason assigned being that he was the only person in the colony who had the qualifications for the office. Whatever qualifications the younger d'Auteuil possessed, for by that name he was afterwards known, he was always a devoted adherent of the Intendant.

The main points of Duchesneau's accusations remained unnoticed. The King, however, addressed to de Frontenac a letter on the subject of the *coureurs de bois*, instructing him with some harshness to put an end to the disorders which they caused. He also told de Frontenac that everybody was complaining of him; the Bishop, Ecclesiastics, Jesuits, the Supreme Council, and he called upon him to act with moderation for the good of the Colony.

On the 29th of May instructions were received from Paris, which were registered in Quebec on the 29th of October, 1680. The rule was laid down that the title of "Monsieur" should be given to M. de Frontenac as Governor and Lieutenant-General, to M. de Laval as first Bishop, and to M. Duchesneau as Intendant of Justice, of Police and Finance.

There was a slight difficulty in February, 1681. The Intendant was not present, and the first Councillor, de Villeray, claimed to hold the place of the Intendant in his absence, and on the Governor desiring to be the last to give his opinion,

* Accablé des chagrins et des incommodités; 13th November, 1681.

de Villera y disputed this right. De Frontenac, however, would not yield, and it was recorded that although he was the last to give his opinion, the Sieur de Villera y gathered the votes and pronounced the decision. During the period that Colbert remained in charge of the Colonies there was in France, generally speaking, a favourable view of de Frontenac's conduct. Colbert knew the circumstances of the early difficulties between M. de Laval and the former Governors, and he must have understood the hidden influence underlying the disputes at Quebec. His letter to the Intendant was one of censure.* Duchesneau was blamed for not acting in the spirit which the King's service demanded, and warned if his conduct did not change he would be removed from his position : the following year† Colbert administered to him another rebuke. The King himself wrote with severity to de Frontenac‡ against misapplication of the orders sent him ; calling upon him to maintain a proper spirit of discipline, and when counselling him as to his future conduct, pointed out that the honour of representing the King's person, elevated him above the difficulties he had to contend against. There is strong ground for the belief that Duchesneau's accusations were sustained by letters from Canada. But de Frontenac himself was a man by no means to be idle in such circumstances. His relations with his wife appear to have been peculiar : there was little affection between them. She never joined him in Canada, but she seems to have considered that her own social status depended upon his political well-being, and evidently in this respect she earnestly devoted herself to his interests.§ It was to

* 15th May, 1678.

† 25th April, 1679.

‡ 29th April, 1680.

§ Saint Simon thus describes Madame de Frontenac, V., p. 122 [1707]: *Mourut aussi Mme. de Frontenac dans un bel appartement que le feu duc de Lude, qui étoit fort galant lui avait donné à l'Arsenal étant grand-maitre de l'artillerie. Elle avoit été belle et ne l'avait pas ignoré. Elle et Mlle. d'Outrelaise qu'elle logéoit avec elle, donnèrent le ton à la meilleure compagnie de la ville et de la cour sans y aller jamais. On les appeloit Les Divines. En effet, elles exigeoient l'encens*

her * he sent the documents by which he sustained his cause, knowing that she would unflinchingly stand by his side; and no one could have acted in his interest with more zeal. De Frontenac retorted the charge of corruption against Duchesneau. He accused him directly of being engaged in trade. He named as his partners de La Chesnaye, le Moyne and his family, Le Ber, Saurel, Boucher, and others, all of whom were of the clerical party, and his charges were attested by what he claimed to be proofs, and by *procès-verbaux*. To judge by the number of these papers, they could not have been difficult of attainment on either side.

When Colbert retired from the charge of the Colonies in 1681, his son, de Seignelay, entered upon the office. It was an unfortunate change for de Frontenac. Colbert knew the difficulties which had attended the early years of de Frontenac's government, and he could not have failed to see that, although the issue was changed, the quarrel was one and the same. The contest practically involved the determination of power, whether it should lie with the Governor or with the Bishop; it cannot be said abstractedly, with the Church. No such extreme pretension to political power as that put forth by M. de Laval was advanced by any one of his successors, and no reader of the history of that period can doubt that Duchesneau was a mere instrument in the hands of that able prelate. The succeeding seventy years of French rule were mostly passed in war; the intervals of peace were rare.† It was a

comme déesses, et ce fut toute leur vie à qui leur en prodiguerait. Mlle. d'Outrelaise étoit morte il y avoit long temps. * * * Celle-ci étoit fille d'un maître des comptes qui s'appeloit Le Grange Trianon. Son mari qui comme elle avoit peu de bien, et comme elle aussi beaucoup d'esprit, et de bonne compagnie portait avec peine le poids de son autorité. Pour l'en dépêtrer et lui donner de quoi vivre ils lui procurèrent en 1672 le gouvernement du Canada, où il fit si bien longues années, qu'il fut renvoyé en 1689 et mourut à Quebec à la fin de 1698.

* Frontenac au Ministre, 2 novembre, 1681.

† The years during which peace lasted were, from the Treaty of Ryswick, 1697, to the declaration of war on the accession of Queen Anne, 1702; from the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713 to about 1743; and from the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748, to the commencement of final hostilities in 1751. Excepting during the first years succeeding the treaty of Utrecht, the relations with the British Colonies continued to be so strained that there was a constant threat of war.

struggle for existence ; and with the limited population, and the insufficient help given from France, it is a wonder that Canada unaided should so long have maintained her ground. De Frontenac saw clearly that the safety of the Colony was to be found in a vigorous policy and a reliable disciplined force, and that the ecclesiastical pretension to power was paralyzing its vigour. He obtained neither aid nor support from home. His treatment by the King was harsh and ungenerous. A letter often quoted to the disadvantage of de Frontenac, in reality only shews the essentially vulgar nature of Louis XIV., and his abandonment of an able and devoted servant. It was the King's duty to determine the Governor's position as far as practicable, a decision not free from difficulty even in modern times ; to establish the relative obligations between the Intendant and his representatives, and clearly to define where the superiority lay. He sneeringly told de Frontenac that he was the only man in the Kingdom honoured with the title of Governor and Lieutenant-General who wished to be named Chief and President of such a Council as that of Canada.* "I desire that you abandon that ill-founded pretension," he continued, "and that you content yourself with being my Governor and Lieutenant-General." Matters were left as they were. What de Frontenac advocated as a function of government was attributed to the promptings of a vain love of display. No responsibility was taken from him ; he was blamed for his proceedings with regard to the two Councillors and the Attorney-General. He was threatened with recall ; a step, he

* "Vous avez voulu que dans les registres du Conseil Souverain vous fussiez qualifié de chef et président de ce conseil ; ce qui est entièrement contraire à mon édit concernant cet établissement, en date du cinq juin, 1675 ; et je suis d'autant plus surpris de cette prétention que je suis bien assuré qu'il n'y a que vous dans tout mon royaume qui étant honoré du titre de gouverneur et lieutenant général dans un pays, eût désiré d'être qualifié chef et président d'un conseil pareil à celui de Canada. Je désire donc que vous abandonniez cette prétention mal fondée, et que vous vous contentiez du titre de gouverneur et mon lieutenant-général.... n'était l'assurance précise que vos amis m'ont donné que vous agiriez avec plus de modération à l'avenir j'aurais pris la résolution de vous faire revenir." [29th April, 1680.]

was told, only prevented by the assurance given by his friends, of his future moderation. The King could only see on the part of his Lieutenant a desire to occupy what the King looked upon as an insignificant position ; those surrounding him having succeeded in keeping the true issue out of view.

CHAPTER II.

The letters of de Frontenac establish his constant devotion to his duties. He carefully watched the English relations with the Indian tribes ; and during his first government the Iroquois remained, to a great extent, under French control. His personal influence restrained them from being hostile, whatever effort made to turn their feeling against Canada. Andros, then the English Governor, was anxiously soliciting them to break their relations with the French and to form a close alliance with Albany and New York. This was not a step to escape the sharp eye of de Frontenac, and by him to be unfailingly reported to France. There were infinitely more favourable terms of trade in Albany than in Canada, and the *coureurs de bois* did not neglect to profit by them. One of the principal channels of communication was through Chambly to Lake Champlain, the Saint Lawrence being left above Montreal. De Frontenac recommended that de St. Ours should be established at Chambly with a sufficient garrison. He pointed out that the English rated the beaver one-third higher than the French, and they paid in hard dollars ; or, if merchandise was given, it was furnished at half the rate required for that obtained in Canada. The French dealer was held to pay one-fourth of the beaver into the treasury ; a tax not levied at Albany. Further, de Frontenac expressed the opinion that five or six hundred soldiers would be of great use in occupying posts on Lakes Ontario and Erie.

De Frontenac received no encouragement in these views. It can now be understood that the country was passing through a crisis, and that under the surface of apparent calmness, fires were smouldering, kindled by the rivalry of national interests, soon to burst forth and work on all sides devastation and

* 6th November, 1679.

destruction. What above all was needed in Canada was the concentration of its strength, with a thorough appreciation of the difficulties to be met, and that all should join in an earnest representation to France for countenance and aid. No such spirit animated the Council. Its members were chiefly occupied in asserting their own powers, while sustaining the pretensions of Duchesneau. There is no trace of patriotism or sense of public duty to be found in their proceedings. The trumpety causes of quarrel scarcely merit mention, and when they are named, it is but to shew how futile was the aim and frivolous the conduct of those who were placed in prominence to protect the fortunes of the young colony.

The Council met on the 16th of August, 1681. There was a full attendance, when Madame Damours entered and presented a sealed letter. De Frontenac objected to its being opened as business of greater importance had to be considered, and it was unusual to receive letters of that character. The Intendant, on the contrary, desired the letter should be read. The business before the Council was to register an amnesty of the *coureurs de bois*, by which it was hoped that these adventurers would be brought within the influences of the town population, and would in future carry on less lawlessly their trade in furs. The proceedings had evidently been predetermined, for, on this difference of view, the opinion of the Attorney-General was called for, and without hesitation he recommended that the communication should be read; and it was so voted.

The letter contained a petition from Councillor Damours, who had been imprisoned by order of the Governor. Early in the season, as the law provided, Damours had obtained a permit to send a canoe to Matane, two hundred and fifty-five miles below Quebec; and, on the strength of this pass, he had subsequently sent a trading vessel to the same spot. On the return of the vessel, while Damours was giving instructions for her being unloaded he was arrested.

At the time Damours was taken before de Frontenac, the latter was engaged with a Recollet and some other person, so he

conducted Damours to an inner Cabinet. The Governor asked why he had despatched a vessel without a permit when he knew that one was required. Damours replied that in April, before the ice had disappeared, when he was unable to start his vessel, he had received a permit for a canoe, and had been referred to Boisseau, Director-General of the Farm and Rights of the King ; no difficulty having then been made, he looked upon the permit as both for canoe and vessel. The Governor replied that it was for the canoe only. Damours answered with some insolence that his vessel had been sent to the land given him by the King, and that he considered that it was the King's intention that people should have free access to the lands so granted, upon which de Frontenac replied : "You shall learn the intentions of the King and remain a prisoner until you know them." Damours was taken a prisoner to the *Chateau*. His letter delivered on this occasion was to ask that he should be informed of the accusations against him, and his trial take place according to the usual practice.

The Intendant was at no loss how to proceed. He desired to be informed of the intentions of the Governor. The Governor replied that they were present to attend to the King's affairs ; and he trusted to the King to obtain satisfaction for the insolence shewn him by Damours. The Intendant, however, in no way abandoned his ground. On hearing of the arrest, he had followed the Governor to the Bishop's house, and the Governor had told him that it was not a matter affecting the Council. He now asked that Damours be allowed to take his seat. De Frontenac replied such a proceeding would be to set his authority at defiance. Damours had sent off his vessel at night without even acquainting the officer in command at Quebec of the fact. He had made no explanation, he had simply been insolent. His conduct was leading to insubordination, and must be brought before His Majesty. In the mean time the Council had to attend to the matters before them. The Attorney-General submitted that the case should be referred to him, suggesting that the powers

of the Governor-General had some limit. This course was followed. On the Intendant proceeding to withdraw with the Clerk to prepare the minutes, the Governor objected to his leaving until the papers were signed. The Intendant, however, stated his determination to go to his own house, where he could quietly examine them; but the Governor placed himself before the door and said the Intendant could not leave. He had found that the Intendant did not set forth the reports perfectly in the terms, in which the words had been spoken; he desired, therefore, to see them written and initialled. He would act as usher to prevent the door being opened, and he called upon the Intendant to carry out what was so necessary in the form, otherwise the Intendant would have to go out by the window or remain all day where he was. The Intendant protested against this violence towards the Council and himself. The Governor replied, that daily and by every means the Intendant had endeavoured to introduce discord into the Council; and now that the Governor had placed on record his opinions, he had no objection to the Intendant proceeding to his Cabinet.

Two days afterwards there was another meeting. The Bishop, from illness, was unable to attend. The Attorney-General asked the Council to take part in praying the Governor to judge the conduct of Damours favourably, and to release him, so that he could act in the registration of the Royal Edict. The Governor insisted as he had previously said, that it was not a matter for the Council; nevertheless, the Intendant desired to submit the question to vote.

It has been ably pointed out* that in any quarrel with the Bishop, the Governor was at a disadvantage. The former was permanent in the country and had the whole weight of his position; while the clergy, dependent on his control, were removable at his pleasure. It was difficult to define where his influence would not penetrate. The Governor was liable to be recalled by the first ship leaving France in spring, and he

* M. l'Abbé Faillon.

could never know what influence was being exercised against him in Versailles.

There are always men who take what is thought to be the winning side, and it has ever been found that those desiring to commit a meanness never want reasons for their conduct. To support Duchesneau was to support the Bishop: de Villeray was by nature and sentiment on the side which represented arbitrary ecclesiastical opinion. The remaining members of the Council had no desire to oppose the formidable combination which they were made to feel. That de Frontenac should have resisted this opposition, and on no occasion to be forced from the position which he had assumed, shews the strength and vigour of his character. In any criticism of de Frontenac, all the facts of the case must be taken into account. The offence of Damours appears in itself slight. It was in reality an act of defiance of the Governor's authority insolently justified: one of the many efforts made to lessen the consideration in which the Governor should be held, and to reduce his power in order to throw it into the hands of those opposing him. It was no personal altercation which de Frontenac resented. In making Damours responsible for his breach of the law, he was simply asserting the prerogative of his position.

De Frontenac briefly replied that it was useless to make the demand of putting the question to the vote. Enough remains recorded to show that an angry discussion followed. The mode in which the minutes were written was again criticised by de Frontenac, while the Attorney-General asked the Council to join with him in the request that the case of Damours should be referred to the King.

The enregistration of the Edict of Amnesty to the *coureurs de bois* was now considered. The Attorney-General desired the notice should be published at Nipissing, Sault St. Mary, Michillimackinac, and at what is now known as Green Bay, Lake Michigan, with injunctions to those concerned to return to Canada before July, 1682. The Governor considered that it was simply the duty of the Council to register the Edict

not to specify the places where it should be published. The Attorney-General stated that he had followed the precedent of 1676, and asked the Council to deliberate on his proposition. The Governor replied that if he had consented to any such proceeding in 1676, he had his reasons for so doing: now he held a different opinion, and to remove any scruples on the part of the Council he would assume all responsibility. It was resolved that the Edict should be published in the three cities and copies sent to the places named. The Edict against proceeding to the Indian villages without *cong  * was repeated. It was also stated that in spite of the prohibition of 1679, liquor was still taken to the Indian villages, and that in order to keep the furs from being brought to Montreal, the report had been spread that the plague was raging in Canada, and that the merchandise obtainable there was accordingly poisoned. In consequence, the Ottawas had been deterred from descending with their cargoes, causing immense loss to the Colony.

The Attorney-General was a young man of twenty-three years of age. One reads with astonishment of the self-assertion of M. Ruette d'Auteuil, as he signed himself after his father's death. The prominent position in which he placed himself can only be traced to the influence of the Intendant who had always some proposition ready to fit in with the preliminary skirmishing of his law officer. It was, in fact, an organized attack on the Governor. The uncompromising attitude of de Frontenac, and his calm adherence to his opinions made these efforts of little avail.

At the next meeting M. d'Auteuil gave some explanation exculpatory of himself in the case of Damours. The papers were directed to be sent to the King. Three of the Council, however, de Tilly, Dupont and de Peiras, expressed the opinion that the case was not one to call for the intervention of the Council. The Edict of Amnesty to the *coureurs de bois* was again brought forward. De Frontenac considered the remarks of the Attorney-General, with regard to the parties accused of spreading false reports, and of having prevented the Ottawas

coming to the cities with furs, to be at variance with the spirit of the amnesty, which included everybody, whereas any special mention of such conduct was to exempt from its operation those accused. He regarded the ordinance of 1679, which forbade taking *eau de vie* to the villages of the Indians, antagonistic to that of 1681, which authorized that annually permits should be granted to twenty-five canoes with three men each, to proceed to the Indians in the woods; and he considered that not to allow parties to take *eau de vie* with them, was to interfere with, and limit the permission granted. He said the proceeding was one to harass the King's subjects, for as liquor was troublesome to carry, not much of it could be taken. The illicit trade in spirits was really carried on by Indians and French scoundrels who had established *cabarets* twenty or thirty leagues from Montreal. These were the people who injured the colony, by intercepting the furs to take them to the Dutch. He should oppose everything contrary to the King's service which interfered with the comfort of his subjects. On M. d'Auteuil asking to have communication of the Governor's statement, de Frontenac called upon him to report on the subject on the 23rd of August. Four of the Council voted that he should be ready by that date. When the Council met on that day, d'Auteuil was not prepared further to face the Governor-General. He withdrew from his demand that the Council should report on the remonstrance and requisition which he had laid before them, and requested that they might be sent to the King as a proof how he had striven to perform his duty.

The Governor was of opinion that canoes should be sent to Michillimackinac to winter there, and in spring proceed to Lake Michigan and Sault St. Mary to give the notification to the *coureurs de bois* assembled at those places. He recommended also that Père Dablon should be of the party, as one who had the best knowledge of these places, owing to his long residence with the Ottawas. He also considered that the time named in the edict should be extended in these cases. At the next meeting, on the 5th of September, the Attorney-

General reported on the inexpediency of prolonging the period except with regard to those who were with the Sioux and Assiniboines.

A further difficulty arose in September. The Intendant brought before the Council the condition of the currency. There was much foreign coin in the country, which the merchants refused, and commerce was accordingly interrupted. He proposed that the gold and silver coins should be taken by weight, with an additional third added, according to the value, at which as French money it would be received to rate as Canadian currency, and that no refusal of the money should be permitted.

The Governor declined to attend the meeting. He had previously been requested to signify his views with regard to complaints against Perrot, the Governor of Montreal. Perrot had been accused of interfering with the administration of justice in having assaulted Migneon a bailiff, charged with a warrant to arrest a *coureur de bois* asserted to be in Perrot's interest. The matter had been brought before the Council without communication with de Frontenac. He had replied that it was necessary for him to look into the matter. There was also an accusation by the Attorney-General in relation to Josias Boisseau, for his attacks against God and religion, his calumnies against the Council, and his violence of conduct. Both Perrot and Boisseau were looked upon as partisans of de Frontenac, so the attack might be regarded to be as directed against him as much as against the parties named.

In thus acting the Council was assuming to take the initiative in public affairs. Hitherto the principle followed had been that the Council had to adjudicate on the matters brought before them, and to decide causes in litigation. It appertained to the Governor solely, or the Intendant with the Governor's consent, to introduce the public business to be considered. The pretensions of Duchesneau went to the length that no such assent on the Governor's part was necessary; thus setting at nought the theory of government then recognized. While thus extending his own power, he was willing

to increase that of the Council, so that he could count upon their support. The latter he trusted to secure through the Attorney-General or his substitute, who, by *procès-verbal* or remonstrance, brought matters directly before the Council in the form M. Duchesneau desired. Thus the Council on their own authority would consider directly the point to be determined, and submit the facts to the Governor to obtain his co-operation. The sagacity of de Frontenac led him to penetrate the concealed purpose of this course, and he shewed his determination to resist it.

On the 21st of October, 1681, he replied to a deputation which had been sent to him in the matter of Perrot, that he himself would examine into the accusations made against the Governor of Montreal, and when he had done so, would take his place at the Council and explain his intentions. Upon the receipt of this message, the Attorney-General and one of the Council were deputed to wait upon the Governor, and ask him to communicate his views at as early a date as possible, as the vessels would soon be leaving for France. The meeting was adjourned for a week. On the 27th another visit was made to the Governor on the subject of the complaint of the Governor of Three Rivers against de la Martinière and d'Auteuil; de Frontenac replied that when he had copies of what had passed he would see what he had to say.*

The Council had thoroughly ranged themselves on the side of the Intendant, feeling secure in the undemonstrative support received from M. de Laval and the clergy. De Frontenac perfectly understood the situation, and was not prepared to be led like a lamb to the sacrifice. There is one curious incident in the quarrel. On the 4th of November the Attorney-General begged to be excused from waiting on the Governor, owing to the bad treatment and threats which he received when attending at the *Chateau*. De Villeray and Dupont were accordingly deputed again to ask the Governor's intention with regard to Perrot. At the same time they desired to know his views relative to the Governor of Three Rivers.

* "Il verroit ce qu'il auroit à dire." Cons. Souv. II., p. 705.

De Frontenac replied in a Minute. He referred to his answer of the 20th of October, in itself so plain that no deputations were called for on the subject. He complained that delay was imputed to him, when the fault lay with the Council. He stigmatized as calumnious and false the statement of the Attorney-General that he had received bad treatment, and appealed to Dupont and the clerk on the subject. What had taken place was owing to the impertinence* of the Attorney-General. He had to repeat, when the copies asked for by him had been furnished he would explain his views. He desired his reply to be entered on the minutes.

The Attorney-General, on hearing this statement, requested that the testimony of the parties named should be taken. On the same day, de Villeraŷ asked permission to proceed to France, which de Frontenac would not grant. Another deputation waited on the Governor, who received them with the remark, that these matters had been studied and concerted, and that pretended civilities were shewn in order to take him by surprise; what he required was copies of what had been recorded.

On the same day, Boyvinet, the Lieutenant-Governor of Three Rivers, attended the Council by summons. He declined to give any answer to the questions of the Council, as he had been instructed by the Governor not to reply. It was proposed to send a deputation to M. de Frontenac on the subject; the votes were equal, so nothing was done: but as the Governor had declined to take steps against Boisseau, it was resolved that copies of the remonstrance of the Attorney-General, and of the other proceedings, should be sent to France.

One important resolution was voted, that the King should be petitioned not to permit appeals to France in civil actions, which should be finally determined by the judges of the country: the distance being so great that such proceeding would be ruinous to those interested.†

* Algarades.

† Cons. Souv. II., p. 725.

At the end of December,* the Governor was asked to take his place at the Council, to confer on the subject of the money then current. The Governor replied that he would take the matter into consideration, and on the 12th of January, 1682, the request was repeated. On the 3rd of February, the Governor sent a Minute to the effect that he was surprised that the Intendant should have brought forward the subject, without preliminary discussion with himself. On the 16th of the month, half an hour before the meeting of the Council, he had been notified, like any ordinary member, that the subject would be submitted; as if the position of a Governor and a Councillor were identical. It was not in the Council Chamber that a Governor should have to examine into such a matter. According to the King's order, he should first confer with the Intendant, and after they had together considered what was most essential to the King's service, and were of one opinion, the subject should be brought before the Council.

The Intendant endeavoured to justify his conduct. It was easy to see, he said, that the desire of the Governor was to cause him anxiety, but the Council knew how he had performed his duty. Although he had reasonable ground for complaint of the treatment which he had received from the Governor, he had often been to his house, to confer with him on the King's service. On the 18th of July, 1679, although he considered that the control of the currency belonged to him as Intendant, he had by his Ordinance of that date, left matters as they were. But on the 8th of October, 1680, he had passed an Ordinance, in which he had stated that it had been so determined after a conference with the Governor. It was now necessary to make other regulations, and † having learnt

* 22nd December. p. 739.

† "Et luy Intendant ayant pris que le Conseil estoit en possession de faire les Reiglemens des monoyes comme il luy fut justifié par celuy qui auoit esté fait en mil six cent soixante sept le dixiesme januiér, Il crut qu' ayant L'honneur d' y faire les fonctions de president, Il deuoit non seulement conseruer a la Compagnie tous les aduantages dont elle jouissoit mais mesme les augmenter autant qu'il seroit en son pouuoir." Cons. Souv. II., p. 752.

that the Council possessed authority to regulate the currency, as had been the case on the 10th of January, 1667, acting as President he considered it to be his duty, not only to preserve to the Council the advantages which they enjoyed, but even to increase them as much as lay in his power. Accordingly, without conference with the Governor, he had proposed the regulations of the 2nd of December. He was desirous of freeing himself from the suspicion of having previously arranged with the Governor the policy proposed, and submitting it to the Council as a mere form.

When the Intendant plainly declared that he had dispensed with the Governor's authority for the introduction of an important ordinance, it was simply an attempt to reduce de Frontenac's authority to a nullity. In fact it was the transfer of power to the hands of the Bishop. It was really the Bishop's influence at Versailles which had controlled the appointment of the Council. When the discussion took place, he was present; there is no record of his interference. With the Intendant on his side, a subservient Attorney-General, willing to produce *procès-verbal* or requisition as it was demanded, it was only necessary to make the Council act independently of M. de Frontenac for M. de Laval to be master of the situation. It can be well understood why M. de Frontenac refused to attend further meetings. At the Council he met continued opposition; in his *Chateau* he was Governor-General, and not a mere purposeless figure of straw. His power was still positive; and in the crisis he did not fail to assert himself.

There was a lull after this date. One more meeting, however, took place on the 16th of February, 1682. The Governor had been asked to attend in his place to aid in the settlement of the currency, and to take steps to prevent the beaver passing to New York. The Governor replied in a written Minute that he had nothing to add to what had been sent to the Council. The King had forbidden the beaver to be taken to the English, and no one could leave the settlements without his permission as Governor-General.

The Minute of M. de Frontenac dealt directly with the

powers which the Intendant claimed to possess. It set forth that the Intendant had made an admission to the Council, without being willing it should be entered on the Minutes, although a request had been made to that effect, that his instructions were to take no steps with regard to the affairs of the country, without communicating his purpose to the Governor: that he should seek the Governor's opinion, and, when not in accordance with his own, should conform his policy to that of the Governor. Although matters had been transacted in the Council without any expressed difference of opinion, the Intendant ought not on his own authority to have submitted to the Council a subject so important as an Edict on the currency, in which the most humble as well as the highest in the Province were interested; whereas the Governor had only been invited to take his place as an ordinary Councillor, to give his views on the subject. In the Parliament of Paris, and the other Superior Courts of the Kingdom, the Attorney-General never took the initiative in matters of this character except by order of the King. In a country so distant, where the King cannot be addressed, it was necessary to have recourse to his representative; and if the Attorney-General could take no step without consulting the Intendant, the latter ought to follow the same course with regard to the King's representative. For the Intendant should communicate to the Governor the orders which he proposed to give, before issuing instructions to execute them.

The Attorney-General had defended this conduct by the assumption that the Intendant fulfilled the duties of President of the Council, that M. de Frontenac, as Governor of a Province, certainly held the first place; but that the Intendant was not bound to give a closer knowledge of matters to him than is given to the Provincial Governors in France and to the Council. "We wish to undeceive him," continues de Frontenac, "and those whom the Intendant desires to persuade that he is above us in the Council, because he performs the duties of President, as he stated at the last meeting, although he would not have it put in writing. The King has forbidden

any title but that of Governor and Intendant. Nevertheless, the King has informed us that we were the Chief of the Council, although not acting as President, because he believed it to be beneath the dignity* of a Governor to perform that function. Therefore, it is apparent that it is not the King's intention to make the Intendant pre-eminent. Every care had been taken to heighten the prerogatives of the Council. But neither warning nor remonstrance would be spared to induce them to avoid the false step, which an attempt was being made to lead them to take."

"No one had more interest to preserve their prerogatives than the Governor. The Intendant had admitted that in his Ordinance of 1680 he set forth that the Ordinance had been made after a conference with us, in which he only did his duty. In the days of M. de Tracy, M. Talon had conferred with him as to the *sols marqués* before the matter was submitted to the Council. M. Talon was jealous of the prerogatives of his office, but he was versed in the proceedings which the King desired should be followed. Hence he did not fail in them, and seek for some mode to dispense with doing so;† and the Council felt the deference due to a person of honour holding the office, not to undertake anything at variance with what was owing to his position. It is these sentiments we expect the Council to entertain‡ with regard to us, even if in the past some of its members have departed from the principle. We ourselves would have been present personally to have made this request, if we had not been desirous of avoiding fresh altercation, and if we did not entertain the hope that the orders received from His Majesty this year will prevent their renewal in future. It was extraordinary that any interference with these matters should be desired. Everything was peaceable. Commerce undisturbed. At Quebec, as at Montreal, there was perfect tranquility. There was no difficulty about taking the dollar by weight. The

* Caractère.

† "chercher des tours pour sen deffendre." Cons. Souv. II., p. 765.

‡ Reprendre.

changes had been proposed to bring trouble and confusion in the interest of two or three private persons, who wished to make profit to the detriment of the other inhabitants. No loss would be experienced by waiting for the orders of the King. It required some other step beyond decrying the value of the piastre, to prevent the beaver being taken to the English, who would not fail to pay in other money when this silver was found to have no currency."

The Intendant replied also in writing. He had never forgotten the deference due to the Governor. He had punctually obeyed the orders of the King in submitting the affairs to him on which a conference should be held. He had, however, considered himself excused from doing so in this case, as he had explained. He admitted his subordination to the Governor, and, in a few words, justified the proceedings of the Council.*

The quarrel relative to the son of Duchesneau is scarcely worthy of mention, except that it involved the leading members of the Government in the dispute. The facts are told in different versions. So far as can be made out, young Duchesneau, about sixteen years of age, with a servant man named Vantier, met Boisseau and one of the Governor's guard. A quarrel arose, which led to violent recrimination. Boisseau reported the matter to de Frontenac, who complained of the proceeding to Duchesneau. The latter sent his son, with Vantier, to the Governor to give their version of the proceeding, and otherwise to make explanations. The boy arrived at the *Chateau*, and subsequently made his escape to his father's house, and Duchesneau, affecting to fear for the personal safety of his son, barricaded his house, and expressed the determination to defend him at all hazards. The Bishop intervened, and the boy was taken again before the Governor, who ordered him to be locked up in a room in the *Chateau* for a month. Duchesneau's party stated that de Frontenac struck

* The answer of the Intendant is brief, occupying about two-thirds of a page, while the Minute of the Governor fills nearly five pages of the Conseil Souverain records.

and behaved badly to the boy : the statement was as strongly denied. De Frontenac would have acted more wisely in treating the reports with contempt, or in contenting himself with calling on Duchesneau to punish his son's insolence, which occasioned the whole quarrel, which appears to have been admitted. But the affair happened in March, 1681, when the disputes in the Council were being carried on with unusual acrimony ; and the partisans on both sides took more or less part in what was in itself a small and contemptible matter.

During the days previous to the ships' sailing, both de Frontenac and Duchesneau wrote letters to France, giving their views of the misunderstanding. De Frontenac considered that the amnesty would have the effect of re-establishing order. He had despatched officers to urge upon the Indians next year to come to Montreal, and to offer to escort them and protect them, going and returning. He complained that he had been ill-seconded by the Council, who had liberated the men he had ordered to be arrested. He related the difficulties west of Lake Michigan when the Iroquois had attacked the Illinois, and the aged Father de la Ribourde, a Recollet, had been murdered. He had called upon the Iroquois to meet him next year at Fort Frontenac. There were indications that they were insolent and inclined to war. "I most humbly supplicate you to consider," he proceeds to say, "that for ten years I have maintained all these savages in an obedient, quiet and peaceful temper, only by a little address and management." He asked for five or six hundred soldiers : with this force he would march through the Lakes, and without any other hostile act, insure ten years' peace. He strongly protested against the calumnies which had been written to France concerning him ; and he asked that his wife and friends might be allowed to bring forward proofs of their falsity ; for such was the character of the accusations sent from Canada against him.†

* 2nd November, 1682.

† The contradictory orders sent from France must have been most embarrassing. It is plain that neither the Governor nor the Intendant had any standard

Duchesneau's letter was accompanied by special memoirs on the *coureurs de bois*,* and the Western Indians.

He spoke hopefully of bringing the Indians into the habits of Frenchmen. These hopes have never been even imperfectly realized, since only after the lapse of years has the semblance of civilization been attained. He dwelt on the difficulties affecting the church. There were but seven churches built with stone walls, constructed to a great extent by the royal bounty, aided by contributions from the seigneurs. The churches were in the neighbourhood of Montreal, on the property of the Sulpicians, on that of Bishop de Laval, and of two other proprietors. The Bishop would not consecrate churches built of wood. The clergy are described as poorly paid, the tythe being insufficient to maintain them, and overburdened with work, owing to the great extent of the parishes. Then follows his justification of himself with regard to the *coureurs de bois*, and his attack on de Frontenac. He deliberately charges the Governor with sending the beaver to New England, and dividing the profits with Perrot, Boisseau, and Du Luth. In his memoir he recommends the purchase of Manhattan and Orange† from the Duke of York, with the country belonging to him, stating that the English possess the most fertile country in America: and then comes the significant paragraph: "Should the King adopt the resolution to arrange with the Duke of York for his possessions in this quarter, in which case Boston could not resist, the only thing to fear is, that this country might go to ruin, the French being naturally inconstant and fond of novelty."

by which either of them could judge the limit of his duties. At a later period, on the 10th of April, 1684, de Seignelay wrote de Meulles: "You are not justified in the pretension to enact ordinances to oblige the inhabitants to keep arms in their houses; and when the said Sieur de la Barre was pleased that you sign with him the ordinance he issued in this regard, he felt a deference for you that he was not obliged to have, since that ordinance is an attribute of his principal function, which regards the defence of the country, and the military command, and your duty in this matter ought to be, to have his ordinances executed, and to fine those who would fail therein." As translated, N.Y. Doc. IX., p. 222.

* 12th November, 1682.

† New York and Albany.

It can well be conceived how these contradictory views of Canada from the two leading officials of New France, each indulging in accusations of the other, and with utter disaccord between them, must have affected French official opinion. These voluminous papers were sustained by evidence, which, being by no means conclusive, was attacked, according to their feelings and sympathies, by the friends of the parties at home who obtained access to them. Every care was taken to analyse the testimony, and, where possible, to set it aside. These contradictions must have made the controversy impossible to fathom.

Whatever the hopes formed from the assumed prosperity of the colony, there was nothing to assure its ultimate success. No assistance of the least avail could be sent from France. The Indians were insolent and threatening, repelling all effort to control them, as their attack on the Illinois, the allies of the French, had shewn. The attempt to bring them under the influence of civilization had led but to feeble results. There were establishments at Lorette and Sillery near Quebec, at La Prairie de la Madeleine, above Montreal, and at the mountain back of Montreal; the Intendant felt that it was a matter of congratulation that the strength of these settlements had been increased by two hundred and seven; Acadia was ceasing to be French, passing under the control of New England. It had hitherto been of little account in New France, and was without any organized government. De La Vallière was not even commissioned by the King.*

To get rid of the difficulty, it was resolved at Versailles, to change the whole Government of Canada, and to remove the one man, whose subsequent firmness and determination proved that he eminently possessed the qualities to fit him for the emergency.

The Council met on the 9th of October, 1682. M. de Laval was present, with him the Intendant, the six Councilors and the Attorney-General. The Governor was absent. He had attended no meeting of Council since the 23rd of

* Documents Colonial History State of New York, Vol, IX., p. 168.

August of the previous year, fourteen months back. De Frontenac must have been well aware that the principal business of the meeting was to enregister the appointment of his successor. M. de la Barre was in Quebec, possibly a guest at the *Chateau*, and it could not but have been known that he had arrived to assume the Government. The despatches from France were opened. Among them, were signed letters patent with the great yellow seal, appointing M. de la Barre, Governor of Canada, Acadia and Newfoundland, for and in the place* of M. le Comte de Frontenac. The letters were registered; and the Council proceeded in a body to M. de la Barre, and accompanied him to the Council Chamber. The new Governor took his seat and addressed the Council. His orders were to establish peace, and to re-unite such of its members as had been affected by the dissensions of the chief personages. He replaced de Tilly as Councillor, who had not been present at a meeting since the 23rd of February. He did so without examination as to the past, and de Tilly was sent for and there reinstated. M. de la Barre then placed on the table the letters patent appointing M. de Meulles Intendant. From the presence of M. Duchesneau at the meeting, it may be inferred that such a change was totally unlooked for. There is here a significant marginal note in the proceedings: "M. Duchesneau retired."† The letters were registered, when M. de Meulles was admitted, the minutes being signed by de Villeraŷ.

Such was the termination of de Frontenac's first administration. Had he not subsequently returned to Canada, we should at this hour entertain an indifferent opinion of his political abilities. He would have passed in the panorama of history as one of the many personages who have held exalted positions 'to leave not a rack behind:' consulting only his own profit and emolument. Calumny has heaped upon his head many an epithet of wrong-doing, arrogance and corruption. It is possible that to some extent he may have followed in

* "pour et au lieu." Cons. Souv., p. 828.

† "Monsieur du Chesneau est sorty." Cons. Souv., p. 828.

the path of nearly every official in public life in French Canada, up to the last days of the surrender at Montreal, and have held that it was justifiable to engage in trade, and so supplement his narrow and insufficient income. De Frontenac's pay from the crown, as Lieutenant-General and Governor did not exceed 12,000 livres,* £480 sterling money, possibly equal to a modern income of £1,500 sterling. He is not to be judged by the standard of a century later, when his place was held by a British General, and a whisper of such conduct would have been a reproach in no way to be explained away. The great majority of officers at that date, and in the following years, made money by trade in furs, or in some form or other. Charlevoix tells us, that the Ursuline nuns† had re-established their convent by their labours. The Jesuits, there can be little doubt, had greatly added to their income by their dealings with the Indians. The fur trade was the one source of profit, its development prompted every attempt at discovery, and was the basis of every adventure. There were no mines. The fisheries found little or no market. Scarcely any article was exported. Thoughtful men saw, to use the language of L'Escarbot, that the best mines of the country were to be found in corn and wine, and forage for cattle; all of which could be turned into money, while men and women could not live on silver and gold. There never was any well considered plan for the settlement of the land. The emigrants sent out by the King were established in the neighbourhood of Quebec, and a large proportion

* "Le Comte de Frontenac malgré ses hautes fonctions de Gouverneur et Lieutenant-Général ne touchant que 12,000 livres." Notes pour servir à l'histoire de la Nouvelle France. Harrisse, p. 175.

† "Les Ursulines ont essuyé deux incendies . . . avec cela elles ont si peu de Fonds, & les Dots qu'on reçoit des Filles de ce Pays sont si modiques que dès la première fois que leur Maison fut brûlée on pensa à les renvoyer en France. Elles sont néanmoins venues à bout de se rétablir toutes les deux Fois, & l'on achève actuellement leur Eglise. Elles sont proprement & commodement logées : c'est fruit de la bonne odeur qu'elles répandent dans la Colonie, de leur économie, de leur sobriété & de leur travail : elles dorent, elles brodent, toutes sont utilement occupées & ce qui sort de leurs mains est ordinairement d'un bon gout." Charlevoix Letters to La Duchesse de les Diguieres, Letter III., p. 75.

of them found their way to the property of M. de Laval. Land was taken up without examination, and, if the result of sowing and planting was not immediately successful, abandoned with little hesitation. Charlevoix points out that the handful of French who first came to Canada destroyed within a century all the fur animals within their reach. It would be difficult, he says, writing in 1720, "to find a single family enriched by the trade. Nothing was more common than to see people dragging out in misery and disgrace an old age of suffering, having often been in a position to make for themselves an honourable place in society." It was even more mischievous for New France that the fur trade awoke the reverse of patriotic feeling, for the *coureur de bois* was as willing to seek his market in Albany as in Montreal or Quebec.

In this atmosphere de Frontenac passed his life from 1672 to 1682. There was no war with England. The King of France was all-powerful at the English Court, and while the last Stuart kings were on the throne there was little possibility of war for the possession of the North American Continent. If de Frontenac had only the Iroquois to contend against, he had but limited means of asserting his strength; nevertheless he held them with a grasp of iron. Although surrounded by difficulties, he was not prepared to purchase peace by giving over the civil government to M. de Laval and the ecclesiastics. He opposed that prelate in his policy with regard to the Indian trade. He firmly repressed the attempt of a few Sulpicians to take possession of the government of Montreal. The quarrel was settled: the Sulpicians recognized his statesmanship and worked harmoniously with him. Indeed, to this day the Sulpicians have been remarkable for the services they have rendered to the cause of order and good government. The settlement at Montreal was carried on in peace and without molestation, and old men who recollected former days could not fail to recognize the strong hand of de Frontenac's authority. Such memories even were of greater force in Quebec. What was best remem-

bered there, was the Governor's successful interference to regulate the traffic with the Indians on a broader basis than the Bishop endeavoured to establish by his ecclesiastical power. The firm assertion of the supremacy of civil rule in civil matters raised against de Frontenac powerful enemies who endeavoured to compass by intrigue what they could not effect by force. The records of the Council establish the systematic opposition the members shewed to his policy, to the extent of indirectly attacking the powers which he possessed. Until 1680, Colbert's influence exercised some restraint on what was taking place in Quebec. His retirement gave de Frontenac's enemies fresh power. We have no means of penetrating the hidden influences which were appealed to, in order to gain support for the calumnious despatches sent to France. They would read strangely to-day. But the future was to vindicate the statesmanship of de Frontenac. In less than six years he was to re-appear as the saviour of French Canada, as he is called, "the second founder of Quebec;" while his puny opponent, the Intendant, has passed out of mind, to be known to the student of history by his intrigues alone, and with little or no faith given to the statements by which he strove to sustain himself.

CHAPTER III.

The new Governor, Le Fèvre de la Barre, had passed the mature age of sixty. He had been Intendant of the Bourbonnais, west of the Rhone, and had taken part in de Tracy's expedition to the West Indies, and was appointed Governor of Cayenne. Subsequently he returned to France. On war being declared against England, in 1666, in support of the Dutch, he was despatched in command of an expedition, recovered Cayenne, and took Antigua and Montserrat. For this service he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. The pertinacity with which he paraded this rank was a point of ridicule with his contemporaries.* He is accredited with naval successes in the West Indies against the English. He had further attracted attention as the author of two works on the French possessions near the Equator.

De la Barre was instructed to cultivate commercial relations with the West India Islands, and to exercise strong control in Canada over the trade in furs, and not to issue licenses to traffic with the Sioux and the more western tribes. As Chief of the Council, he was to govern by reason, rather than by authority, and not to follow the example of de Frontenac in threatening arbitrarily to send recalcitrant members to France. In dealing with the emergencies of the hour, he was directed to assemble five or six hundred of the militia, and to appear with this force on Lakes Ontario and Erie. Such had been de Frontenac's recommendation; but in the hands of de la Barre the execution of the programme was by no means the

* " Sur ces entre faites M. le Comte est rappelé et a pour successeur M. le Fèvre de la Barre premier Intendant d'Auvergne, Capitaine de vaisseau qui avoit donné un beau combat aux Isles, et se fait appeler M. le Général. M. le Général commence par envoyer trois de ses gardes avec leurs casaques aux Iroquois leur dire de le venir voir au printemps à Montreal pour faire conseil." M. l'Abbe Belmont.

same. Under pressing necessity he was to attack the Iroquois, if certain of finishing the war promptly and advantageously. He was told that he must depend on his own resources, it being neither convenient, nor the intention of the King, to send regular troops to Canada.*

The Intendant, de Meulles, was directed to live on friendly terms with the Governor-General. Should the policy followed by the latter appear inexpedient to the Intendant, he was to place on record his expostulation, and not further interfere; allowing the Governor to act as he saw fit, without contradiction. It was the duty of the Intendant to represent to the King's Council any proceeding which he held to be prejudicial to the state, and he did not hesitate to avail himself of this clause in his instructions.

One of the last acts of de Frontenac had been to hold a conference to consider how war between the Illinois and Iroquois could be averted, so that the Ottawas and other tribes under French protection should not be involved in hostilities. The Superior of the Jesuits Bechefer, with Fathers Dablon and Fremin, had been of opinion that the Iroquois should be summoned to a Council at Fort Frontenac on the 15th of June, as at that date the hunting expeditions for the beaver and moose would be ended; that the Governor, in order not to wound Indian susceptibility, should not be accompanied by more than twelve or fifteen canoes of four men each, and the presents should be considerable, both to chiefs and warriors.

With Duchesneau one difficulty had been the expense which such an expedition would involve. His orders were, not to increase the ordinary outlay unless war was declared; he asked, therefore, that the smallest possible expenditure should be incurred. Some outlay was indispensable, and although the Colony was not involved in hostilities with the English, war had been commenced against their Indian allies. He would have preferred Montreal as a place of meeting. As it did not appear that its selection was attainable, he would recommend Fort Frontenac. He trusted that the Governor would not

* Versailles, 10th May, 1682.

agree to a locality in the neighbourhood of the homes of the Iroquois.

The opinion of de Frontenac had been that the meeting should decidedly not take place at La Famine,* the spot designated in the letters sent him: it would be a departure from the personal dignity attached to his office to accept this change. Acquiescence in their request in this respect would be misunderstood by the Indians, and be attributed by them to want of strength to resist their demands. Moreover, in proceeding to this place he would require a strong escort, causing an expenditure which in France it might be difficult to justify. The same argument, to a less degree, applied to Fort Frontenac, where an escort of some strength would be necessary, which might awaken Indian suspicion. He considered, therefore, the meeting should be held in Montreal, between the 15th and 20th of June, provisions being given to the Indians during their descent of the river, and that the Iroquois should be invited to send two or three deputies from each of the five nations. A meeting in June would, however, really be useless, as a second conference would be necessary in autumn, after the arrival of the ships, when the policy approved by the King would be notified.

The fact that no aid could be looked for from France was strongly felt. The Iroquois persevered in their view that the meeting should take place at Chouaguen† or at La Famine. It was known that these tribes were taking steps to proceed to attack the Illinois. Both de Frontenac and Duchesneau saw that the crisis must be met and that it was expedient to place Fort Frontenac in a condition of defence; and to equip the brigantine which lay there, to be fit for service. But the negotiations failed and no meeting took place.

The Iroquois were inflated with their successes over the unwarlike tribes of the Illinois. In 1680, they had returned with several hundred prisoners who had been incorporated

* Salmon River, Oswego county, New York, on the south shore of Lake Ontario.

† Oswego.

into their tribe in accordance with Indian policy. By these means their numbers were maintained ; while their arrogance had been increased by the destruction of the Illinois villages, and the exercise of unresisted, remorseless cruelty.

De Frontenac had made an ostentatious display of what force he could command, both at Quebec and Montreal. He caused provisions to be collected, and endeavoured to shew that he was thoroughly on his guard against attack.

In 1682, the Iroquois were irritated by grievances which many of them felt. Black Kettle,* one of their Chiefs, complained of the injustice which he had received from Perrot. Other Chiefs had suffered from what they held to be wrong treatment ; and one of them had been killed in a quarrel at Michillimackinac. The feeling of the tribe had been incensed by the new settlement of the French on the Illinois, which they regarded as an interference with their interests, against which they were entitled to make reprisals. They commenced pillaging private traders. Three parties were robbed at Chouaguen. A barque moored at the discharge of the Niagara River was seized, the pilot bound, and sixteen thousand livres' worth of merchandise abstracted.† De La Salle still remained at this date the owner of Fort Frontenac, which was under the command of Major La Forrest, but the place contained only a few men. The Iroquois plundered of its merchandise a barque moored there ; and also robbed a canoe proceeding to the Senecas. Complaint was made by La Forrest at the Seneca village ; but he could obtain no satisfaction ; the Indians were even unwilling to trade with him for what goods he brought.

The threatening aspect of affairs was apparent to de Frontenac. He was without men or money, while he was convinced that some decisive efforts were necessary. He had asked for men from France: and had they been sent, in a few months he would have established sufficient respect for his authority to have overawed the most warlike of the Iroquois.

* La Chaudière Noire.

† M. l'Abbé de Belmont.

The establishment of de La Salle's Fort on the Illinois, of all their grievances, was the most obnoxious to the Senecas. While they looked upon it as a threat in the future, it had rendered futile their expedition of 1680; and in 1683 another French fort was being built in the centre of this territory which they had determined to appropriate. Around it were clustering their declared enemies, who would in time gain strength to retort on them the cruelties which they had inflicted.

When de la Barre arrived in Canada, de La Salle had returned from his expedition to the mouth of the Mississippi, and was then engaged in the establishment of the Fort on the Illinois. De Frontenac would have seen its political necessity, in the hold which it would have given of the country. It is questionable, if he had remained in Canada, whether it would have been attacked in March, 1684. There was a prestige about his name which clung to it to the last. De la Barre fell under the control of a class of men who were the rivals of de La Salle in trade, and they could see in the creation of French power on the Illinois only a blow to their own interest, and the advancement personally of de La Salle.

A circumstance had tended to throw de la Barre, on his arrival in Canada, within this influence. He found the lower town of Quebec in ruins from a fire which had taken place on the previous 4th of August. The one building left standing was that of Aubert de la Chesnaye, the richest merchant in Quebec. On that occasion de la Chesnaye opened both his house and his purse to those who had suffered from the fire. His beneficence was the theme of general praise, and is still mentioned with respect. He thus attracted the attention of M. de la Barre, of whom he may be said to have been the evil genius. According to de Meulles, he was the principal adviser from whom de la Barre took counsel.

De la Chesnaye's entry into the Governor's favour re-acted on de la Chesnaye's friends. From this clique the Governor received his impression of de La Salle's labours, and from this source arose the strong condemnation, which in his letters to France he expressed of de La Salle's career.

De La Salle, seeing the unfriendly course taken towards him, resolved to proceed to Paris to submit to the King the true character of his late expedition, and to ask the aid and support of the Minister for his future operations. He first placed his Fort on the Illinois in security, and reaching Quebec in the autumn of 1683, he sailed for France. His subsequent history is fully related in another place.

When M. de la Barre assumed the Governorship, his first duty was to consider in what form he would meet the trying circumstances in which the country was placed. Accordingly, the day after he was sworn in, a meeting was held in Quebec of the leading personages in the colony, at which the Governor submitted the account of an interview between an Iroquois deputation and de Frontenac, on the previous 12th of September. The Iroquois were endeavouring, according to their policy of promises, and a show of submission, to cajole the French, while their Indian allies were being destroyed in detail. By these means the Senecas hoped to control the fur trade, so as to carry it on with the English and Dutch satisfactorily and profitably. The consequence would have been that Canada would have been compelled to abandon the western depots of trade at Michillimackinac, Sault St. Mary, and on the Illinois; her territory would thus have been limited to the boundary of the Lakes, and her trade in furs, at that date the sole source of wealth, destroyed.

Those present at the Council expressed the opinion, that the English and Dutch of New York were endeavouring to induce the Iroquois to declare war against the French, having encouraged hostile feelings by presents, and by the greater cheapness of the provisions and merchandise furnished by them, especially of guns, powder and lead. But the Iroquois had deemed it better policy first to destroy the Indian allies of the French, and afterwards the Christian Iroquois at the Sault, leaving future events to determine the proceedings they would take with regard to the French themselves.

The facts really were that the Senecas were as jealous of English as of French power. At an early date they saw the

advantage of holding the balance between their rival pretensions. Individual traders may have found it to be their interest to excite the prejudices of the savage, but the unfriendly feelings of the Iroquois towards the French, to the extent of declaring war, cannot be attributed to English intrigue; indeed, there never was a period when this influence was so little exercised, as the events of the two following years establish.

The condition of Canada exacted a firm and vigorous policy. One thousand men accustomed to life in the woods could be put under arms but by placing them in the field, all cultivation of the land would be suspended; and it became necessary to gather supplies to support the expedition. If war were commenced, it was felt that it must be prosecuted until the Senecas were utterly subdued. An appeal to the King was suggested, to send two or three hundred soldiers to garrison Fort Frontenac and La Galette,* that a hundred and fifty men should be obtained and distributed throughout the settlements to prevent famine; and that barques and canoes should be built. Men reasoned that the failure of aid from France of late years had led the Iroquois to undervalue the strength of the Colony, and if they were made to know that the Mother Country was again sending troops, they would allow the Indian allies of France to remain in peace, and war would be averted.

M. de la Barre wrote to France by the last ships. He described the threatening aspect of affairs; he believed, however, that with a little assistance he could defeat the Iroquois. Later he appealed to the King for men, money, arms and ammunition. He reported that he had notified the Iroquois of his arrival, and had called upon their chiefs to meet him in spring.†

Above all, it was necessary that there should be accord and unity in the Colony. Such was not the case. The men who had the ear of the Governor, saw the opportunity of

* Prescott.

† 4th October: 12th November, 1684.

inflicting serious injury on de La Salle. Some of their own set had obtained permits to trade in the west, and during 1683 the Iroquois were notified that such traders as did not hold permits could be plundered by them. A form of the document was placed in the hands of the Indians, and they were told that the canoes which could not produce such a paper were without protection from the Governor. Some canoes belonging to de La Salle were captured. De la Barre was also induced to seize Fort Frontenac, with the property it contained, on the ground that it was insufficiently garrisoned. He sent up de La Chesnaye and Le Ber to take it out of the hands of de La Salle's Lieutenant, La Forrest; and to complete his attacks on de La Salle, he shortly afterwards despatched an officer of his guard, de Baugis, to represent him at the fort on the Illinois, and to assume command.

The Montreal and Quebec dealers engaged in the fur trade had placed a stock of goods in the hands of the men who were carrying it on, and a large and valuable amount of property had been stored at Michillimackinac, the principal depot of the west. The prospect of immediate war threatened the owners with ruin, and it was evident that, whatever course had to be taken, it was first necessary to ensure the safety of this property. Charles le Moyne, of Montreal, was sent to Onondaga to endeavour to mollify that tribe, and so far to gain delay that some chance of peace might be obtained. Delay was equally the policy of the Iroquois; accordingly a conference was held in the parish church at Montreal, as yet unconsecrated. The meeting included some of the Seneca chiefs with the other Iroquois tribes. Many Christian Indians of the Hurons, Ottawas and Algonquins were present. The first point was to propitiate the Iroquois as to the death of Hannon-sacha, killed in a brawl by an Illinois at Michillimackinac. The "tears were to be wiped away" with blanket coats, shirts and guns. The tomahawk was then figuratively thrown into the river. The power of pillaging French traders not possessing permits was taken away. The Iroquois asked that de La Salle should be punished for having placed arms in the hands of the

Illinois. The Governor proceeded to acknowledge as his children the tribes of the Hurons, Ottawas and Algonquins. When mention was made of the Illinois, Teganisorens, the orator, chief and interpreter of the Iroquois, haughtily replied : "He merits death ; he has killed me." No one dared reply.* We learn from de Belmont in the next sentence of his record, that de la Barre sent out 16,000 livres worth of merchandise for the purposes of trade.

In November three companies of marine infantry arrived, each company consisting of two officers and forty-three rank and file. They were for the time billeted in the neighbouring parishes, and in the following spring they were sent on to Montreal ; a detachment of the force was despatched to Fort Frontenac. De la Barre ostentatiously made preparations as if for war. He built a second barque at Kingston, the Intendant placing on record that the first was being used for purposes of trade. Perrot, Governor of Montreal, was named Maréchal de Camp ; he could not, however, agree with the principal officers. Considerable difficulty arose, and Perrot was suspended from his position. Subsequently he was engaged in a quarrel with Saint Helène, and a discreditable brawl between them took place in the streets. Perrot was shortly after removed from his governorship to be appointed to Acadia.

In March, 1684, an attack was made by the Iroquois on the Fort on the Illinois. It lasted for six days, and, finding that they could make no impression on it, they withdrew, after losing many men. Shortly afterwards they met some canoes, with a crew of fourteen Frenchmen in charge of them,† containing valuable cargoes, which the Iroquois plundered. Writers‡ of that date affirm that they contained the furs purchased with the 16,000 livres of merchandise of M. de la Barre and his associates, and that the loss led to a deter-

* " Pour la question de l'Illinois il dit fièvrement : il mérite la mort ; il ma tué ; on n'osa point répondre." De Belmont.

† Charlevoix gives the date as the last day of February, 1684. Vol. I., p. 485.

‡ M. de Belmont.

mined claim made for restitution. It was shortly after these events that Teganisorens, who had represented the Iroquois at the Montreal conference, appeared as an emissary at Quebec. He was immediately arrested, by the Governor's order. The latter subsequently explained * that he had taken the step to assure the safety of the missionaries. Had such been the case it was a breach of good faith, even if de la Barre's declaration be true that he treated his prisoner with consideration. It is impossible to resist the conviction that the furs seized by the Iroquois had more weight in the scale of his opinions than care for the Jesuit missionaries who were with the tribe.

It was when irritated by the losses suffered by French commerce, that de la Barre assumed an attitude of hostility in defence of Canadian interests. Even with the facts as we possess them, it is difficult to determine whether he was desirous of striking a decisive blow, or simply to make a show of doing so, in the hope that his preparations would terrify the Senecas into acceptance of his conditions. There is ground for belief that in the first instance the expedition was conceived in earnestness of purpose. The troops at his command were well disciplined, the officers full of spirit. The Canadian Militia, now they were in the field, understood that the critical condition of the colony made the expedition a necessity, and there was nothing to be desired in their sentiment or bearing. The Intendant de Meulles, felt that the hour of negotiation was passed. He had, nevertheless, little confidence in de la Barre, and the doubts entertained by him are fully expressed in his letters. As he saw the delay and mismanagement which marked the Governor's proceedings, he felt that the 'General' did not possess the high qualities by which victories are won. The expedition was characterized by dilatoriness and absence of purpose. The necessity of the peace afterwards made by de la Barre was explained by him to have arisen from the want of provisions, and the sickness which affected the troops. Both might have been

* 5th June, 1684.

avoided by prudence and generalship; and that these were not exercised was the fault of de la Barre.

The Governor may have been perplexed by the contradictory orders received from France, for the rule observed in such despatches was to provide for the chance of failure. The instructions were so worded, that if success arose it could be appropriated by the King and his minister: if failure resulted, it would be placed to the account of the unfortunate leader of the expedition.

As a rule, the letters from France, whatever the capacity of the Governor, must have caused doubt and anxiety, and have paralysed effort by the distrust which they created. Early in de la Barre's government, the King wrote concerning Hudson's Bay. At a time when the country was threatened with an Iroquois war, and the extent of the reinforcements sent from France were limited to three companies of marine infantry, the King called upon the Governor to prevent, as far as possible, the English establishing themselves in Hudson's Bay, of which the French had taken possession several years back. While giving these instructions, he informed de la Barre that Dongan, the Governor of New York, had received precise orders to maintain a good correspondence with the French Governor.*

With this information, de la Barre, desiring to see the engagement enforced,† suggested that Barillon, the French Minister in England, should obtain an order from Charles II. prohibiting Dongan from assisting the Iroquois with arms and ammunition. He reported that he had determined to attack them, giving as his reasons their attempt against the Fort on the Illinois, and the seizure of the canoes with the crew of fourteen men. The King replied‡ immediately, admitting the explanation of the Governor, and, in view of hostilities being brought to a rapid termination, he informed him that a reinforcement of three hundred men had been

* 5th August, 1683.

† 5th June, 1684.

‡ 31st July, 1684.

sent by the ship "L'Emerillon," giving him instructions utterly to destroy the Iroquois. These troops reached Quebec the following year.

While the King thus spoke of active operations, he pointed out the miseries arising from war, and told de la Barre that he ought to prefer peace, which would restore quiet and increase the prosperity of the colony. Should war take place, continues the King, "As it tends to the good of my service to diminish the number of savages, who are strong and robust, and will serve usefully in the galleys, it is my pleasure that you make as many of them as possible prisoners, and send them to France."

In 1683, Colonel Thomas Dongan, who had been appointed Governor of New York, arrived to assume his command. The colony had been eight years in the possession of the English after having been held by the Dutch in 1674-5. Dongan was the nephew of the notorious Dick Talbot of that time, afterwards Earl of Tyrconnel. He was a Roman Catholic, as might have been expected of any one who possessed the favour of the Duke of York, especially after his public profession of that faith on the death of the first Duchess in 1671. On Dongan taking office, he had been instructed to give the Governor of Canada no cause of offence. His career, however, was marked by the sincere desire of performing his duty. Not only did he not strain these instructions in favour of the French, but he battled unshrinkingly for English interests, with zeal, and generally with statesmanship. As he had served in France, much was looked for from him in Quebec from this fact, and from his being a Roman Catholic. The Duke of York's sympathy with French interests was known, and owing to the communication received by de la Barre from the French King, he trusted that no difficulties would be created by the English Governor.

One of the earliest steps taken by Dongan was to announce that the Duke of York had granted the establishment of two houses of representatives; an Assembly to consist of eighteen

members, with a Council of ten : both elective. The laws passed by the legislature of New York were to be approved by the proprietor ; and Dongan, on his part, endeavoured in every way to gain the confidence of those living under his government.

The New York trader, like those engaged in that occupation in Canada, now began to experience a decrease in the beaver furnished by the Iroquois. He was made to understand that the area whence the furs had been previously obtained was becoming exhausted, and that it was necessary to proceed to fresh hunting grounds to obtain them. Even at this date, many of the traders from Albany and Schenectady had joined in expeditions to the West, and encouraged the Iroquois to get possession of and control the trade, so that it could be turned to New York. It was the hope of obtaining fresh hunting grounds which had led the Iroquois to attack the Illinois, and they likewise desired to divert from Montreal the peltry which the Ottawas were obtaining, in order that it might pass through their hands to Albany. It was not only in the West that the Iroquois had shewn their activity. They had penetrated to the borders of settlement in Maryland and Virginia, causing much mischief, so much so that a Council was held in Albany in 1683, to prevent the recurrence of these raids, and a treaty of peace had been obtained.

Counting upon Dongan as an ally, and New York as a power easily to be managed, and with the turn for bravado which was a part of de la Barre's character, he had written to Dongan on his arrival. In April, 1683, he had had some correspondence with Captain Brockholls, then administering the Government. De la Barre had expressed the hope that a good understanding and friendship would prevail so as to maintain peace and tranquility. He had been told in reply, that it had always been the care of the English government to preserve peace, to prevent and hinder the spilling of Christian blood and to hold and maintain a civil correspondence with their neighbours.

De la Barre informed Dongan that the Senecas and Cayugas had committed depredations at Fort Frontenac, and seized French canoes and he would therefore be compelled to chastise them. He asked that the New York Colonists should not be allowed to furnish arms and ammunition to these tribes. It was an opportunity which Dongan could not let pass. He at once advanced the claim of England to the country south of the lakes occupied by these tribes. Dealing with the Iroquois as subjects of his sovereignty, he undertook that they should make restitution for any wrong which they had committed, and he called upon de la Barre not to violate English territory ; at the same time he laid the complaints made by de la Barre, before the Indian Council.

The occasion was one when delicate diplomacy had to be exercised ; nevertheless, Dongan made the mistake of abruptly alarming the jealousy of the Iroquois. They were desirous of avoiding French dictation, but they had no idea of placing themselves under English mastership, however willing they might be to accept Dongan's support. They still remembered de Tracy's chastisement ; and war was never so much dreaded as when carried to their homes. The protection which they sought for was as a free people to be in alliance with England. Dongan's true policy was to have alienated them from French influence without awakening their jealousy ; but the attempt was so made as to create Indian distrust. The main point he insisted upon was that the Senecas should make no treaty with the French without his consent ; and, as a material mark of English power, he desired that the arms of the Duke of York should be displayed prominently in their villages.

To effect this purpose, he sent Arnold Viele, an Indian interpreter of Dutch descent, to take steps to affirm the sovereignty which he had claimed. Viele proceeded along the Mohawk, affixing the arms in the villages through which he passed. Finally, he came to that of the Onondagas. He found there two representatives of de la Barre, Charles le Moyne, of Montreal, and the Jesuit Father de Lamberville.

Among those present there was a Chief of some prominence known as *la Grande Gueule*, Big Jaw, entirely in the French interest, so far as an Iroquois Chief could be. Without difficulty he was incited by the two representatives of de la Barre to reply to Dongan's pretensions, and he did so with some force. He refused to recognise the coat of arms as capable of protecting the tribe against the French. On the other hand, the Iroquois did not desire to embroil themselves with Dongan, and they proposed to send a messenger to him to learn his wishes. The proposition was opposed by le Moyne. Finally, the Onondagas agreed to act as mediators between the French and Senecas: thus meeting the wishes of the French Governor, who, by accepting this mediation, shewed that he entertained the desire for peace.

During July and August, 1684, de Lamberville wrote constantly to the Governor. He describes the Onondagas as peaceable, but the Senecas as proud and insolent on account of their strength. "If the war occurs," says the Jesuit, "all those who have houses apart from fortified places must abandon their dwellings, for they may be burnt, and many of the inhabitants brought away as prisoners to be tortured." He saw plainly that if war was to be carried on it should be vigorously conducted after effective preparation. He recommended a fort to be established either at La Galette* or La Famine,† under the pretext of erecting a blacksmith's shop. He was opposed to war being commenced at that season, for it would be carried into Canada, and the Senecas would not be found in their villages. They felt their security to lie in the large forests in their rear, towards Maryland and Virginia, where they believed that none would dare to follow them. They affected to hear of war with joy; for then they would see how French flesh tasted, and if it would prove salt from the salt they swallowed. De Lamberville was using his influence with the Onondagas, so that they should endeavour to obtain from the Senecas satisfaction for the injuries which

* Prescott.

† The mouth of Salmon River, Lake Ontario.

they had committed, as had been suggested by the Christian Indians of the Sault. There was a Council held at Onondaga on the 16th and 17th of July, the result of which de Lamber-ville, the following day, communicated to de la Barre. At the commencement all was difficulty : finally, the Onondagas persuaded the Senecas to entrust to them the representation of their dissatisfaction, with the understanding that if they failed to effect a peace they would join their fortunes with the Senecas in war. Big Jaw, the Jesuit tells us, signalized himself in the negotiation. It was after these proceedings that Dongan's emissary arrived on his bootless errand.

There are few characters in Canadian history on whom censure is so unsparingly heaped as on M. de la Barre. Even the kindly de Belmont tells us drily that he caused himself to be called, " M. le Général." De Callières, appointed Governor of Montreal, on his arrival wrote to thank de Seignelay for the appointment.* He had arrived after de la Barre's expedition, and told the Minister, that the most intelligent people in the Colony felt any peace to be most unsatisfactory until the Illinois were left undisturbed.

De Meulles, the Intendant, has written concerning de la Barre in the plainest language. There was no quarrel between them ; their relations were personally on a pleasant footing ; there is not a single entry in the proceedings of the Conseil Souverain to betoken misunderstanding. There are two letters of the Intendant before and after the advance : we have, therefore, the history of the campaign, and there is no ground to think that either is marked by untruth. No evidence is extant to contradict the Intendant's statements ; and certainly no failure short of defeat could have been greater than that of the expedition of 1684. The Intendant tells us that at the date of his writing† all parties had entered willingly into the war. At first, there had been dissatisfaction. The war, it was said, was being undertaken to preserve the beaver of five or six merchants of Quebec who monopolised

* 9th November, 1684.

† 18th July, 1684.

the trade. Complaints had been freely expressed that four or five hundred persons had been dispatched to the woods, besides the two barques sent to Hudson's Bay, each with a crew of from thirty-five to forty who were all young men. In consequence, fathers of families had been called out for active service. "Though all this reasoning is true," added the Intendant, "it is still of the greatest consequence not to allow the people the liberty of expressing their opinion."

He then represents that the Governor was interested in the trade combination, in which from ten to twelve thousand crowns had been divided: that the Governor had used the barque at Fort Frontenac for the purpose of his own operations, and had at great expense constructed a second vessel. That he was the partner of de La Chesnaye, and took part in sending the peltry to New York. Indeed, that the correspondence which had been carried on with Dongan had principally this end in view. At the date he was writing there were two strangers from New York present at Quebec. They had not been near de Meulles. The hostile attitude of de la Barre had been taken at the suggestion of the merchants who found their cargoes liable to be pillaged. If the attack were successful, trade hereafter would be uninterrupted; if peace were made, the furs being brought in by the canoes would arrive in safety.

The Intendant prophesied that there would be no war. The Governor would go to Cataraqui, send for the Senecas, and conclude peace, making fools of everybody, including the King, if he were allowed to say so with due respect. He had left Quebec with two hundred men on the 10th of July, "*tête-à-tête* with the man named La Chesnaye, which appeared very extraordinary to the Bishop, the Jesuits, and every honest man in the country." The Governor had undertaken the war without consulting any person, and he would conclude peace in the same way.

If it was not established that this letter of the Intendant is genuine, it would have the appearance of having been concocted after the event, so thoroughly correct did its anticipa-

tions prove. There is scarcely an event in Canadian history more discreditable than this expedition, and through the imbecility of this one man, "the general." What was needed was despatch, vigour and hardihood. The blow should have been struck thoroughly and decisively. It was a crisis in the history of the Colony ; the commencement of a struggle to extend over three-quarters of a century.

De la Barre knew well the pretensions of Dongan that the southern shore of Lake Ontario was regarded as English soil, and at that date New York was ill prepared to assert the claim by force of arms. On the other hand, it could have been no secret to him that the French King possessed remarkable power in the English Court, and that the decisions of Versailles never wanted abettors in London. The Saint Lawrence was far from European influence. No great effort would have been required to satisfy the Duke of York with regard to the policy of the French King in Canada. As de la Barre had shown his hostile feeling to the Senecas, as the representative of French power, there was only one policy for him to follow. The Senecas were the one tribe of the Iroquois who had acted as if they had strength to defy his authority, and had an attack been made on their territory with spirit and good generalship, there is no reason to think that it would have failed. Had it been followed by a wise and firm assertion of strength, the destiny of the northern continent might have been changed. The southern shore of Lake Ontario might possibly have been French. The policy of de la Gallissonière, sixty years later, when he attempted to take possession of the Valley of the Ohio, would have been anticipated east of Niagara, and the probability is that it would have been successful. When the effort was made it was too late. The Mother Country had embarked in the struggle with all the strength she could put forth, while the British Colonies had so increased in population and wealth as to prove formidable antagonists.

De la Barre's force consisted of seven hundred French and Canadians, of whom one hundred and forty were regular

troops.* The remainder had been taken from the settlements, expert in handling the canoe, inured to life in the woods, knowing the character of Indian fighting, and, when well led, were an effective body of men. Orders had also been sent to Du Luth and de la Durantaye to gather from the west the *coureurs de bois*, with what Indians they could muster, and to conduct them to Niagara, to await de la Barre's instructions.

The war at first had been unpopular, but when the field was taken it was regarded as necessary. Its object was well understood, to inflict such a blow on the Senecas that their power would be for ever broken. Every French-Canadian who was at the front was present at great personal sacrifice. He had left his family on his farm, the cultivation of the soil that year had been greatly neglected, and he had undertaken the fatigues of the campaign, sustained by the one hope, that from the blow to be struck, years of prosperity would follow. He received no pay for his service.

It was subsequently stated by the Governor that sufficient provisions had not been sent forward, an accusation against the capacity and zeal of the Intendant, met by denial on his part. De Meulles contended that the supply was ample, and the quantity sent on in accordance with the orders of the Governor.

Dates show the gross blundering of de la Barre. He left Quebec on the 9th of July, and peace was made on the 5th of September. He dawdled away ten or twelve days at Montreal, fourteen or fifteen at Fort Frontenac. At La Famine, from the sickness of his troops, and his inability to advance owing to an insufficiency of provisions for the campaign, such supplies as he had brought were consumed during this period of inactivity, and accordingly de la Barre felt every day lost was adding to the danger of his position. The policy which he ought to have followed had been traced by his predecessor. De Frontenac had strongly dwelt on the inexpediency of holding any meeting with the Senecas on the southern shores of Lake Ontario, as a departure from personal

* 14th August, 1684. New York Documents IX., p. 234.

and national dignity, which the savage would attribute to want of power. De la Barre's duty was carefully to mature his preparations, and to collect his whole force at Fort Frontenac; to summon deputies of the Senecas and the other Iroquois to attend within a certain date, and if they failed to appear, to accept the fact itself as a *casus belli*, and then unhesitatingly carry into their own villages the desolation which they were threatening to inflict on the western friendly tribes. The policy had its difficulties and dangers, but it was the only one which would have led to a satisfactory peace.

De la Barre has himself given an account of his operations. He was in Montreal on the 10th of June, when he sent seven Christian Indians to the Mohawks, Oneidas and Onondagas. He notified Du Luth and the *coureurs de bois* to meet him at Niagara. Bourdon he despatched to Orange with a message to Dongan, asking him to unite his forces with the French expedition, to revenge the death of the twenty-six English killed in Maryland. On the 20th of June he sent carpenters to Fort Frontenac to repair the Fort as could be best done. He himself left Montreal on St. John's day, the 24th, to arrive at Quebec the 26th. On the 9th of July he left for the front. The slowness with which he moved can be understood, when we learn from himself that on the first of August he was in Lake Saint Francis, at the foot of the Longue Sault. On the 9th he arrived at Fort Frontenac. On the 10th he sent the younger Father de Lamberville to the Onondagas, with the message that he would prefer their mediation to war. After holding a review of his force, he represents that it consisted of thirty-three officers and seven hundred and eighty-two rank and file, with some non-combatants. He remained fifteen days encamped at Fort Frontenac. He makes no mention of any marked sickness from fever, although he states that some of his men were left behind. On the 21st he sent off a great part of his force to La Famine. On the 27th he arrived there, and tells us that he then found one hundred and fifty attacked by fever.

De la Barre now felt that further advance was impossible. Consequently, he sent one of the Christian savages to le Moyne, who was with the Onondagas, to urge upon that tribe to come immediately with the proposals of peace which they had undertaken to submit. The deputation arrived on the 3rd of September. It consisted of nine Onondagas, three Oneidas, and two Cayugas. The conference was of short duration. On the 5th, the terms proposed by the Onondagas were accepted, and peace was made on terms disgraceful to France.*

De la Barre abandoned his Western Indian allies. He undertook not to attack the Senecas, and they agreed to make restitution for the injuries committed on the traders. The Iroquois with haughtiness asserted their right to destroy their enemy, the Illinois. "I am at war with the Illinois," were the words of the Iroquois, "we shall die fighting." "Take heed," was the ignominious answer, "not to strike the French when you meet them in your path, and in the neighbourhood of Saint Louis." The Senecas asked for their missionaries to be restored to them. It was promised that they would be sent back when satisfaction had been given for the wrongs committed. The Senecas requested that the Christian Indians should be prevented from coming to their villages, as they "dismembered" the country. The evasive answer was given that drunkenness and superstition dismembered the country, and that there was liberty to all to come and reside in Canada.†

The most important concession in a political point of view was that conferences hereafter should be held at La Famine, and not at Fort Frontenac. This was the abandonment of every advantage possessed by the French; and the request had been made with the astuteness which marked the negotia-

* Charlevoix Vol. I., p. 490, summarily rejects the assertion that Dongan offered to assist the Senecas. "Il n'y a pourtant aucun lieu de douter que si le Colonel Dongan s'en fut tenu à ces offres elles n'eussent été acceptées; et que M. de la Barre ne se fut trouvé dans un très grand embarras."

† New York Documents IX., p. 239.

tions of the Iroquois. The scene of future discussion was removed to the enemies' country, transferring to the side of the Indian the prestige of supremacy, in so far as the movements of the Governor of Canada had been made subordinate to their wishes: a departure from the standard of strength which de Frontenac always firmly asserted, and which it was the policy of Canada to maintain. Moreover, at Cataraqui there was a fort, and the Indians encamped in the neighbourhood were at a disadvantage, compared to the French protected by its walls. The demand was dictated by no necessity on the part of the Iroquois, and was advanced to test the sense of strength which sustained the French; and to admit it was an acknowledgement of weakness, which added to their insolent bearing.

Du Luth and de la Durantaye had gathered one hundred and fifty *courcurs de bois*, and five hundred and fifty Indians. They had to be notified that Peace was declared; a peace which did not include the Western Indian tribes, against whom the Iroquois would take their own time to exact vengeance, for the hostile feeling shewn by their presence. Depressed, and with a sense of the danger of their position, the Western Indians returned whence they came.

On the 6th of September, the morning after the so-called Peace, de la Barre left La Famine. He describes having caused his sick to be embarked in the morning. He tells us, they filled one hundred and fifty canoes and twelve bateaux. He himself arrived at Fort Frontenac in the evening, having left behind one hundred and ten sick, who were afterwards despatched to Montreal. He rapidly descended the river, to find at Lachine a large stock of flour, which, he adds, would have admitted of a longer stay in the western country had it been sent to him.

In the gloom which he must have felt was gathering round him, the Governor had the satisfaction of receiving the praises of de Lamberville. The Jesuit told him in his letters,* that by his peace he had entitled himself to the name of the

* 9th October, 1684. N. Y. Doc. IX., p. 263.

saviour of his country. At the same time, he wrote dolefully to the effect that the Senecas were unconquerable, and that they would have destroyed the force brought against them.

Throughout the colony the Peace was held to be disgraceful. "The peace, Monseigneur," wrote de Meulles, "has astonished all the officers of any rank in the army, and the men who compose it, who entertain such deep displeasure, and sovereign contempt for the General's person, that they cannot prevent their display." The Intendant denied that provisions had been wanting. He had forwarded them plentifully; and the quantity left at Lachine had been placed there in accordance with the General's own order. The original arrangement had been that the troops should not start until the 15th of August. This date had been anticipated by a month. The Intendant described the Onondaga deputation of Indians in contemptuous terms; 'Big Jaw' he described as a buffoon; the others, as eight or ten miserable fellows, who had fooled the Governor shamefully.

In France the news created the impression that might have been looked for. De Seignelay spoke of the treaty as 'the shameful peace.'* It was determined to recall de la Barre immediately. The King wrote to him, that his years did not permit him to fulfil the duties of his office, and consequently, his successor had been named. An order was added that he should at once embark for France. To de Meulles the King expressed his dissatisfaction with the treaty, and his serious displeasure at the abandonment of the Illinois: he had accordingly recalled M. de la Barre, sending Sieur de Denonville as his successor, with power to declare war or continue peace as he should deem it most expedient.

On the 13th of August, 1685, the letters patent appointing M. de Denonville Governor of Canada were enregistered. To the last, de la Barre presented a deplorable figure. He stated that the King had in no way notified him of the

* la paix honteuse.

intention to recall him. Recognising this intention in the letters read, he prayed the Council if they had complaints to make of his conduct, to do him the favour to inform him if such were the case.

Writers of authority have regarded the testimony of the Baron La Hontan as reliable, and have accepted his account of the meeting at La Famine as worthy of credence. There is difficulty in attaching weight to his narrative. There is even evidence to shew that much which he reports could not have happened. His memoirs were published in 1703, at a period when he was in disfavour with the French Court, and they are dedicated to the King of Denmark. He wrote at a time when the rage for memoir writing was in full strength, when the first desire was to make the reading attractive at any sacrifice to truth. Indeed there are few French memoirs of the Eighteenth Century which have not to be read with extreme caution. Without an explanation from Charlevoix it would not be easy to recognise that he was in the country at that date, for his name does not appear in the list of officers given by de la Barre in the State of the troops reviewed by him at Fort Frontenac previous to proceeding to La Famine. Charlevoix tells us that although a man of condition, La Hontan came to Canada in the ranks, and that subsequently he received a commission. He was afterwards sent to Placentia, in Newfoundland as the King's Lieutenant. When in that position he became entangled in a quarrel with the Governor, and was removed. He proceeded to Portugal, eventually to find his way to Denmark. His account of his travels to the Mississippi is so extravagant that even if he actually did make the journey, they belong entirely to the domain of fiction. His *Rivière Longue*, his Tribes of the Essénapès and the Guacsitares, are to this day unknown and not accepted by a single person. La Hontan gives precise dates, so does Swift, in his immortal Satire of Gulliver.*

It is La Hontan who is the authority for the calumny that the young female emigrants sent from France, between 1666—1672, were characterless women from the streets. He wrote thirty years after the event and gives no ground for his opinion. Indeed it is impossible that he could have had special knowledge of the subject. All evidence is directly to the contrary. The number was under one thousand. Indeed, in 1673, the whole population was but 6,700; and it is ridiculous to affirm that France could not furnish that number of well conducted young women to send to Canada, especially when great care was taken to find young girls of good character. In all societies there are unfortunately causes for scandal, and the Mère de l'Incarnation spoke of the *canaille* of both sexes who caused trouble. Happy the community where no such tradition can be traced. Applied to the whole number the description given by La Hontan is scandalously untrue.

* Gulliver tells us: "I accepted an advantageous offer from Captain William Pritchard, of the Antelope, as he was making a voyage to the South Sea. We set sail May 4th, 1699. Our voyage was very prosperous."

La Hontan started on the 24th September, 1688.

In one of his letters La Hontan describes the altar of the Jesuits' Church, Quebec, as formed of four columns, each of one block of black porphyry. Charlevoix, * in his quiet way, laughs at this description as pure invention. La Hontan's memoirs were put on paper eighteen years after the events had taken place. Of the Iroquois language he knew nothing, and under the most favourable circumstances his narrative must have been based on the report of third parties. It is certain that de la Barre could never have uttered the words attributed to him by La Hontan; that if the Senecas would not make peace he would be obliged to join his forces to those of the Governor of New York, who, by order of the King, his master, would aid him to burn their villages and destroy the tribe. The Iroquois knew quite well the impotence of such a threat. They had been brought face to face with Dongan, and knew his claim to the country on the part of the Duke of York. La Hontan latinizes the name of the Iroquois "Big Jaw," and calls him Garantula, a name unknown on the shores of Lake Ontario. The oration which he is represented to have spoken is out of character with the part he assumed. Moreover, according to the Abbé de Belmont, the orator of the Iroquois was Teganissorens. "Big Jaw" was not the defender of the rights of his own tribe. He was an intercessor on the part of the Senecas. We have also the *procès verbal* of what did take place, quite antagonistic to the melodramatic declamation given by La Hontan. De Meulles † writes that no Senecas were present. De la Barre himself says that one Seneca only attended, the others not having come, in order not to displease Dongan. De la Barre had determined to make peace at any cost, so there was no occasion for any very forcible appeal. Indeed the matter had already been arranged by the missionary de Lamberville and Charles le Moyne, of Montreal.

* Letter iii., 28th October, 1720, p. 76.

† New York Documents ix., p. 247.

CHAPTER IV.

In the autumn of 1684,* M. de Laval left Canada for France. He was not an old man, being but sixty-one ; but his constitution was broken. He had shewn great personal energy, constantly travelling in summer in a bark canoe, in winter on snow-shoes, for it does not appear that at that date dogs were used for sleighs. These fatigues for twenty-five years, with the personal mortifications which he had often to suffer, had told their tale. The last meeting of the Council which he had attended was on the 28th of August, 1684. It had been the scene of many a stormy discussion. One cause of dissatisfaction entertained by the French Court greatly embarrassed him. Difficulty had arisen between himself and the Minister at Versailles with regard to the permanent position of the clergy in Canada. To the last, he resisted the desire of the French Court, that the secular priesthood should be placed in *cures*, irremovable by the Bishop. The political power which their dependent position gave him was well understood. Adopted by his five first successors, his policy has been persevered in to this day. At the time, the system as laid down by M. de Laval, was regarded with disfavour in France, and he was repeatedly called upon to give greater individual liberty to his clergy.

Previously to his departure, he established the Chapter of Quebec Cathedral,† its revenue being based on the Abbeyes of Maubec and d'Estrée, in France, granted by the King for its support.‡ The new Chapter consisted of twelve Canons, and four Chaplains, and was inaugurated on the 12th of

* 14th November.

† He was born 30th April, 1633.

‡ Ordinance 6th November, 1684.

§ Letter of the King to Pope Alexander VII., 28th June, 1664. " Nous avons déjà pourveu à l'entretien du dit evesque et ses chanoines."

November, two days before M. de Laval's departure. M. de la Barre with his staff attended the ceremony. The religious services were observed with all possible effect. The bells of the churches rang a peal. The garrison fired a salute, and the whole population of Quebec shewed their sympathy with the new creation.

According to a letter from Rome in 1679,* M. de Laval at this date first made an attempt to establish the Chapter. Some difficulty arose, owing to the fact that no ecclesiastic of the Quebec diocese had taken the degrees in canon law and theology necessary in such cases ; but a dispensation was granted by Pope Innocent XI., removing the objection.† This was a matter with which M. Dudouyt had to deal when in Paris in 1681. In his letters he urged the Bishop to continue his efforts, in spite of the obstacles which presented themselves : when once established, the Chapter could not easily be done away with. By the correspondence of M. Dudouyt three years later, it is shewn that there were so little means available to carry out even the preliminaries of the institution, that money had to be borrowed to buy the albs and amices of the canons.

The day following the ceremony, the Bishop re-constituted the *Cure* of Quebec, re-uniting it to the Seminary, placing in that body the right of presentation. But as this right had been suppressed by the Pope, the proceeding was irregular. M. de Saint Vallier endeavoured to obtain the rectification of the arrangement ; but it was some years before it was legally adjusted. Until 1768, the Seminary made the presentation, and the Bishop recognised the nomination.

M. de Denonville left France in the same ship as the Bishop-elect, M. de Saint Vallier. A vessel with reinforcements sailed in company, with five hundred soldiers on board : from the over-crowding of the ship, fever broke out, and one hundred and fifty died. Of the two priests who accompanied the force, one died before reaching Quebec, one shortly

* 23rd March.

† 23rd August, 1677.

afterwards. Well might the Bishop write that he was affected by their fate. M. de Saint Vallier describes the exemplary conduct of the Governor, much of whose time was passed in religious studies. He was an unfailing attendant at prayers, and was even present at the familiar addresses given in the form of catechism. M. de Saint Vallier places in a strong light the pious deportment and serious turn of thought of the new Governor. M. de Denonville was at this date a Colonel of Dragoons, and had seen much service. His character was somewhat speculative, and although personally possessing courage, he shrank from responsibility ; and this feeling led him to be much influenced by the opinions of those who surrounded him. During his stay in Canada he produced many State Papers, which bear more testimony to his industry and his desire to perform his duty, than to the possession of a strong, vigorous mind. He was not gifted with that self-reliant determination by which great obstacles are overcome, and his policy was not that of a man of action who made himself respected and feared. He found Canada in a depressed condition, and his irresolution of purpose added to the difficulties which he had to meet ; his instructions did not tend to re-assure him. He was reminded of the past difficulties between Governors and Intendants, and, although not expressly named, the quarrel of M. de Laval with his predecessors was suggested by the very monition. While in Canada he was the constant friend of M. de Saint Vallier, who on his side remained the steady ally of the Governor. The policy enforced on him, was by a firm peace to obtain quiet times for Canada ; and in order that it should be durable, it was held necessary that the pride of the Iroquois should be humbled. He was instructed to spare no effort to keep a good understanding with the English, but should they aid the Iroquois in their hostility, they were to be treated as enemies.

No sooner had M. de Denonville taken his seat at the Council, than he drew the attention of its members to the case of the Abbé de Saint Vallier appointed Bishop of Quebec. The Governor stated that he had himself invited

his attendance, but M. de Saint Vallier, not possessing the Brevet of his appointment, had declined to be present. On the assurance of the Governor that he had been informed by the King of the nomination, it was resolved that the Bishop elect should be invited officially to attend. At the next meeting a deputation was appointed to wait on Madame de Denonville to congratulate her on her safe arrival in Canada. Madame de Champlain had been present only for a short period with her husband during the infancy of the Colony: Madame d'Ailleboust had also participated in the honours of her husband; but thirty-five years had passed since her retirement. The presence of Madame de Denonville was, therefore, the more appreciated. She was the last lady of French birth who appeared in Canada as the wife of the Governor General.*

Throughout de Denonville's government, extending over four years, he constantly sent to France reports on the state of Canada; the first being made a few weeks after his arrival. They convey the impression that under a constitutional government, in quiet times, when there was little to call forth his statemanship and activity, he would have gained a respectable reputation. He was honest, well meaning, in no way given to his ease, but the crisis in which he was placed required a mind more vigorous, and a determination more unshrinking, than he possessed. One of his first despatches was to point out the unprotected condition of Canada, and the danger to which it was exposed in any attack from the Iroquois. He recommended that the French should be masters of Lake Ontario, and establish a post on Lake Erie so as

* M. de Vaudreuil, the first Governor of his name, married Louise Elizabeth Joybert, born in St. John, Acadia, granddaughter of Chartier de Lotbinière. Her father, Pierre de Joybert, was a native of Soulanges in Champagne, which name he afterwards assumed.

The second Vaudreuil was not married. His brother, François Pierre de Rigaud, married Louise Thérèse Fleury de la Gorgendière, sister of Catharine de la Gorgendière, the wife of the third and last Baron de Longueuil, both granddaughters of Jolliet. Madame de Vaudreuil appears to have presided at Government House during the rule of her brother-in-law.

to command the trade to Michilimackinac. He felt confident that war could not be avoided : and he saw that the Indians on the Western Lakes, hitherto allies of the French, were discontented, owing to the course taken by de la Barre. Accordingly he endeavoured to conciliate the Illinois and the Ottawas. He strongly recommended the purchase of New York, and remarked "The most certain safeguard against the English of New York would be to purchase it from the King of England, who, in the present state of his affairs, will doubtless stand in need of the King's money. The King would thus be master of the Iroquois." What a commentary on the relations of James II. to the French King that a Colonial Governor should place this estimate on his patriotism and honesty !

M. de Denonville describes the Canada of his day. The youth, he says, are so badly trained that the moment they are able to shoulder a gun, their fathers dare not speak reprovingly to them. They do not take kindly to labour ; they prefer the life of the *coureur de bois*, in which they adopt the habits of the Indian even to going about naked. The life had great attraction for them, for they imitated the Indian in all things. The noblesse of Canada were in a condition of extreme poverty. To increase their number was to multiply a class of lounging idlers.* Against this statement stands the remark of the Minister, "they must not be increased."

* "La Noblesse du Canada est ce qu'il y a de plus gueux, et en en augmentant le nombre c'est multiplier le nombre de faineans. Les fils de Conseillers ne sont pas plus laborieux que les autres jeunes gens. . . . Les Canadiens sont très grands, bien faits, robustes et vigoureux, et accoutumés à vivre de peu. Les femmes et les filles y sont assez paresseuses faute de menus ouvrages." [Archives MS. Vol. 3. 1685-1687, p. 62.]

Resumé des lettres de M. de. Denonville, du 20 Aout, 3 Septembre, 12 Novembre, 1685.

I do not conceive that the expression "de plus gueux" can be interpreted by the modern accepted meaning, "the most disreputable vagabondism." The words used in the text may claim to be a fair translation. At this date, even in Canada, it would be so accepted as a colloquial phrase. "Je n'ai jamais été si gueux que je le suis aujourd'hui," would have its English equivalent in "I was never so perfectly hard up."

The sons of the Councillors were not more industrious than the other youth. The men were tall, well made, robust, active, accustomed to live on little. The women and girls, pretty, but idle from want of occupation in the minor work of the sex.

He found English dealers in Montreal ready to buy the beaver; but "they returned as they came." The English had offered to buy grain at Quebec. The proceeding would be useful to Canada, as it would raise the price of produce, but he had had no orders. Accordingly, the *habitant* had to suffer from his crops being held at a less value.

There were, however, establishments in Canada which found favour with M. de Denonville; the Jesuit Missions near Montreal and Quebec.

It is not difficult to form an opinion as to the source whence these views were obtained. M. de Denonville had been but two months in the country when he gave utterance to them. Personally, he could have formed no such generalizations from his own observation, nor could he have heard them from the Council. We are told by a writer, at a critical hour of his life, that it was from the Jesuits only that the General took counsel.* The picture may be traced to their inspiration, and they obtained great influence during the period of de Denonville's unfortunate government.

At the time the Governor was writing this picture of Canadian life, the Bishop, M. de Saint Vallier, gave his view of the situation. Were he certain, he said, that his letters would not be seen, he would enter upon matters more at length. He describes the whole society as demoralized; none worse than the married men, whose relations with the squaws were notorious. His remedy was simple: to establish Jesuit Missions throughout Indian life. One proposition made by him is marked by good sense and is an accepted principle in modern times; that an establishment should be formed for the instruc-

* "M. le Général, qui en conféra avec les Jesuites qui paraissaient les seuls de son conseil." Recueil de ce qui s'est passé . . . depuis 1682, p. 22. Quebec Edition.

tion of school teachers, the expense of bringing them from France being great. The poor, he described as destitute to the last degree, overwhelming him with applications for relief. From want of clothes, the children could not leave their houses in winter. They were growing up in perfect ignorance, 'frightful irregularities' resulting from this condition.

M. de Saint Vallier did not always write in this strain of disapproval. On his first arrival in Canada, he visited the country east and west of Quebec where churches had been constructed, and in 1686 he proceeded to River du Loup, the limit to which the straggling settlements had extended. Ascending River du Loup to the portage at the height of land and following the river running to the south, he reached the River Saint John, which he partially descended, and turned to the east to Miramichi. Thence he went to Richibucto and Shediac; from the last named place he passed over to Prince Edward Island, then known as Ile Saint Jean, and returned through the Gut of Canso to Chedabucto. In the heat of summer he crossed the country to the Bay of Fundy to Beaubassin, Mines and Port Royal. He went back to Quebec by the way of Percé. In November, he embarked for France. He remained a year there, to be consecrated the second Bishop of Quebec at St. Sulpice in Paris, on the 25th of January, 1688, and returned to Canada on the 8th of August of the same year.

When in Paris he published a work on the condition of Canada and the Church.* The population of Canada and of Acadia is there described as the most virtuous and pious of humanity; models of religious zeal and austerity; proud of their priests as their priests, who by their lives proved themselves worthy to minister to such a people, were proud of them. Prominent in this roll of virtue, M. de Denonville and his wife are named. The latter had a worthy associate in her good works in Madame de Champigny, the wife of the

* *Estat présent de l'Eglise et de la Colonie Francaise dans la Nouvelle France par M. l'Evêque de Quebec.* Robert Pepie, Paris, 1688.

Intendant, who was equally commended for his zeal and piety. It was the golden period of concord between the Governor and the higher Ecclesiastics.

Previous to the arrival in Canada of M. de Saint Vallier, M. de Laval had returned to Quebec, relieved from the burdens and honours of the ecclesiastical duties which for thirty years he had performed, from his own standing-point, with rare ability, courage and unbending determination. He arrived on the 15th of August, 1688, and took up his abode at the Seminary which he had founded, where he remained nearly until his death, on the 6th of May, 1708.

Among many of his countrymen, his memory is, to this day, honoured as that of a saint. Those who believe that the happiness and advancement of mankind are to be encouraged by freedom of thought, a liberal system of education and constitutional government, will see little to admire in narrow, arbitrary, self-asserting ecclesiasticism, even when sustained by a strong will, marked ability and by private personal worth ; such as these must remain outside that class who continue to reverence his name.

M. de Denonville proceeded to Cataraqui, where, in accordance with the royal instructions, La Forrest had been established on the part of de La Salle. In de La Salle's interest La Forrest had asked leave to proceed to the Illinois, and as the Governor had been instructed to consider favourably any such request, permission was granted, and d'Orvilliers was placed in charge of the Fort. When in Cataraqui M. de Denonville heard that the Iroquois were still intractable and were unceasing in their attacks on the Illinois. It was a fact to suggest that amity with them could in no way be counted upon. As time advanced this opinion was confirmed, and he formed the conviction, that in view of the safety of the Canadian settlers, it was necessary to destroy the Senecas, or to strike such a blow at their power that they could no longer be mischievous. Many of the settlers were deaf to these considerations, and continued to establish themselves on holdings at wide intervals apart ; and the danger to which

as individuals they were exposed, was increased accordingly. There were other considerations of almost equal importance. The fur trade was threatened by their attitude. The English and Dutch from Albany were pushing their way to the west, and with the aid of the Iroquois were endeavouring to establish themselves at Michilimackinac.

As early as May, 1685, de Denonville proposed the establishment of a stone fort at Niagara, in which he could place a garrison of five hundred men. By such means the upper Lakes would be closed to the English, and at the same time the French would exercise control over the trade of the Iroquois at Albany. The two forts of Cataraqui and Niagara would dominate Lake Ontario, and the Iroquois would be forced into relationship with Canada.

To meet the expense, de Denonville proposed to confer exclusive privileges of trade on those occupying the post. So profitable did the scheme appear to a knot of Quebec traders, that they agreed, if a lease of nine years were granted them, to furnish the merchandise required for the trade, and to pay an annual rent of 30,000 livres.

When M. de Denonville arrived in Canada he courteously announced the fact to Dongan. It was the commencement of a correspondence which continued until Dongan's recall. The English Governor replied with civility. He spoke of the bread of the King of France which he had eaten, and his desire to prevent umbrage to his representative. He told de Denonville of Monmouth's execution, and expressed his desire for friendly relations.* The same tone was observed by de Denonville.† As he knew Dongan was a Roman Catholic, he asked protection for the Jesuit missionaries from Quebec, who were at that date in the territory of the Senecas, claimed, it must be remembered, by Dongan as being English territory. Dongan was willing enough to sustain the Fathers in their religious character, but politically he had no desire for their presence. What peculiarly appealed to the susceptibility of

* 13th October, 1688.

† 6th June, 1686.

Dongan was the intelligence brought by the *coureurs de bois* of de Denonville's intention to build a Fort at Niagara. Dongan immediately protested against its establishment : he could not believe that the French Governor " would follow the steps of Mons. Labarr, and be ill advised by some interested persons in your government to make disturbance between our masters' subjects in those parts of the world for a little peltrie." De Denonville denied that such was his intention, and traced the story to the " rogues, vagabonds and thieves who desert us and seek refuge with you." Dongan thanked de Denonville for his letter, comparing him favourably with de la Barre, " who was so furious and hasty and very much addicted to great words, as if I had bin to have bin frightened by them." He promised to protect the Jesuit fathers and to give up " runaways." All this civility, nevertheless, but superficially covered feelings of suspicion and dissatisfaction arising from the opposite interests each represented. De Denonville wrote that the French traders still found a refuge in Albany. He taunted Dongan with furnishing rum to the Indians, and Dongan retorted that it did as little hurt as de Denonville's brandy, and, in the opinion of Christians, was much more wholesome.

In the autumn of 1685 news reached Quebec that two Frenchmen had made their way from the southern waters of Hudson's Bay, having ascended the River Abbitibbi to the height of land, and thence had followed the River Ottawa to the Saint Lawrence. This intelligence suggested the feasibility of an expedition by this route, to obtain possession of the northern sea, and to drive out the English garrisons. In a succeeding chapter an account is given of the event, which was marked by full success. Mention is made of the expedition in this place simply that it may be chronologically recorded. During the winter the preparations were completed, and at the opening of the navigation in 1686, the project was carried out.

The event attracted the attention of Quebec and Montreal : but the country was disquieted. On all sides it was felt that

the peace made by M. de la Barre was insecure, and an Indian war inevitable. During the summer the Iroquois attacked the Ottawas of Michilimackinac when hunting on the eastern shores of Lake Huron. The missionary Père de Lamberville attributed this hostility to the influence of Dongan. The latter, the Jesuit reported, had called a meeting of the Iroquois at Albany, and had informed the Senecas of de Denonville's intention to attack them. Moreover, Dongan had encouraged the Iroquois to attack the French and their allies wherever they found them, as the French were not in expectation of being assailed.

Whatever disposition de Denonville had to commence hostilities, he was restrained by the small force at his disposal. He wrote to de Seignelay that there were but nine hundred troops in Canada.* He had to wait for reinforcements. A few weeks later he again wrote, that before June of the following year he hoped to be on Lake Ontario with two thousand Frenchmen and six hundred Indians. His one thought was to prepare for the war, and he did so with the greatest secrecy.

Père de Lamberville was sent again on his mission to the Senecas. On his arrival he found them agitated in anticipation of being attacked by the French; and they were preparing for hostilities when de Lamberville appeared. His first effort was to remove these impressions. He was eminently qualified to do so by his own pleasing manners, and from the influence which he had gained during his previous residence among them. He was charged with presents to the Chiefs, and as the French had been careful to give no cause of personal offence, he was the more successful in allaying suspicion. During the summer months an endeavour was made by the French to create a more general feeling of amity: one of the consequences was that several Hurons and Ottawas descended to Cataraqui.

Early in the autumn de Lamberville was again in Quebec, with the report that the Onondagas had surrendered their

* 6th June, 1686.

prisoners ; but the Senecas had declined to do so, assigning as a reason that the captives did not wish to return to Canada.

M. de Denonville did not act towards de Lamberville with frankness and candour. Although his feeling was strong that no satisfactory result could be gained by treaty, he simply expressed disappointment at the failure of the negotiation, and the Missionary left, uninformed of the determination of the Governor to prepare for hostilities. De Denonville wrote to de Seignelay * an account of the difficulties in which he was placed. He represented Dongan as encouraging French deserters, and that he was obliged to treat them gently until he had the power to chastise them.

In 1686 de Meulles, the Intendant, was recalled and his place taken by M. de Champigny, now principally remembered by his treacherous conduct to the Indians at Cataraqui the following year. There was an independence of character in de Meulles, which made him unacceptable to the Governor and his knot of advisers. But he was popular in the Colony : he is mentioned as admirably performing his duty, as extending justice to all who applied to him, and firm in repressing crime.† Equally he received the praise of La Hontan ; praise which to many may suggest his want of favour with de Denonville. The ground of his removal was that he was interested to some extent in trade. There is no mention of his acting unjustly to the exclusion of others ; but it formed the ground on which de Denonville asked for his removal. The Governor himself throughout his career in Canada remained free from suspicion of such associations. Of his high personal character there can be no question.

It was de Meulles who drew the attention of the French Court, to the wisdom of opening up some career in the French service to the cadets of good family in Canada. On his recommendation, the King ordered that annually two commissions should be given to the youth of the Colony, who proved themselves fitted for the duty. It was also by his

* 8th November, 1686.

† Histoire de l'Hotel Dieu.

representation that it would be to the public interest, that members of the *noblesse* should be encouraged to enter into trade, even to sell by retail without detracting from their rank.

The determination of de Denonville to attack the Senecas led to an event which, to a great extent, aided in assuring French power in the West. During the winter of 1686, messengers had been sent to assemble as many as possible of the *coureurs de bois* scattered over the territory, between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi, and on the opening of the navigation to muster them at Michilimackinac. One of those so engaged was Nicolas Perrot. Efforts were likewise made to obtain the co-operation of the Indian tribes with which the Iroquois were at enmity. Many presents were given. Every inducement was offered to the Chiefs to attend, and it was hoped that a large force would be gathered of Ottawas, Miamis, and Illinois.

The claim which Dongan had put forth to the southern shore of the Lakes, and to the right to trade on Western waters, was not mere idle pretension. The support given by him to these views, had induced a party in the summer of the year to leave Albany, to proceed on an expedition to the West, with a cargo of merchandise. There is no record of the route they followed. There is, indeed, but one means of gaining the Lakes by water from Albany; to ascend the Mohawk, to what is known as Rome, and by a portage of six miles to gain the creek which discharges into Lake Oneida; thence by the River Oneida to the River Onondaga, and in about thirty-seven miles descend to Oswego. The expedition of 1686, which consisted of seven English traders, had proved highly successful. But it had not been without mishap. On their return they had been attacked and seized by a band of Miamis, who, when carrying off their prisoners, had been, in their turn, assailed by a strong force of Iroquois. The English thus released made their way homewards. The Iroquois proceeded to the Miamis village, destroyed it, and carried away two hundred captives, mostly women. In their march they were met by the Miamis in force, who recovered

many of the captives and killed, according to de Belmont, one hundred and twenty-seven Iroquois. There is evidently some mistake in this number.

In mentioning these expeditions from Albany, some modern writers describe them as having been led by French deserters. For many years the *coureurs de bois* had traded with Albany. During this period we constantly hear of English and Dutch traders ; and to take this view is to suppose that they remained stationary at Schenectady. The fact really is that at this date the trapper, as he was afterwards called, had greatly widened his field of operations. Step by step, he had extended his journeys to the Upper Lakes. In the correspondence with de Denonville, and in the negotiations with the Père Valiant, the pretension is not made, that the Albany traders had been conducted by the French to the Lakes, where they were taken prisoners.

The Albany traders to whom allusion has been made, arrived at the Hudson to shew a profitable return for their enterprise. They had a good stock of furs. Those with whom they had traded, were pleased with their new friends, and every encouragement had been given to continue the traffic. In the autumn of that year plans were laid for its systematic development. Major Patrick McGregor was commissioned as Captain and Chief.* His instructions were to overtake, and travel in company with the party which had preceded him. Unfortunately for the enterprise the canoes were separated. The two detachments together would have been a formidable force, and the value of the property entrusted to them would have been a spur to their courage. As it happened, from their having been separated, they were powerless when attacked.

In the meantime many of the Indians to the north of the Illinois had been gathered together at Michilimackinac, to co-operate with de Denonville in his projected attack on the Senecas. Those in the neighbourhood of the Fort, had been

* He is spoken of as MacGregory. His commission, dated 4th December, 1686, shews this name to be incorrect. N. Y. Documents, IX., p. 318.

won through the good services of the missionary Engelran. The more distant tribes bordering on the Mississippi had answered to the appeal, and attended the summons. It was an unwieldy mass of diverse and discordant elements, difficult to manage; but if it was possible to control them by discipline, no men more capable of effecting this result than de la Durantaye and du Luth could have been found.

While making preparations for their departure from this spot, news came that some strange canoes were approaching. They were those of the first party, under a trader named Roseboom, consisting of twenty-nine English and Dutch and five Indians. De la Durantaye's force included one hundred and fifty Canadian *coureurs de bois*, with the numerous canoes of his Indian allies.* They proceeded at once to the attack. There could be no resistance under such circumstances. The English party, in heavily-laden canoes, were outnumbered five to one, independently of the Indians. They could neither fight nor escape. They were carried prisoners to Michilimackinac, while the merchandise and rum proved a rich prize to the captors.

All of this mass of savages who could be organized and placed under control, now left Michilimackinac, carrying the prisoners with them. They descended Lake Huron, where they found Tonty. Tonty, placing twenty French in the Fort, as a garrison, left the River Illinois on the 17th of April. He started with sixteen French and one hundred and sixty Indians. He took two hundred hours to reach the mouth of the Detroit River, most of the journey having been made over land. At the Detroit River, Tonty constructed canoes and proceeded to the Fort, not far distant from the spot where the present City of Detroit stands. On the arrival of de la Durantaye, Tonty formed his men into two lines, and

* My estimate of the numbers is based on the fact that one hundred and eighty *coureurs de bois* were present at Niagara. Sixteen of this number with Tonty joined the force at Detroit. There was also the small party which had been left at that place.

received the Michilimackinac contingent with their prisoners with military honours.*

The united French expedition was proceeding down Lake Erie to Niagara, where further orders were to be obtained, when McGregor and his party were met. They consisted of thirty Albany traders.† They were bringing with them several Ottawa and Huron captives, who had been taken by the Iroquois to be restored to the tribes at Michilimackinac, as a mark of the amity felt towards them by the Governor of New York. This was the first attempt of the English to make a settlement on the Western Lakes and so demands attention. The means taken were altogether too insignificant to attain success; even, what little strength was put forth, was not concentrated. It may be said, however, that it could never have been contemplated, that there would have been a national muster of the *coureurs de bois* at Michilimackinac under leaders like de la Durantaye and du Luth, both devoted to French rule. The force from Albany was considered to be equal to any ordinary emergency. The *coureurs de bois* individually had no objection to the trade with Albany. Their co-operation, under such circumstances, to some extent might even be looked for. The attempt, however, was made at a period when failure was certain, for the numbers gathered at Michilimackinac made success impossible.

The expedition descending to Niagara in its full strength of one hundred and eighty French and four hundred Indians, at once overpowered the thirty men of McGregor's party; no resistance indeed could be attempted. Their seizure, while of immense advantage to the French, gave a serious blow to

* The narrative of Tonty says [p. 25] that de la Durantaye arrived with three hundred prisoners, "Je fis border la haye aux Français et aux Sauvages, et après que le Sieur de la Durantaye nous eut saluez nous lui rendismes le salut. Ils avoient avec eux trois cents Anglois qu'ils avoient pris dans le lac Huron." According to M. Harrise, Tonty wrote execrable French in bad handwriting. Mr. Harrise gives a letter of the 14th of August, 1686, as an example. The mistake must have been that of the amanuensis or copyist. No doubt the numerals 30 originally used, have become 300.

† Tonty.

English prestige. Tonty remarks that "without those two strokes of good luck, we would have been much embarrassed. We were at war with the Iroquois, and by the *eau de vie* and merchandise brought by these parties, our allies would have been gained, and we should have had all the savages and English against us."

This event gave the French the preponderance on the Upper Lakes, and was the main cause that no attempt from Albany was repeated in that direction. From that date to the Conquest, the northern waters remained in the possession of the French. The struggle was to take place in the Valley of the Ohio, on the southern shore of Lake Ontario and on the western shores of Lake Champlain.

One misfortune of 1686 must not be omitted from the record. In October, the Ursuline Convent was a second time destroyed by fire; the first disaster of this character happened in 1650. The nuns were at mass, which was being performed by M. l'Abbé d'Urfé; they had difficulty in saving themselves, so rapidly the flames gained the mastery. In two hours everything was destroyed, including the Church and Chapel built by Mme. de la Peltrie, and a small portion of the premises only was saved. M. de Saint Vallier obtained for the *religieuses* a temporary home with the Hospital Nuns. Great sympathy was shewn with these now homeless ladies. Bishop de Saint Vallier, always open-handed, with M. de Denonville headed the appeal for public aid with liberal subscriptions. On all sides it was responded to, and in a few months the building of the new convent was recommenced.

CHAPTER V.

The first step of de Denonville was to place Fort Frontenac in security, and recollecting that the failure of de la Barre had been attributed to want of provisions, his determination was to obtain a sufficient supply, and to have at his disposal the means of moving it with facility to the objective point. There were three barques lying at Cataraqui in bad condition. They were repaired in a way to attract as little attention as possible, and the summer of 1686 passed without any sign that provisions were being gathered, so as not to awaken the caution of the Senecas. The whole arrangements were completed during the winter ; the troops were then organized. Throughout the parishes the men fit for service were enrolled, and the necessary preparation made. As spring came and the navigation opened, the men reached Montreal, and were encamped on Saint Helen's Island, opposite to the city. Flour was sent to Cataraqui, and the farmers were urged to sow their grain as early as possible. De Champigny, the Intendant, after having passed some days with the troops, proceeded to Cataraqui. As he ascended the river he invited such Iroquois as he met to attend a feast at that place, and on his arrival he extended his invitation to those who were in the neighbourhood of the Fort.

He at once set carpenters at work and prepared a series of "stocks," such as in former times were used for the punishment of vagabonds and drunkards. As the Indians arrived they were seized, and each one placed in this confinement, to the number of ninety-five. There was a picket in the rear, to which each prisoner was bound by a strong cord, his arms being also tied closely. Their wives and daughters were trusted to bring them food. Here they remained and sang their songs of death. It was afterwards explained, that the object

of this outrage was to prevent these Indians joining the Senecas and taking part in the campaign ; more especially to check information being carried across the lake. At the end of the campaign, these men, with some others, were sent to the galleys in France. Many of the women died from a contagious disease which broke out among them ; no few from grief and hardship. After the performance of this exploit M. de Champigny hurried towards Montreal.

In the meantime M. de Denonville was engaged in the organization of his small army. The Jesuit Father Engelran was at his side, acting as his principal adviser. It was the Order to which M. de Denonville gave his full confidence, and their counsel was sought on all occasions.

M. de Vaudreuil at this time arrived from France in the King's ship *L'Arc en Ciel*, in the unusual time of thirty-three days. He brought the news of the arrival of the reinforcement of eight hundred men. Their presence led to the number of Canadians who had been called out being reduced, many being sent home. Some money and supplies likewise arrived, and generally speaking, an encouragement unusual in France had been given to the expedition.

M. de Vaudreuil assumed command of the troops, made up to the full complement of thirty-five companies. Three of the captaincies had been left to be filled in Canada : St. Ours, Duguay, and de la Durantaye were appointed to the vacancies. De Belmont describes the new troops as mostly recruits.

The force left Montreal on the 13th of June. M. de Denonville undertook the direction of the expedition with M. de Vaudreuil as Commander-in-Chief of the King's forces, fulfilling the duties of what in modern times would be called Chief of the Staff. The Royal troops were under the command of de Callières ; the Canadian militia under Duguay, with Berthier, de la Valterye, Granville, and le Moyne de Longueuil as battalion officers. The whole force numbered sixteen hundred men with two hundred and sixty Indians from the Christian Missions of the Sault now known

as Caughnawaga, those of the Mountain at Montreal, and of Lorette. Some Abenakis and Algonquins were present.

As the troops were leaving, four well-known Iroquois Chiefs arrived at Montreal. They were arrested. One of the number, Horchouasse, was afterwards sent a prisoner to France.

The troops were in high spirits. Their numbers, the popularity of the war, the abundance of provisions, gave them confidence and promised success. To add to the general feeling of satisfaction a canoe brought the news that de la Durantaye, Tonty and du Luth, were on Lake Erie, proceeding to Niagara, with their little army of *coureurs de bois*, and their Indian allies of the west, and that they were carrying with them the sixty English and Dutch prisoners taken in the two detachments on Lakes Huron and Erie.

The vessels in the ascent consisted of three hundred canoes and flat-bottomed boats, organized into battalions. They moved forward in order and with military regularity. In ascending the dangerous rapids of the Cedars two bateaux were lost. Six days were taken to reach Lake Saint Francis; at this spot four Iroquois were brought in prisoners, one of whom had the unfortunate reputation of having ill-treated Father Corbeil. They were sent to join the other prisoners. Two men only are recorded as having been drowned in the ascent.

By the first of July the troops arrived at Cataraqui. The canoes were unloaded, and the provisions placed in the barques, one of which was destined for Niagara.

During the ascent, when near Ogdensburgh, the expedition was joined by de Champigny. He reported his disgraceful proceedings at Cataraqui, and proceeded onwards to Montreal. Unfortunately, in the history of every country, there is much to condemn; but a more scandalous act of treachery on the part of a Christian nation is scarcely to be found. Every contemporary writer has raised his voice against it. "It is pitiable that Indians under our protection were thus seized, pillaged and chained, seduced under the bait of a feast!" writes de Belmont. "It was the more blamed," he

adds, "as it was not sustained, and, if in the beginning we were too violent, we were too weak and humble at its close."

The canoes which had brought the provisions to Fort Frontenac carried the Indian captives to Quebec. It remained, however, for de Denonville to take further proceedings in the same direction. A detachment was organized under Péré, which proceeded to Quinté, twenty-five leagues above the Fort, to seize what Indians he could find in the villages. At Fort Frontenac de Denonville had definite intelligence of the western contingent. La Forest arrived to inform him of its safe arrival at Niagara.

De Denonville had carefully concealed his design of attacking the Senecas, and what gave a colour to the belief that he had no such intention, was that the missionaries, uninformed of his purpose, remained at their post. It was a successful piece of stratagem, for it was in consequence of their assurance that peace would be continued, that war was not declared by the Iroquois. De Denonville expresses himself clearly on this point: he acknowledges "the care and ability of the Reverend Father de Lamberville, who by his shrewdness averted the storm, that was the more dangerous, as we were unprepared to protect ourselves against their incursions."

So long as the missionaries were present, the Senecas felt safe from attack, and the Fathers, living their usual life, innocently aided in the deceit. De Denonville must have known that he was staking the lives of these two men on the issue. He, however, in no way hesitated in carrying out the policy he had formed, and, according to Charlevoix, they narrowly escaped paying the penalty of their apparent treachery. Charlevoix relates that even de Lamberville owed his life to the magnanimity of some of the chiefs. They told the Father that they were sure, from his past life and loyalty to them, that he was in no way a party to the deceit which had been practised. They instructed him at once to leave, and furnished him the means of escape; and by the aid of guides he was enabled to join the advancing force of de Denonville.

This story is not sustained by the facts. The force did not

leave Montreal until the 13th of June. On the 29th it reached La Galette.* De Denonville states that de Lamberville joined him on that day, "whom I had sent for under the pretence of bringing the most influential of the Iroquois, to consult as to the means of settling differences."

The 2nd of July was given to rest and preparation for the advance. Moreover, de Denonville had to wait for the party sent out under Péré, which only returned early in the morning of the 3rd, having seized eighty persons, including women and children. "The prisoners," adds de Denonville, "now consisted of fifty-one able men, and one hundred and fifty women and children." It had been his intention to embark in the afternoon, but the wind was high, and it was considered advisable to defer the departure until the morrow at day-break.

However carefully de Denonville had endeavoured to conceal his purpose, the destination of the troops became known, and the Senecas were enabled to take steps for their defence. A prisoner, watching his opportunity when freedom of movement could not be denied, jumped from the walls of the Fort, sixteen feet high. The alarm was at once given, but the prisoner had reached the woods, and managed to gain the Seneca country to inform his tribe of the danger threatening them.

The 10th of July was named as the time for meeting at the spot selected.† De Denonville had calculated on the journey being made in seven days. They were troubled with bad winds and rough weather. Nevertheless, they reached their destination without accident. As de Denonville was arriving at the rendezvous he observed, with every feeling of satisfaction, that the Indians of the West, with the *coureurs de bois*, were at the same time approaching the spot. The spectacle

* Prescott.

† Now known as Irondequoit Bay, on Lake Ontario, to the south of the City of Rochester. Following the coast, with short traverses, it is about one hundred and twenty miles from Kingston, and something more than eighty miles from Niagara.

of the junction of the two forces attracted the admiration of the contemporaries who record these events. They speak of it in glowing language. There was the headquarter staff of the General, with the Royal troops of France, the Canadian militia, the three barques at the entrance to the Bay, with a noisy crowd of Indians of different tribes—some of them Christian, some almost naked, painted, with horns on their heads, and tails to their backs, many armed with bows and arrows, all full of vigour and activity.

A Fort was immediately constructed, in which a guard of four hundred men was placed for the protection of the bateaux, canoes and provisions. Preparations were made for the advance. It commenced on the 12th, each man carrying thirteen days' provisions. On that day, three leagues, seven and a half miles, were made. On the following morning the march was continued. De Callières was in front. The advanced guard consisted of the force of *coureurs de bois* and volunteers, led by de la Durantaye and du Luth; Tonty commanded the Illinois. The Ottawas and Hurons followed. At mid-day, the party halted from thirst, for it was in the commencement of the hottest season in Canada. While they were searching for water the trail of a large body of men was seen. De Callières immediately sent an officer to the rear to report the discovery to de Denonville, who lost no time in coming to the front. The advance was now made with caution, for there were two known defiles, at which an attack might be looked for. But they passed through them unopposed. There was a third spot thick with alders, a stretch of low ground, through which a somewhat rapid stream ran in marshy ground, and from which some hills abruptly ascended. The place had been made known to de Denonville, and he had determined to reach it and pass the night there. The heat was extreme. The men suffered much from fatigue and thirst, and from the weight of their accoutrements and the provisions that they were carrying. About three o'clock they received the first intimation that the enemy was immediately in their front.

The Senecas had divided their forces. They had posted one party along the stream running between two of the ascents, in a grove of beech. The remaining force they ambuscaded in the thick alders. Their plan of campaign was to allow the troops to pass between these two bodies, and then make the attack in front and rear. De Callières, accompanied by his small staff, had advanced some distance, and what was actually the advance-guard moved forward. The Senecas, holding it to be the main body, poured a fire into its ranks. When the attack was made the majority of the Western Indians gave way: the Christian Indians however fired two volleys with but little effect. The steadiness of the French retrieved the disorder, and the French Indians, gaining courage, returned to the attack. The main body was now brought up. There was what appeared to be a small fort on an adjoining height, which it was determined to silence. On the attack being made, the Berthier militia fell into a panic, but Varennes and Duguay coming up with the rear-guard of the Montreal corps, enabled them to rally. De Denonville was in his shirt sleeves. He gave orders to fire constantly and to beat the drums, even when no enemy was seen; and the roll of the drum was as much feared as the fire of the musketry. The Senecas, seeing the large number brought against them, lost heart. They had themselves fallen into the snare that they had prepared for the French. They had directed their onslaught against the advance-guard, believing it to be the main body, and they found themselves unexpectedly attacked by a mass of men, the existence of which they had not suspected. They abandoned the ground and fled. Six French and five Indians were killed, and eleven men wounded—among them Père Engelran. The French Indians pursued the retreating Senecas and brought back fourteen scalps.

The action was not long, de Denonville reported, but the firing was heavy. Twenty-seven Senecas were left dead on the field. The fatigue of the day had been great. There was no knowledge of the route which had to be followed, and no guide would take the responsibility of leading the way.

Accordingly, the troops bivouacked on the scene of the action. The following day, the 14th, it rained till nearly noon, so the halt was continued. The advance was then made. The village of the Senecas was reached, but it had been burned; another village, less than two miles distant, was also deserted. Some corn was found, which, with that under cultivation was destroyed. Nothing, the Abbé de Belmont tells us, was to be seen in the village but the cemetery and some graves, with snakes and animals. There was a large mask, with teeth and eyes of bright copper,* covered with bearskin, under which the Indians performed their jugglery. It was calculated that the French destroyed one hundred thousand minots of corn, and one hundred and fifty thousand minots of the crop in the ground, in addition to the pigs that were slaughtered and the beans obtained and made valueless. Sixty persons were reported as killed. There is no doubt that the Senecas received a serious blow to their prosperity and strength; but it is impossible to resist the conviction that the extent of the damage inflicted has been exaggerated.

De Denonville remained until the 23rd, laying waste everything that he found, which he could not appropriate. There was no resistance. The Senecas fled before the storm. Four of their villages were burned, and the grain under cultivation was rendered worthless. On the 26th, de Denonville set out for Niagara. Owing to contrary winds, it took four and a half days to reach the head of Lake Ontario, where he halted and commenced the construction of a Fort. After carrying on the work to a sufficient extent, on the 2nd of August he sent home the militia. On the 3rd he himself embarked, leaving de Vaudreuil to complete the Fort. In a few days, de Vaudreuil descended Lake Ontario, following the north shore, placing de Troyes in command with a detachment of one hundred men.

It may be here remarked that the Fort was abandoned the following year on the 15th of September. There had been much sickness. De Troyes, the leader of the expedition to

* Cuivre jaune.

Hudson's Bay, died there from dysentery, a complaint which made great ravages among the garrison. De Belmont attributes this disease to the excessive use of fresh pork and beans. He relates that upwards of one hundred of the soldiers died during the season. It was found impossible to furnish another garrison and to maintain the Fort. When abandoned, it was under the command of Desbergères, who, according to his instructions, destroyed the fortifications, but left many of the buildings standing. A *procès verbal* of the proceeding was drawn up by the Chevalier de la Mothe, with the view of establishing that possession had been held by the French of the territory at that time. The buildings are described as consisting of a bakehouse, five cabins or huts, a frame house and storehouse, all inhabitable.*

There is a saying attributed to a Christian Indian named Louis Atarhea. As the campaign was about to commence he remarked to de Denonville that the enterprise was a serious one, and that if he did not closely follow up the affair he would, perhaps, meet the experience of one who would attack a wasp's nest,† and that, unless he found means to kill all the wasps at once, he ran the risk of being stung.

The expedition had been so far successful that serious damage had been inflicted on one branch of the Iroquois—the Senecas. But it was at the season of the year when the suffering fell the lightest. Their villages had been burned, their corn destroyed, and a few of their people killed. Here the injury had ended. It was plain that whatever ravages had been committed, to have been thoroughly effective in their consequences, they should have been followed up by a vigorous and active campaign, until a recognized peace had been obtained. The expedition returned to Montreal in August. In October, the Iroquois, to the number of two hundred,

* Col. Hist. N.Y. IX., p. 386.

† “Que son entreprise lui paraissait grande, que s'il n'y prenait garde de près qu'il ferait peut-être comme celui qui va fourgailler un nid de guêpes, qu'à moins qu'il ne trouve moyen de les écraser toutes à la fois, il court risque d'en recevoir des piqures.” Recueil, &c., p. 16.

attacked the upper part of the Island of Montreal, where they burned five houses and killed six *habitants*. The consequence was that de Callières caused a redoubt to be constructed in each Seigneurie, so that the troops quartered there and the inhabitants could find refuge in the hour of attack. A contemporary writer says that there were twenty-eight such Forts in the government of Montreal. A corps of one hundred and twenty men picked from the *coureurs de bois* was placed at Lachine. More troops were asked for from France, and the plan of the next campaign was to advance with two columns in distinct expeditions against the Iroquois. The possession of New York by the French, as a desirable acquisition, was advocated by the leading men in Canada more than ever.

On Lake Ontario five hundred Iroquois threatened Fort Frontenac. They were first seen some distance from it, by men of the fort, three of whom were seized. The fort was besieged for a month, but the extent of damage was limited to sinking some canoes. At La Galette nine canoes, containing provisions and stores, were taken. Chambly was attacked, and a soldier, his wife and child carried away. Verchères, below Montreal, also suffered from assault, and eighty head of cattle were killed.

The year 1688 was unfortunate for Canada. The scurvy devastated Fort Frontenac. Upwards of one hundred men died there. Niagara, as has been related, was abandoned owing to the sickness which prevailed. Even Saint Hélène, on his descent of the Saint Lawrence with a party of eighty soldiers from Cataraqui, was attacked, with a loss of four men killed, and one taken prisoner. The Mohawks now interfered in the quarrel, and some of their emissaries found their way to the Christian settlements. They so far influenced those of the tribe at Sault St. Louis, that thirty men and twenty women left the mission.

Early in June some peace negotiations were commenced,* and three of the Iroquois tribes signed a declaration of neu-

* 15th June, 1688.

trality. The proceeding was not looked upon in Canada as one promising a satisfactory conclusion, and events soon proved that this estimate was correct.

While the campaign of de Denonville was, in Canada, regarded as an efficient step towards humbling the insolence of the Senecas, in Albany it was felt to be a menace to English interests. The erection of the fortress of Niagara was looked upon as nothing less than a breach of the treaty of amity communicated from England. Dongan, however, was in this position, that he felt that he could look for but little support from James II. Conduct, on his part, marked by determination and enterprise, could be so represented by the Court of France as to lead to his recall. On the other hand, while all moral encouragement was given to de Denonville, he had been reinforced by whatever troops the European demands on the French King permitted him to send. The despatches from Canada, recommending that French influence should be exercised to obtain Dongan's recall, furnish the highest tribute to his patriotism and sense of duty.

A Treaty of perpetual peace had been made in 1686, and owing to the proceedings taken in Hudson's Bay the same year by the French, the Treaty had been supplemented by a conference in London. I will record more fully what took place on this occasion, when the events in connection with Hudson's Bay are related. The conditions of the Treaty only tended to fetter the English governors in America. With the French authorities, the resolutions that were communicated to them were justly regarded as little more than waste paper. There is no trace in the history of those times, that they had the slightest influence on French policy on the American continent.

Dongan felt the blow struck at the Senecas to be one directed against his government. Accordingly, he summoned the Chiefs to Albany, and asked them to receive no more Jesuit missionaries, and to recall the members of their tribes established in Canada. He forbade them to make treaties with the French without the consent of the Governor of New

York, and he called upon the Iroquois to unite with the Ottawas, and to make an effort to bring their trade to Albany.

He had already addressed de Denonville on the subject of the two parties, seized by de la Durantaye on Lake Huron and Lake Erie, and had demanded the immediate surrender of the prisoners. The request was refused by de Denonville, on the ground that he regarded the presence of the men where they were taken, as an invasion of French territory, and a breach of the treaty of peace. He declared that he would keep the prisoners, and also taunted the English Governor with giving aid and comfort to the Senecas. Dongan retorted that it was the French who had invaded English territory. With his usual spirit, he expressed the hope that their masters at home "will suffer us to do ourselves justice on you, for the injuries and spoyle you have committed on us," and if leave were given him, he added, "I will be as soon at Quebeck as you shall be at Albany."* He denied that he had furnished arms to the Senecas until after the advance of the 6th of August. He had then given powder, lead, and arms, and had united the Five Nations together. He had sent no men, and he adds that there were only four hundred Senecas who opposed the French advance. Finally, he demanded the release of all the Christian and Indian prisoners who were subjects of the King of England.

In November, 1687, letters were received from England authorising the protection of the Iroquois by Dongan as Governor of New York. Possessing this additional power, he was placed in a totally different position, and had the support from London, necessary to the policy that he was desirous of carrying out. Hitherto he had acted from his own impulses, with no assurance that his conduct would not be disavowed. This support was the more necessary to him, as there were constant threats that the French were contemplating an attack upon Albany. He reported in the spring of 1688, that such an attack had been looked for during the winter, and that he had kept under his orders at Albany four

* 9th September, 1687.

hundred and fifty infantry and fifty horsemen with eight hundred men. Of all the governors of New York, he was the first clearly to see the policy which should be followed by the English colonies, that the country to the west should be occupied and forts constructed "as ye French doe"—otherwise that the trade could not be maintained. The political troubles in Great Britain at this date had mounted to their height. The battle at home was to be fought for personal and religious liberty, and when Dongan's letter reached England the leading public men were busy in their negotiations with William of Nassau to intervene with an armed force for their rescue. The invitation to the Prince of Orange to appear in England as their deliverer was dated the 30th of June, 1688, and for twenty-eight months, England was engaged in quieting the complications on her own soil. It was only on the 30th of October, 1690, that, by the Treaty of Limerick, peace was obtained in Ireland, while on the Continent war with France was raging. As early as March, 1690, Marlborough had started with ten thousand troops to join the Dutch forces on the Continent. For the succeeding years until the Treaty of Ryswick, Great Britain was engaged in a struggle for existence. The quarrel in America was left to be fought out by another generation. Dongan, however, has the merit of standing forth among the first to advise the policy, which, from the English standing point, should have then been followed against the French.

In the correspondence which took place between the Governors after the campaign of 1687,* de Denonville wrote Dongan, that he had been instructed to live on good terms with him ; he had, however, cause of complaint, that Dongan had hired sixty Mohawks to make a foray on New France ; nevertheless, he would send back McGregor and his party, to shew his desire for amity. Dongan denied that he had been the cause of Iroquois aggression. He protested against the invasion of English territory, and the construction of the

* 2nd October, 1687.

Fort at Niagara. He suggested that an agent should be sent to Albany to confer with him.*

After the return of McGregor, Dongan expressed his thanks† to de Denonville for the kind treatment shown to the prisoners. Nevertheless, he asked satisfaction for the merchandise seized, and repeated the demand that the Fort on Lake Ontario should be destroyed, and the Indians who had been seized and sent to France, should be released, to be restored to the English embassy at Paris, or to the Secretary of State at London. McGregor was sent to Quebec with the letter. He arrived there on the 3rd of December, and was well received. De Denonville acknowledged‡ the letter, stating that it was his intention to comply with Dongan's suggestion, and he would send Father Valiant, accompanied by Dumont as interpreter, to confer with him.

The two proceeded to Albany. On their route they were attacked by Iroquois, and some property taken from them. The matter was brought to the notice of Dongan,§ who expressed his deep regret for what had happened, and undertook to make restitution for the injury. He informed the Father that the King of England was himself sending Roman Catholic missionaries among the Iroquois, and repeated the demands he had already made.

There is a critical remark in this letter worth preserving. Dongan pointed out that the word "*sauvage*" was used by the French without the word Indian, "not soe in the English where the words Wild Indians are employed to distinguish thoes who have submitted themselves under govern^t and thoes who have not."

A series of papers were now exchanged between Dongan and Valiant. Dongan commenced|| with a protest against the arrest of McGregor and Roseboom, renewing the demands which had been made to Quebec. Valiant demanded repara-

* 25th October, 1687. † 31st October, 1687.

‡ 28th December, 1687.

§ 17th February, 1688.

|| 13th February, 1688.

tion for the injuries he had received. Dongan repeated his promise to give satisfaction for the wrong ; he asked to be told on what authority it had been asserted that the outrage was committed by his orders, and desired the author might be made known, expressing his disbelief in the statement itself. Valiant confined himself to the general rejoinder that McGregor, when taken prisoner, was acting in contravention to the treaty, and had no right to be where he was. The dispute, he suggested, should be left to the determination of the two Kings. He complained that McGregor had threatened to run a captain through the body. Dongan spoke of the general good conduct of McGregor. Meeting Valiant's remark, he pointed out that the Ottawas were not French Indians, and that McGregor had the right to travel among them. The correspondence was leading to no result. Dongan finally said, " If the sheep's fleece be anything in the dispute, pray let the King of England have some part of it, especially by the owner's consent." To which Valiant answered that he should have the whole fleece, if the most Christian King were willing.

What Father Valiant was desirous of effecting was a treaty of peace, directly with the Senecas. Dongan's influence was given to prevent that tribe treating directly with France. Since the expedition against the Senecas in the summer of 1667, Canada had been kept in continual ferment. To use the Indian simile of the wasp's nest : the nest had been destroyed, but the wasps could yet sting. Great injury had been suffered, not simply from the positive devastation caused by the inroads of the Iroquois, but by the unsettled feeling which dread of them occasioned. While de Denonville was anxious to obtain quiet times, he was not willing to purchase them on Dongan's conditions. Dongan was constantly appealed to from Quebec as a Roman Catholic ; but, in spite of his faith, he distrusted the Jesuits acting in the French interests. He was sufficiently zealous for his religion, but he did not desire to consult its interests at the expense of what he held to be his duty. Father Valiant borrowed from the

tactics which had prospered in London, for it was understood in Canada how supreme Louis was in the English Court. Dongan himself was not without experience in that direction. Nevertheless he would not recognize the advisability of Valiant's proposition for the re-establishment of the missionaries, and immovably persevered in the view which he had expressed.

The mission of Father Valiant proved a failure. De Denonville shewed his disappointment in his letters to Dongan and continued to accuse him of being the instigator of the Iroquois attacks. There was no ground for the charge. What Dongan did assert was, that the Iroquois were claimed as subjects of England, and that he had been instructed to give satisfaction for any injuries which they had committed. It is established that on occasions he rescued prisoners from the Iroquois. Mdlle. d'Alonne, seized near Cataraqui, was restored uninjured, no doubt at his instigation. De Denonville wrote specially to thank him for his conduct: "I have only to assure you," he said, "that the whole Colony feels the most perfect gratitude for the good offices which you and your people shewed to these poor unfortunate captives."

The efforts of the French Governor, and those subordinate to him to obtain the removal of Dongan at length met with success. Louis XIV., through his ambassador, Barillon, asked for his recall and Dongan was summoned home.

He was succeeded by Sir Edmund Andros, who arrived in 1688, and at this time a change was made in the Constitution of the English Colonies. New England, New Jersey, and New York, were formed into one government, and Andros was placed at its head. Dongan did not fail to impress on his successor the necessity of continuing the policy which he had followed. Shortly after the arrival of Andros a correspondence took place between him and de Denonville. It commenced with an interchange of courtesies, but the new Governor soon fell into the track of Dongan, and repeated the demands which had been made by him. The change of

Governors did little for French interests, and de Denonville wrote bitterly on the subject to de Seignelay.

The great requirement of Canada was an assured peace. The alarm arising from the threatened attacks of the Iroquois had told equally on commerce and agriculture. The whole condition of the colony had been affected, for the activity of the Senecas had closed the avenues of trade. The *coureurs de bois* had been collected together in 1686; from that date all passage of furs from the West had been impeded, and this trade was the one means of support to the population. For personal protection the inhabitants of the seigneuries, especially those who, living a greater distance from settlement, were, owing to their isolation, more exposed to attack, took refuge in the forts. The inhabitants of Montreal were virtually confined to the picket enclosure, which de Callières had constructed in 1687.* It was the same at Three Rivers. Moreover, it was a season of unusual sickness. It has been stated to what extent the garrisons of Fort Frontenac and Niagara suffered. Food too was insufficient, for the tillage had been checked by the events of the past months.

In this dilemma de Denonville appealed to the King, to send back to Canada the prisoners who had been seized at Cataraqui. It was the first step towards peace. His force had been reduced by death and disease to fourteen hundred men. He had accepted the policy which de Callières had submitted to attack New York, unless obtained by negotiation, and de Callières was sent to France to submit his plan of operations. It was held to be the only means by which Canada could be preserved to the French. De Callières' view was to advance by Lake Champlain and Lake George with thirteen hundred soldiers and three hundred Canadians, with the declared purpose of attacking the Mohawks. Arrived in their territory, he was to state that the real object of the campaign was against the English. It was not expected that Albany would make much resistance. The town, surrounded by pickets, had but three hundred inhabitants, and its small

* De Belmont.

fort, indifferently constructed, contained but one hundred and fifty men. New York, with four hundred inhabitants, would also prove an easy conquest. France would then obtain the fine port of New York, open at all seasons of the year, one of the best in America. The dissatisfaction of the Dutch devoted to the Prince of Orange, was also counted upon, and it was considered advisable to anticipate them in their effort to be free from English rule. The treaty of neutrality passed in London did not stand in de Callières' way, for he held that it had been violated.

De Denonville had likewise a project to attack the Iroquois, and a reinforcement of four thousand men was asked from France. On a previous demand in which eight hundred were named as the number required, three hundred had been the number sent. But Louis XIV. was too much occupied in Europe to send troops to Canada. He was busy insulting and defying the Pope in his own city, on the question of the right of sanctuary. He offensively persisted in claiming this privilege for the locality attached to his embassy, when for the well-being of Rome Innocent desired to do away with it, as the source of crime and disorder. The King of France was the only Catholic monarch who would not give ear to the Pope's representations.* Louis was also endeavouring to obtain the election of Cardinal Furstemberg to the Archbishopric of Cologne. With this view he had advanced his forces to attack Philipsburg, and to seize Worms, Metz, Treves and Bonn. His thought was mainly given to the establishment of the Rhine frontier, save when it was diverted to the persecution of the Protestants. De Seignelay wrote recognizing the wisdom of the proposition made by de Denonville, but there were no troops to be spared to carry it out. Until they should be sent, de Denonville was to enrol the inhabitants, and fight as best he could. At this date the census records the population of Canada at 11,562 souls.

Thus de Denonville was unprepared for active operations. There were neither men nor provisions for a campaign. The

* The dispute is summarized by Macaulay Vol. II., chapter IX.

colony was so unsettled that the cultivation of the fields above Three Rivers was attended with danger. The Iroquois were alienated from France, for the judgment and diplomacy of Dongan on every side had ended with being successful. In de Denonville's desire to obtain peace he turned his attention to the Eastern Iroquois, and sent back to them the slaves held by the Christian Indians. The prisoners were delivered to the Onondaga, Cayuga and Oneida tribes. He was much assisted by Père de Lamberville, who had retained his influence, and was busy in endeavouring to establish negotiations with Quebec.

Prominent among the chiefs was Big Jaw, who had been present at the conclusion of the peace at La Famine with de la Barre. By his aid a deputation was named to proceed to Quebec to confer with de Denonville; and their first step was to cross to Fort Frontenac to explain their claims.* They were received with every mark of respect, and an officer with some men was appointed to accompany them to Montreal. Not many leagues from Cataragui the descending party was joined by a fleet of canoes. At Lake Saint Francis they were met by an equal number, and we are told that twelve hundred Iroquois were present, a number scarcely possible, as the Senecas and Mohawks were not included. The fact is not authenticated by de Belmont who describes the embassy as consisting of several Indians.

The basis of peace was that Fort Niagara should be abandoned, that the Ottawas should be compelled to preserve peace,† and that ninety-one slaves held at the Sault and at the Mountain at Montreal should be restored. The treaty signed on the part of the tribes was one of neutrality; when signing it the Iroquois added the affirmation, that they were neither French nor English, never having been conquered by either.

During this lull de Denonville reinforced and re-victualled Fort Frontenac. A convoy of a thousand men under de Callières formed the expedition, so dangerous were the attacks

* New York Colonial Documents IX., p. 390.

† "On ôte la hache aux Ottawas."

of the Iroquois. The outrages continued on the Saint Lawrence: Sorel and Boucherville were burned. The negotiations for peace were, however, continued, and progress was so far made that it was agreed that deputies should attend to discuss the conditions, when an unexpected incident destroyed further negotiations.

The Huron Ottawas had among them a chief named Kondiaronk, "Le Rat."* He had at one time acted in the interest of the English, and, with some effort on the part of the French, had been induced to join them. Peace, he knew well, would prove destructive to the Huron tribe. Unprotected by the French or the New York Governor, they would fall a victim to the Iroquois, in revenge for the part which they had taken in the expedition against the Senecas. His own fate was involved in that of his tribe. He was at this period engaged with a party in enterprises against the Senecas, when he heard that it was hoped that a peace would be concluded with the Five Nations. He learned that some Senecas were immediately to proceed to Montreal to discuss the terms on which it could be obtained. In his view, the only salvation of his tribe was in the continuance of the Iroquois war with the French. Making a pretext of returning home, he left Cataraqui and proceeded to La Famine, and placed himself in ambush. He waited for some days until the Seneca embassy arrived. They were leisurely hauling their canoes ashore and preparing to encamp, when they were attacked by "Le Rat" and his party. The Huron force was the stronger. The Senecas were taken by surprise; some were killed, others wounded. One of the leading Seneca Chiefs, Teganissorens, reproached "Le Rat" for what had taken place and threatened that he would have to answer for his conduct to the Governor-General.

"Le Rat" coolly replied that it was the Governor-General who had notified him of their approach, and had suggested the

* Charlevoix gives the detail of what took place. It is alluded to by de Belmont, who has preserved the phrase "J'ai tué la paix." The writer of the "Relations des Evénements de la Guerre" speaks of "Le Rat" having killed one of the deputation and made prisoners of the other three.

attack. When he was told that the Chiefs were proceeding to Montreal to discuss terms of peace, he affected the greatest surprise, and expressed extreme regret for what had happened. He declared that hereafter he would no longer trust the French Governor. He immediately gave his prisoners their liberty, although he was at war with them, adding that he would feel satisfied, only when he had revenged on the Governor the unworthy action the latter had committed by his deceit.

The Iroquois acted precisely in the manner "Le Rat" had anticipated. They abandoned all negotiation, and returned home to relate the outrage, with the firm resolution to take steps to revenge the supposed wrong. "Le Rat" complacently told those about him that he had killed the peace.

But the diplomacy of "Le Rat" was not ended. He had lost one of his men in the fray, and, according to custom, he had supplied his place by a captive Iroquois. Arrived at Michilimackinac, the prisoner was given over as having been taken in war, and was condemned to be shot. In vain the unfortunate prisoner narrated the true circumstances of his presence there. His story was set down to cowardice and fear of death. No sooner was the sentence executed than "Le Rat" took steps for the death to be known. He held an Iroquois slave, whom he set free, and sent to the Indian villages to relate what he had seen, and to tell how all the efforts of "Le Rat" to save the prisoner had been in vain.

The efforts of "Le Rat" to create discord were successful. The treachery of the French was on all sides believed, and the narrative was circulated through the Iroquois villages. There was no hope of safety for the future but in war, and a war of extermination. A terrible act of revenge and slaughter was resolved upon. In the meantime the Hurons remained unharmed. They were accepted friends of the French, but the Iroquois exerted themselves to obtain their friendship, in accordance with the policy of Dongan.

If ever a nemesis followed an act of treachery, it was seen in the consequences which arose from the conduct of de De-

nonville and de Champigny at Cataraqui the previous year. The mode in which their countrymen had been invited under the bait of a feast to Fort Frontenac, and had been seized as prisoners to be sent to the French galleys, was the theme of every Iroquois wigwam. The painful memory of the outrage remained. Had de Denonville's early policy been honest and honourable, he might have been spared the consequences of "Le Rat's" treachery. It was now recollected how silently and covertly he had carried on his preparations for the invasion of the Seneca territory, and how to the last moment the missionary, Père de Lamberville, at the risk of his life, had been left at his post. The Iroquois were thus prepared to believe any deceit or wrong attributed to the French. Under other circumstances the eyes of the Senecas might have been opened to the true state of the case. One of the wounded Iroquois had reached Fort Frontenac, and had there told his story. He was kindly received, and sent back to the Senecas as the bearer of explanations, to which were added strong expressions of sorrow for what had happened. The Iroquois, however, regarded the message as part of the fraud. Every attempt to renew negotiations failed. Promises never to be realized were given of Indian attendance at Quebec. They were renewed again, to be broken. The Senecas assigned as a reason that Andros would not allow them to attend any convention. Months passed away. All was doubt and uncertainty. The early weeks of spring succeeded a winter undisturbed by outrage. Summer came with its sunshine and heat, and the quiet was unbroken. The one item of news which disturbed Canada arrived on the 14th of July, 1689. The Revolution in England had been successfully accomplished. James II. was a fugitive at Saint Germain's, and there was now war between the two countries.

On Wednesday, the 13th of February, 1689, William and Mary were proclaimed King and Queen of England. The Revolution was not so peaceably carried out in Scotland. In Ireland, Tyrconnel clung to the fortunes of James, and, aided by a French army, commenced open hostilities. In New

England and New York the change of dynasty was accepted within a brief period. A few years only were to pass, before the effect of this momentous change was felt on this Continent. Until the Treaty of Ryswick, England could make but moderate efforts for the preservation of her Transatlantic possessions. Nevertheless, a more determined attitude was at once taken in the English Colonies. From this date the rulers of New France felt that their strength must not lie in intrigue only, but that a bold, determined policy, was necessary to the preservation of Canada as a French possession.

From this period may be traced all that we possess of liberty in the British Empire: freedom of religious thought, of speech, of political belief, of personal action, of individual liberty. In Great Britain personal government came to an end. There have since been periods when parliaments have been corrupt and obsequious, when they have included placemen whose votes were to be purchased. But the principle of good government was established, to be developed it is true, slowly and gradually, often evolved in effort, pain and sorrow. Still the progress has been certain and constant, and true liberty has never receded. There has been no return to the uncontrollable, despotic, irresistible will of one man. There is no Canadian in the Dominion, of whatever race he may be, that has not to-day cause to bless the memory of this Revolution, from the workings of which he enjoys the full liberty that he possesses. He can worship God according to the dictates of his conscience, and has his share in the responsibilities and duties of government; no slight boon if, as individuals, men will remember that they always obtained the governments they deserve. A ministry can be regardless of their trust and obligation only when the constituencies abandon their rights and duties. It is the people who form the institutions under which they live; and institutions are good or bad as men make them. That in this land we have this power, is owing to what we may still truly call the glorious Revolution of 1688.

M. de Belmont relates that a Christian Indian in July had

been seized by some Iroquois on the Island of Montreal. They took possession of his bracelet and shirt. They told him they would give him his freedom, if he would persuade the Indians dwelling on the settlement to leave it, and return to the Iroquois ; that the French were lost. The man, in making his report, declared it to be true ; “but,” remarks the Abbé, “neither we nor anybody else were willing to believe so.”

News was brought that an unusually large expedition had left Onondaga, with many women disguised as men. On the alarm being given, orders were sent for the garrisons to keep within the forts. Père de Lamberville and Le Moyne de Longueuil were sent on an embassy, to quiet if possible the hostile feeling of the Senecas. But they failed to meet any of the chiefs.

There were, indeed, indications enough that mischief was brewing. The insufficient precautions taken shew, that the magnitude of the danger was not contemplated. There was little vigilance. No preparation was made for an extraordinary emergency. Even while the Senecas were on their way to assail Lachine, there was no anticipation of an assault differing from the forays of the past, by which the Colony had suffered : an attack which was to terminate in the most terrible massacre recorded in our annals.

It was the night of the 4th and 5th of August, 1689. One of the severe hail-storms, experienced at this season, raged on Lake Saint Louis. The Iroquois, whose numbers have been set down at fifteen hundred, cautiously advanced and landed above Lachine. They silently grouped themselves in parties round each house. In the early night, when all had retired to rest, the signal was given, which passed along the whole line. De Frontenac reported after his arrival in the autumn of the year, that the devastation extended over three leagues, seven and a half miles. Houses had been burned up to the gates of Montreal. The first intimation of the danger was the Indian war-whoop, only too well known. The massacre of the unfortunate inhabitants followed. Outrages were committed,

which can only be recorded with pain. Women whatever their condition were not spared. There were three stockade forts at Lachine: Remy, not far from the church; Rolland, and La Presentation, on a small island above the settlement. There was also a fortified camp, containing two hundred soldiers, about four and a half miles above Montreal, on the road to Lachine, from which aid when required might be obtained. It was under the command of de Subercase. The Indian named Atarhea, the one who had stated that to get rid of the wasps' nest it was necessary to destroy the wasps, had waited on the Governor, and had foretold that the attack was to be made. M. de Denonville had spoken on the subject to the Jesuits, "the only councillors he accepted." As they described Atarhea to be unworthy of credence, no notice was taken of the information. The Governor, however, had proceeded to Montreal, and, on his arrival being known, the principal officers had gone thither to pay him their respects. Of this number was M. de Subercase.

An officer belonging to the camp tells us* that at four in the morning his attention was awakened by the report of a gun. It was an intimation that something unusual had happened, and he reported the event to de Galifet, in command during the absence of M. de Subercase. The men were ordered under arms. Shortly after, the news arrived that Lachine was in flames.

"I asked," says the writer, "for twenty men to advance and repel the enemy. In fact, I did stop them, but the Commandant sent me orders not to go further. I entrenched myself at the spot where I was, but I was out of range, and in our very sight I saw the Iroquois empty the houses and go away loaded with clothes."

The news reached Montreal, carrying consternation. The

* "Recueil de ce qui s'est passé en Canada au sujet de la guerre tant les Anglois que des Iroquois, depuis l'année 1682." This work has been attributed to M. Gédéon de Catalogne. It records the events to 1712. It has been published by the Historical Society of Quebec, and likewise appears in the Quebec Documents I., p. 551.

gates were closed. The officers away from their posts started to rejoin them, and those on duty at the upper part of the island experienced great difficulty in returning. M. de Subercase went immediately to the camp of which he was in command, and with the force at his disposal unhesitatingly advanced to attack the Senecas. He was joined by one hundred volunteers. The troops from the upper forts were added to this body, and the whole proceeded onwards. As the men passed by the burning houses, and looked upon several of the inhabitants, each tied to a stake and burned, they became more desirous of meeting and punishing their enemy, whose path was thus marked by blood and destruction. From a surgeon who had escaped, de Subercase learned that the Senecas had established themselves in a wood, half a league to the west. Placing the volunteers as scouts on his wings, for there was some woody land to pass through, de Subercase pressed forward. He had proceeded but a short distance, when the order was passed from the rear to the front to halt.

De Subercase treated the command with contempt, and was hurrying his advance, when he was joined by de Vaudreuil. Unfortunately, the best soldier of high rank in Canada was absent, de Callières; and it is in an hour of emergency like this, that the presence of a commanding intellect is felt in its full worth. De Callières was in France, urging his project for the conquest of New York. The position which he would have filled was taken by M. de Vaudreuil.

M. de Vaudreuil joined de Subercase with an order from de Denonville that nothing was to be risked, and the halt was commanded. De Subercase was indignant;* still there was no course but to obey. During the halt, an officer with a small party pushed forward into the woods. They found some of the Iroquois stupefied with drink. They learned the next night from a *habitant*, who had been a prisoner and who had escaped, that three-fourths of them were dead-drunk from the brandy which they had stolen. Had they been attacked, their destruction would have been certain. The

* "Ils en vinrent au gros mots." Recueil p. 23.

retreat, however, was ordered, and the column returned to the flying camp. So little provision had been made against any serious attack; that there was but little powder in the camp, and two barrels had to be obtained from the magazine.

At ten in the morning the Iroquois took to their canoes. They landed near to Fort Presentation, and passed before it within range. "Four hundred men," says the writer, "would have scattered them, but nothing was done." De Subercase proposed a sortie, and a hundred volunteers marched out under the command of St. Jean. They advanced towards the bush, where some Iroquois were established, and some shots were exchanged. During the skirmish, a party of fifty Frenchmen and thirty Indians which had left Fort Remy, endeavoured to join the detachment. They were vigorously attacked by a large body of Iroquois, and defeated in the presence of the French force; orders having been imperatively given that no advance beyond a certain point should be made. No aid was given them, and they were overpowered without the slightest effort to rescue them. The Commandant, de la Robeyre, was taken prisoner and was afterwards burned. The Christian Indians fought desperately. Most of them were killed. The Baron de Longueuil had his arm broken, and was carried back to Fort Remy. Some few of the most active escaped by distancing their pursuers, but the majority were killed or taken prisoners, and the small force was annihilated.

No attack was made on Montreal, or any of the forts in the neighbourhood. But the Iroquois devastations extended as far as Point aux Trembles. Finally, the Iroquois took their departure. They embarked in their canoes and crossed to the opposite shore to Chateauguay. As they were leaving they gave ninety yells, to denote the number of the captives they had taken, one for each prisoner. They, however, succeeded in seizing one hundred and twenty of those whom they had attacked. The fires were seen from Lachine, where the unhappy prisoners were tortured and burnt. There were five thus sacrificed in view of their countrymen; sufficient to

appease Iroquois rage and malignity, and the remainder were carried away to be distributed among the confederates. The record also exists that some children were roasted and eaten. As they were leaving the Canadian shore they shrieked, "Ononthio, you cheated us; now we cheat you." The estimate has been made that during this terrible night two hundred were killed.*

The canoes paddled homeward on the following day; and for weeks the Iroquois parties hung about the island. Their canoes were constantly threatening attack. In one of these expeditions, they were met in the Lake of the Two Mountains by du Luth, who had been sent out to reconnoitre the River Ottawa. There were twenty-seven men in his canoes. The Iroquois consisted of about the same number, and the sun was in their eyes. Du Luth ordered his men to make no attack, and they continued steadily to paddle towards the enemy. The Iroquois commenced firing unsteadily, hence without effect. Du Luth still advanced, until his canoes were within easy range. Every man in his party deliberately covered an individual enemy, and the whole fired. They killed or wounded the whole of the Iroquois, and those who fell into the river were drowned. Two only escaped with life. Both were seized. One was landed and immediately burned, while the other met the same fate in Montreal by the order of de Denonville.

This was the one act of prowess to cheer M. de Frontenac, when he returned to Canada in the autumn for his second governorship, as the recall of de Denonville had been determined on. Even, with the support which M. de Denonville had received from the ecclesiastics, his government had proved in every respect unfortunate, and, what more immediately affected him, was so considered in France. He had

* The expression is preserved by de Belmont: 'on nous a trompés, Ononthio; on te trompes aussy.' The term 'Ononthio' was applied to the Governors of Canada from the days of de Montmagny. The Iroquois, learning that the name meant 'Great Mountain,' translated it into their own language as 'Ononthio,' and the word was long retained by them, to be applied to every Governor.

seen Canada brought to the verge of ruin. So demoralized was the power of M. de Denonville, that he ordered Fort Cataraqui to be abandoned, and the buildings to be destroyed. The Bishop to the last could only see in him an able and virtuous administrator. M. de Denonville was prepared to do all the Bishop demanded, to extend to the ecclesiastics full consideration, to constitute them his advisers, and to increase their number. The difficulty of the crisis in which he was placed, was to be met in another way than by personal devotion. His conduct, with that of Intendant de Champigny, stands out in the annals of French Canada as the greatest act of treachery to the Indians, committed by the King's representative. A few years of such policy, with English Governors of the ability of Dongan, supported by the Court of St. James, and New France would have ceased to exist. Nevertheless, his conduct was approved and justified by his advisers in Canada. On the other hand, if his administration was condemned, personally he lost no prestige; for, on his return to France, he was appointed governor to the young Dukes, for which duty he was fitted by the respectability of his life. No Governor ever left the Colony so little regretted by the soldier who defended it, by the *habitant* who cultivated the soil, and the merchant who conducted its commerce.

There is one historical question in connection with this massacre. Did it originate at the dictate of English authority? Was it in any way fostered by the Government at Albany? It has been pretended that such was the case. Those who advance this opinion do so simply on surmise, and all evidence is against it. The attack on Lachine was dictated alone by the love of revenge which marks the Indian. The seizure of the Iroquois at Cataraqui, with the attack on the Seneca deputation at La Famine, attributed to the Governor's treason, exercised a powerful influence on savage thought. The main cause of hate, however, lay in the attack on the Seneca villages in August of 1687. Great injury was suffered, but the blow was not of sufficient force to strike terror

and repress all future self-assertion. It went no further than to awaken hatred.

The great argument against such an expedition having been countenanced by the English of New York was its political inexpediency in every point of view. Its failure would have humbled the Senecas, and have caused them to seek an independent peace with the French. Its success, by increasing their sense of power, would have added to their arrogance in their relations with New York. It could bring no advantage of any kind to the Government at Albany. There was no personal ill-feeling between the Governments of Quebec and New York. There was no wrong calling for an avenging retaliation, no venomous spite to gratify on either side. The interests of New York were in every direction against the expedition. No benefit could arise from it for the English Colonies. When the hour of declared hostility came, the attack was not treacherously made, no slight argument in considering this event. The conquest of Canada was attempted directly and openly. The attempt failed in 1690, and again in 1711. But these expeditions establish that Great Britain, in endeavouring to seize Canada, counted on success by other means than on an Indian war of extermination on outlying settlements. It remained for de Frontenac and his successors to endeavour to drive back British advanced settlement in this form; the policy which is the blot on the escutcheon of France, which in Languedoc crushed the Protestant in ruin or death on account of his belief, and turned the Palatinate into a wilderness.

CHAPTER VI.

There are few events in Canadian history more difficult to describe, than the closing scenes of de La Salle's life. He has himself left no narrative of what happened. Both the purpose that he had in view, and the proceedings he took to effect it, are covered with mystery. The documents which remain from his hand were written for special purposes, to attain the end of the moment, and cannot be accepted as unquestionable evidence. De La Salle's whole career establishes that he was unable to form effective combinations, and that he was incapable of enforcing the quiet but firm discipline indispensable to success. It is difficult to discover the true policy he had in view, in his voyage to the Gulf of Mexico. In every previous effort of his life, one dominant principle is apparent: it was to obtain peltry in exchange for French goods, and to sell the furs profitably in France. Was he actuated by a higher principle in his last expedition? It may be affirmed that, in its inception, his first descent of the Mississippi had no other origin than this, that, as the territory hitherto worked for furs ceased to yield the advantages of former days, it became necessary for de La Salle to extend his operations to more distant fields. It is difficult to assign any other object for his first explorations, except the desire to obtain a knowledge of the localities to which his trade relations might penetrate. The recall of de Frontenac had great influence on de La Salle's fortunes, and the inference is, that if no change of Government had then taken place, his career might have been less embarrassed and less unfortunate.

No such adverse circumstances can be traced in his maritime expedition to the mouth of the Mississippi as those by which he suffered in Canada. The course followed by him was the uncontrolled suggestion of his own deliberation and

purpose. No one but himself can be held responsible for the consequences.

Whatever admiration we may feel for de La Salle's nobler qualities, we look in vain for statesmanlike views or for the genius which conceives a wise and sound policy. On the contrary, all that is recorded of his life is vague, marked by uncertainty and hesitation. His want of success cannot wholly be affiliated to misfortune. There is nothing to suggest that he had any conception of a result desirable to attain. We are forced to recognize the reckless pursuit of an undefined object. Whatever the courage and fortitude shewn by him, they were unaccompanied by the forethought and wisdom that the exigencies of his desperate position should have called forth. All was confusion and want of purpose.

De La Salle, when he had reached the mouths of the Mississippi on the 9th of April, 1682, and had taken possession of the country by his proclamation to the two score of men and women standing by his side, reascended the river. They had but little provision, and had to live as they were best able. Alligators' flesh to some extent furnished them food. As occasion offered, they obtained corn from the tribes friendly to them ; but the Indians generally shewed themselves to be hostile. By the time they reached Fort Prudhomme, de La Salle was so ill that he was unable to proceed ; doubtless from the depressing fever and ague caused by the miasma in the undrained countries of those latitudes, especially near rivers. Accordingly, Tonty was despatched to Michilimackinac, whence he was to forward the news to Canada, announcing what was then called the discovery of the mouths of the Mississippi, and is so spoken of to this day.

De La Salle remained at Fort Prudhomme until September, attended by Father Membre. From the latter we learn, that at that date, de La Salle expressed the determination of forming settlements near the mouth of the river. On his recovery he proceeded to Michilimackinac, where he found Tonty, whom he despatched to the Illinois, with what men could be collected to construct a fort, naming as the site a

rock on the south side of the river which had previously attracted his attention.* De La Salle had formed the opinion on this occasion, that, if defended by a few resolute men, it was impregnable. It so proved in March, 1684, when for six days it was attacked by the Iroquois. De La Salle himself was preparing to leave for Montreal, when news reached him that an attack from the Iroquois on the Miamis was threatened. Considering his own men to be involved in the danger he retraced his steps to the Illinois, personally to direct the work, and in a few weeks the fort was placed in a condition capable of defence. One of the consequences of its construction was, that the tribes, threatened by the hostility of the Iroquois, established themselves in its neighbourhood. The garrison consisted of twenty Frenchmen and Canadians. De La Salle afterwards represented that twenty thousand Indians had been gathered there, with four thousand warriors; evidently an exaggeration, or a statement to be explained as including the population of the surrounding territory. There could have been no means of feeding so many Indians, always exacting and shiftless; but there was doubtless a large number attracted by the presence of the French.

The fort was finished in March, 1683, when de La Salle heard that his friend and protector, de Frontenac, had left Canada. He therefore addressed himself to the new Governor, de la Barre,† asking for countenance and support. He

* Mr. Parkman specially visited the River Illinois and examined the ground, in order to identify the spot where Fort St. Louis was constructed in 1682. He describes the locality as a rock on the south side of the Illinois at the junction of the River Vermilion, with a narrow plateau on the summit rising to the height of one hundred and twenty-five feet on a length of four miles, precipitous and inaccessible, except by an ascent from the east. The village of Utica on the north side is opposite to the eastern end of this rock. The present River Vermilion is shewn on French maps as the Aramoni.

Spoken of by the French as "Le Rocher," in modern times the place is known as the "Starved Rock," from the tradition that after the Indian war with Pontiac in 1764, some Indians, who had taken refuge on the summit, were besieged by the Pottawatamies, and starved to death.

[France and England in North America, III., p. 221.]

† 2nd April, 1683.

reported the success of his expedition, and dwelt on the necessity of establishing colonists along the route which he had opened, a policy which he had commenced to carry out; and earnestly asked that such of his men, as were sent by him to Montreal for supplies, should not be arrested. In his second letter he speaks of the threatened Iroquois attack, and again asks that his men should not be detained, as he was in need of reinforcements; likewise, that no seizure of his property in Montreal should be permitted, as he was in want of munitions and supplies. He represented that he had but twenty men and only a hundred pounds of powder.

It was evidently the duty of de la Barre, if the Illinois settlement was to be maintained, either to permit de La Salle to procure the means of defence that he was endeavouring to obtain, or to take the fort from his possession and hold it under Royal authority with an efficient garrison, and sufficient provisions and material of war. M. de la Barre had other views, for he had connected himself with a clique in the colony, intent on the monopoly of the western fur trade. He believed in their representations, that by acting with them he would be enabled to obtain large profits. The principals in this arrangement were de la Chesnaye, Le Ber, and Le Moyne. Seeing matters as these parties represented them, the Governor could only look on de La Salle as a rival. Accordingly, he endeavoured to make de La Salle's success impossible and to destroy his prestige. M. de la Barre's official position gave him extraordinary power, and he availed himself of it to denounce de La Salle to M. de Seignelay.

One point could always be urged with Louis XIV., who, permitting nothing to be done without his authority, would be struck by an appeal for its enforcement in any direction. The King had expressed the desire that men should remain on their farms and patiently cultivate them, remaining side by side, as much in the east of Canada as possible, in communication with France. He was constantly expressing his opposition to widening the area of settlement. M. de la Barre represented de La Salle as giving false reports of his dis-

coveries and as encouraging all the bankrupts and roving spirits of the country to join him in building up a power in the far west. The first effort of the Governor was directed against the personal credit of de La Salle in France. If this end were obtained, he, with his associates, would be able to ruin de La Salle in Canada.

At this date de La Salle had no reason to believe that there was a want of friendly feeling to him on the part of the new Governor, but a short time only was to elapse before he was made fully sensible of the fact. No supplies were sent him, and his men were made prisoners in Montreal as transgressors of the law. M. de la Barre also determined on the seizure of Fort Frontenac, on the pretence that the conditions on which the grant had been made had not been carried out. In 1683 he sent de La Chesnaye and Le Ber, who took possession of it by Royal authority. They were willing to retain the services of La Forest, de La Salle's lieutenant, if he would act in their interest. The offer was declined, and La Forest left the country. De La Salle subsequently complained that his stores and property had been seized and misappropriated. The Governor justified the proceeding on the ground of the insufficiency of the garrison; an irregularity which de La Salle's operations elsewhere might have been considered to condone.

In these difficulties de La Salle determined to proceed to France, and appeal in person to the Minister. He had, however, to experience a further proof of de la Barre's enmity. As he was descending the Lakes he met the Chevalier de Baugis, who had been sent up by the Governor to take possession of the fort on the Illinois. This order had been given without the garrison being strengthened, and it had only in view the removal of de La Salle. The latter saw the necessity of accepting the situation, and wrote by the Chevalier to Tonty, telling him to receive M. de Baugis with all respect. Tonty and de Baugis passed the winter together, their relations being perfectly friendly. Circumstances, indeed, called for cordial co-operation. They were constantly expecting attack. In the

spring of 1680 a large band of Iroquois did besiege the fort. Tonty tells us that the attack lasted for six days, and that, failing to make any impression, the besieging force withdrew.

In 1684, de La Salle was busy in France, endeavouring to find support for the projects that he had laid before the Minister. The hostile attitude of Spain greatly assisted him. The city of Strasbourg had been lately seized by Louis XIV. Alost, a small town between Ghent and Brussels, had been likewise claimed arrogantly from Spain. Luxembourg had been cannonaded and taken; Genoa had been bombarded on the ground that, the Republic had engaged to furnish galleys to Spain, and had accordingly shewn hostility to France. All efforts to attain redress at Versailles having failed, Spain was so carried away by indignation as to declare war, although ill prepared for it. Hostilities, however, were not long continued, for peace was made on the 15th of August, 1684, by the truce of Ratisbon. It has been made a reproach against de La Salle that he proposed an attack on the Spanish American Province of New Biscay, and the mines of St. Barbe. In the actual condition of war such an expedition was perfectly justifiable. The graver suspicion, based on the insufficient means he asked to be furnished him, suggests either that he could not have been sincere in making the proposal, or that he counted on being sustained after his arrival by an immediate and powerful reinforcement of men and material of war.

It was not the first time that France had made pretensions to the country in the Gulf of Mexico; or, in other words, to establish a French port there. As early as 1669, Louis XIV., had addressed a letter to the Comte d'Estrées, asking, in view of the good of the service and the advantage of his subjects in the West India Islands, whether the filibusters should be allowed to make war against Spanish ships. In 1672, Colbert threatened reprisals if French vessels were interfered with in the Gulf. In 1679, the Comte d'Estrées presented a Memoir in which he set forth that it would not be difficult to seize the prominent positions in Spanish America, naming especially Carthagena and Havana. In the same year matters were

brought to a crisis. In the month of July, a small frigate, commanded by Captain Longchamps, was seized by the Spanish squadron, under the command of Quintana, who made the captain and crew prisoners, and carried them to Porto Bello, on the ground that he had received orders to prevent the navigation of the Gulf of Mexico by French vessels. Accordingly, M. d'Estrées was sent out with a force to find Quintana, and to compel him to salute a vessel of strength inferior to his own, bearing a French flag ; and, as it was not to be expected that he would obtain full satisfaction, to find grounds for fighting him. Further he was everywhere to declare the nature of the service on which he was engaged. In 1682 the same instructions were given to Gobaret, who was placed in command of three vessels. He was ordered to observe the several ports, to cruise in the Gulf of Mexico, and if he found Spanish ships there to fight them ; likewise, to visit all foreign ships to see if they contained French prisoners. The English were excepted from this order. No encounter took place, for the vessels of Spain and France did not meet.

About this date, Comte de Peñalossa appeared in Paris. He was a Creole, of Spanish blood, born in Peru in 1624. He was of good family, and had held many positions of honour. In 1661, he was Governor of New Mexico. He himself states that he there arrested an Inquisitor who had interfered with his authority. Subsequently, on proceeding to Mexico, he himself was arrested by the all-powerful Inquisition. For thirty-two months he was kept a prisoner. His property was seized and sold for a fourth of its value, the sum obtained being eighty-six thousand ecus. He was fined fifty-one thousand ecus ; the remaining thirty-five thousand were also withheld from him. Accordingly, he determined to go to Spain to appeal for justice. Possibly, it was felt that at Madrid, he would be more thoroughly in the power of the Inquisition, and that his arrest on his arrival had been determined. In 1668, he reached Vera Cruz. Thence he gained Teneriffe, where, meeting an English vessel, he

sailed for London. He was kindly received by the Duke of York. From London he proceeded to Paris, where he found the conditions of life so much to his liking that he resolved to renounce his Spanish allegiance and become a subject of France.

Like all men who had undergone this revulsion of feeling, he was exceedingly embittered against his native country, and especially against the Spaniards of Mexico. On several occasions, he accuses them of treating the native Spanish Mexicans with cruelty and injustice, and, having his own injuries to avenge, he believed that he was acting patriotically to his new country, by proposing an attack on the Mexican possessions.

Early in 1682 he addressed the French Government on the subject. In this Memoir* he proposed the conquest of the northern province of New Biscay. He argued that all the Indians, Metis, Mulattos and Spaniards born in America hated the Spaniards, and that they would willingly ally themselves with the French, as being Roman Catholics. The gold mines of San Diego and the lead mines of Santa Barbara would prove the source of great wealth. He asked no money, but simply de Seignelay's protection. He would arm eighteen hundred buccaneers of San Domingo, and with this force make the attempt. The population of that island was then from six to seven thousand Frenchmen, with seven hundred women, taking no account of the Indians. In 1684, de La Salle was in Paris. In January of that year Peñalossa presented a second Memoir. He suggested two modes of attack. The first was to proceed to Panuco with a thousand or twelve hundred filibusters, and one Grammont as his second in command. He stated his willingness to be hanged on the first tree if he gave false information, or failed in his promises. He was certain of success. He set forth that it was only with difficulty

* 18th January, 1682. "Memoire pour Mgr. le Marquis de Seignelay touchant l'establissement d'une nouvelle colonie dans la Florida, dans l'embouchure de la Rivière appelée Rio Braso, et les avantages qu'en peuvent revenir au Roi et à ses sujets."

that soldiers could be brought to New Biscay. The mines would yield a revenue of from twenty to twenty-five millions *ecus*, and would in themselves repay the cost of the enterprise. There was little fear of opposition. The Governor of Mexico dared not leave the capital for fear of revolt, and if troops were despatched, the men sent forward would never find their way to the place attacked. He asked the Government, to undertake the assemblage of the filibusters in San Domingo, the means of landing them, and to furnish them six months' rations.

The second scheme was to ascend the Rio Braso, the present Rio Grande, which Peñalossa confounded with the Mississippi. De La Salle had lately arrived in France. Peñalossa speaks of him as being in possession of Fort St. Louis, on the Illinois, held by a French garrison, and a good commandant, with four thousand Indians, armed and disciplined,* and as having built four other forts. His assistance is accordingly counted upon as a matter of course.

Peñalossa was evidently the man to believe what he wished. He speaks of the arms of His Majesty, set up by de La Salle in localities on the Mississippi, as being held so sacred by the Indians that they offer sacrifices to them. He explains that the design in establishing a port on the Gulf of Mexico, was that France, at the first rupture with Spain, would have a basis to attack her Mexican possessions. De La Salle's co-operation was therefore necessary. If the main enterprise were deferred for a time, de La Salle could proceed to the Gulf of Mexico, and place matters in such a condition, that the project in view could eventually be carried out.

To those knowing de La Salle's Canadian career, these statements read strangely untrue. Until he had met Peñalossa in Paris, such theories formed no part of his project. He had descended the Mississippi, with the design of extending the operations in the trade of furs in which he was engaged. His occupation of Fort Frontenac furnishes full evidence that

* "Et quatre mille sauvages qu'il a armés et disciplinés du nombre de plus de dix huit mil personnes qui se sont habituées aux environs de son fort."

he had in no way countenanced any plan of settlement; and it is most probable that he had never heard of the Province of New Biscay until this date. It is equally evident, that Peñalossa and de La Salle had met, and were acting in concert. The Memoirs given by both show the reflex of the other's influence, and that each was reacting on the other; each possibly endeavouring to make use of the other. It was upon the information that Peñalossa had given him, that de La Salle took upon himself to declare the enmity to Spain, felt by the Mississippi Indians whom he had met in his descent, and, as a consequence, their devotion to himself. Of their feelings in this respect, personally, he could form no opinion of the least value.

There was something plausible in all that was said by Peñalossa, which no doubt appealed to the craving for power so apparent in the character of Louis XIV. Possibly, if a dash had been made for Panuco, the expedition might have succeeded. The Abbé Bernouï said of Peñalossa, that he had never found him guilty of falsehood with regard to what he had said that he had seen.* At this period, any proposition for expeditions of this character was submitted to the Marquis de Seignelay. His father, Colbert, had inculcated as the leading principle of his conduct the duty of pleasing the King; and, excepting his pleasures, and the interest felt by him in the Royal navy, he thought of little beyond. No doubt, the Abbé Bernouï expressed the general view of those who had knowledge of the objects of the expedition: that de La Salle should proceed to the spot and establish himself, and, at the same time, make the necessary observations, on which the enterprise could be carried out without fear of mistake.†

Peñalossa does not appear on the scene after de Beaujeu returned to France in July, 1685; he died in 1687.

* "je ne l'ai trouvé menteur en rien de ce qu'il dit avoir vu."

† "Si l'entreprise est retardée il persuadera d'autant plus aisément les ministres de la nécessité qu'il y a, qu'il aille devant, pour s'établir et prendre toutes les lumières nécessaires sur lesquelles on pourra tout entreprendre sans crainte de se tromper."

Whatever the influence of Peñalossa on the tone of thought of de Seignelay, which de La Salle's quick powers of observation led him to discover, certainly de La Salle on his side represented matters on the Mississippi not in accordance with their true condition.* The project of the foundation of a colony in the newly discovered Louisiana, did not meet general acceptance in France. The descent of the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico, which he had accomplished, was, however, held of greater importance, and obtained for him credit and consideration. He was listened to by de Seignelay, and well received by the King. The *Mercure Galant* spoke of his labours in the tone† often taken by himself. He was represented as the victim of the machinations of his enemies ; his vessels had been purposely destroyed ; of his men four hundred in number, all had been seduced from his service excepting twenty-two ; but he had forced his way to the river mouth, against every obstacle. He was credited with knowing ten Indian languages, so that he could judge the conditions and feelings of the tribes he had met, in the light of their devotion to himself and French interests ; an important statement in respect to his representations on the subject. He had discovered and pushed his expedition to the confines of Mexico. Midway he had built a fort capable of containing fifty men, so the temporary entrenchment above the Ohio was described ; and de La Salle had arrived in France to make his report to the King.

In his Memoir to de Seignelay there was the usual insincere appeal to the King's weakness, that the glory of God would be advanced by preaching the Gospel to these tribes. De La Salle set forth that it had been Colbert's desire to establish French settlements in the territory where the Spaniards had obtained their wealth. He proposed to build a fort sixty leagues above the mouth of the river, representing that it was easy to found a colony there, on account of the fertility of the soil, and the temperate climate. He dwelt on the

* Vide documents given by M. Margry, p. 353, Vol. II., *et seq.*

† May, 1684.

hatred of the Indian against the Spaniard, describing the tribes as devoted to himself, ready to follow him in any enterprise; and he counted on the service of fifteen thousand Indians, prepared to rally round him in his proposed undertaking. He then advocated the seizure of the northern Mexican Province of New Biscay, defended by four hundred indolent and effeminate Spaniards. To assist him in this project, he asked for a vessel and two hundred men: not regular soldiers, but artizans who could work and be made soldiers. He dwelt earnestly on the expediency of this policy, and parenthetically speaks of the demoralizing influences arising from the presence of regular troops in a country. He stated that he had ascended the Red River, named by him the River Seignelay, sixty leagues, some one hundred and fifty miles; an assertion in no way warranted.

He enlarged on the necessity of constructing forts at well selected points, to prevent the country falling into the hands of the English or Spaniards. He proposed to recruit fifty buccaneers at San Domingo; to bring down four thousand Illinois Indians from Fort St. Louis; to arm fifteen thousand Indians on the Mississippi, and to seize New Biscay; or in other words Spanish America, for to this the proposition virtually amounted.

Under the system of personal government in France there was no one to make the inquiry if this force really existed, and in what form its services could be made available. Slight consideration of de La Salle's statements, would have shewn them to be purely speculative. The project of arming the buccaneers was more feasible, and de Seignelay wrote to de Cussy, Governor of Ile Tortue, to assemble as many as he could collect, to be ready to start in October.

We read the disastrous fate of the expedition, and wonder if the statement of de La Salle was miscalculation, or misrepresentation. One impression it is impossible to resist; that de La Salle did not understand either the character or magnitude

* 4th March, 1684.

of the difficulties which lay in his path, and that he was without a policy to overcome them.

Writers favourable to de La Salle represent that the Mexican scheme had no serious part in his policy, his intention being to hold the mouths of the Mississippi, and colonize the territory in the mode followed in later years; and that he only used this tone of argument to gain the attention of the Court, which otherwise he would have failed to obtain; that likewise he looked forward to the early termination of the war, which would lead to the abandonment of this part of his scheme. This theory can only be admitted on the supposition, that de La Salle was guilty of deliberate misrepresentation; advancing for his own purpose a project, of the risk of which he knew nothing, and staking on the game, recklessly and dishonestly for his selfish ends, the lives of gallant men and adventurous women. Blame has been thrown by him upon every one but himself. But it is impossible to resist the conviction that he was without a defined serious policy. He trusted to the future to carry out some successful *tour de force*, which would justify his departure from the line he had traced out, and his self-reliance was unfaltering.

His project obtained favour with the Government, and sympathy and support were in no way withheld. He received more than the countenance he asked for. The king wrote to de la Barre and to the Intendant de Meulles, commanding them to make restitution to de La Salle for the injury done him in seizing Fort Frontenac and Fort Saint Louis. De la Barre was instructed to replace the former in the hands of de La Salle's lieutenant La Forest, and likewise to make good the loss arising from his property having been taken and appropriated.

Orders were given for an expedition to be fitted out at La Rochelle. A Royal commission was given to de La Salle as its leader, and it was expected that it would shortly leave France. The vessel selected was the 'Joly' of thirty-six guns. The naval commander was M. de Beaujeu, and it is upon his name that censure has been unsparingly heaped.

No character in the French history of Canada has been held up to greater reprobation. It is my duty to examine into the justice of these accusations, and to endeavour to determine if this verdict is warranted by the facts.

De Beaujeu is distinctly named as the principal, indeed as the only cause of de La Salle's failure. Doubts have been cast upon his loyalty, as if he had been a consenting party to conduct designed to embarrass future operations, and had persistently directed his efforts to mar the success of the expedition. The perusal of the letters of M. de Beaujeu justify no such view.* While the expedition was fitting out, several objections were certainly raised by him; but they were such as prudence suggested on his part as an experienced seaman. He was Norman by birth, and more than once alludes to the fact in explanation of the opinions which he expresses.† He had been thirty years at sea, thirteen of which he had passed as captain of a vessel. He was extremely susceptible about the consideration which he considered was his due, and he felt that the powers given to de La Salle were not in accordance with the personal and professional courtesy he had the right to expect. De Beaujeu's powers were not extensive; he was held responsible only for the navigation of the vessel, and was bound to carry out all that in other respects de La Salle might desire. He had not been nominated in the first instance. Captain Pingault had been appointed;‡ but the change had been made at an early period, for de Beaujeu's instructions are dated only three weeks later.§ The destination of the expedition was concealed. It was at first reported that the vessel was to sail for Canada, and mystery on the subject was observed for some weeks.

After two months had elapsed and no start had been made, expostulations were earnestly sent on the subject from Paris.

* Mr. Margry has published these letters, italicising many passages to establish his theory of M. de Beaujeu's antagonism to de La Salle.

† "Je suis un bon gros Normand, qui ne scay qu'aller mon grand chemin et droit au service." Margry II., p. 434.

‡ 23rd March, 1684. § 14th April, 1684.

Not until the 25th of May did de Beaujeu know the nature of the service in which he was to be engaged, and he immediately protested against sailing on such an expedition with six months' provisions. He asked for nine months', and he pointed out that if the information had been communicated to him in Paris, he would have recommended the employment of a larger vessel, "Le Pendant," in every way more fit, having a larger hold, with the capacity of embarking three hundred men, whereas the "Joly" was limited in her capacity. "Le Pendant" would have cost less to equip, and there would have been no danger of the separation of the vessels during the voyage. At the same time, while de Beaujeu expressed his willingness to lend assistance in every form, he complained of being placed under the orders of de La Salle, and that, in case of the death of the latter, Tonty, then named to accompany the expedition, was to take command. What he asked was, that he should have joint authority, and that no offensive operations should be taken without his consent. With the civil and commercial relations of the enterprise he desired in no way to interfere.*

De Seignelay's reply was really a rebuke. He called upon de Beaujeu to give every facility possible, and in no way to feel aggrieved in the matter of the command, otherwise there would be nothing so likely to lead to failure. Four days later de Beaujeu reported the "Joly" as ready for sailing; it was the matter of provisions which had caused the delay. De Beaujeu, even at this date, complained of the unreasonable character of de La Salle. One condition which the latter was desirous of exacting was that no one should be allowed to ascertain the latitude. It appeared to de Beaujeu that de La Salle was preparing against failure by his protests against the Intendant, in which he complained that some of the officials were in league with his enemies. De Beaujeu himself therefore desired special instructions how to proceed, so that hereafter he would not be held responsible, in case de La Salle failed to execute all that he had promised. De La Salle, moreover,

* Letter to de Seignelay, 17th June, 1684.

demanded the full command of the troops when on board ship. De Beaujeu pointed out the difficulties which would arise in certain contingencies from such an arrangement. His practical experience led him to discern clearly the insufficiency of de La Salle's proceedings, and accordingly he asked that throughout there should be a definite understanding, so that he might clearly know what his duty was. The difference of opinion between the two, was on one side, the view taken of the situation by a man bred in discipline, and on the other, by one who had no experience of what was necessary, and who failing to understand the points raised by de Beaujeu, attributed them to jealousy. To any one knowing the necessity of a clear definition of duty and obligation, in such a recognized divided authority, it is evident that de Beaujeu desired to provide for the contingencies which he foresaw must arise.

De Beaujeu replied to de Seignelay's reproof that he only desired to have joint authority when at sea, more especially as de La Salle had plainly told him that he had simply charge of the sails and sailors, and could exercise no control over the volunteers and soldiers. The point, however, had made no difficulty between de La Salle and himself, and it had been referred to the Intendant. He had not found it possible to comply with de La Salle's request to embark the provisions, and 20,000 livres' worth of merchandise belonging to a merchant named Cochy.

There was a question as to the number of persons to be boarded at the Captain's table. Naturally, the point arose who should pay the expense. Among other matters, de La Salle demanded that a sentry should be kept at his cabin door, and claimed to give the order of the day, on the ground that his commission conferred on him powers equal to those possessed by the Governor of Canada. He also drew up a memorandum, consisting of twenty-eight articles, which he asked de Beaujeu to sign. It was submitted to the Intendant, who was again the peace maker, and de Beaujeu signed it, after it had been somewhat modified. "You will judge," adds de Beaujeu, "the character of de La Salle better by

this proceeding than by all I can tell you, and you will see that it is not I who am making the difficulties, but it is he who is creating them for himself. For I grant him everything and he is not content. I have done more. For seeing him here embarrassed, and without money, I offered him a hundred pistoles, * which he took, and I have his note for them. You can then clearly understand, that it is not my desire to interfere with his enterprise, since I even contributed my money, for which I have only the security of the government of Louisiana."

The absence of method and system in de La Salle, produced the effect always attendant when they are wanting. De Beaujeu wrote plainly to the Minister, that de La Salle had undertaken a matter of which he was not certain, and that if his success did not meet the expectations which he had raised, he would not fail to cast the blame in all directions; predicting what in modern times has come to pass, with the writers who vindicate de La Salle's memory at de Beaujeu's expense. De Beaujeu gives the names of those who had had opportunities of judging what had taken place, and he refers to them for the expression of their views on the subject. This was no underhand statement, but an official communication to the Minister, and, while making it, de Beaujeu declared his intention of so acting that no just or well-grounded reproach could be made against him. †

Reports had been carried to Paris unfavourable to the condition and health of the troops enlisted, stating that many were children and unfit to serve. The Intendant requested de Beaujeu to report as to their character. 'I solemnly assure you, Monseigneur,' he says, 'that I have never seen a better troop. It is true that there are youths among them, but they have all good frames, and they will better accustom themselves to the climate where we are going, than those who are older.' He explains that he had been authorized to take

* One thousand livres.

† "Soyez persuadé que vous n'en aurez aucune reproche au moins qui soit juste et valable."

ten of these men to complete the crew of the "Joly" to eighty men ; but as this step would raise a difficulty between de La Salle and himself, he preferred to keep his crew to seventy, and not claim the ten men.

There are also private letters of de Beaujeu extant which demand our attention, and give a favourable view of his character. Written in the familiarity of friendly relationship, they are marked by unusual literary ability, and are in every way readable. He writes with perfect frankness with regard to his feelings during this crisis. He conveys the idea of being any thing but unsympathizing and ungenial. Certainly he was in no way deficient in professional knowledge and capacity ; and had he been assigned a leading part in the expedition, and a larger vessel selected, a result might have been attained different from the melancholy sequel which has to be chronicled.

He relates that when he reached La Rochelle, de La Salle had not arrived. He came a few days later, and found the "Joly" small ; somewhat late for him to do so. He early communicated the fact that he was not bringing Tonty with him, an arrangement which remained unaltered, although attempts were made to modify it. It was not long before a misunderstanding arose. Seeing a Memoir of his writing in the hands of the Intendant Arnoul to whom it had been referred, with marginal notes, de Beaujeu remarks, that de La Salle had difficulty in containing himself, and made use of language, "which led me to reply to him, that I had little interest in his affairs, and that the King, who had intrusted to me matters of much greater importance, and likewise his vessels, would not speak to me as he had done. He came back and apologized to me, so we parted good friends." De Beaujeu was asked to take an interest in the venture, but declined to do so. On his side, de La Salle complained to Minet, the engineer, that he had made many advances to de Beaujeu who would not accept them. De Beaujeu mentions the statement with surprise, as he had shewn de La Salle unusual friendship and kindness. "I thought him an honest

* 21st May.

Norman," de Beaujeu was himself from Normandy, "but such are not now in fashion. To-day it is one thing, to-morrow another," and, he adds that he always endeavoured to agree with de La Salle in order to avoid a quarrel.

In the meantime de La Salle still kept his secret, and the destination of the vessel remained unknown. Be Beaujeu felt relief that such was the case, for it saved him from responsibility. As late as the 5th of June, de Beaujeu writes that de La Salle had determined to proceed by way of Canada. It was not until the question of pilotage came up, that light was thrown upon the future. It was then said, that the pilot should know the coast of San Domingo, as they might go from Canada to that island, where they would be the forerunners of others. No mention was made of the character of the expedition; evidently the reference was to Peñalossa. Even this slight allusion warrants the supposition that de La Salle's operations were not intended to establish a commercial colony, and that the serious design entertained against Spanish America was to be sustained by a second expedition under Peñalossa. On this theory, much of de La Salle's vacillation and delay can be accounted for.

By the middle of June de La Salle stated that he would pass by the Gulf of Mexico, and de Beaujeu still writes that nothing was certain. De La Salle did not know what course to take. At one time, he feared that the expedition would be entrusted to somebody else; as if Peñalossa would appear to take command. When the question came up as to the additional freight, which de Beaujeu declared the "Joly" could not take, "Why did you not tell me that in Paris?" said de La Salle. "How could I," was the reply, "when I knew nothing of your affairs?" "I recognised my Province,"* remarks de Beaujeu. It was not even from de La Salle himself, that de Beaujeu first knew the destination of the "Joly;" he read it in the *Gazette de Hollande*.

The demand of de La Salle that a sentry should be placed at his cabin door, was met by the Intendant suggesting that

* "Je reconnai-sais la Province."

de La Salle and de Beaujeu should each have a sentry, "which," said de Beaujeu, "I do not require." As de La Salle also desired to determine the word of the day, thus making himself the first person on the vessel, it was settled that on one or two occasions he should give it, and then refer the order to de Beaujeu.

In private conversation de La Salle expressed his want of confidence in de Beaujeu. He was suspicious of the esteem in which Madame de Beaujeu held the Jesuits. He said she was governed by them ; and the inference follows, that, in his opinion, her influence over her husband made him inimical to the expedition. The Jesuits at this date were the fashionable confessors in France. No doubt, it was to follow the general example, that Madame de Beaujeu selected a Jesuit father as her *directeur*. As a woman of rank and fashion she would act like other ladies of her position ; but no one can read the letters of de Beaujeu without recognizing his strong, clear intellect, and that he was the last man to commit a wrong under the sentimental guise of religion.

De La Salle unfortunately distrusted everybody: de Beaujeu, the Intendant Arnoul, the staff of his office, his own officers. No one was his confidant, and even with his subordinates he was unfriendly. Tonty, the brother of his trusted lieutenant in Canada, he refused to bring with him ; de Valigny, one of his captains, recommended by Morel, an official in the confidence of de Seignelay, was dissatisfied. Minet, the engineer, was equally so. La Forest did not desire to return to Fort Frontenac. The proverb still holds good that the epitaph of anyone who has taken a leading part in the world's history, must be written by those who have served under him in the humbler and less rewarded positions, unconnected with the clique whose praise, purchased by advancement and emolument, is often only the consequence of corruption.

It is not a favourable point of view for de La Salle's character to be judged by.

CHAPTER VII.

All hindrances being removed, the expedition started from La Rochelle on the 24th of July, 1684. It consisted of four vessels: the "Joly," the royal frigate, carrying thirty-six guns; the "Belle," a barque of six guns, specially given by the King to de La Salle; the "Aimable," a store ship, freighted by traders in La Rochelle interested in the enterprise; the "Saint Francis," laden with provisions and stores; a ketch, a vessel with two masts. From the unequal powers of sailing of these vessels, the chance of capture was increased, and the expedition consequently was disadvantageously constituted. The number on board, independently of the crews of the vessels, is given by the engineer Minet as one hundred and seventy-two; * one hundred soldiers, three Sulpician priests, the Abbé Cavelier, Messrs. d'Esmanville, and Chedeville; three Recollets, Zenobe Membré, Anastase Douay, who left an account of the expedition, and was one of the five who were fortunate in reaching the Illinois, and Maxime Le Clercq, a connection of the historian of the *Établissement de la Foi*; five officers, De Saligny, Barbier, Marquis de la Sablonnière, and Moranget, a nephew of de La Salle; nine volunteers; eight merchants; forty-four artisans and labourers. There were also some emigrants, among them a Canadian family named Talon, with six children, four boys and two girls, with some young girls, † who risked their fortunes on the success of the expedition.

Among the volunteers were men of family and citizens of respectability. Of the former was young Cavelier, a nephew of de La Salle, a mere boy, who passed through the dangers

* Joutel names the number including the crews at two hundred and eighty.

† According to Couture, who received his information from the Abbé Cavelier, there were five women and young girls. Margry III., p. 602.

and privations safely to reach Canada. Joutel who was also of the expedition had seen some service in the royal army; he was the son of the gardener to de La Salle's uncle, and in after years published an account of the expedition. The leading events after the departure of the French frigate are preserved for the most part in his Memoirs.

The vessels had been but a few hours at sea when the bowsprit of the "Joly" broke. They put back to Rochefort. In a few hours the necessary repairs were made, and on the 1st of August the vessels again sailed. On approaching Madeira, de Beaujeu desired to obtain water and provisions. De La Salle objected; he had the constant argument to sustain his views, that what he opposed was contrary to the King's wishes. The "Joly" carried two hundred and forty persons, crew and passengers.* It is natural to suppose that an experienced commander like de Beaujeu, would be the best judge as to the necessity of obtaining additional supplies. De La Salle argued that the vessel had been but a few days out, and could not require them, and that the presence of the vessels in the harbour would betray the character of the expedition. De La Salle's powers overruled the desire of the commander, and the voyage was continued. There was some disappointment among those on board. One of them, Puget, described as a passenger and a Huguenot, expressed himself somewhat freely, but we are told he apologized for his language.† The vessels were separated by a storm, and they again met. It has been said that as they were approaching the Island of San Domingo, de La Salle desired to land at Port la Paix, and that this wish was ignored by de Beaujeu, who passed by the place in the night.‡ There was a fair wind on the 25th of September, and letters of de La Salle establish that it was by agreement they proceeded to Petit Goave, on the western side of the island. The "Joly" had far outsailed the other vessels.

* De Beaujeu, 25th October, from Petit Goave.

† D'Esmenville.

‡ The fact is not mentioned by the Recollet Douay. His account was published in 1691, within three years of his return to Canada.

There had been much sickness on board, and de La Salle was himself a sufferer. Two of the men had died on the passage. One cause assigned for the bad health of the crew was that the mid-decks were filled with merchandise, and that the soldiers and sailors had been forced to remain on deck, exposed to the sun and rain.

The "Aimable" and "Belle" soon followed. They brought the painful news that the ketch, the "St. Francis," had been taken by Spanish cruisers. The captain, apprehending no danger, had kept no watch, and in a perfect calm the ship was surprised by Spanish pirogues. She had entered Port la Paix for protection during the storm, and it was on leaving that port she had been captured. The convoy had been throughout imperfectly observed, and owing to much bad weather the vessels had been little together.

At Petit Goave, de La Salle was prostrated by sickness ; it was under these circumstances that de Beaujeu reported the arrival of the vessels to the Minister. Whatever the cause, de La Salle had no lieutenant of ability or character to supply his place when absent. It seems incredible that there should have been such a lack of discipline and system. This defect is discoverable throughout his career. His early want of training, his life with the Indians, his uncertainty of purpose, the instruments with which he had hitherto acted, had tended to develop this fault in his character. As a leader he was deficient in the prudence and powers of combination necessary to success. In this case, the absence of such a second in command led the Sulpicians, Cavalier La Salle's brother, and d'Esmanville to ask de Beaujeu to intervene. At first de Beaujeu declined to do so ; subsequently, the necessity of the case being pointed out to him, he named one of de La Salle's officers to superintend the distribution of provisions from the "Aimable." He had also ovens constructed, so that bread and biscuit could be baked from the flour and he gave all the co-operation possible.

One would expect that when at San Domingo, the soldiers would have been trained and drilled, to fit them for

the duties which they had to perform, and that they would have been subject to firm discipline, to render them efficient and keep them under control. The illness of de La Salle removed every check, for his authority was personal and individual. The men passed their time in indulgence, riot and excess, to such a degree that with many, their constitutions were impaired, and when the hour of difficulty and trial came they were unequal to the strain, and succumbed to it.

The assertion that de La Salle's instructions to stop at Port la Paix were ignored by de Beaujeu is in no way tenable. It would have been a proceeding, so utterly at variance with his instructions and with his duty, for de Beaujeu in so important a matter to have opposed the wishes of de La Salle, that it would have subjected him to be sent to the Bastille. Nevertheless, the consequences arising from the loss of the ketch have been attributed to the disregard of de La Salle's instructions. The official report of the capture is preserved, but no such statement is hinted at. It also sets forth that, owing to the capture, de La Salle purchased provisions to the amount of 1550 livres, giving a Bill of Exchange on Rochefort. M. de Beaujeu also obtained provisions for his crew, proving that all that was wanted could be purchased at Petit Goave. De La Salle himself wrote that the capture was the fault of the captain of the ketch. This "certificate" was asked for in the presence of Begon and St. Lawrence, as they had learned that de La Salle expressed displeasure against de Beaujeu. The opposite to any such feeling is set forth in this letter.*

Previous to starting from Petit Goave a correspondence took place between de La Salle and de Beaujeu. De La Salle expressed his determination to sail in the "Aimable," giving as his reason, that if the vessels were separated and the "Aimable" attacked, he could direct the defence, whereas on the "Joly" he would be useless. He stated this determination with the courtesy he knew so well how to assume, and with the expression of all good feeling to de Beaujeu. The latter answered in the same spirit, approving of the proceeding, and

* 25th June, 1685. Commander St. Lawrence and Begon, "certificat."

de Beaujeu agreed to follow the "Aimable," that vessel carrying a light on the mast-head by night.

On the 25th of November, 1684, the vessels left the island, in a few days to reach the Gulf of Mexico. France had never recognized the pretensions of Spain that it was a "Spanish sea," but de Beaujeu was well aware that these pretensions were still advanced, and he sailed onward on these waters with the belief that he might be attacked at any hour. Little was known of the navigation, and that little was through the filibusters of San Domingo.

After some days they saw land, a low sandy coast, on which the landing of men and stores would have been difficult. No trace of the river could be seen and the weather became rough. The "Joly" was carried out to sea; her greater draught required more sea room. The "Aimable" coasted the shore. As we read the record we can scarcely imagine a less efficient examination. The point of disembarkation depended upon the decision of de La Salle. It was he only who had visited the locality, and his was the examination to be acted upon. It was afterwards said that on the 6th of January they had passed the low projecting land of the mouths of the Mississippi, but at the time it was in no way identified.

Joutel relates day by day the progress made. According to this statement, it appears improbable that de La Salle could have reached Metagorda Bay, the place generally accepted as that where he landed. Indeed it is an injustice to his memory to suppose such to be the case. The small river, La Vaca, discharging into Metagorda Bay, is named as the locality where he constructed his more permanent fort; little short of four hundred and fifty miles from the Mississippi. De La Salle himself professed to believe that he had landed at a branch of the Mississippi which it was his intention to follow up. Few men had had more experience with regard to the courses of streams than de La Salle. They had frequently influenced his career, and he was not likely to believe that a river would have one of its mouths at this distance from its main outlet. From the mouth of the Illinois to the Gulf of

Mexico is one thousand three hundred miles, and as de La Salle was descending the Mississippi, he could not fail to remark that by its character, it was not possible for a second mouth to be at the distance Metagorda Bay in modern times is known to be from the spot where he had planted the Royal arms of France on the 9th of April, 1682.

As those on board the "Aimable" perceived the changed direction of the coast, trending more to the south, the conclusion was formed that they had passed the river mouths. Belief was then expressed that the land seen on the 6th of January was the place sought for. Shoals had been plainly visible on the 6th and 7th when the vessel was at anchor. On the 8th the shore was examined. De La Salle went to the mast-head, and observed the two points of a bay, which he believed to be that of Mobile, then known as the Bay of Saint Esprit. On the 9th, further explorations were made, and de La Salle came to the conclusion that they were in the Bay of Appalachi. On the 10th his observation recorded latitude $29^{\circ} 23'$, which suggests that he was in one of the bays west of the Mississippi. On the 11th there was a calm, when an exploration was made by the pilot and the master of the "Belle," but they could see little, owing to the fog. The master however gave the opinion that there was a river within the shoals. Comment has been made upon de La Salle having been deterred from a personal examination by the pilot; but the fog would have equally interfered with him, as it did with those who attempted to perform the duty. Whatever the cause, de La Salle determined to sail to the south. On the 12th he was in $28^{\circ} 50'$, where, owing to a change of wind, the anchor was dropped. On the 13th, finding that the fresh water was running short, a party was sent in to obtain a supply. But they were unable to land. Some Indians were seen on shore, two or three of whom swam out, and were taken on board the boat, but nothing could be made of the information which they gave. Towards evening the wind changed and the vessel continued her course. On the 14th there was a calm, when, by observation at noon, they were in $28^{\circ} 51'$. Towards

evening they proceeded on their route, but for a short time.* The anchor was cast and an exploration attempted of the shore, but a storm coming on, the men were summoned to the ship by a gun. On the 15th there was a change of wind and the vessel was navigated until morning; the observation recorded was $28^{\circ} 20'$. On the 17th the route was continued to the south-west. About ten o'clock they discovered a kind of river†, and a party of ten men were sent to examine it, but they could find no fresh water. On the 18th the vessel continued on her course. The want of water led de La Salle to return to the river seen on the 17th, and on the 19th they reached the spot as a fog came on. They were preparing to steer to the shore by compass when the fog cleared away, and they saw the "Joly" advancing towards them.

The lieutenant the Chevalier d'Aire came on board, and on the part of de Beaujeu called de La Salle to account for having left him to make a separate reconnaissance, the expense of feeding the troops in the interval having fallen on the stores of the "Joly." De La Salle explained that he had been following the coast in order to find the point they were in search of, that he had had no desire to act independently, and that he himself had been anxiously looking for the frigate. The question arose where they were; some thought that they were too far south. De La Salle, however, determined to disembark the troops, and sent a written order to de Beaujeu to land them. The weather was rough, and it took eight days to effect the landing.‡ The vessels remained at this spot until the 4th of February. The situation was one of danger, as the vessels were exposed unprotected to the influence of the southeast winds, and de Beaujeu wrote impatiently to de La Salle on the point, after having been kept in these trying circumstances ten days. His letter is not extant; but we know from de La Salle's reply § that he asked for

* "mais pour peu de temps."

† "une espèce de rivière."

‡ Minet.

§ 3rd of February, 1685.

pilots to be given him to enter the river, and for repayment of the provisions furnished by him to the soldiers from his own stores, during the period that the ships had been separated. De La Salle replied with equal acerbity. On the same day de La Salle again wrote to de Beaujeu, to the effect that the want of water forced him to land where he was. It was on this point that the quarrel arose with Minet the engineer, concerning whom on the 6th de La Salle wrote from the "Aimable" that he had written a letter marked by impropriety. Minet's explanation is that when he heard that de La Salle had determined to send his forces northward by land, to obtain a better location, where good water could be obtained, he felt it his duty to expostulate with him. He pointed out that there were many openings in the shores of the bay ; no water ; no opportunity to hunt ; that there was the risk of attack by Indians ; without taking account of bad weather which would drive the vessels to seek sea room ; that there was nobody to lead them, de La Salle having determined to embark on one of the vessels. He held that it was better to re-embark the soldiers on the "Joly," and to give to de Beaujeu the provisions necessary to feed them, and to proceed in company with the "Joly" in search of the River.

De La Salle treated the recommendation with contempt. The water at the spot where they disembarked was brackish, although pools here and there, containing good water, could be found. His object was to reach some stream where good water would be plentiful. The force, consisting of one hundred and thirteen men, started by land on the 4th of February. The vessels left on the 9th in the same direction.

Joutel relates that he was placed in command, and that they marched for three days along the shore, when they reached a "great river," and being unable to cross it, encamped on its banks. They remained here waiting the arrival of de La Salle, and consuming their provisions. As their supplies disappeared and the vessels did not arrive to replace them, the feeling arose that starvation was before them. On the 11th and 12th, they commenced to construct canoes to pro-

ceed in search of the ships, when, on the 13th, they saw the "Joly" and "Belle" approaching. Joutel had found good water, but his party were at the entrance of a large salt water bay. The channel was visited without delay by de La Salle's directions and sounded by Barbier. According to this examination, de La Salle notified de Beaujeu that there was a navigable channel of from sixteen to eighteen feet of water. An old seaman like de Beaujeu was not prepared to act on such an insufficient exploration. He instructed his own pilots to make the examination, and they reported that they could find but eight and nine feet.

All the known facts establish that de Beaujeu was prepared to continue the examination, and was in no way responsible for landing at this spot. It was not he, but de La Salle who declined to proceed further, and who formed the determination to stay where he was. De La Salle's own account of his selection of the locality and of his landing is given in a letter to de Seignelay, dated the 4th of March, 1685, from the western mouth of the Colbert (the Mississippi). He states that owing to the advanced condition of the season, and "seeing that very little time remained to carry out the enterprise with which I have been entrusted, I have resolved to ascend this channel of the River Colbert rather than return to the main channel, distant from twenty to thirty leagues* from here to the north-east, which we remarked so soon as the 6th of January, but of which we were unable to make a reconnaissance, believing in the reports of the pilots of His Majesty and of our vessel, that we had not passed the Bay of Saint Esprit."† He added that he had accordingly resolved to ascend the river by this channel.

De La Salle, in his letter to de Beaujeu, distinctly states that he was near the place, that he was desirous of reaching. On the 18th, de Beaujeu wrote: "There was no river visible but a large bay, and he would not risk the 'Joly' across the bar." He expressed his belief that there was a river discharg-

* From 60 to 70 miles.

† Mobile.

ing into the Bay. He advised de La Salle to proceed to the west, and not to trust to the channel for the "Belle" to enter. He added that the dangerous position in which his vessel was placed, forced him to leave these waters, and that he would return if de La Salle would give him the provisions to enable him to do so.

There was difficulty in unloading de La Salle's freight from the "Joly." In modern times we have learned something of the indifference and carelessness shewn in English dock-yards, in placing a miscellaneous cargo in government ships. De La Salle's property had been deposited in the lowest depth of the hold. De Beaujeu took the greatest pains to obtain the iron that de La Salle required, which indeed was indispensable to him. He had to disturb the whole cargo; his vessel was lying in an exposed offing; the weather was stormy, and his officers represented the danger of the proceeding. He, however, persevered, placing six of his guns where the iron had been, to act as ballast. "It is impossible," he says, "to give you your four guns and your shot. But that fact cannot hinder your establishment, not only against the Indians, but against the Spaniards in America, who are not so dangerous as people make them out to be, as I have heard tell several times."

Where did de La Salle land? With this record of the journey, it is not possible to recognize that between the afternoon of the 9th and ten o'clock of the evening of the 17th four hundred and fifty miles had been made. There could scarcely have been seventy hours of slow navigation, and from this distance the return march travelled by the force of Joutel and Moranget has to be deducted: from fifty to sixty miles.

No confidence can be placed in the recorded observations;* what we have to guide us is the time taken in navigating the Gulf of Mexico. It appears an impossibility for Metagorda Bay to have been reached. Galveston Bay is three hundred

* Minet remarks: "Sa hauteur n'est pas juste, n'ayant un instrument bon pour la prendre."

and fifty miles from the Mississippi, but, while this distance appears excessive, the description of the Bay answers to the locality. Joutel's narrative was written by a third party, a quarter of a century after the event. It affects to give a map showing the routes followed. So far as precise geographical information is concerned, it is of no account. Minet's map of May, 1685, has been considered to be that of the mouths of the Mississippi. It is a map of the Bay where de La Salle landed; but it is unintelligible. He places the latitude at 31° , which modern geography shows to be an impossibility. The "Joly," after leaving de La Salle, did not proceed to the mouths of the Mississippi, although de Beaujeu received a letter from de La Salle, setting forth that de Beaujeu would perform a great service, if he would himself go in search of the main branch, and the discovery would redound to his credit. In his letter to the Minister, of the 4th of March, de La Salle reported having made this request.

De Beaujeu earnestly pressed de La Salle to be deputed by him to proceed to Martinique to obtain for him provisions, sails and cordage. If necessary he would purchase them on his own responsibility. He continues to say "It would be to the credit of M. de Seignelay that this matter should succeed. Both of us, therefore, should spare no effort to attain the desired result. You have but to speak. If you desire it, I will go on board your ship to see what we shall do."

De La Salle declined the offer. He feared to engage M. de Seignelay in additional expense until he had something tangible to offer in the shape of success; and he doubted if the Intendant of the Isles would consent to the demand.

On the 20th of February the attempt was made to bring the "Aimable" into the inner bay. It miscarried, and the vessel was wrecked. Minet's account of the affair is, that de Beaujeu, the pilot and himself, warned the Captain, Aigron, not to enter, for it was dangerous. Aigron replied that he had received an order in writing to make the attempt to steer towards a fire which de La Salle would light, and it was the signal to be given for him to start.

The difficulty of navigating the "Aimable" was serious. It was one of those operations which ought personally to have been directed by de La Salle. Even if he were deficient in seamanship, it was an emergency when he should have been by the side of the Captain, to advise and to observe. When leaving Petit Goave, he had changed his position from the "Joly" to the "Aimable," with the avowed intention of directing the defence of the vessel in case of attack from the Spaniard. He had since sailed in her, and it was clearly his duty to have given his aid and countenance on this occasion. Instead, however, of concentrating his attention on the important attempt of steering the "Aimable" through the channel, and keeping his force in compact form, he sent out detached parties to execute work which could have been equally well performed a few hours later. Some men were sent to cut down a tree and make a piroque.* In the midst of the operation of bringing in the "Aimable," he was informed that the Indians had carried off some of the men so engaged. It might be supposed that he would have had some able and confidential subordinate who would have been detached to perform the duty of following the Indians. His future success entirely depended on landing safely on shore the stores in the "Aimable," and to preserve the ship for future service; for the loss of the ketch had rendered the cargo the more valuable. De La Salle acted as if he had no one to send, no one on whom he could rely. He went himself to the Indian wigwams, some miles distant, when his proper place would have been on the deck of the "Aimable." Could his presence there have averted the catastrophe which followed? The "Aimable" drew eight feet six inches. The *procès verbal* of the soundings sent to the Minister by de Beaujeu affirms that there were but eight feet of water.

Joutel has described the scene at the Indian camp: the half-naked, ill-looking men, and the repulsively ugly women. Indian life was new to him. Not so to de La Salle, who knew what course to take, and walked forward with his old

* A wooden canoe.

determination. As they were passing among the wigwams a gun was heard from the sea. The Indians were as terrified as if the lightning was casting its bolt among them; they threw themselves on the ground. The "Aimable" was in view; she was seen taking in her sails; it was plain that she had struck.

The prisoners were given up. The Indians even became friendly, and furnished some supplies, smoked buffalo and dried porpoise; and they expressed every desire to live in amity with the new-comers. De La Salle returned to the shore, to find the "Aimable" a wreck. Nothing could be done but to save the cargo, as far as possible, and the loss was serious.

It was a custom of de La Salle to attribute his misfortunes to the intrigues of his enemies. On two occasions he states that he was poisoned, and only cured by a universal antidote which he brought from France. He could never recognize that his plans were ill conceived and imperfectly carried out. The loss of the "Griffon" he attributed to the persecution of those opposed to him. In this case, he came to the conclusion that the loss of the "Aimable," which arose from his want of judgment and prudence, somewhat allied with ill fortune, was the deliberate act on the part of Aigron to cause the failure of the expedition. The supposition is perfectly unwarrantable. The statement has been repeated by Joutel and Le Clercq without any evidence to sustain it, and it has been followed by modern writers. It is manifest that the attempt to enter the channel, should not have been made in the depth of water, without considerably lightening the vessel, and it is probable that the attempt to save this labour led to her destruction. De La Salle reported to the Minister the conduct of Aigron, and on his return to France, according to the arbitrary system of those days, the unfortunate captain was imprisoned.

The Indians were not slow to profit by the confusion. It was soon seen that articles were being stolen and carried off, and a party under Moranget was sent to regain some of the

missing property. Moranget acted without judgment, and as he could not find what he was in search of, he seized some canoes in reprisal ; a proceeding which changed the pilfering Indians into declared enemies. The men, without experience in the country, were unable to navigate the canoes with skill, consequently their progress was slow, and it became necessary for them to encamp on the shore during the night. No sentinel was placed, no precautions were taken to assure safety, while the camp fire was a guide to the hostility of the Indians. An attack with a shower of arrows was the consequence. A discharge from a musket put their assailants to flight, but their assault was the first notice of their presence. Two men were killed, Moranget was wounded. The attack seems to have made a profound impression on all who were present. Two of the principal persons declined to remain, the engineer Minet and the Sulpician d'Esmanville. The latter states that de La Salle informed him that it was his intention to attack the Spaniards ; upon this the Sulpician replied that he had been sent by his Superior on no such errand, and consequently should return home. Minet's previous quarrel with de La Salle suggested to him the impossibility of remaining in the service.

On the 4th of March, de La Salle wrote to de Beaujeu asking him for the "Joly's" boat ; de Beaujeu replied that he was unable to give it, as he required it to obtain wood and water, which he much needed, and that it was necessary for him immediately to sail in search of them. He felt the serious risk of staying in these waters, the weather being occasionally rough ; and as there was no protection from the wind, he felt that there was a constant danger of being driven ashore. Having now landed the troops and all the stores, except the guns, he considered that he had fulfilled the trust he had accepted, and so resolved to return to France. He again offered to proceed to Martinique and obtain additional provisions. The Abbé Cavelier, Moranget and d'Esmanville also agreed to join in the responsibility of obtaining them. He stated that he was ready himself to advance the money, and also offered

to bring back any small boats which were required. "I implore you," he added, "to make use of the King's vessel while you have her: you will be freed from responsibility with regard to events, which do not always succeed as we wish and have conceived they will happen." De La Salle promised to send news to de Beaujeu in March or April. If he did not find him in the river he hoped to do so in the Bay of Saint Esprit, and he asked that the guns and shot should then be given to his messenger.

De La Salle desired to retain the crew of the "Aimable," and would have forced them to remain with him: they were received, however, on board the "Joly" against his wish. It was de Beaujeu's feeling that they should not be contravened in their determination; and the men were required in the marine service in France. On the 12th of March, de Beaujeu left the coast.

His official report, on his return to France, was to the effect that he was met by contrary winds, and, having been in want of water, he had to make for the western point of Cuba, Cape St. Antoine, at which place he arrived on the 30th of March; sending a boat in for water, it was seized by some buccaneers almost under the guns of the vessel. Two of his men were killed, and four made prisoners. He had no means of chastising these pirates, but knowing how the Inquisition kept the Spaniard in continual terror of committing an outrage against an ecclesiastic, he sent d'Esmanville, the Sulpician priest, to see what could be done. It was only by negotiation that he obtained the release of the men. M. d'Esmanville has left an account of the transaction. The pirates received two small swivel guns, *pierriers*, ten quintals of powder, two hundred *écus* and two barrels of *eau de vie*. De Beaujeu subsequently met some English vessels who assisted him with water and provisions. He accompanied these vessels to Virginia, and thence sailed for France.

I have endeavoured faithfully to narrate the circumstances of the landing of de La Salle. It is plain that, in all instances, he refused the advice given him. He alone decided the course

to be taken, and determined it from his own standing point. The facts shew that de Beaujeu gave all the assistance possible, and even made the offer of future disinterested co-operation. What is more, he understood the desperate circumstances in which the expedition was placed, better than de La Salle himself. But when de La Salle asserted that he had reached one of the channels of the Mississippi, it was not possible for de Beaujeu to dispute the statement. The knowledge of the geography of the country by which they were to be guided was possessed by de La Salle alone, and none but he, had a voice in the selection of the place for disembarcation.

There must have been many sad forebodings as the French ship was sailing out of the sight of those left behind. It was not possible, however, for much time to be given to grief or doubt, for the present exacted every consideration. Even with those inclined to despond, the circumstances of the hour were sufficient in themselves to drive away sad thoughts with regard to the future. There had already been some attempt to give effect to the expedition. Huts had been constructed and the property landed from the ships placed under protection, and a reconnaissance of the surrounding country was at once undertaken. Joutel was left in command of the buildings, sufficiently exposed in every respect to attack. The community had never been subjected to much organization; Joutel describes himself as endeavouring to establish discipline and order. Two men deserted; one man was hanged; one of the principal volunteers, when out shooting, was bitten by a rattlesnake. During these proceedings a plot was formed to kill Joutel, but it was revealed in time for the mischief to be averted.

In following the career of de La Salle from the date of his landing to his death, a period of two years, it is not possible precisely to define the end he had in view. He still possessed the "Belle" barque. Why did he not himself proceed by water in a voyage of discovery to find the position of the Mississippi, and on gaining the information transfer his

force and establish himself in a suitable spot, if it really was his intention to make a settlement on the banks of the river? He had in an imperfect way observed the latitude* of the mouths of the Mississippi, but the longitude had not been ascertained, so he was without a guiding principle to direct him to the spot; and it was only by exploration and discovery that he could learn where he was. He appears to have been sensible of this fact, and to some extent to have been guided by it.

De La Salle remained until the 24th of March, 1685, gathering up what he could from the wreck of the "Aimable." He likewise placed on board the "Belle" much of his own baggage and whatever was not immediately required. To some extent, he extended and protected the Fort which he had built. He formed the opinion, however, that the spot was exposed and unfit as a station, and accordingly resolved to seek a more favourable locality, where there would be fresh water, wood and good land, none of which were found at the entrance to the bay. On the 24th he started on an exploration. He was accompanied by the Sulpicians and Recollets and forty-seven men. They embarked in four canoes and the boat of the "Belle." On the 2nd of April they reached the embouchure of a river fifteen leagues from the mouth of the Bay, giving the Bay an extent of thirty-six miles. An attempt was made to find a favourable location, and the site for a new fort was eventually established. It was marked by the inconvenience, that the barque could not approach within some leagues of the place, so the discharge of provisions and stores had to be made by canoes. De La Salle endeavoured to remedy this difficulty by landing the cargo at the nearest point, a league distant from where the vessel was lying.

On their arrival at the head of the Bay, those present who had accompanied de La Salle, set themselves at work to construct their future home. For the time they established themselves in tents and huts, and an attempt was made to

* De La Salle named the latitude at $28^{\circ} 18'$ to $28^{\circ} 20'$. The true latitude is $29^{\circ} 05'$ to $29^{\circ} 10'$.

prepare the ground for the summer crop. Towards mid-summer, Joutel received instructions to abandon the buildings on the coast, and with his party to remove to the new location. What timber had been used in the earlier fort was brought by the "Belle" for the new structure. It was not long before a mortal sickness came upon the small settlement. The men, new to this semi-tropical country, with fruit plentiful around them, partook of it to an extent to cause fever and disease; while the previous excesses in San Domingo of most of those present, doubtless contributed to this result from the maladies contracted there, and many deaths followed.

These proceedings taken by de La Salle, justify the opinion that the question of the Mississippi was of secondary importance to him. Certainly he acted as if his intention had been to form a settlement on Spanish territory, in the expectation, as he explained to de Beaujeu, that he would be followed by another expedition. He did not particularize what this re-inforcement would be; but it is plain that he looked for the presence of Peñalossa with the buccaneers of San Domingo. With the footing on the soil which de La Salle had obtained, the new force could have landed without difficulty, and after recruiting for a few days have started for Panuco to attempt the seizure of the northern Mexican Provinces. De La Salle well knew that any settlement on the Gulf of Mexico was fraught with danger. Spain, although no longer the power it had been of the sixteenth century, still had ships and men. No portion of her empire was watched with greater jealousy than the waters where he had landed. In spite of the protests of France, the Gulf, in the eye of the rulers at Madrid, was held to be a Spanish sea. In proportion as the settlement became flourishing, it would be the more exposed to danger, and unless sustained by a powerful armament by sea and land, the report of its prosperity would have led to its destruction. The fatal attempt to colonize Darien in 1698 shews what would have been its fate. In 1701 the settlement, in itself almost broken up by disease and want, was visited by a

Spanish fleet, and fourteen days given to the settlers to leave the spot.

The fort was at length finished. The ground was a pleasant ascent, but there was no wood or water within two or three miles. The early accommodation of huts and tents was replaced by more permanent buildings, and the whole area was surrounded by a palisade. Protection in this form having been obtained, on the last of October de La Salle again started with fifty men, on another journey of exploration. Joutel was left behind in charge of the second fort, which, we learn from him, at that time, contained one hundred and thirty souls. His instructions were, to have no intercourse with the Indians, while he kept the inmates employed in completing and developing the accommodation of the place, and throughout he acted as a devoted and efficient representative of his chief.

De La Salle's design was to explore the whole extent of the Bay, to convince himself whether the waters of the Mississippi discharged into it, or if the river of which he was in search was contiguous to the Bay; physical facts which he was desirous of establishing before he passed beyond its extent.

The men marched on the banks, while the "Belle" anchored in the Bay opposite to their halting places. As they proceeded onward, the Indians were found to be inimical. Minor attacks frequently took place, and de La Salle determined to proceed in the "Belle" to inflict chastisement on them, in order to prevent further harassing encounters. During this expedition some articles were obtained having the character of spoil taken by the buccaneers from the Spanish cities to the south. He was eight days absent on this enterprise, and, on his return to the camp, he found many of his men sick from eating the fruit immoderately, and from the effect of the bad water, which in their march they often found to be brackish. In this dilemma, he returned to the fort, while a party was detached to take soundings in the bay, by which its character could be better judged. Again misfortune followed the careless neglect of precaution. Shortly afterwards

the pilot and some of the crew, acting with the want of prudence which marked nearly every one connected with the expedition, went on shore to sleep. Failing to place a sentry, they were massacred. Time wore on, and de La Salle obtaining no tidings of his men, went in search of them, to find their mutilated bodies. De La Salle now determined to continue his explorations by land. In order for the "Belle" to be available for future operations, he sent on board a supply of fresh water, and the better to secure such articles of dress as he did not require, he placed them with other property on board. Other members of the expedition acted similarly. Tessier, one of the pilots, was placed in charge among the volunteers. The Marquis de Sablonnière is particularly mentioned for his misconduct. At San Domingo he had indulged in his pleasures, not only at the expense of his health, but also of his clothing, which he had sold to obtain money. His excesses had destroyed his health. As he was unable to march, he was sent on board the barque to assist in the operations. De La Salle started, leaving instructions, that the barque should remain moored where she was, and wait for further orders. Whether the cable broke or was cut, the "Belle" left her moorings, and when de La Salle returned she was absent, and had drifted out of view. The party that he sent in search of her, came back without tidings of the vessel, and this depressing circumstance was accepted by de La Salle as evidence that the "Belle" was also lost. In this distressing extremity he saw no course open to him for future aid, but to proceed to France by way of Canada. It was the 24th of March, 1686, when de La Salle returned to the fort.

Such is the account given in the *procès verbal* of the 18th of April, 1686, attributed to de La Salle.

During this expedition, de La Salle had reached a wide river, which he asserted to be the Mississippi. He built a temporary fort on the banks of this stream, in order to leave some men in possession for future operations. There is no further mention of the fate of these men, nor is there any narrative of explorations having been made to determine

the certainty of this view. The opinion was generally entertained that this was not the river of which he was in search, and the discovery had no influence on his ultimate proceedings.

De La Salle had at this date been a year in the second fort where he had established himself, and in this time his position had only increased in difficulties. Each day they became more desperate. With all his efforts he had done nothing towards the healthy development of the enterprise; even the limited attempt that had been made to cultivate the soil had not answered expectation. To add to the unpromising situation which on all sides met his view, de La Salle was seized with sickness, and in the dreary hours of suffering he must have felt that in every respect his attempts had been wanting in success. He had abandoned all hope of the safety of the "Belle," and had formed a resolution to force his way to the Mississippi, to ascend that river to the Illinois, and thence reach Canada, whence he would send assistance to his struggling colony. It was the one remedy which de La Salle could conceive, and even if that desperate effort were successful, months must intervene before the relief would be available.

The Abbé Cavelier subsequently explained that de La Salle never himself intended to abandon the colony; that his design was simply to accompany his brother, the Abbé, to the Mississippi, and start him safely on his journey to carry out the mission entrusted to him, and that de La Salle would then have returned to his post. This theory is the only one admissible to explain the possession by the Abbé of the letter which contains the written instructions of de La Salle, of the 9th of January, 1687, addressed to Tonty, asking him to refund to Abbé Cavelier the expenses of the voyage, and to place property in his hands to the amount of 2,652 livres. It will be seen that Cavelier obtained this property on the 24th of March, 1688.

On the 22nd of April, 1686, de La Salle started, with the avowed object of finding the route to the Mississippi. His party consisted of twenty-eight. Every preparation had been

made to provide those associated in the effort with clothing ; and the start was made with the best auspices that the situation permitted.

In this crisis we may trace the influence which throughout his life de La Salle could exercise over a certain class of men. There are many such characters in the world, and those who are not subjected to the fascination, ask in vain the source of this power. The qualities of de La Salle were not those of a large and noble mind. His attempts ended in failure ; he accomplished nothing. The romance which hangs about his career ; the devotion of many of his followers ; his active life ; the prominent part which he played in the history of that date ; his commanding presence ; his courage ; his endurance ; his patience ; his stoicism ; his misfortunes ; his murder ; have given to his name the charm which it possesses. But in the results he attained, he rises only to a slight elevation above the many wild spirits who in those days lived an adventurous existence in the woods. He was capricious and unjust to his followers. Even Joutel, personally devoted to him, informs us how he was led by disappointments, often unreasonably, to ill-treat those about him.* His courage was unfaltering ; he was never appalled by danger. His bold nature, with undemonstrative calmness, was undaunted by the most cruel reverses. But throughout his life there is the same feature of never rising above the spirit of adventure. From the want of an end ably and prudently followed, everything he undertook collapsed in ruin.

It was not long before the news of the wreck of the "Belle" was confirmed. All but eight men perished. These found their way to the fort with what property they managed to save. Their only chance of safety now lay in the help which de La Salle could obtain from Canada, for it was plain there was nothing to hope from France.

Joutel had difficulty in maintaining his position in the fort, for there was discontent, as there well might be. The Indians

* " Le chagrin de M. de La Salle . . . qui le portoit a maltraiter ses gens souvent à contretemps."

were unfriendly, and a person named Duhaut was marked in his contumacy. He was destined to be the murderer of de La Salle, and in a few weeks to fall himself by the pistol of a desperado dissatisfied with the amount of plunder which Duhaut had consented to give him. He had embarked a large sum of money in the venture, and his discontent on seeing its almost certain loss, was increased by the haughty manners of de La Salle.

The surprise must have been great at the fort when de La Salle returned on the 17th of October.* Of the twenty-eight men who had accompanied him, eight only were present, bringing five horses with them. Four had deserted. One Dumesnil, de La Salle's servant, had been seized by an alligator as he was swimming a stream. The remainder, unable to continue on the march, had been left behind to reach the fort as they were able. They were never again heard of, and were either killed by the Indians or died of starvation. De La Salle had been absent from April to October, six months. The party had passed over plains where the buffalo were in plenty and easily killed. They crossed the larger rivers on rafts, and threw trees across the smaller streams. They met Indians, apparently friendly, but who evinced every disposition to destroy them for the property they possessed. As they advanced northward, they were kindly welcomed by the Ceniz Indians, who received them in their lodges; and it was from this tribe that they purchased the five horses they brought back. As they reached one of the streams, de La Salle and also his nephew, Moranget, became ill, and they remained in consequence encamped on its banks for two months. By this time their ammunition was almost expended, and being in possession of the horses obtained from the Ceniz Indians, de La Salle determined to return to the fort to reorganize, to

* Joutel places the event in August. Joutel, however, tells us (p. 94) "comme j'ay perdu les mémoires que je fis alors & que ce que j'écris est du fond de ma mémoire je ne me servirai plus de dates de peur de manquer."

The date given in the text is according to Douay.

obtain fresh stores and supplies, and to procure an efficient outfit for their journey to Canada.

In this critical situation de La Salle retained that equanimity for which he was remarkable. The outlook, indeed, was gloomy enough. Of the one hundred and seventy-three persons, independently of the women and children, who had left France, and the crew of the "Belle," forty-five only remained. Those who have recorded the events of the expedition dwell upon de La Salle's courage and composure. They tell us, he still spoke words of comfort and pointed out the resources they could yet command, and that his intrepid spirit never shrank in view of the dark prospect before him; to the last he calmly assured those who were with him that Heaven would aid them in their difficulties. It is in trials of this character that the great qualities of de La Salle are apparent.

One hope only was left to the remnant of the adventurers, who had sailed from France with such high expectation nearly three years previously,* relief and aid from Canada. They had nothing to expect from the Mother Country. It is one of the most disgraceful passages in the history of the reign of Louis XIV. that he abandoned, without thought or care, those whom he had encouraged to leave their native land, in order to develop the fortunes of a territory that bore his own name, and whose success was to add to his glory and renown. He was then occupied in directing the policy which was to lead up to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the persecution of the Protestants. The lives of a few Frenchmen on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico were a small matter to his ambition, and of less regard to his ministers, who lived on his favour as on the light of Heaven.

No doubt, to the last, these unhappy exiles turned in thought to their much-loved France. They could obtain from her, however, neither comfort nor relief. The only means of salvation lay in assistance being obtained by the ascent of the

* 1684.

Mississippi, that* "*fatale rivière*," to use the words of Joutel, and this course was again determined on.

There is much which is touching in the final scene of this Colony, as it is known to us. It was resolved to leave behind twenty at the fort under the charge of Barbier, who had been the leading spirit in the hunting expeditions, and who had married one of the young women. There were the two Recollet friars, Membré and Le Clercq, the Sulpician priest, Chedeville, a surgeon, five or seven women and girls, five children of the Talon family, and about eight men, soldiers and artisans.

Mass was performed for the last time. Five priests assisted at the ceremony, and doubtless the blessings and consolations of religion were never more devoutly and earnestly appealed to. De La Salle gathered together all who were present, and addressed them with that power of language and that charm of manner which were always at his command. They were all much affected, some even to tears, and many felt that they were meeting together for the last time in this life. Every effort had been made to patch up and complete the clothing of the men starting on the expedition; for the safety of those left behind depended on their reaching their destination. It was but too well known that the journey was long, marked by hardship and danger: and the previous attempt which, after months of absence, had ended in a return to the starting place, must have created forebodings of failure and disaster. But, to the last, they were cheered by that old French gaiety of heart, so marked a feature in the national character.

The night before the departure, they were all assembled together. It was the *Fête des Rois*, our English Twelfth Night. They must have spoken of France, of home, of the future, and they were led after the custom of old days to pledge health and happiness to each other. Joutel tells us how they lifted their glasses to the toast of "*Le Roi boit*." There was no wine to mark the festivity. But hope gave its undying zest to the water with which their cups were filled, as they

* pp. 113-137.

were *trinqué* one with the other. Those whose fate it has been on occasions to live cast away from civilization, know well how such recollections of home will arise, awakening thoughts difficult to control, recalling, as it were, the whole panorama of the past as a passing scene. In an hour like this, who can tell the emotions that vibrated through each heart of this band of men and women, from the impossibility of resisting the feeling that few would escape the fate which so sternly threatened them?

On the 7th of January, 1687, the expedition started. The baggage was placed on the backs of the five horses obtained from the Indians. Their departure must have been painfully watched from the walls till they were out of sight. There were de La Salle; his brother the Sulpician; the two nephews, Moranget and young Cavelier; Joutel; the Recollet Douay; Duhaut; Liotot, a surgeon; de Marle; Tessier, the pilot; L'Archevêque, a servant of Duhaut; Nika, an Indian hunter who had been long attached to de La Salle; a Wurtemberger named Hiens, who is also spoken of as "English Jem;" Barthelemy, a young lad from Paris; Saget, de La Salle's servant, and some five or six others.

Before recording the few events which remain of de La Salle's life, it will be well to narrate the fate of the colony, as known to us by Spanish reports. The capture of the ketch suggested the design of the French to establish a colony in the Gulf of Mexico, and expeditions were sent out to destroy it. Joutel mentions that he saw a Spanish vessel in the distance, in April, 1685. No trace of the settlement was discovered by the Spaniards: finally, some intelligence concerning it crossed the Rio Grande, when a Spanish expedition, consisting of five hundred men was organized to destroy it. They found the Fort without a trace of life, in ruin and desolation. Hearing that two Frenchmen had cast their fate with the Indians in the neighbourhood, the Spaniards sent out a party to find them. They were l'Archevêque and Grollet, whose names will appear in the subsequent narration. They were seized, and eventually sent to Mexico; it was

from them that the fate of the inmates of the Fort became known. The Indians, hearing of de La Salle's murder, of the subsequent deaths of Duhaut and Liotot, and of the departure of the other members of the party, openly declared their enmity. They obtained entrance into the Fort, and destroyed most of its inhabitants. The children of the Talon family were saved by an Indian woman. A woman and a child who were taken prisoners were afterwards killed by the Indians. The woman, represented as the wife of an officer, was probably the young girl married to Barbier.

A second expedition of two hundred men was sent to gain possession of these children known to be with the Indians. They found Pierre Talon and a young man named Eustache Brement, with Pierre Meusnier. Being well treated by the Spaniards, Pierre Talon gave the information by which his brothers Jean Baptiste, Robert and Lucien were found. They had all been tattooed as Indians. There was a third expedition, by which the sister was given up by the Cenís, not without some difficulty. The two eldest were impressed into the Spanish navy. Seven years after they were taken by a French ship of war, and so regained their liberty. The younger children were carried to Spain; Brement and Meusnier to Vera Cruz.

Such was the close of de La Salle's attempt to colonize the Mississippi. There was never the least gleam of good fortune promising success, if indeed the prosperous establishment of the settlement was ever looked for. There are few of the minor chapters of history more painful to read, and few more discreditable to the Mother Country, France, than the neglect to send relief and aid to these unfortunate men and women in the hour of distress: for the fact that they were not heard of for three years ought to have suggested disaster.

It was on the 7th of January, 1687, that de La Salle and his party left the Fort and proceeded on their journey to Canada. On the 5th of March they reached the river in the neighbourhood of the villages of the Cenís Indians. These two months of travel intensified the hatred entertained

against de La Salle by several of his men. Duhaut was the leading spirit representing this jealousy ; he had embarked money in the enterprise, and, as has been said, the prospect of its certain loss was keenly felt by him. There was another source of more painful dissatisfaction. Duhaut had a younger brother who had been missing since the last expedition. He was not one likely to desert, to seek a home with Indian squaws. He had been unable to keep up with the party on their return, and was left behind to find his way to the fort as he was able, and was never again heard of. His fate must have been death from starvation, or he must have been killed by the Indians. Liotot was the surgeon. Tonty tells us that Liotot held de La Salle directly responsible for the death of his brother, under similar circumstances. There is no mention of this young man by Joutel, whereas the loss of the younger brother of Duhaut is recorded. It is not impossible that Tonty confounded the names. Whatever the cause, Liotot was exceedingly embittered against de La Salle, and was determined to be revenged.

Wanting provisions, de La Salle despatched some of his men to find a *cache* which he had established on his former journey. They found the provisions, but they were spoiled. The party were, however, more fortunate in shooting a buffalo, the flesh of which they dried and smoked, and sent word to de La Salle to order the horses to bring it over to camp. Moranget, de La Salle's nephew, and de Marle, started with the animals. Moranget is mentioned as having been offensive and exacting, and a serious dispute arose. With this state of feeling, the malcontents resolved to consummate their project, doubtless long entertained and often discussed, of killing de La Salle. Of those present, Moranget, de La Salle's nephew, Saget, his servant, and Nika, the Indian hunter, who for years had followed his fortunes, were devoted to him, and, with the others of the party, might be looked upon as prepared to resist to the death any attempt against their chief. It was now determined, as preliminary to the attack on de La Salle, that the three should be killed. Besides

Duhaut and Liotot, Hiens and Tessier, the pilot, were present. The latter did not oppose or take an active part in the crime, and may be looked upon as a passive accomplice. A servant of Duhaut, L'Archêveque, one to be an instrument of good or evil as he was led, was also with his master.

The three first hours of sentry were given to Moranget, Saget and Nika. As the third man was relieved, and wrapped himself in his blanket for sleep, and when all was quiet, the assassins proceeded to act. Duhaut and Hiens held their loaded guns ready to shoot down all active resistance, while the surgeon stepped forth stealthily, and struck with mortal blows the three sleeping men in succession. Moranget was the only one that was not at once killed. De Marle, who was present, was forced to give him the finishing stroke, that he might be held to be an accomplice in the crime. The other two died without a struggle.

De La Salle's camp was six miles distant. Two days passed, and Moranget not having returned, de La Salle, accompanied by the friar Anastase Douay, and two Indians, passed over to Duhaut's camp. It was the 19th of March. Douay relates that on their way, de La Salle was more than usually depressed. The circumstance much affected the Recollet, for he afterwards recorded that during their route the conversation became unusually serious. De La Salle spoke of grace, predestination, and of all that he owed to the protection of God's Providence in the many perils he had passed through. Carried away by these thoughts, for a few seconds he seemed to be overwhelmed in sadness; but his elastic nature rapidly recovered itself, and the two walked onwards. As they came near the camp, de La Salle noticed two birds of prey circling in the air, as if attracted by the carcase of an animal, or by a human corpse, and he fired off his pistols to attract the attention of those who were there. It was the signal for his own death. Duhaut and Liotot believing the shots were from him, placed themselves in ambush, crouched in the long grass. L'Archevêque proceeded onwards, as if to meet de La Salle, who, on seeing him, asked

where Moranget was. The man replied, in a tone of unusual insolence, and without the customary salute, that Moranget was by the river. This demeanour angered de La Salle, and he was advancing towards l'Archevêque, apparently to chastise him, when two shots were fired from the grass, one of which struck de La Salle, and he fell dead. Douay expected a similar fate; but the voice of Duhaut was heard from his lair telling the friar that he had nothing to fear.

The two murderers came forward from their hiding place. For once, Liotot, in the presence of his old commander, unchecked uttered insulting words, but they were addressed to the corpse of the man before whom he had ever quailed. The body was stripped and dragged naked into the bush, a prey to the wild animals and birds of the plain.*

The assassins had glutted their revenge; they now took steps to profit by their crime. They passed over to de La Salle's camp. Cavelier had heard of his brother's death from Douay. When the murderers entered his tent, he expected instant death, and throwing himself on his knees, asked for half an hour's delay to prepare himself for his fate. There was no desire for further blood, and the priests were spared. Joutel had been seen and warned by l'Archevêque not to attempt resistance, so he accepted the situation. He speaks of himself as desiring to avenge de La Salle's death, but he was restrained by the dead man's brother. It is hard to see how he could have acted differently.

Duhaut seized the property in the camp, on the plea that it belonged to him; he likewise assumed command, and his authority was accepted. Like all criminals, now that the crime had been committed, the perpetrators felt irresolute as to the course they would follow. Cavelier and Joutel desired to continue the journey to Canada. This proceeding appeared to the murderers as an advance to certain punishment. They, however, made no change in the route, and kept to the trail

* Couture establishes the fact that de La Salle was shot dead, his body stripped and left a prey to wild animals. He had heard the narrative from Cavelier at the Arkansas. Margry III., p. 603.

to bring them to the Cenís tribe of Indians. On their arrival they were received with distinction. To their astonishment, they discovered three Frenchmen with the Cenís: deserters from de La Salle, who had adopted the dress, life and manner of the Indian, and were in no way recognizable as Europeans. One was a native of Provence. The other two were sailors, by name Ruter and Grollet. They were much pained at hearing of the fate of their old commander: nevertheless, they aided their countrymen in their difficult position. Trade and barter were commenced for the purpose of obtaining corn. Outwardly there were quiet and peace, and nothing took place to awaken suspicion: but Cavelier and Joutel expected daily to be assassinated. When they were informed that Duhaut and the surgeon had changed their views as to their future movements they felt more than ever uncertain as to their own fate. Shortly after de La Salle's death Duhaut had expressed his intention to return to Fort Louis, in the Gulf of Mexico, and there construct a ship, in which his party could reach the West Indies. Had they been able to effect their purpose, it is probable that they would have become buccaneers, and have followed that career as long as they were able. Personally they had not the skill to build a vessel, and there was no one remaining who could undertake the work. Moreover, they had neither stores nor rigging to fit her out. Under these circumstances, they may have considered that the only course open to them was to seek an asylum in Canada. When the proposition was made in the first instance, that they should all return to the Gulf of Mexico, Joutel and Cavelier determined to continue their journey to the Mississippi alone, and concealed the design under the pretence that they desired to remain some time with the Cenís. But their intention became known through the indiscretion of one of the French deserters. They felt, therefore, the greatest insecurity to themselves, when the change of plan of Duhaut, that the whole party would proceed to Canada, became known. They feared that the murderers would never carry with them the witnesses of their crime, and

that all who were not compromised in de La Salle's murder, would be put out of the way before the Mississippi was left.

The question was settled otherwise. Hiens, "English Jem," claimed a share of de La Salle's property. Duhaut curtly refused the demand. The quarrel took the form of personal altercation, and, after some angry words, Hiens drew a pistol and shot Duhaut, while Ruter, one of the French deserters, shot Liotot.

Those who remained now divided into two parties. The Abbé Cavelier, the Recollet Douay, Joutel, de Marle, Tessier, the younger Cavelier, and a youth named Barthelemy, from Paris, agreed to remain together, to proceed to the Mississippi, and thence to Canada. The remainder, about six Frenchmen, joined Hiens, with the determination of domesticating themselves with the Ceniz Indians. Hiens obtained a certificate that he was not implicated in de La Salle's murder.* Tessier, who accompanied Joutel to Canada, likewise obtained a written exoneration from Cavelier.

Hiens, although he strutted about in de La Salle's scarlet coat, behaved with generosity. He gave those from whom he was separating a good share of the articles of trade, so they could make their way among the Indian tribes. There appears yet to have remained a good stock of merchandise.

Hiens and his followers joined a party of the Ceniz in a war expedition, and, owing to their presence with firearms, the tribe returned conquerors. These Frenchmen, therefore, entered upon their new life under favourable auspices, and commenced with this success the savage existence they embraced.

Cavelier now became the recognised leader of the expedition. Joutel obtained guides and horses, and they started onwards. They came to the Red River and, finally, reached the Arkansas. Here their view was cheered by the sight of a cross, a log house, and two men in European dress. They

* There is a passage in Charlevoix suggestive that Hiens returned eventually to France. "C'est peut-être uniquement sur la foi de cet écrit que quelques-uns ont publié qu'il avait eu effectivement aucun part à cet attentat." Vol. II., p. 35.

were two of the party left by Tonty; Couture and de Launay. Rude as the spot was, it was the one sign of civilization, independent of their own lives, which they had seen for three years, and never was the abode of man looked upon with more joy and thankfulness.

Here the news was obtained, that Tonty, having been reinstated on the Illinois, and hearing some vague report of the loss of the "Aimable," resolved to descend to the mouth of the Mississippi with the hope of succouring his chief. He made the journey with twenty-five Frenchmen and five Indians. He arrived in April, 1686, and searched the coast east and west for some thirty leagues. Not finding de La Salle, Tonty wrote a letter which he gave to a Chief to deliver, who, fourteen years afterwards, placed it in the hands of d'Iberville. As the expedition was returning up the Mississippi, some of those present volunteered to remain at the mouth of the Arkansas to assist de La Salle's party in the ascent of the river, when that event took place. These were the men seen by Cavelier.

The journey was resumed on the first of August with two less in number, de Marle having been drowned while bathing in the Arkansas, and Barthelemy having been left behind with Couture. On the 14th of September, 1687, they reached Fort St. Louis, on the Illinois. Tonty was absent. His lieutenant, Boisrondet, received the party with all hospitality. The newcomers agreed among themselves that they would suppress the news of de La Salle's death. Accordingly they represented that they had last seen him at the Cenis village, the whole of the five being parties to the deception. Douay makes the lame explanation for this conduct, that it was their duty to give the first news of what had taken place to the French Government. Cavelier evidently feared that if he reported de La Salle's death, he would not be able to obtain aid and money for the order which he presented on Tonty. Considering de La Salle's sudden death it must appear extraordinary that such an order should be in existence. The Abbé Cavelier gave the only explanation possible, that de La Salle, when he

reached the Mississippi, intended to return to the Gulf of Mexico. There is nothing in the statements of those who have recorded the expedition, Douay and Joutel, to warrant this view. Was the order a forgery? A man who would deliberately suppress an important fact, and, on his misrepresentation, obtain money upon it, would not shrink from further falsehood to carry on his fraud. Cavelier must be held entirely responsible for the deceit practised. Joutel had been bred in the Cavelier family and could easily have been made to believe in the necessity of any statement. The nephew, young Cavelier, was even then a mere boy. Tessier, the passive accomplice in de La Salle's death, had Cavelier's declaration of his innocence in his pocket, and was not likely to create difficulty in which he would be involved: he rather welcomed the presence of the Abbé as an accomplice in the deception.* It was not until 1688 that Tonty learned the truth, when Couture, with two Arkansas Indians, came to the Illinois fort, and then reported the facts as he had heard them from Cavelier.

When the expedition started in 1684, it consisted of one hundred and seventy-three persons, without taking account of the women and children. All that now remained of it were the five persons seeking refuge at Fort St. Louis; the Abbé Cavelier, the Recollet Douay, Joutel, Tessier, and young Cavelier.

Their intention was to proceed to France with all possible haste. Arriving at Fort Saint Louis on the 14th of September, and obtaining canoes, they left on the 18th, and reached Lake Michigan without difficulty. But the lake was rough, and after waiting eight days for fair weather, they made their way back to the Fort. On their return they were received by Tonty. It was the 7th of October. He had been absent on the expedition of de Denonville against the Senecas. He received the brother of his chief, as he would have de La

* He was a Huguenot, and, on his arrival at Montreal, made a public recantation of his faith.

Salle himself. Cavelier was a Sulpician priest, Douay a Recollet ; one might have hoped that they could have risen above the personal meanness of fraud and falsehood. If there was one man in the world to whom the truth in such circumstances should have been told, it was Tonty, whose devotion had withstood every trial of disaster, public disfavour, the displeasure of the highest authorities, personal loss and suffering ; and who had given so wonderful a testimony of his unwavering adherence to the fortunes of de La Salle, by his descent of the Mississippi, in his endeavour to aid his chief in his supposed misfortunes.

But the fraud was continued, the written order produced, and the provisions, the furs, the means of descending the Lakes, obtained from Tonty, as if de La Salle were alive and prosperous.

Although the Abbé Cavelier passed the winter on the Illinois, the true story remained untold. On the 21st of March, 1688, he, with his four companions, left to descend to Quebec. They reached Lake Michigan, passed through the Straits of Mackinaw, and followed the Ottawa to Montreal, where they arrived in the middle of July. They continued their journey to Quebec, where they lived in seclusion till the end of August, when they embarked for France, reaching La Rochelle in October.

In France the secret was not at once publicly disclosed. On the arrival of the Abbé Cavelier, he retired to Saumur. After a short period, he sent a letter addressd to M. de Seignelay, which he enclosed to M. Tronson, the Superior of St. Sulpice in Paris. The latter had attentively watched the progress of the expedition, as far as he was able. In 1686, after the return of d'Esmanville, he wrote to de Belmont, the Superior in Montreal, to the effect that de La Salle had not discovered the mouth of the river in 27° or 28° latitude. He had simply found a great lake of salt water, into which possibly the river might discharge. He had, however, received letters from the ecclesiastics who remained with de La Salle, begging him to suspend his judgment. But time was passing

away, and no news had been received. D'Esmanville had formed an unfavourable opinion of the expedition.

De Denonville wrote to the Minister from Canada, in reply to his desire to receive some information of de La Salle,* that Tonty had engaged to give his attention to the search. On the 8th of March, 1668, the King expressed his surprise to de Denonville that nothing had been heard of de La Salle, and this the more, as a report had reached Paris from Cadiz that, aided by the Indians, the French had defeated eleven hundred Spaniards. The King did not consider that it was necessary to organize an expedition for the descent of the Mississippi, as it would prove a matter of some expense: it was, however, important to learn in some easy way what had become of de La Salle. At the same time the grant of Fort Saint Louis on the Illinois was revoked.

On the 8th of August de Champigny informed de Seignelay of the arrival at Quebec of the Abbé Cavelier, who was proceeding to France to report what had taken place. With everybody in Canada, he was ignorant of de La Salle's death. He also stated that furs were plentiful in the lower part of the Mississippi, and the fact might act disadvantageously on the population of Canada.

The first knowledge in Quebec of de La Salle's death, was from the report sent in 1688 to the Intendant by the ecclesiastic who succeeded Allouez at the Illinois mission, as he had heard it from Couture. The narrative sent to France, was based upon the statement of Couture, as it had been obtained from Cavelier, and the man left behind at the Arkansas, Barthelemy, whom Cavelier had declined to bring with him, lest he should speak the truth of de La Salle's fate. Barthelemy's exaggerations on the subject are entirely devoid of credibility, and it is surprising that they should have been entertained for one moment.

Even in February, 1689, four months after Cavelier's arrival, de Beaujeu wrote that he had heard that the Abbé had come back to complain of his proceedings, and that de La Salle

* 25th August, 1687.

was at the mouth of the river, sixty leagues to the east of where he had been left. In June, 1689, the letters of M. Tronson, and he was a person of influence, shew that he was ignorant of de La Salle's fate, and that it was only on the 1st of June, 1690, that he could write communicating the fact.

In 1689, however, de Seignelay communicated the result of the expedition to de Denonville, and ordered the arrest of his murderers, if they appeared in Canada. In November, de Champigny replied that they would do what was possible to obtain news, and that had not Cavelier, when in Canada, concealed the death, they would have sent parties to investigate the facts.

Thus in France the disastrous result was for the time suppressed. Public men of the school of de Seignelay, they cannot be called statesmen, as they are quick to profit by the success of the men of eminence they employ, so they shrink from the truth when there is failure in any attempt which they have authorized, and cover the mishap with discreet silence. It is one of the advantages of constitutional governments that this reticence is impossible, and the light of enquiry reveals the painful history of incapacity, blundering and neglect, when unhappily they must be recorded. Mention of the failure of the expedition, was felt as a reproach against the Court, the atmosphere of the *salons* of Versailles demanding, that every enterprise should be marked by the flattering accompaniment of success. The facts, therefore, were suppressed in Paris. As time went on, by degrees they became imperfectly known. Eventually, through the news from Canada, the total failure of the expedition, and the loss of nearly all who composed it, could no longer be concealed.

This mystery acted unfavourably to de La Salle's reputation in France. As Charlevoix remarks, "What is most unfortunate about the memory of this celebrated man, is, that he has obtained the pity of so few." *

* "Ce qu'il y a de plus triste pour la mémoire de cet homme célèbre, c'est qu'il a été plaint de peu de personnes." Vol. II., p. 26.

NOTE A.

JOUTEL.

Joutel's account of the landing of the troops is confused and at variance with what is stated in the correspondence between de La Salle and de Beaujeu. So far as I can understand his narrative, he relates that on the 18th of January, owing to the want of fresh water, de La Salle resolved to return to the spot where they had been on the 17th, and to land a sufficient number of men to make what discovery was possible [p. 57]. On the 19th de La Salle reached this place, and was shortly afterwards joined by de Beaujeu's ship, the "Joly." According to Joutel, a discussion took place as to the locality where they were, and de La Salle proposed to return to the shoals seen on the 6th of January, feeling sure that it was the point where the mouths of the Mississippi would be found, and where the landing should be made. Owing to the deficiency of provisions on the "Joly," de Beaujeu demanded, that if the landing of the troops was delayed, and the voyage was made as de La Salle asked, rations for his crew should be furnished from the stores of de La Salle and not be taken from those of the "Joly." Upon this the latter offered fifteen days' provisions, all that he could give, being also of opinion that it would not take that time to reach the spot seen on the 6th of January. De La Salle also expressed his inability to give more of his stores without disturbing his vessel, the "Aimable," to the bottom of the hold, and, by so doing, risking her loss. De Beaujeu, however, persisted in his demand for a larger supply, and consequently the expedition to the shoals seen on the 6th of January was not undertaken; a serious matter for de La Salle, forcing him to disembark his troops at a spot he did not select, and the weather being stormy, it took several days to put them ashore.

All that Douay says on this subject is [Shea's Translation, p. 213] "As provisions began to fail, the soldiers had already landed."

It is difficult to accept the statement of Joutel on the subject of the disembarkation. He admits that the vessels remained at the first landing-place from the 19th of January to the 9th of February, when nothing was done. The impression made by the perusal of the correspondence between de La Salle and de Beaujeu is, that de Beaujeu's claim was for the provisions furnished the soldiers from the "Joly" stores during the period the vessels were separated, and that there was never a demand on the part of de Beaujeu for fifteen days' rations, contingent on his making any further examination jointly with de La Salle. The opinion is confirmed in my mind that, according to his instructions, de Beaujeu throughout was prepared to co-operate in every way possible with the expressed wishes of de La Salle. The refusal of de La Salle to listen to Minet's suggestions goes far to shew that he had determined to follow his own course, irrespective of every other opinion, and that he alone was responsible for the disembarkation of the expedition where it took place.

NOTE B.

THE IROQUOIS OR FIVE NATIONS.

I do not consider it incumbent upon me to enter into an account of the Indian races of North America. The subject demands much attention, and to be understood in the view of race, language and customs, would occupy many pages. It, forms a special field of enquiry, and is totally independent of the History of Canada, except so far as it bears upon the relations of the European and Indian races. I have, therefore, in these pages confined myself to the record of events, without entering into ethnological details, considering that they would only lead to an undesirable interruption of the narrative.

The Iroquois, who acted so important a part in the events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, must to some extent be excepted from this view. They obtain prominent mention from the days of de Champlain to the Treaty of Utrecht. To the English of New York, until about 1720, they were known as the Five Nations; to the French as the Iroquois. Several attempts, not, however, generally accepted, have been made to establish the etymology of the name.

The main tribal divisions were differently named by the two European races :—

<i>By the English</i> —Mohawks.	<i>By the French</i> —Agniers.
Oneidas.	Onneyuts.
Onondagas.	Onnentaqués.
Cayugas.	Goyogouins.
Senecas.	Tsonnontouans.

Their territory extended from the Hudson above Schenectady on the Mohawk to Lake Ontario, to within a short distance from Niagara. To the north it went proximately to Crown Point above Ticonderoga, as is shewn by de Champlain's expedition to Lake Champlain in 1608.

The Iroquois attained their greatest power in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Their numbers, not easy to estimate, have been stated as being from 12,000 to 13,000 souls, and the warriors they could bring into the field from 2,000 to 2,600. They constantly increased their strength by the adoption of prisoners taken in war, but first tortured and burned a sufficient number of captives to satisfy Indian feeling, were it pride, hatred or revenge. This policy was the main secret of the continuance of their strength.

A kindred race, the Tuscaroras, in South Carolina, in 1711 made an attempt to destroy all the white settlers. Assistance was obtained from North Carolina, and they were defeated by the forces under Barnwood in January, 1712. Peace was made; but war broke out the following year, and in March, 1713, the Tuscarora fort Nahucke was taken, with eight hundred prisoners, all of whom were given over to the Indian allies of the English. Those of the tribe who escaped made their way to New York. They were well received by the Five Nations, and allotted lands on the south-east of Lake Oneida, where they permanently established themselves, eventually to be engrafted on the Iroquois family as the sixth nation.

From this date the Iroquois, in English history, are known as the "Six Nations." In 1745 Sir William Johnson received an appointment as "Colonel

of the Warriors of the Six Nations." Peace had prevailed between France and England, from the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 to the events of 1743, which led to the declaration of war. This commission of Johnson may be looked upon as among the first official marks of recognition of the "Six Nations."

The celebrated Joseph Brandt, Thayendanege, was a Mohawk Chief. At thirteen years of age he accompanied Johnson in the expedition against Crown Point in 1755, which ended in the defeat of Dieskau. The intelligence shewn by the lad was the cause of his having been sent to school at Lebanon, Connecticut. In 1759 he left his studies to take part in the expedition against Niagara. The relations of Johnson with "Molly," the sister of Brandt, determined the brother's career, and he was actively employed under Johnson as Superintendent of Indians. In the Revolutionary war Brandt was an active partisan of the British. Campbell, in his "Gertrude of Wyoming," heaped every species of poetic indignity on his head.

"The monster Brandt,
With all his howling, desolating bands."

The truth is that Brandt was not present in the expedition. In after life the poet acknowledged the injustice of his accusations, and had the honesty to say, "the name of Brandt therefore remains in my poem a pure and declared character of fiction." This retraction is inserted in the later editions of Campbell's works.

Brandt's letters yet exist in the Canadian Archive Department. I have to acknowledge my obligation to the Archivist, Mr. Brymner, for directing my attention to them. They are written in clear penmanship, with correct spelling, and evince much ability.* It was Brandt who established the Mohawks on the Grand River, Ontario, in 1783, after the war of United States Independence. Except the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, generally speaking, the Iroquois left the United States at the period of the contest. The tribes subsequently claimed their lands in New York, protesting that it was beyond the powers of the British Government to cede Indian territory. A portion of the lands passed from Indian possession by Treaty; a reservation being granted to the Oneidas and Tuscaroras; and some of the latter yet remain near Niagara in the State of New York. The territory belonging to the tribes which had embraced the British side, was arbitrarily taken possession of by the United States Government. The British Iroquois were established in Canada at the Bay of Quinte, Lake Ontario; at Grand River; and on the River Thames in Ontario. The French Indians who, in the Revolutionary struggle, had mostly taken the side of the revolted colonies, remained at Saint Regis, at the foot of the Longue Sault Rapids of the Saint Lawrence; the Lake of the Two Mountains on the Ottawa; and at Caughnawaga, the ancient Sault St. Louis settlement above Montreal, in the Province of Quebec. We have in these localities all that remains in Canada of this once formidable race.

* One of these letters was lately published in a Report to Parliament on Indian Affairs. Sessional papers, 1887, No. 206.

BOOK V.

ACADIA TO 1689.

THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF DE FRONTENAC TO
HIS DEATH, 1698.

CHAPTER I.

It was during the first period of service of de Frontenac, that Acadia obtained direct consideration from the Government of Quebec, and that owing to this more immediate control, its history becomes interwoven with that of Canada. Although possessing her own Governor, Acadia was dependent on Quebec for her defenders, her religious teachers, and for material aid in an emergency. From Quebec also were to proceed the unfortunate influences which operated so fatally to the disadvantage of her inhabitants, who, at a later period, without education and political knowledge, became the dupes of an appeal to their passions and religious enthusiasm to refuse all accommodation and acceptance of a condition, which they could resist, but could in no way modify. Even after the Treaty of Utrecht when Nova Scotia was ceded to Great Britain, the effort to regain possession of the country never ceased ; and what arms could not effect, it was hoped to attain by intrigue. A policy to bring ruin and desolation on the unhappy Acadians, who remained the firm, aggressive enemies of the power which treated them with a beneficence and consideration without a parallel in the history of a conquered people.

Whatever romance may be attached to much of the history of those days, it has little connection with the main course of the events which followed. In the first years of Acadia, the settlements were scattered and unimportant. The attempt of de Poutrincourt to found a colony at Port Royal had been brought to a close by Argall in 1613. On Argall's arrival, de Poutrincourt was absent on a friendly expedition to some Indians, and his son, de Biencourt, was in command. The few inhabitants of Port Royal were engaged in their husbandry, some miles up the river. The place,

undefended, was taken without resistance, sacked, and, as far as possible, destroyed. The consequence was that de Poutrincourt, on his return, finding the colony ruined, abandoned hope of its re-establishment, and went back to France. De Biencourt, however, remained at Port Royal, and the place afforded a precarious existence to a small struggling community engaged in fishing, and in trade with the Indians. There were some few fishermen in other localities scattered along the coast, but as a political community Acadia had no existence.

When, in 1613, Argall drove the French from Port Royal, one of those present was Claude Etienne de la Tour, a French Huguenot, it has been said, of the family of the Duke of Bouillon. He had been in the country since 1609. He subsequently passed over to the Penobscot, from which location, in 1626, he was driven out by an expedition from the Plymouth colony. His son, who had accompanied him from France, formed a friendship with de Biencourt, and eventually obtained from the latter a transfer of his rights. In 1623 the son married, and his wife, "Lady de la Tour," of whom little except one passage of her life is known, remains to this day one of the most venerated names in Nova Scotian history. Subsequently, de la Tour collected the few French who remained, and established them at Cape Sable. From this place he addressed a memorial to the King, asking to be appointed its Governor, which his father carried to France. His father, returning with provisions and stores for the settlement, was with de Roquemont's fleet, when it was defeated by the Kirkes at the mouth of the Saint Lawrence in 1628, and was one of those carried prisoners to England.

When in London, the elder de la Tour was thrown into communication with Sir William Alexander, Lord Sterling, whose grant of Nova Scotia had been lately ratified by Charles I., and was then attracting some attention. Etienne de la Tour accepted a grant from Lord Selkirk, by this act transferring his allegiance to Great Britain. His patent included the territory from Yarmouth to Lunenburg, extend-

ing fifteen leagues inward, and it is estimated that it embraced four thousand five hundred square miles. In November, 1629, he was made a Baronet of Nova Scotia, and in May, 1630, his son, although he was at Cape Sable, and had never been in England, received the same honour.

In 1630, an expedition, with men, arms and stores, under the command of the elder de la Tour, sailed for Nova Scotia with the design of establishing a Scotch colony; and it was expected that the son would recognize the powers of the father, and, accepting the new order of events, abandon his allegiance to France, and cede the fort at Cape Sable. But Charles de la Tour absolutely refused so to act, urging that he held the fort only for the French King. He was able to resist the attempt to take the fort by force, and his father, after repeated unsuccessful efforts to shake his son's determination, sailed to Port Royal.

In the same year a French expedition started from Bordeaux, under Tufet, for Grand Cibou, the entrance to the Bras d'Or, and also for Cape Sable. From him Charles de la Tour learned that Acadia was immediately to be surrendered to the French. He lost no time in acquainting his father with the fact, and requested his father to come to Cape Sable to discuss plans for the future. The invitation was accepted, and in the family council it was resolved that they should proceed to the mouth of the Saint John, and there erect a fort. This design was carried out.

The Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye, of 1632, gave the country back to France. From this date until the close of the civil wars in England, in 1649, Acadia suffered from no hostile attack; nevertheless, its progress was slow, and little advance was made towards permanent settlement, although no unfavourable influence was exercised to prevent it being made. The enterprise of England was directed in a more southerly direction, but at the same time settlement advanced along the coast towards Maine. Steps were taken in France to assure possession of Acadia, but they were marked by little vigour. Isaac de Razilly sailed on the 27th of

March, 1632, to receive the territory from its English possessors, when he was the bearer of a letter from Lord Selkirk, directing that Port Royal should be given up. With him arrived Nicolas Denys, the early historian of Acadia, and Charles de Menou de Charnisay, accompanied by forty families to increase the settlement.

Port Royal was at once transferred. The small colony, from its commencement, had greatly suffered, and many of the inhabitants gladly returned home. The few Scottish families which remained, were in one generation absorbed in the French population, so all trace of them is lost. De Razilly also erected a fort at Cape La Have, where he made a settlement and established a fishery.

At this date Winthrop was Governor of New England, where the news of French occupation was unwelcome, for difficulties were foreseen, and it was not long before they were experienced. Previously to de Razilly's arrival, the French drove away from the Penobscot some traders from Plymouth; and in the following year de la Tour took possession of a small settlement on the coast, with a declaration that the French King claimed the country from Cape Sable around the Bay of Fundy; and he notified those whom he displaced, that if he found parties from New England, trading north of Pemaquid, he would seize their vessels and cargo.

New England settlers had again established themselves on the Penobscot, so de Charnisay was sent to dislodge them and drive them off. There was much feeling on the subject in Boston and Salem, and there was an ineffectual attempt to organize an expedition to resist these attempts. The newcomers agreed among themselves, as to the division of the territory which each was to occupy. De Razilly, with de la Tour and de Charnisay, exercised control over the west of Nova Scotia, extending along the shores of the Bay of Fundy. Denys' operations were confined to the east of Cape Breton. He established himself at Chedabucto, where Guysborough now stands. He had also a settlement at Saint Peter's in Cape Breton, and constructed a road to the Bras d'Or over

the half mile of isthmus now overcome by the Saint Peter's Canal, by means of which road he hauled his vessels across to the lakes; thus he obtained access to the Atlantic on the north-east coast of Cape Breton. He likewise directed his attention to Saint Anne's on the eastern coast. He became actively engaged in the fisheries, and shewed a degree of enterprise remarkable at that date.

De Razilly died in 1636, leaving his interest to his brother; but de Charnisay in some form obtained possession of the property. There now remained the younger de la Tour with de Charnisay, who between them controlled western Acadia. De la Tour established himself at the Saint John; de Charnisay at the Penobscot, the French settlement of Pentagoet. A quarrel of extreme bitterness arose between them. Each desired to be supreme, each to control the fur trade, and finally de Charnisay, by his representations to France, obtained an order to send de la Tour home a prisoner.

In this dilemma, de la Tour, who was at the same time an English Baronet, applied to Boston for aid. During his absence in 1647 de Charnisay attacked the fort at the Saint John, defended with many romantic incidents by his wife. The place eventually surrendered. Three years later de Charnisay died, in 1650. De la Tour, then a widower, thought it advisable to marry the widow of his old enemy, trusting by these means to obtain undisputed possession of Acadia.

But there existed difficulties unknown to de la Tour. De Charnisay's affairs were embarrassed, and among his creditors was one Emanuel Le Borgne, of La Rochelle, who had obtained judgment for the whole property in Acadia. As de Charnisay had been appointed Governor in 1647, the judgment had wide application, and armed with these powers Le Borgne took immediate proceedings. He commenced attacking the property of Denys to the east, and at Cape Breton. He seized the settlement, and carried Denys himself a prisoner to Port Royal. He did not, however, long hold Denys in captivity, who, on his release, sailed for France. When in France Denys was able to obtain a grant from the Crown, from

Cape Canso to Cape Rosier, and he returned to Acadia armed with this power.*

He immediately sent a messenger to Port Royal to inform Le Borgne of the privileges which he had obtained, with the parchments of his grant and his commission. Le Borgne was absent ; he had heard that de la Tour had left the Saint John to proceed to Boston to obtain provisions, and accordingly had determined, under pretence of carrying supplies, to proceed with two vessels to seize the fort, when the news arrived of the presence of Denys in Acadia, under the favourable circumstances mentioned.† This intelligence induced him to return to Port Royal. Events, however, had taken place which prevented the further prosecution of his schemes.

In 1654 Cromwell had sent out an expedition under the command of Major Sedgwick, to seize Manhattan from the Dutch. Massachusetts had been called upon to render assistance ; and accordingly, five hundred volunteers were furnished. As peace was shortly afterwards made, the expedition against Manhattan was no longer possible. Impelled by what he had heard in Boston, Sedgwick directed his force against Acadia. With scarcely any resistance, he drove the French from the Penobscot. He next proceeded to the Saint John, and took possession of the country to Jemseg. Sailing to the south, and with the same ease, he seized Cape Sable and La Have. He then passed upward to the north, and presented himself before Port Royal.

Le Borgne had scarcely reached that place to communicate with the messenger of Denys, when the English fleet entered the basin. He replied with defiance to the summons to surrender ; but his people made an imperfect resistance, and the place capitulated. La Verdure, the commandant, was permitted to return to France, but all Acadia now passed into the

* Dated 30th January, 1654.

† We hear of Denys in 1679. He was then at Quebec. He is spoken of as having established local fisheries in New France, and of being blind. He was an applicant for the office of Master of the Forests for his son, aged twenty-two. Denys had then been thirty years in Canada. Quebec Doc. I., p. 273.

hands of the English, and John Leverett was left as Governor of Port Royal.

Although the French still advanced their pretensions to the territory, Cromwell did not abandon his hold on Acadia. In the Treaty of Commerce which Mazarin entered into with England, known as the Treaty of Westminster, of the 2nd of November, 1655, a claim was put forward by the French to the country around the Bay of Fundy, following the coast from the Penobscot to La Have, embracing the western half of Nova Scotia; and the forts of Penobscot, the Saint John, Port Royal and La Have were specified as French possessions. The settlement of this dispute was referred to commissioners, but in spite of frequent attempts to open the question, Cromwell declined to enter into any negotiations for the transfer of the territory.

De la Tour now appeared in a new character. He was a Nova Scotian baronet; nevertheless, he had resisted all the efforts made by his father to induce him to accept English rule, and had defended the fort at Cape Sable against the attempt to seize it. He was some years past sixty, and he proceeded to England with the determination to transfer his allegiance from France. Cromwell did not fail to see that his experience and knowledge of the country would be useful in its settlement. In company with Thomas Temple and William Crowne, de la Tour obtained a grant including the country from Lunenburg in Nova Scotia, following the coast of the Bay of Fundy beyond the Penobscot to the confines of New England. One of the conditions of the grant was that the territory was to be settled by Protestants; a condition never enforced. Temple arrived in the country in 1657, and began the improvement of his possessions. Shortly afterwards de la Tour sold his share of the grant to Temple and Crowne. He disappears from history to die in Acadia in 1666.

Cromwell died on the 3rd of September, 1658. During the twenty-one months of confusion, trouble and almost anarchy which succeeded in England, to be followed by the Restoration, nothing was done on the part of France to regain

Acadia ; but in 1658 Le Borgne's son attempted to make a settlement at La Have. He was repulsed, captured, and carried a prisoner to Boston. Temple in the meantime established himself in possession. His chief station was on the Penobscot, but he had trading forts at the Saint John and Port Royal. He also made a settlement at Jemseg up the Saint John River, forty-nine miles from its mouth, the river being navigable for that distance.

The Restoration of Charles II. in 1660 was the commencement of much of the trouble which afterwards bore down on the English Colonies in North America. At this date the French in Acadia, as a nation, were scarcely existent. They were scattered widely apart, numerically too unimportant to be considered. Acadia, with ten years of Cromwell's life, would have become an English settlement. There probably would never have been a French Acadia. No sooner was Charles II. on the throne than the English possession of it was assailed. Temple's rights were successfully called in question ; he was compelled to pay one Elliot the annual sum of six hundred pounds, in order to settle the demands which the Council of State justified. A new Governor was even sent to Acadia, but Temple proceeded to England and obtained his recall. Charles II. had scarcely been a year on the throne, when the pretensions of France to possess Acadia were advanced, with the confidence derived from a sense of power over the English Court, apparent in French diplomacy in this disgraceful period of our history.* The French ambassador asked for the appointment of Commissioners, in accordance with the Treaty of Westminster, and in 1662 they were appointed. The people of Massachusetts were strongly impressed with the advantage of holding Acadia, and they earnestly protested against its re-transfer to France. At one time it appeared as if these representations would have weight, for the King conceded to his brother, the Duke of York, the territory from the Saint Croix to the Pemaquid, extending back to the Saint Lawrence by the Kennebec. This grant

* "The ignoble reign of . . . Charles II." Earl Stanhope.

included land contained in the patent to Temple, but that fact in no way interfered with the assertion by the Duke of York of his newly acquired right.

Louis XIV. had languidly engaged on the side of the United Provinces in the war of 1665 between England and Holland, in the hope that the navies of these two maritime powers would be so crippled that France would become mistress of the seas. The war was concluded by the Treaty of Breda, the 31st of July, 1667, and by its provisions Acadia was once more ceded to France.

The French did not fail to assert the rights which they had acquired. Morillon de Bourg proceeded to Acadia with a son of Le Borgne, known under the name of de Belleisle: and commencing at La Have and following the coast, they took possession of Cape Sable, Port Royal, St. John and Pentegoet. De Belleisle had been appointed Governor of Port Royal. Orders had been sent to Temple to surrender the Forts of Acadia; he declined, however, to deliver up any places but La Have and Cape Sable, on the ground that the other localities were not in Acadia but in Nova Scotia. Shortly afterwards fresh instructions came from England, directing him not to give up possession. The respite was of short duration, for in March, 1669, the order was received to cede the entire territory.

In July, 1670, Hubert d'Aubigny de Grand-fontaine arrived formally to receive the surrender. He established himself at the Penobscot. Temple accordingly left the country. He afterwards claimed to be re-imbursed his expenditure by the Crown, but nothing was ever paid him.

It is from this date that the French possession of Acadia can be dated. Ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the French occupation lasted forty-three years. Cape Breton was conquered in 1745, but was restored to France by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, again to fall into British power ten years later. Cape Breton therefore remained a French dependency forty-three years longer than Acadia.

De Grand-fontaine was a man of ability, and did all that was possible to perform the difficult duties assigned him. The settlements were mainly fishery stations, and for the purposes of trade. Pentegoet, on the Penobscot, where he established himself, partook of the character of a fort. We have the census taken by him in the year of his arrival. The population consisted of three hundred and ninety-nine souls, with a garrison of twenty-five soldiers at the Penobscot. Of this number three hundred and fifty-nine were at Port Royal. The remaining population of Acadia consisted of forty souls.

During this period New England was advancing her frontier to within a short distance of the Penobscot. It was in de Grand-fontaine's day that settlement was begun at Chignecto, followed by the establishment of some families at the Basin of Mines; the commencement of that unfortunate population known to history as the "Acadians," half a century later to be visited by the painful punishment of deportation.

De Grand-fontaine's instructions* were to avoid awakening any hostile feeling on the part of New England, but on the contrary, to encourage a good understanding with the people. Nothing was to be done in the way of interfering with her fishermen. No payment of duty was to be exacted from French fishermen; the English were to pay the duty which before the restitution of the territory had been exacted from the French. He was to repair the fortifications. His principal duty was the establishment of settlements at Port Royal and the Saint John, and along the coast. He was informed that Talon had been instructed to open a communication from Quebec to Acadia, which would soon be completed.† Thirty of each sex would be sent as emigrants. In his reports, de Grand-fontaine was to specify the population, with the number of marriages and births. He was told that no subject in con-

* 11th March, 1671.

† In 1676 this connection was so far made that it was possible in eight days to pass from the Chaudière to Pentegoet: a journey which had hitherto exacted a month of time. *Mémoire sur le Canada*, 1676, Quebec Documents I., p. 240. But the road had no result, and was soon abandoned.

nection with Acadia was looked upon with such interest by the King as the increase of the population.

De Grand-fontaine remained three years in Acadia. He was succeeded by de Chambly, known as having belonged to the Carignan-Salières Regiment, whose name is preserved in the fort constructed by him on the Richelieu, at the foot of the rapids above the Basin. He, like his predecessor, established himself at Pentegoet. In 1674 there was war between France and Holland, and a Dutch privateer found its way across the Atlantic, to attack and plunder the French settlements in Acadia. De Chambly attempted some resistance, but, seriously wounded, he was forced to surrender. The place was plundered of what little could be taken from it. Jemseg experienced the same fate. One result of this expedition was, that Pentegoet was ultimately abandoned by the French, and fell into decay.

Two years afterwards, in 1676, the Dutch returned and occupied Pentegoet, as if with the intention of making a permanent settlement. They had lately been driven from New York. New England could scarcely see with complacency their establishment on the northern frontier, so an expedition was sent from Boston and the Dutch driven away. No attempt was made to occupy the fortress, and it was abandoned, again to fall into the possession of the French.

About this date the Baron de Saint Castin took possession of Penobscot. He was a native of Oleron, in the Basses Pyrenees, to the south-east of Pau. He had served in the Carignan regiment, and had formed a taste for savage life, which he followed with zest, as if it were his natural condition. He accordingly gained extraordinary influence in the tribes with whom he lived, and it was to some extent through his associations with them, that the Indians in critical periods, remained faithful to France.

Acadia was commencing to attract greater attention in Quebec. De La Vallière had arrived there from Canada, in 1676, to make a settlement at Chignecto, and had established a fishery at the Saint John. Shortly afterwards de Chambly was

succeeded by de Soulanges, who did not long hold his position, for he was removed by death, upon which de La Vallière was named Commandant by de Frontenac, in 1678. He was one of that numerous class of men who have principally in view the advancement of their own fortunes. Hitherto there had been dissatisfaction because the New England fishermen had been permitted to follow their calling on the Acadian coast, and a strong desire had been expressed to exclude them from it. De La Vallière had no such feeling; his policy was to exact that each vessel should pay him five pistoles for a fishing license, and he permitted the New England fishermen to come and go as they saw fit, to carry on trade; the only condition being that they should trade with him. Nevertheless, de La Vallière managed to obtain the praise of de Meulles, even to the extent of being recommended as the future Governor.*

A new Company, formed of merchants of La Rochelle and Paris, of which Berger † was head in 1682, obtained a concession for fishing, drying fish, and commerce. They commenced operations at Chedabucto Bay, erecting a fort where Guysborough now stands, and bringing with them a force sufficient to carry on both fishing and the cultivation of the soil. In 1683, Berger had cleared some land, and had sown wheat, barley and rye; he also planted the vine and several fruit trees, and was impressed with the fertility of the soil. He reported that the coast fisheries were ruined by the English fishermen, and he threw the blame on the licenses granted by de La Vallière. He pointed out how much more accessible the coast of Acadia was than that of Canada, that the principal commerce must be its fisheries, and that the situation of the country was in every respect advantageous.

The concessions of de La Vallière to the foreigner were exceedingly distasteful to the Company, and Berger for-

* Quebec Doc. I., p. 239.

† His name has generally been printed Bergier. But by the letters patent granting the concession, the name is shewn to be Berger. Que. Doc. I., p. 304. Also in his appointment as King's Lieutenant, 11th August, 1684. Que. Doc. I., p. 322.

warded a Memorial on the subject to France, supporting his complaint with what evidence he could collect. At the same time, he represented that acts of piracy were being constantly committed by vessels from Salem and Boston. These filibusters continued their incursions along the coast for some years. Port Royal was the main sufferer, and on one occasion six fishing vessels were seized. They consisted both of English and French desperadoes, simply pirates, marked by no national character. One of the leaders, named Carter, even visited the establishment at Canso, and dined with the chief person there. He asked permission to fish, but it was not granted. Carter informed himself of the condition of four vessels in the harbour, but must have held them to be too strong to be attacked, for he sailed away. No doubt, vessels of this character found access to New England ports; for the presence of such people brings profit to the trader; it is nevertheless certain that they received no countenance from the Governor of Massachusetts. When the matter was brought to his notice, he expressed his readiness to punish the perpetrators of any outrage, and told the parties sent from Acadia to represent the case, that they themselves should act in the same way if they seized any one engaged in piracy. Such an instance occurred in the person of James Tailer, of Boston, who was sent a prisoner to Quebec. In this emergency, an earnest application was made to France for aid. A small frigate, with from ten to twelve guns, was asked for, to prevent these depredations, and the Company offered to pay the sailors and to maintain them; they also desired to have authority to arrest the men from New England, who were carrying on a trade in furs and who were fishing, drying their fish, or obtaining coal. At that date there were six English vessels in the port of Canso, while two others were bound for the Magdalen Islands, laden with provisions, bricks, plank, lime, and building materials.

The arrival of this Memorial in France led to a change in the Government of Acadia. Perrot, who had married the niece of Talon, and had obtained notoriety in Canada, was

named Governor in 1684 ; the office was to be held for three years. Berger was appointed King's Lieutenant, and as Perrot did not immediately arrive, Berger assumed authority. As leading member of the Fishery Company, he understood the necessity of acting with energy to protect the interests confided to him. During the summer, he seized some New England vessels, for illegally fishing and trading on the coast, which he sent to France. Two of them were acting under de La Vallière's license, and were restored ; moreover, Berger had to satisfy the owners for their seizure.* Six vessels were however, confiscated. Although removed from his official position, de La Vallière remained in Acadia, establishing himself at Chignecto. His son, Beaubassin, inherited the enterprise of his father, for he took upon himself to attack one of Berger's settlements in Cape Breton, when Berger, who was present, narrowly escaped with his life.

Berger never found favour with de Meulles,† who asserted that Berger was a Huguenot, and reported on his appeal to the Governor of Canada for justice against de La Vallière, that no information had been given either to the Governor or to himself of Berger's position, that accordingly, de La Vallière had received no instructions to recognize him, and that it would have been injurious to the public service, for de La Vallière to have acted otherwise than he had done.

De Meulles in this letter pointed out that a lead mine had been reported on Ile Percée, with the remark that the best mines of Canada were her fisheries, towards which he had exerted himself to turn the youth of the country ; but that the Acadian fisheries were mostly in the hands of New England. The Quebec merchants experienced difficulty in trading with Acadia ; a communication by land had been opened out in the days of Talon, but was no longer followed. As a consequence, the people of Acadia were thrown into relationship with Boston ; and it was proposed to establish

* Letter of the French Ambassador, London, 6th November, 1684. Que. Doc. I., p. 329.

† Que. Doc. I., p. 298, 14th November, 1683.

a connection with Canada by giving grants of land in small allotments, so that a continuous route between Canada and Acadia would be obtained, in time to be developed into an admirable highway. With this assistance, trade would be established between Acadia and Quebec, and the disadvantage, under which Acadia laboured in this respect, would be removed. An attempt had been made in 1676 to encourage trade relations with New England, when it was proposed to exchange the wine and brandy of France for dried fish, masts, and other products. No steps were taken to carry out the project.

Acadia, for a short time, was to exercise an evil influence on Canada. The *coureur de bois* had become impressed with the feeling that it was a good field for his labours. Some of the number who had gained notoriety by following this life, turned to Acadia as the spot where their fortunes could be better advanced. Among this number were four sons of Damours, of the Conseil Souverain at Quebec. They established themselves on the Saint John, and commenced a trade in furs; an example which found its imitators.

Perrot had now assumed the duties of his office, and in Acadia his character remained true to the impulses which had marked it in Montreal. He was desirous of getting possession of the trade, and he saw that, as matters stood, much of it was beyond his control. The Saint John River was occupied under the circumstances related; de Saint Castin was at Pentegoet; de La Vallière at Chignecto. Perrot established himself at Port Royal with thirty soldiers quartered on the inhabitants. He became dissatisfied with the locality, holding it unfit for his purpose, and resolved to erect an establishment at La Have, and there carry on extensive operations. In a Memorial addressed to the Minister, he asked that the place should be granted him as a seigniory, and that a corvette of ten guns should be given him to protect the fisheries. Among his requirements were a pilot and a missionary. He undertook to build a fort capable of defence, with a house, stores and a mill; to establish a village, and to encourage the

fisheries. He did not ask for the exclusion of the New England fishermen, but proposed that, without paying any tax, they should be allowed to dry on the coast the fish caught by them, with the condition, that they should be obliged to exchange their fish for French merchandise at fixed prices.

The feeling on the part of the rulers of Acadia towards New England had, at different periods, been marked by difference of view. There was a close relationship between Boston and Port Royal, and it was also seen that it was scarcely possible to prevent intercourse of trade, which at one period had been forbidden, at another, encouraged.

In 1670 an ordinance was published, forbidding vessels from New England taking fish on the coast, but little notice was taken of it. De La Vallière even gave licenses to fish. But such licenses in no way permitted the holders of them to deal in furs. Two vessels were seized for contravention of the law,* and it was declared that the possession of one muskrat skin was sufficient to cause the confiscation of a vessel.

The Memorial of 1685 sets forth that the New Englanders had establishments throughout Acadia, at the Saint John and Port Royal, and that the population of that place, consisting of six hundred souls, had no other commerce but with Boston and Salem, places described as peopled with fugitives from England, guilty of the death of Charles I., who were accused of conspiring against Charles II.†

Perrot's irregular proceedings, and the memorial sent by him to Versailles, led to his recall. He was replaced by de Meneval, in 1687. Both de Denonville and de Champigny, in a joint letter, congratulated the Minister on this nomination, in every way acceptable.‡

De Meneval's instructions assigned the Quinibiqui, eleven leagues from Pentegoet, as the boundary of Acadia, and no English settlement was to be allowed east of the Penobscot. He was desired to examine into the irregularities of life which

* Quebec Doc. I., p. 340.

† Que. Doc. I., p. 340.

‡ 6th November, 1687.

existed among many of the inhabitants, and of which complaints had been made ; to control the concession of land which the King had taken into his own hand. No trade was to be allowed with New England, either on the part of the French or Indians ; no foreigner to be permitted to fish in French waters ; no further licenses were to be given. The frigate "Friponne," under the command of Beauregard, was to protect the French coasts. Pasquine, an engineer from France, also accompanied the expedition to place the fortifications in proper condition. The Sieur de Saint Castin was especially named for his irregularities, and the Governor was directed personally to exhort him to change his life ; and de Saint Castin was told that, on his following a line of conduct more becoming a gentleman, the King would show him some mark of consideration.

M. de Saint Castin's views were directed to the material condition of Pentegoet, which he was desirous of placing in a condition to resist attack, rather than to the acceptance of reproof on the score of his transgressions. He accordingly applied for a force of thirty men to garrison it, engaging to retain four hundred Indians, all enemies of the English, and having entire confidence in him.

One of the first acts of de Meneval was to oblige Perrot to pay his soldiers the arrears due them. He reported to the Minister that a large trade was being carried on with Boston, protected by Perrot, who had profited by it. He proposed to reconstruct the fort at Pentegoet in which work he looked for some assistance from de Saint Castin ; and he pointed out that the inhabitants of Port Royal were in great poverty. Perrot was ordered to return to France, and there is a letter extant in which he is pointedly reproved for his dealings with New England.* He had quarrelled with de Saint Castin ; the latter complained to de Denonville of the treatment he had received, stating that he had been kept under arrest from the 21st of April to the 9th of June, on account of some irregularities in his life. "It was not this which was the

* 21st January, 1688. Que. Doc. I., p. 416.

trouble," he proceeds to say ; " I do not think that there is another man under heaven, whom self interest can make commit more ignoble acts, even to sell in his own house before strangers, a pint or half-pint of *eau de vie*, not trusting to one of his servants to do so. I see his malady. He desires to be the one merchant of Acadia." *

From the date of the Treaty of Breda, there were constant disputes as to the boundary line between New England and New France. So far as priority of discovery could give a title, the coast had been visited and explored by de Champlain before New England had any existence. Port Royal had been the scene of de Poutrincourt's labours, to be destroyed by Argall in 1613. It had been restored in an imperfect way by de Biencourt, and the French, however slender their numbers, still clung to Acadia, even to the west of the Bay of Fundy, along the coast of what is now the State of Maine. A line of division was for some time arbitrarily drawn at the River Saint George, Quinibiquy, its inlet offering a good harbour, between the Penobscot and the Kennebec ; indeed, this river was named as the boundary. The close of what is known as King Philip's war, had much influence in determining the pretensions of New England. It had lasted along her borders for two years, accompanied by much loss and suffering, and had been brought to a close in 1676 by the courage of the settlers. To the south, in Massachusetts, Plymouth and Connecticut, the outbreak had been earlier subdued. It had been the fiercest struggle in which New England had been engaged. Several actions had been fought, marked on both sides by desperate determination. It was said that there was scarcely a family in New England which did not mourn a friend or a relation, and to the last the conflict had brought

* " Mais ce n'est pas cela qui luy faict de la peine, et comme je ne pense pas qu'il y ayt un aultre homme soubz le ciel à qui l'intérêt fasse faire des actions plus basses jusques à debiter luy mesme, dans sa maison, à la vue des estrangers, la chopine, et le demyar d'eau de vie, ne se fiant pas a un seul de ses domestiques pour le faire. Je vois bien son mal : il veut estre le seul marchand de l'Acadie." Le 2 juillet, 1687. Que. Doc. I., p. 400.

desolation. Houses and villages were burnt, and it was computed that six hundred of the colonists had been killed in action, or murdered by the Indians. Even after the death of Philip, to the north in New Hampshire and Maine, the Indians remained unsubdued ; the tribe of the Abenakis continued in unceasing hostility.* They had been brought under the influence of the French missionaries, and, as the war became one of extermination, it was plain that the English settlements could adopt no other policy, but that of unceasingly following them until their power was broken, and their strength prostrated. The Jesuit missionaries urged them to pass over to Canada, and there establish themselves. In a political point of view, it was understood how the devotion of these tribes would be of avail in the struggle against the Iroquois. The emigration commenced in 1675, under the direction of the two Jesuits, Jacques Bigot and Vincent Bigot. The Abenakis were established first at Sillery, near Quebec ; but as their numbers increased they were transferred to the mouth of the Chaudière, six miles above that city, on the south shore. One of the Bigots even went to the neighbourhood of Boston, to influence such of the tribe as still remained there, to join the Chaudière mission.

The Abenakis ever remained the devoted adherents of

* The Abenakis were a tribe of the great Algonquin family, in all respects distinct from the Iroquois in language and customs. The Algonquins originally extended over the eastern portion of the American continent, from Virginia to Canada. They had crossed the Saint Lawrence and were established at Allumette Island on the River Ottawa, and had penetrated to the neighbourhood of the Lakes. Several of these tribes, in great numbers, inhabited New England and the territory north of Massachusetts. Although their language was not identical in every locality, the dialects were characterized by affinities which established a common origin. The country along the course of the Kennebec to the Atlantic was possessed by the Abenakis ; the Etchmins occupied north-eastern Maine ; the Micmacs, Nova Scotia. Thus the Abenakis were placed between the French and English colonies. Another Algonquin tribe closely related to them is mentioned as the Canabas. The hunting grounds of the Abenakis and Canabas were chiefly in the present States of New Hampshire and Maine, and the south-eastern part of New Brunswick. A few scattered tribes only were domiciled between Nova Scotia and the Saint Lawrence.

France, never failing to appear in the field when their services were asked. They never forgot that they had been driven back from the lands of their fathers on the Atlantic, which they still looked upon as theirs. The sentiment was too politically important, for it in any way to be permitted to be weakened. Every encouragement was given at Quebec for the Abenakis to transfer their allegiance to Canada, for such virtually was the acceptance of the asylum offered them, and one of the last acts of de Denonville was to establish this mission. In a letter to the Minister,* he acknowledges his obligations to the Jesuits, in bringing the Abenakis under French influence, especially to the two Bigots; and he relates that it was by their endeavour that the tribes had been excited against the English, and that no few of those engaged in these aggressive expeditions had left the missions on the Saint Lawrence, having been supplied in Canada with arms and ammunition.

The difficulties of which de Saint Castin had complained did not lead him to abandon Pentegoet. He still continued in the establishment which he had formed; living with the Indians as one of them, accepting their life, taking as many temporary wives as suited him. His furs he generally sold to the English, but while he was willing enough to drive a profitable trade with New England, his sympathies and his feelings remained on the side of France. No more devoted Frenchman was found in Acadia; he saw the only salvation for mankind in Roman Catholicism. With all the irregularities of his life, he had courage and determination; he was likewise an experienced trader, able to turn to the best advantages the opportunities offered him, and he so far succeeded in impressing de Denonville that he was recommended by the latter as a successor to Perrot.† From time to time he visited Port Royal, where he made himself remarkable by his attendance at church, and by the liberality of his gifts. Nevertheless, Bishop de Saint Vallier, in speaking of the religious requirements of Acadia, and the number of missionaries he was

* January, 1690.

† Que. Doc. I., p. 387.

desirous of sending there, thought that the presence of a priest at Pentegoet was required by Saint Castin himself.

French settlers had also penetrated to Pemaquid. In 1683 they were notified to leave the place, as belonging to the English plantation of the Duke of York. Leave was given to those who so desired, to remain conditionally on their recognition of the English government. A New England party, consisting of eighty men, took possession of Pentegoet. The fact is known by the report of de Saint Castin to de Denonville.* They informed de Saint Castin they were proceeding to the Saint Croix, to take possession of the country, within the limit to which their territory extended. De Saint Castin, having received no orders to act in such an emergency, simply said that he was a private person ; they, on their side, telling him to take no orders from the French. Thus, although the Treaty of Breda had restored Acadia to France, the difficulty of establishing what constituted Acadia remained as great as ever.

Andros became Governor of New England in 1688, and, on the ground that de Saint Castin was on English territory, determined to take possession of Pentegoet. He proceeded thither, and, as de Saint Castin augured unfriendly intention from the visit, he, with his squaws, abandoned the place. Andros landed without opposition, and plundered it of all he could lay his hands on ; one of the most discreditable proceedings on the part of the English in the history of those days, and one which had its influence in creating the nemesis which avenged it.

The sense of injury awoke the spirit of enterprise by which de Saint Castin was characterized, never long torpid, and there were strong influences to which he could appeal. An Indian war arose along the northern frontier of New England, and, to whatever extent, it was attributable to the attack on Pentegoet, that event certainly added to the hostile feeling which existed. It was the interest of the French to drive back the advancing settlements of New England, and this

* 2 juillet, 1687. Quebec Doc. I., p. 399.

very incident was used to justify an appeal to the passions of the Indians, and in support of the policy of organizing them in bands to attack every outlying dwelling, and to destroy its inmates. M. de Frontenac has been accused of being the first to introduce this mode of attack ; but he deserves no such unenviable reputation. On his arrival in Canada for his second period of office, he found this war on settlements in full vigour, directed against all, of whatever age or sex, who had advanced beyond a geographical line. Those active in carrying it on were priests of the Roman Catholic church. The names of the two Jesuits the brothers Bigot, and of Father Thury, stand prominent on the list. The latter, a priest of the Quebec Seminary, had, in 1684, been sent by M. de Laval to commence, systematically, the establishment of the church in Acadia. On the arrival of Bishop de Saint Vallier, Thury returned to Quebec, but in Acadia he had shewn such evidence of his ability, that he was sent back there with additional powers. M. de Saint Castin may also claim participation in this form of hostility, and it obtained the approval and support of M. de Denonville. The attacks of the Abenakis on the outer New England settlements, commenced in the fall of 1688.

We have precise knowledge of Acadia in 1686. M. de Meulles purchased a barque, for the purpose of thoroughly examining the country. He visited all the settlements, and a census was taken of the inhabitants. The population amounted to 858 souls ; 896 acres were under cultivation. The Bishop, M. de Saint Vallier, also visited Acadia, as stated in a previous chapter. From Miramichi he descended to Richibucto and to Shediac. He passed to the Island of St. Jean (Prince Edward Island), returned by Cape St. Louis (Cape Saint George), thence by the Petit Passage and Frontsac (Gut of Canso) to Chedabucto (Guysborough), whence he examined into the condition of the fisheries. From thence he crossed over to Beaubassin by land, greatly annoyed, as he tells us, by mosquitoes. Here he found one hundred and fifty souls ; it is to be surmised the whole population of the country

to Chignecto. Ten years had elapsed since the commencement of this settlement. In the first years these people had suffered many hardships, it having been necessary to construct dykes to redeem much of the land. They had now large pastures of cattle, and raised some grain ; but were principally engaged in the fisheries. From want of communication, they had been unable to obtain clothing, and in their necessity had been forced to make coarse cloth for their own use. At Port Royal there were six hundred souls, dispersed four or five leagues along the river.

At the date of the first Abenaki attack there were supposed to be good intelligence, and amity between the courts of England and France.* Louis and James, at the period when these events took place in Acadia, were held to be the most sincere of allies, as the declaration of 1687 had set forth. In spite of this outward pretension, hordes of French Indians were turned against the unprotected settlers and their families. In some cases they were enclosed within palisades ; but as no attack was looked for, little watchfulness was exercised. We are told by Father Thury that some of the Indians, nominally allied with the English, opened the gates of six of the forts in the neighbourhood of Quinibiqui, so the Canabas obtained easy entrance and killed all they met. De Denonville relates complacently, that sixteen of these " forts " were so seized, and that two hundred of their inmates were killed. Father Thury is more exact : he records that the precise number was one hundred and forty-two ; and that many cruelties were exercised.†

The authorities at Boston sent troops to arrest the disaster. Andros was absent when this step was taken, and, not recognizing its necessity, expressed his disapprobation of it. But the emergency forced itself on his attention, and he personally proceeded northwards with seven hundred men. On his advance the Indians retreated. To prevent a recurrence of such

* It was only on the 5th of November, 1688, that the fleet of William III. entered Torbay Harbour.

† Que. Doc. I., p. 478.

attacks he left garrisons on the Saco, at the Kennebec and at Casco Bay.

In his absence, news came of the English Revolution, which Boston at once accepted. The arbitrary proceedings of Andros had on all sides created for him enemies ; the people of New England, therefore, hailed the event as one by means of which they could resent the treatment which they had suffered. There were but two companies of regular troops in New England. The greater part of this small force was at Boston, but some detachments were absent on the frontier. The revolution was asserted by public feeling to be in force, and there was little resistance to its general acceptance. Andros' adherents were seized, the forts taken possession of, a new government was organized, and a frigate in the harbour captured. On his return to Boston, Andros found that his government had ceased to be ; and prejudice was so strong against him, that even the scant justice due to him was denied. He was held to be acting in concert with the French of Canada, and it was asserted that the disposal of his troops had been made in the interest of his own government, in league with the French. In all revolutionary proceedings any artfully prepared story, however improbable, is believed, and in this case its influence caused the garrisons established by Andros, in some instances, to be looked upon as unnecessary, in others to have been placed from unpatriotic motives, and several were withdrawn. In other places, the men rose in revolt and deposed their officers, and many returned home. These proceedings having been accepted, and no remedy having been applied, much suffering followed, for the frontier was undefended.

The Indians, on the other hand, were desperate and organized ; and, seeing the defenceless condition of the country, they returned to the attack. Houses were assaulted. The stockades had few defenders, so they could not be maintained, and the inmates were killed. Prominent in these assaults was the attack on Cocheco, now Dover, in New Hampshire. Two squaws came to the enclosure and asked for lodging. They

were admitted, and in the night, when all were asleep, they opened the gate to the Indians, who lay in ambush in the neighbourhood. The owner, Major Waldron, a man of eighty, defended himself as best he could, but was killed with those about him.*

The attack of Pemaquid followed. This place was a regularly constructed fort, with cannon, built on a point of land between the Penobscot and the Kennebec, strategically important from its position. It could not be avoided by the Indians when passing north and south in their canoes, on which occasions it was necessary to keep in close proximity to the shore. Its existence was looked upon by the Abenakis with extreme jealousy; and from being accepted by them as a material proof of New England power, its destruction was equally desired by the French. It was defended by a Lieutenant Weems,† a regular officer, nominally with a garrison of thirty men. The force which had been placed there by Andros had consisted of one hundred and fifty-six men, but the greater part had been withdrawn. The Indians left their villages on the 9th of August, and sent scouts to examine the fort. On learning its undefended state, owing to the weakness and the carelessness of the garrison, an attack was resolved upon.

The Indians, having concealed their canoes in a bay above the fort, were enabled to advance through the woods, unperceived. As they were approaching the fort, they surprised three settlers living in the neighbourhood, from whom they endeavoured to obtain information. The men thus seized strove to mislead them, magnifying the strength of the garrison, for which, no doubt, they paid the penalty of their lives. Before making an attack on the cluster of houses which had grown up close to the fort, a religious service was held,‡ after

* Belknap says, Vol. I., p. 142-5, that this attack was an act of retaliation, for the treachery with which Waldron, under a show of friendship, had seized some Indians whom he had recognized as having taken part in King Philip's war.

† So written; doubtless of the family of Wemys.

‡ "Ils firent la prière en commun."

which the Indians rushed on the buildings, killing all they met. At the same time, with a dash, they surprised some outlying sheds ; and others placed themselves behind a rock, from which they kept up a continual fire.

The place was defended until the following day, when it surrendered. Weems, with thirteen men and some women, marched out.* Andros gives the number as eighteen having been present. Although the strength of the fort was said to be thirty men, many were absent. According to this account, five men were killed in the attack. Thury, who was present, has left a record,† that seven corpses were found in the ditch. He relates that the women were not insulted, and that there was no drunkenness, and that the Indians massacred such as they desired, without taking a single scalp.

Father Thury mentions the number of the settlers taken by surprise outside the fort, killed and captured, at fifty, but thinks that it may have been greater. There was a fort on an island opposite Pemaquid, to which some fishermen had retired. Some of the party desired to attack it, but the project was not entertained. The Indians must, however, have visited the island, for they returned with two boats, having killed those who were in them. Pemaquid was taken on the day of the Assumption, the 15th of August.

Such had been the course of events in Acadia, when, in 1689, de Frontenac returned from France. The population was small, scattered, and in extreme poverty, with imperfect union with Canada, owing to difficulty of communication ; with an undefined boundary, the debateable land constantly the scene of aggressive war and suffering ; New England still urging on settlement northwardly ; the French endeavouring to check it by Indian attack and massacre. In spite of the difference of nationality, and the obstacles which had arisen, commercial relations, in an irregular way, had sprung up between New England and Acadia, almost inevitably the

* " Il sortit du fort quatorze hommes, y compris le Gouverneur, et quelques femmes, portant chacun un paquet sur le dos."

† Quebec Documents, I., p. 479-81.

result of their geographical situation. But, to New England, Acadia, backed by France, was a perpetual cause of anxiety, and that this condition was attached to its existence as a community, was understood nowhere more fully than in Boston. It was this sentiment, so powerfully entertained, which in the following years led to the efforts of the English Colonies against Canada; efforts carried out with spirit and energy, but with imperfect organization, and entrusted to men who neither understood the difficulties to be overcome, nor possessed the experience and capacity to cope with them. On the other hand, they were directed against a well disciplined force, under the command of a professional soldier of experience and unconquerable determination, who selected his leaders for their ability and capacity. The emergency was one in every way to tax de Frontenac's powers, but he gathered together what slender strength he could command, and with skill and judgment, unchecked by a scruple, he rendered abortive the sacrifices so resolutely made by New England; sacrifices which were futile, owing to the military incapacity of the leaders, who would neither enforce discipline, nor skilfully place in the field the brave and hardy population called out to serve their country. Under able generals the record would have been of a different character.

CHAPTER II.

The selection of de Frontenac as the Governor was dictated by the events which had taken place in England at the close of 1688. There was war between the two countries. Every principle which the French King cherished had been violated. The divine right to reign, with other religious dogmas of Louis, had been assailed, and he foresaw that, without a recurrence of the dependence of an English King on French support, the power of England, which, in the last Stuart reigns, he had been able to nullify, would in its full strength be turned against France. Should he succeed in getting possession of Northern America, and making it entirely a French province, he would strike a blow at the prestige of his enemy, and so add to his own strength and power as to make him irresistible.

Accordingly, Louis gave his attention to de Callière's plan for the subjugation of New York, and in looking round for one capable of carrying it out, his choice fell on de Frontenac. He had ever been a bold, determined soldier, and at the same time knew Canada well. The faults attributed to him during his former government, were, to some extent, indicative of the qualities called for in the emergency. He had self-assertion, will, capacity, all of account in carrying out the royal policy. Since his return to France he had remained about Versailles without employment, among a crowd of men seeking to distinguish themselves. M. de Frontenac was now sixty-nine years old, but as ready as in early youth to accept any duty ; he was a devoted Frenchman, and, like his contemporaries, was dazzled by the splendour of his master's reign ; and at that date Louis had been almost universally triumphant.

Money could not be found for an expedition such as de Callières first conceived ; the plan of campaign was, accord-

ingly, altered. Sixteen hundred men were to advance rapidly from Canada, and seize Albany, descend the Hudson and attack New York. Two large ships of war were to cruise off the harbour of that city, and, on being signalled, were to sail in and join the Canadian force. The duty of carrying out this scheme was assigned to de Frontenac. The undertaking was to be kept secret, and the blow to be sudden and unexpected.

Two ships were placed in commission, "le Fourgon" and "l'Embuscade," and every step necessary taken to carry out the enterprise. Plans were laid down for the treatment of the conquered colony. Protestantism was to be uprooted, and Catholics who would take the oath of allegiance could remain. All men of wealth, officials, merchants, officers of rank, were to be thrown into prison; but they were to be permitted to obtain their freedom by paying a large sum of money to the King. All the lands, and all the property, private as well as public, were to be seized. The Roman Catholics of whose fidelity there could be no doubt were alone to be permitted to take the prescribed oath, and to remain undisturbed. The King of France was to enter upon the ownership of the country, of which he would make grants to such officers and soldiers as he thought deserving of his favour, and the remainder of the land was to be sold. Able-bodied men, mechanics and others, were to be kept at convict-labour at the fortifications, or as the commanding officer saw fit. The inhabitants, men, women and children not in this class, were to be seized and dispersed along the coast of New England and Pennsylvania, and generally scattered in other places, so that they could not combine and be mischievous. In order that there should be no troublesome neighbours to the north, the settlements of New England in too near neighbourhood to the new possessions, were to be destroyed. One point especially insisted upon was that all the French fugitives of the pretended Reformed religion were to be sent to France to share the fate of their brethren.*

* Instructions à Mons. de Frontenac sur l'entreprise contre les Anglais. 7 juin, 1689. Que. Doc. I., p. 455-461.

The vessels left France late in the season under the command of de la Coffinière. They experienced a stormy passage. The repairs necessary to "l'Embuscade," one of the vessels selected, delayed the expedition twenty-seven days in La Rochelle, and the duty of escorting merchantmen, for the most part bad sailors, had prolonged the period of the voyage. The destination was Nova Scotia, whence de Frontenac was to proceed to Canada, and complete the necessary organization for the advance by land. The vessels did not arrive at Chedabucto until the 12th of September,* and at that late season the difficulties of organizing the expedition were greatly increased. With de Callières, who had returned with him from France, de Frontenac took passage in a merchant vessel for Canada. On his departure, he instructed de la Coffinière after escorting one of the vessels to Port Royal, to seize any English ship he should meet; but to avoid any engagement with armed vessels. He was then to proceed to New York, and cruise about the port until the 10th of December; if at that date, he was not communicated with by de Frontenac, by signal or otherwise, he was to return to France by the way of Port Royal.

At Ile Percée de Frontenac heard from the Recollet missionaries of the Indian attack on Lachine. He hurried on to Quebec to ascertain the truth, and reached the city on the 15th of October.† He was received with acclamations of welcome. All parties vied in paying him attention. He had brought back with him from France the Iroquois, thirteen in number, who had survived the punishment of the galleys; to an Indian, of all human beings, possibly the most severe and depressing. Among them was a chief of the Cayugas, Ouréouharé. During the voyage, de Frontenac had shewn him much consideration in the hope of winning his confidence, trusting that he might be useful in future negotiations.

De Frontenac remained but three or four days at Quebec, when he ascended the river to Montreal. Although advanced

* Que. Doc. I., p. 466.

† Que. Doc. I., p. 466.

in life, he retained his energy and elasticity of character. He arrived in Canada in the period of the after summer, when the weather is still pleasant and agreeable. He reached Montreal at the end of October, to pass over the scenes of the massacre, and has left a record of the desolation which he looked upon. No evidence of the deplorable condition of the colony could have been more convincing, and it was in a crisis of this character that he had arrived, in order to carry war to New York, furnished with no one requisite for the enterprise. He called out and inspected the troops, and examined into the means of defence at his disposal. One piece of intelligence was particularly distasteful to him. After the massacre at Lachine, de Denonville had looked upon Fort Frontenac as in danger of being surprised. Having been unable to send assistance to it, and perhaps having felt that the troops stationed there would be of greater use in Montreal, he had sent up Repentigny de St. Pierre with orders that the place should be vacated, and that the stores which could not be brought away should be destroyed. The policy was in every respect repugnant to de Frontenac, while, at the same time, there was possibly some personal sentiment to bias his judgment. The fort had been built at his recommendation, and had been one of the grounds on which his reputation had been attacked. In reality, de Frontenac's opinions were dictated by higher views ; he considered the fort to be indispensable to French interests on the Saint Lawrence, and especially necessary as a *point d'appui* in any operations against the Iroquois ; and it was plain to him that if peace was not attainable by diplomacy, it must be obtained by force.

The first effort of de Frontenac was the organization of an expedition to Cataraqui, to prevent the destruction of the fort. He assembled what canoes were at his disposal, and despatched three hundred men with counter orders for its preservation, but he was not in time to save it. A few hours after their departure, de Valrennes, the commandant, arrived with the garrison, consisting of forty-five men. All that he could carry away had been loaded on his canoes. He had scuttled

the three vessels, and they were under water ; the cannon he had thrown into the lake, and he had burned everything he could destroy by fire. The walls he mined, and, leaving slow matches burning in the charges of powder placed beneath them, and in the powder magazine, he abandoned the fort. At a league distant, he heard the report of the explosion, by which he knew that the fort was destroyed. It attracted also the attention of the Iroquois. A contemporary writer * tells us they visited the place, to find one of the bastions uninjured, and to obtain arms, ammunition, and provisions which remained fit for use. As some counterpoise, du Luth's successful skirmish up the Ottawa was reported to the Governor, but it in no way prevented further Iroquois outrage. On the 13th of November, during a snow-storm, a party attacked La Chenaye, a settlement on the main shore, north of the channel by Isle Jesus, about four miles east of the present village of Terrebonne. The attack was made in the night by one hundred and fifty Iroquois, and twenty people were killed.†

As it was an impossibility to carry out the project of the invasion of New York, the design was abandoned, and, early in November, de Frontenac returned to Quebec. He was in that city when the attack was made on La Chenaye ; the disaster made him more painfully feel the exposed situation of the colony, and the necessity of directing his endeavours to the establishment of peace. He saw that the colony required rest, in order to obtain the strength which gives confidence and self-assertion. He had had this result in view, in the expedition which he had organized to Fort Frontenac. At that time he sent back some of the Iroquois prisoners he had brought with him from France, to be delivered to the Western villages, and they were instructed to inform the tribes of the arrival of the rest of their people.

The conduct of de Frontenac towards Ouréouharé had led

* Recueil de ce qui s'est passé en Canada, &c., p. 26. "Un bon magasin d'armes et de munitions de bouche et de guerre dans la redoute qui n'avait point sauté."

† N. Y. Doc. IX., 431.

the latter to entertain strong feelings of regard towards the Governor, and de Frontenac hoped, by this chief's intervention, to insure the friendly disposition of his tribe. The released prisoners were charged with a message, that Ouréouharé would also be sent back if his freedom were applied for. De Frontenac also despatched a Christian Iroquois to announce his own arrival in Canada. The communication was referred to an Indian Council, and messengers were despatched to Albany, to ask the attendance of those in authority there at the deliberations. Only an interpreter, however, attended. The Council, consisting of eighty chiefs, characterized by the peculiar features of Indian oratory and ceremony, met on the 22nd of January, 1690. The advice from Albany was not to make peace, and not to lay down their arms. The presence of the missionary priest, Milet, was not looked upon as favourable to English interests. He had been taken prisoner in 1689, and had been adopted into the tribe and elected a chief. The request had been made that he should be sent to Albany; but the Iroquois declined to accede to this proposal, from the feeling, that he would be able to aid them in communicating with de Frontenac. Nevertheless, the conclusions of the Council were not favourable to the hopes of immediate peace entertained by the French, but the decision at which they arrived, opened the way for future negotiation. It was resolved to ask for the return of Ouréouharé before any offer of negotiation could be considered, and the French were informed that peace had been made by the Iroquois with the tribes of the western lakes.

At this time, news arrived at Quebec from the West, which threatened serious complications. The post of Michilimackinac was under the command of de la Durantaye; the Missionary was Father Carheil. The news of the attack on Lachine had arrived there, sensibly to affect the feelings of the Western Indians. The Ottawas and Hurons had become strongly convinced that they had to choose between the Iroquois and the French, and it seemed to them that the protection of the latter had lost much of its strength.

Accordingly, they had resolved to accept an alliance with the Iroquois, and to break definitely with Quebec and Montreal. De la Durantaye in this crisis sent a messenger to Quebec, to point out the difficulties of his position ; but it was winter when he arrived, and nothing could be done.

It was evident to de Frontenac that the emergency was one requiring vigorous and resolute action ; and that no policy would more forcibly impress the Indian mind than an exhibition, on the side of Canada, of strength and power. De Frontenac was never scrupulous in gaining his end ; he held any course to be justifiable to do so, and that there was one consequence only to be considered, its success. He had become impressed with the necessity of striking a blow, to regain for New France the prestige of former days, without giving a moment's thought to any suffering he might cause. In judging de Frontenac with regard to the events which followed, the condition in which the Colony was placed, and his responsibilities in the crisis must be kept in view. We must remember the barbarous principles on which war was conducted, and the ruthless spirit of the age in the treatment of an enemy, when thought of his privations and misery was unknown, and his destruction was the one, and main end. Mercy was a word seldom heard, and if ever mentioned by Louis XIV. it was for mere theatrical effect. To record that de Frontenac was moved by feelings of this character, is only to say that he was no better than his contemporaries. Insensibility to suffering was a characteristic of the period. Must it not so remain in the hour of warfare, when the prominent consideration will always be, to attain the objects of the campaign, be the cost what it may ? Actuated by feelings of this character, de Frontenac organised three parties. One was to start from Montreal, one from Three Rivers, and one from Quebec ; each on a mission similar in character, but the three distinct and unconnected with each other. Their object was to strike terror, and to create the feeling that de Frontenac had brought with him from France the power necessary to vindicate every claim he might put forth ; and that war would bring the

sternest retribution on those awakening his vengeance. The expedition from Montreal, efficiently organized, was directed against the English settlements on the Mohawk.

The party, consisting of two hundred and ten men, eighty Christian Indians, sixteen Algonquins, with one hundred and fourteen French and Canadians, was under the command of Saint Hélène and de Mantelht; their lieutenants were d'Iberville, who had returned from Hudson's Bay the previous autumn, and Repentigny de Montesson. They left Montreal towards the end of January and reached the fort at Chambly. There was a second fort at Saint Therese, some seven miles farther. From that point to the Mohawk, the country was without settlement. But it could not be called a wilderness, in the sense of a rugged impenetrable territory that had never been passed over. The route had been constantly in use, as the main line of communication between the Richelieu and the Mohawk. It had been followed by de Courcelles in January, 1666, and when de Tracy made his celebrated advance in October, he had taken the water-way to Ticonderoga, the portage to Lake George. Thus, the route was established. Water was everywhere to be found, and there was "the bush" for a shelter at night where the camp could be made.

The utter want of caution shewn at this date at Schenectady, on the Mohawk, the frontier town of the English settlements, north-west of Albany, is difficult of explanation. The tradition of the earlier winter expeditions could not have died away. To men leading active lives, careless in their fancied security, hardy, practised and experienced woodsmen, in full strength and vigour, it must have been known that the journey from the Saint Lawrence to reach them in the winter, though a demand upon endurance and determination of the highest character, was nevertheless perfectly feasible. There was war between England and France; even men living quietly and remotely on the Mohawk, could not but be sensible that they were affected by it, to the extent of life and property. Their reckless abandonment of every precaution can only be attributed to the contemptuous

feeling, that the French were too prostrate to make any such attempt against them. If they held this view, they paid dearly for their belief.

The distance from Saint Therese to Schenectady is about two hundred miles, in ordinary circumstances about fifteen days' march on snowshoes; the provisions being drawn on the toboggan. When the expedition had been engaged in the advance six days, and had probably reached Ticonderoga, the Indians desired to be informed of its destination. The place to be attacked had not been named when the start was made, and no one knew whether the assault was to be directed against the Iroquois, or against the New York settlements. The leaders explained that they hoped to take Orange * by surprise; they were, however, without positive orders, and were to be guided by circumstances. The Indians knew the difficulty of the undertaking, and considered the force too weak for such an enterprise. With some surprise, they asked the French how long it was since they had become so bold. The recollection of the unavenged slaughter at Lachine, of only six months before, was present to the Indian mind. The French answered, that the present effort was to retrieve their honour, or they would perish in the attempt.

No decision was made, and the advance was continued along the route, common to both places. When they arrived at the spot where the trails diverged, that leading to Schenectady was followed. Eight days had been passed before this point was gained, and nine additional days were taken to reach Corlaer, the name by which Schenectady was then known. The march has been described as marked by unusual difficulties, the men having been obliged on occasions to wade up to their knees in water.

At length, about four o'clock in the afternoon, they came within five miles of Schenectady. There was an Indian wigwam at the spot, which contained four squaws, who were forced, or agreed to pilot them to the village. There was a small fire in the wigwam, over which they warmed themselves

* Albany.

as they could. One of the Christian chiefs, known as the "Grand Agnier,"* of much influence, addressed the Indians present, and urged his hearers to wash out in blood the injuries they had received from the English and Dutch. Scouts were sent forward, who, in a short time, returned to report that all was quiet; they had seen no one. No watch was kept in the doomed settlement. The original intention had been to advance at two in the morning. But it was stormy, "snowing thick." The cold was intolerable. No fire could be lit, from fear of announcing the presence of the attacking force, and action became necessary to their strained nerves. It was resolved, accordingly, to make the attack without delay.

Schenectady is about fifteen miles from Albany. It was then a village of some few houses, protected by a palisade; at the eastern end there was a block-house, and there were gates which opened to the east and west. It contained a hardy, bold population of Dutch, who, having no fear of Indian attack, thought no other danger possible. Discipline, in the sense of guarding against a possible danger, was not understood. All such exertion was looked upon as unprofitable labour. Lieutenant Talmage, with nine men of the Connecticut Militia, occupied the block-house, but no watch was kept, and there was no sentinel.

It was the 9th of February, the night was piercing cold, and there was a snow storm, which doubtless added to the sense of security; the place was left perfectly exposed. The western gates, which were wide open, were pointed out by the squaws. Saint Hélène and de Manteht remained at that entrance. D'Iberville and de Montesson made a circuit to get possession of the eastern gate; but difficulties prevented them from reaching it. They returned and entered the western gate with Saint Hélène. The advance to the opposite gate was made as silently as possible. The assault was commenced by the attack of De Manteht on the block-house, where the men placed in its charge, rushed resolutely to its defence. The block-house gate was burst in, the building

* The name of *Agniers* was given by the French to the Mohawks.

set on fire, and those defending it were overpowered and killed. The signal for attack had been followed by a general assault on the houses, and, where necessary, the doors had been burst open. For two hours the massacre continued. In some instances the defence was desperate ; it was the mere assertion of individual courage against overwhelming numbers. The main character of the attack was simply that of killing unarmed and surprised men and women, rushing out of their houses to learn the cause of the uproar. One only of the assailants was wounded ; a Frenchman and an Indian were killed. The number of those massacred was thirty-eight men and boys, ten women, and twelve children. There was a desire to save the Minister, Peter Tassemaker, for it was believed that valuable information could be obtained from him ; but he was killed before he was recognized. Some few escaped through the gates, eventually to reach Albany.

When the morning came, the attacking force crossed the river to the house of Major Glen, whom the French describe under the name of Coudre. He had fortified his house, and taken steps to defend it. D'Iberville, and the "Grand Agnier," promised immunity to himself, his people and property, in memory of the good treatment the French had received at his hands in former days, and his property was left untouched. With the exception of the building where de Montigny was lying wounded, and a house of Glen's, the whole village of Schenectady was burnt. The place was entirely destroyed, and its population exterminated or carried into captivity.

After the first fury of the attack, the lives of some fifty old men, women, and children were spared. There were also some thirty Iroquois Indians to whom freedom was given, to shew that the enmity was not against the Indians, but against the English and Dutch. Twenty-seven persons were carried away, with fifty horses.

When the attack commenced, one of the inhabitants was able to throw a saddle on a horse, and, although wounded, to gallop to Albany. He arrived at early dawn. Cannon were fired to alarm the neighbourhood. The soldiers were called

out, and the inhabitants mustered. A party, consisting of some horsemen and Mohawk Indians, started for Schenectady. The Indians had undertaken to go forward and give the alarm in the Indian bourgades, and in force pursue the assailants. But, appalled by the sight of the burned village and the numerous corpses, for a time they would not leave Schenectady. The feeling, however, passed away, and, after the interval of forty-eight hours, the news of the attack was carried onward to the other Iroquois villages. The Mohawks now willingly offered their services, and a large force of them was obtained; they were joined by fifty volunteers from Albany, and the pursuit commenced.

The retiring force was encumbered by their prisoners, and there were wounded men to carry. Nearly all the Indians and many of the French were loaded with plunder, for, before they burned the place, they laid hands on all that they could carry off; nevertheless, they hurried forward as fast as they were able. They were short of provisions. As necessity exacted, they killed a horse for food, and, of the fifty of these animals taken, sixteen only reached Montreal. When they arrived at the north of Lake George, the Indians separated to hunt, for provisions were short. D'Iberville and Du Chesne, with two Indians, pushed forward to Montreal in advance of the column, to report the result of the enterprise, while the French and Canadians continued the retreat with somewhat less haste, leaving the Indians in the rear. Some few of the main body, conceiving themselves protected by having the Indians between themselves and a pursuing party, if such existed, loitered behind, overcome with fatigue. They never rejoined, although the force waited for them on the following day until eleven o'clock. They were destroyed by the Mohawks. Two hours afterwards, forty men, without the commandant's leave, left the main body and marched away in one party, leaving the more fatigued by themselves. The latter were pursued by the Mohawks to the neighbourhood of Montreal. The loss of the expedition is stated as seventeen French and four Indians. Of this number, two only were

killed in the attack. Three French prisoners were seized and carried to Albany. Their depositions were taken, and have been preserved.

This event is remarkable as the occasion when, in Canada, the French first deliberately adopted as a policy the Indian system of war, devastation ; the destruction of every thing living which lay in their path, to create the prestige of irresistible power. It was the counterpart of the raids in Maine and New Hampshire by the Abenakis, instigated by the French missionaries ; but, at which, excepting the priests, neither French nor Canadians had been present. Writers have attempted to justify the Schenectady massacre, on the ground that arms and ammunition having been obtained from the English and Dutch traders, they were responsible for the continued inroads of the Iroquois. All traders furnished to the Indian what he required, arms, powder, *eau de vie*, utensils, clothes. It had become the only mode by which the Indian trade could be carried on ; money, a recognised counter of value, passing unchallenged from hand to hand, the product of a higher civilization, was unknown to the Iroquois. But we may search the records of those days in vain, to find a parallel in the annals of New York or New England, of war being declared against women and children, in the ruthless spirit where mercy is unknown. From this date to the Conquest, it was the policy which marked the operations of the French, in their endeavour to obtain new territory, or to defend that which they possessed.

We are not to judge the military ethics of the seventeenth century by the more humanising laws which prevail in our day. Until the reign of James II., the professional soldier had been but little known in England. The persecutions of the Covenanters under Claverhouse, and by Kirke, of the rebels after Sedgemoor, form the exceptions of military ferocity in our history. There were then few regular officers in the American Colonies. Neither they, nor the Colonial officers were over-burdened by delicacy of scruple ; but no record has come down to us of any man countenancing such remorseless

attacks as those made against women and children under the orders of de Frontenac at Schenectady, and in Maine.

I reserve for another occasion the account of the expeditions from Three Rivers and Quebec, as they belong to the history of Acadia. They were directed against Salmon Falls [Berwick] and Fort Loyall [Portland]. They will be described in the narrative of the events which happened in the struggle with New England. They were marked by atrocities similar to those on the Mohawk. In the case of Fort Loyall, which surrendered after a defence not characterized by great determination, the prisoners, with a few exceptions, were abandoned to the Indians. The attack on Salmon Falls was the surprise of an unarmed village, which the attacking party burned, killing and carrying away the inhabitants.

Such policy was in no way repelling to the French officer, bred under the hard, stern, cruel policy of Louis XIV., whose principle was that everything was to be held subordinate to the glory of France. In the six years de Frontenac had been absent from Canada, he had seen the Protestants persecuted for their faith, and human life held as cheap as the clothes with which it was covered. He had seen whole communities, embracing men of the highest virtue and genius, driven from France, on account of their creed; the Palatinate turned into a desert. The one theory of the King's generals was that nothing was to stand in the way of their master's so-called glory. De Frontenac was not cruel; and, although in the hour of trial he was remorseless, hard, unflinching in his purpose, naturally he was frank and genial. It is justice to him to suppose that he held the Iroquois raids in Canada to have been fomented from Albany and, also, that he may have attributed to the same influence the attack on Lachine, the disastrous consequences of which he had himself seen. What he felt to be indispensable, was to establish that the day of the imbecility of his predecessor, which had brought Canada to the brink of ruin, had passed away. All this may be said for him, and the argument tells powerfully in his favour; but these attacks of 1690 on the frontiers of New York and New

England, leave a stain on his name, which it is impossible to remove. All that can be urged is that it was the doctrine in France of the Court, Creed, and Camp, to show no mercy to enemies, and to so-called heretics of any sex or age, and he ruthlessly carried out the precepts of that school, so far as his enemies were concerned. With regard to his religious feeling de Frontenac was certainly not a persecutor on account of his faith.

The success of the expedition encouraged de Frontenac in the belief, that he could approach the Iroquois with success, and availing himself of the influence which he had obtained over Ouréouharé, he again sent envoys to them. Ouréouharé had fallen entirely under the mental control of de Frontenac, and consequently consented to accredit four Indians with a message to his tribe, expressing his surprise that no deputation had appeared to ask for his release, and calling upon them to act without delay. De Frontenac sent with them the Chevalier d'Aux, a retired officer, and three persons known in the colony, with an interpreter. The duty of d'Aux, was to obtain what information he could of the condition of the tribe, to endeavour to conciliate Indian good will, and to point out the advantages which would result from the French alliance. His orders were to proceed to Onondaga. His reception was different from what he looked for; he himself was attached to a post to be burned, but was rescued by some Dutch traders and taken to Albany. Of those who accompanied him, La Chauvignerie was given to the Oneida Indians; young Bouat died of the small pox; La Blaussière and Colur, the interpreter, were burned. The embassy was entirely ignored. Nevertheless, de Frontenac persevered in his policy of conciliation. Any prisoners taken by the French, he sent back with presents, even when he heard that the Iroquois had ill treated their Canadian prisoners. Indeed, the difficulties of his situation were so great, that it was hard for him to know what course to follow.

While it had been the belief of de Frontenac, that the exhibition of vigour which he had displayed on the frontiers of

New York and of New England, would strike terror into the communities which had suffered from them, it had been his more immediate expectation to awaken in the Iroquois respect for his power, to induce them to conclude a peace with the French, by which public tranquility and industry would be re-established. He felt, that it was of the utmost importance to give confidence to the Canadian *habitant*, so that the Province would regain its vigour and vitality. By these means he sought to destroy the influence of New York, which he considered had hitherto been exercised to encourage the Iroquois in their attacks against the Ottawas and Illinois in the west. To the east he looked forward to the possibility of stopping the encroachments of New England, steadily advancing her frontier on what he claimed to be French territory; with these results, he would create confidence, self-assertion and courage, where he had found hesitation and the absence of hope. Many of these important ends he did obtain. He gave strength and vigour to the colony. He confirmed the Western Indians in the alliance with Canada, and for a time he stayed the northern advance of New England. But the most desired, the most weighty of his purposes he failed to obtain. The effect of his attacks on the English colonies, attended by indiscriminate massacres, conceived with the object of striking terror and paralysing opposition, was the reverse of his expectations.

The communities of New England and New York, when forced from their ordinary occupations to appear in the field to defend their homes and frontier, did not possess the trained and skilled officers who would naturally have assumed command in such emergencies. The generals who were to act, had to be formed by the events in which they were taking part; they were to be created by the teaching received in the contest. The soldiers drafted on the occasion had the rough sense of duty, that they were there to fight, but could not understand, and with difficulty were made to conform to, strict discipline. They consisted of hardy cultivators of the soil, of fishermen, of mechanics, possessing their full share of courage. They

were marked by no abstract opinions which they desired to propagate, but they had been reared in the individualism of free institutions. There was scarcely one so engaged, but had more or less been taught to feel that he was a member of the state, and that its safety depended on him and those who lived near him. For aggression, for conquest, such a population can never possess the strength of a people, whose sentiments and thoughts on every matter of public policy are controlled by irresponsible power. But when a sense of self-preservation is awakened, a wave of feeling passes through the community, sweeping away doubt and hesitation. The appeal to the necessity of effort for the common defence and well-being, then becomes the one commanding sentiment.

The assault on Schenectady was of a character to turn men's minds in this direction: a community attacked and destroyed, for no purpose but to convey a sense of power. In Massachusetts, the surprise at Salmon Falls and its disastrous consequences, and, now that it was known, the slaughter of the captives after the surrender of Fort Loyall, awoke, not fear and doubt, but the desire for revenge. It called forth the determination to chastise the power which had authorized the outrages. The courage and spirit of the northern English colonies had been fiercely appealed to; and it was resolved that steps should be taken for the assertion of their strength, and the security of their possessions.

The Iroquois themselves had learned a lesson from the policy of the French. De Denonville's expedition against them, in July, 1687, their own devastating attack on Lachine the previous autumn, their continued foray upon Canada, led them to believe that there must be eternal enmity between the French and themselves. On their side they formed views similar to those entertained by de Frontenac; that they would have no permanent peace until the French were driven from Canada, or so far forced back in their settlements as to be powerless to injure them. Whatsoever the origin of the attack on Canada at that date by the English colonies, it had its motive, not in a desire to obtain increase of territory to the north,

but to deprive the French of the power of attacking their settlements, and to obtain neighbours possessing interests in common with themselves.

A Congress was held in New York in May, 1690, when the invasion of Canada was proposed. The programme was, that a land force was to advance from Albany by way of Lake Champlain, while Massachusetts and the maritime New England colonies were to equip a fleet, and sail up the Saint Lawrence and attack Quebec. It was the plan of campaign followed, even up to the time of the revolutionary war, by both nations. The advance by Lake Champlain was known to be the only feasible route by which either Montreal or Albany could be attacked. It became the battle ground between Montcalm and the British sixty years later; and, in the attempt to retain hold of the revolted colonies, a similar expedition was made from Canada under the incompetent Burgoyne. During this period no other means of access presented itself. East of this passage was the wilderness, then unknown and untravelled but by the trapper and the Indian, while the route by Lake Champlain in summer offered great facilities for the movement and provision of troops.

The expedition was to be formed of four hundred men from New York. Massachusetts, Connecticut and Plymouth were to furnish three hundred and fifty men, and the whole force of the Iroquois was to be included. The proposed attempt was not without embarrassment to Massachusetts. The colony was engaged in the project against Port Royal and Acadia. Her resources were limited, and great calls on her treasury and population were being made. Had wisdom prevailed in this conference, the result of the expedition against Port Royal would have been allowed to develop itself. Acadia would then have been colonized, and have become British, for there was little at that time to prevent this result, and the events of the next century would have been anticipated. New England in possession of Nova Scotia, the Treaty of Ryswick would have distinctly recognized the territory to be within English limits. Waiting the result of these

operations, New York, would not have entered into an engagement to join in an expedition against Montreal, unacquainted with the magnitude of the obligation she was assuming, and without the necessary preparation. The colony would have remained for a time on the defensive, to discipline her forces, and to increase her strength to repel attack. The postponement of the expedition would have led to its being undertaken at a future date more carefully, and being more efficiently organized. It would not have degenerated into the mere raid which it proved to be, when the advance took place. No such wise counsels prevailed. It was resolved without delay to attack Canada.

CHAPTER III.

No suspicion of these designs crossed de Frontenac's mind. In the early spring he had been engaged in taking steps to meet the difficulties threatening his government at the western lakes ; before, however, he could leave Quebec, it had been necessary to determine the course he would pursue with regard to his attendance at the Council.

Since the registration of his patent as Governor-General, de Frontenac had not been present at any other meeting. The Council was constituted much as it had been during his difficulty with its members six years previously. There was, however, another Bishop of Quebec, another Intendant, and circumstances were no longer the same. War had been declared between France and England, and in the interval Canada had suffered severe reverses. Whatever were the personal feelings of the members of the Council towards the Governor, there was full confidence in his courage and soldier-ship to ward off the perils threatening the colony. The success at Schenectady, and the activity shewn in the other expeditions, were accepted evidence of his power, and no one member was inclined to offer any opposition in civil life.

At the meeting of the 20th of February, 1690, the subject of the Governor's attendance was discussed. The Attorney-General reported that both the Intendant and himself had frequently invited him to be present, and, as Attorney-General, he had been deputed to see the Governor and learn his wishes. The reply of M. de Frontenac was, that the Council knew the duty its members had to perform, and that, when the King's service required his attendance at the Council, he would be found there. The Attorney-General continued, that he had formed the opinion that the Governor looked for some personal act of courtesy from the members asking his attendance: At

this period the meetings did not take place at the *Chateau* of Saint Louis, but at the palace of the Intendant. The Attorney-General pointed out that there was no recognized ceremony with which the Governor should be received, and it was advisable that some rule should be established. He suggested that a deputation should wait upon the Governor and submit the form they proposed to adopt, and ask if it met his approval. The matter was discussed and precedents sought; finally it was resolved that four Councillors should proceed to the *Chateau* to learn the sentiments of M. de Frontenac. Prominent in the number was his old antagonist, M. de Villeray.

The result of the interview was reported at the meeting of the 27th of February. The spokesman of the deputation had been M. de Villeray. To save the dignity of the Council, he pointed out, not only that there was no rule for the reception of the Governor, but, likewise, there was none for that of the Bishop and Intendant. M. de Villeray stated that the Governor had expressed his astonishment at the forgetfulness of the Council, who should have remembered, that it was for them to propose how he should be received; and then he would take into consideration what he would do. He thanked the deputation for their visit. The result was that the matter was considered, and de Villeray waited upon the Governor to notify him that the Council were prepared to render him all possible honour, that four Councillors would be deputed to receive him at the upper step of the Palace entrance, and conduct him to his seat. The Governor replied that it was not the course adopted in the "Cours Souverains" of the Kingdom. De Villeray answered that they had obtained the best information, but nothing was positively determined; they only desired to meet his wishes. Upon this de Frontenac suggested that they could learn from the Bishop, and from others who had knowledge on the subject, what was customary. It was resolved, accordingly, that the Bishop should be asked to attend. The next meeting took place on the 6th of March. The Bishop was not present, but sent a communication, stating that he did not know what was

the proper course to follow for the reception of the Governor. M. de Villeray was again requested to wait upon M. de Frontenac, and to propose that four Councillors should proceed to the *Chateau*, and accompany him to the Council, when he had determined to be present. To this proposal, the Governor replied, that having heard that the proceedings which had taken place had been recorded, he desired to read what had been written. Moreover, he wished to be informed how he would be received after his first visit.

The Intendant must have felt that it was time to show some self-assertion, for he expressed his opinion that the Council had made the most courteous proposals to the Governor, and that he considered that nothing should be changed with regard to the custom observed towards Governors on ordinary occasions. It was then proposed that on subsequent visits, two Councillors should receive him on the landing of the staircase, near the entrance of the Council room.

On the 13th of March De Villeray reported that every thing was satisfactorily arranged. The Governor had seen, that the Council had recognised what was due to his position. He had remarked, that, had they made propositions exceeding the limit of the consideration to which he was entitled, he would not have accepted them : the honour of the Council being of the more importance to him, as he was its Chief. Thus, in a general way, he revived his pretensions of seven years back, in an uncontradicted sentence. He would have allowed nothing to derogate from the dignity of the Council. These offers were accepted. The members were thanked ; and he notified them that he would attend after Easter.

De Frontenac did not make his appearance at the Council until Tuesday, the 27th of March, 1691. His presence was then called for, owing to a duel with swords having taken place between two Captains of the Marine Forces, de Lorimier, and de Noyau, in which both were wounded. On the 7th of April they were punished, by a fine of fifty livres each, half payable to the Hotel Dieu, and half to the poor. On this occasion de

Frontenac was also present. It is plain that, after what happened with regard to the Council, he might confidently look forward to little personal opposition or contumacy from its members.

On the opening of navigation, de Frontenac proceeded to Montreal. He had resolved to recall de la Durantaye from the command at Michilimackinac. The causes which led him to take this course have not been explained. Charlevoix suggests that de la Durantaye lived in too good intelligence with the Missionaries, and his government was conducted in subservience to their views. The assertion is without proof; indeed, no one could have rendered more efficient service than he had done. It had been principally by the exertions of de la Durantaye that the Indian contingents had been obtained for the expeditions of de la Barre and de Denonville; and his record was that of an excellent officer. It is painful to read that his last years were passed amid privation and poverty. He was not again employed in any position of importance. Towards the close of his life he was named to the "Conseil Supérieur," and the small stipend he there obtained was his only means of support. At his death he left a large family without provision.*

The expedition despatched by de Frontenac to the Western Lakes consisted of one hundred and forty-three Canadians with six Indians. Nicholas Perrot accompanied it, being charged with a message to the Ottawas, by which they were called upon to resume their friendly feelings towards France, and they were warned, that if they failed to do so, chastisement would follow. As the party ascended the Ottawa, they came across a party of Iroquois, whom they defeated. The dead they scalped. They also carried a prisoner with them to Michili-

* "Olivier Morel de la Durantaie né à Nôtre Dame de Gaure, Nantes, était capitaine dans le régiment de Carignan-Salières. . . . Il mourut laissant sa famille dans la pauvreté. Ses descendants dans la ligne masculine sont encore en grand nombre, et il n'est pas rare de reconstruire sous un toit fort humble, de nobles cultivateurs qui portent le nom de Morel de la Durantaie." M. l'Abbé Ferland, II., p. 208. The writer once met a member of the family, a handsome young girl, as servant at a small tavern up the Ottawa.

mackinac. The force was of too much strength not to command respect ; accordingly, on their arrival they were received with outward marks of satisfaction. The Ottawas gave them a welcome in their savage way, by the firing of guns, and a general tumult of shouts and jubilation; and the French landed among their countrymen, being received with a cordial expression of satisfaction at their presence, which removed fears long felt.

The interest of the French lay in creating a breach between the Indians of the West and the Iroquois, and there could be no surer way of attaining it than by causing the Ottawas to burn the prisoner, and by establishing that the act was attributable entirely to them. The Ottawas had outwardly given their adherence to the renewed alliance. Their chief was Kondiaronk, "Le Rat," who, in the days of de Denonville, had killed the peace; and, under his advice, they asked for the prisoner, promising to burn him. The tribe had in reality, no desire to commit themselves in this way with the Iroquois, and no such step was taken. Accordingly, the jealous feelings of the Hurons were appealed to. They were told that the Ottawas were endeavouring to act independently of the other Indians to their own profit. The Hurons, consequently, took the opposite side. They contended that the prisoner should be killed and eaten. Père Corbeil, or a father acting by his instructions, was busy in the intrigue, and, if writers on the subject are to be credited, the missionaries plainly said that the French desired that the man should be put into the caldron,* and that if the Indians would not take this course, the French themselves would carry out the sentence. The man was tied to a stake and tortured, but, as he shewed signs of weakness, was shot.

The Ottawas, still desiring to avoid proceeding to extremities with the Iroquois, determined to send an embassy to disavow the prisoner's death. But by means of presents, persuasion and diplomacy, the chiefs were led, one by one, to agree that no embassy should start. Thus, for the time, the

* "À la chaudière." The figurative expression for burning a prisoner.

Ottawas and Hurons were again compromised, and gained to the side of France.

At the end of July de Frontenac left Quebec. Prevost was placed in charge of the fortifications, and the duty was assigned him of completing the lines of defence, according to the plans which had been traced. The report of the frequent Iroquois raids, and the disasters arising from them, had no doubt suggested to de Frontenac that his presence might check them. The narrative which we receive of these events is frequently marked by exaggeration, but undoubtedly great ravages were committed. They had all the characteristic of a settlement taken by surprise, without means of organized resistance. The attacks were as rapidly made as they were injurious in their effects ; being mostly directed against localities which, from their isolated situation, could not guard against sudden attack. One narrative specially calls for mention, the occasion when the Indian chief, the "Grand Agnier," met his death. The story related is, that de Tilly, a captain on half pay, four Frenchmen, and a party of Christian Indians from the Sault and the Mountain, left Montreal on the 18th of May. On the 26th, they came upon two wigwams of Iroquois, the occupants of which they seized. Guided by the information they obtained, they surprised an English fort, killed four men and two women, and made forty-two prisoners, of whom eight were English women. As Schenectady was the only outlying village from Albany, and had been burnt to the ground on the 8th of February, three months previously, the story will not bear the test of examination, because there was no place answering the description, where it could have happened. What did occur, however, was that, hearing that a large body of Iroquois was approaching them, the party retreated, and on the 4th of June reached Salmon River, which falls into Lake Champlain. A party of Algonquins and Abenakis had left Three Rivers on a war excursion. Early in the morning, coming suddenly on this force, they mistook them for Iroquois, and attacked them, killing two and wounding ten of the number. One of the killed was the "Grand

Agnier." His death was a serious loss to the French, for he was devoted to them, and possessed great influence with his tribe as a man of ability and enterprise.

There was an affair at Pointe aux Trembles, below Montreal. A party of Iroquois canoes descending by the river Des Prairies, which runs north of the island, were seen by a surgeon named Jallot. The *habitants*, to the number of twenty-five, turned out to meet them. A retired captain, Sieur de Colombet, took command, and they placed themselves in ambush for attack. Unfortunately, the Iroquois greatly outnumbered them, and of the gallant little band twelve were killed, including their leader, de Colombet. The Iroquois, however, lost twenty-five men, and the check which they had received led them to retreat. A raid was also made on the settlements on the river Becancour, opposite Three Rivers, when the Iroquois carried off several women and children. Parties started in pursuit, and, as the unhappy prisoners could not proceed quickly enough for their captors, the Iroquois with their usual brutality, killed them, and advanced rapidly to leave their pursuers behind.

Scouting parties were ordered to patrol the south side of the Saint Lawrence. The Chevalier de la Mothe passed between Longueuil and Sorel, while de Clermont went over the ground east of Lake Saint Peter to the Becancour, feeling the country towards Quebec. On one of these occasions, the latter recovered some children carried off from Sorel. Four of the party engaged in the raid were left dead, de Monseignat tells us, and among them a magistrate from Orange, with his commission in his pocket. The statement is not authenticated, and cannot be accepted. There is no record of the English from Albany joining parties of the Iroquois, for the purpose of devastating French settlements. The evidence that they did so in this case is strained and improbable.

With the knowledge of these onslaughts, de Frontenac must have heard with anxiety the news contained in a letter of the 18th of August, from Captain de la Chassagne commanding at Lachine, that one hundred canoes were descend-

ing Lake Saint Louis, and were within two leagues of his fort. No other opinion could be formed, but that Lachine was again to be attacked, and that an assault would be made on Montreal. No conjecture could be formed of what the force was composed. Measures were at once taken for defence; alarm guns were fired; the troops called in and concentrated, and preparations made to meet the formidable emergency. These feelings rapidly passed away, to be succeeded by joy and surprise. They were the canoes of the Western Indians of Michilimackinac, from Lake Huron and Lake Michigan. The news was brought by Tilly de l'Isle, accompanied by four Ottawa and Huron chiefs. The following day the canoes descended the Saint Louis rapids and reached Montreal with a rich cargo of furs; an arrival important in every respect. For eight years there had been no such traffic. To Montreal it was a promise of the return of the old trade, which, during the late troubles, had died away; and at the same time it was a token that the Ottawas and Hurons had abandoned their connection with the Iroquois at Albany, to renew their relationship with New France. To de Frontenac the intelligence was in every way gratifying, for it assured him of the success of his policy on the Lakes, and that his lieutenants, de Louvigny and Perrot, had efficiently carried out his instructions.

A council was held two days afterwards*. The Ottawas who were present expressed their desire to be furnished cheaply with the articles they required. The Hurons, by their Chief, "Le Baron," expressed perfect devotion to de Frontenac, and asked for arms and ammunition, demanding that the war might be carried on equally against the Iroquois and the English. The chief of the Nipissings desired to know the Governor's pleasure, only that he might conform to it. Trade commenced the following day. Years had passed since Montreal had seen such commercial activity, and business was carried on with unusual energy and satisfaction.

During this interchange of commodities, intelligence was

* On the 22nd of August.

received which caused anxiety. An Indian, named La Plaque, had returned from a scouting expedition in the neighbourhood of Lake Champlain. He had reached Lake George, and had there observed a large party of Iroquois engaged in making canoes, and he drew the inference that an expedition was being organized against Montreal. Although La Plaque's story was illustrated by feats of his own powers and enterprise, the character of the man for courage and honesty led his statement to be believed, and steps were taken to meet the attack should it be made. The Western Ottawas and Hurons were induced to prolong their stay, and one of the means of inducing them to remain was to invite them to a feast and a conference. The banquet consisted of two oxen and six dogs stewed with prunes, two barrels of wine, and tobacco.

Previous to the feast, de Frontenac addressed them; a precaution necessary with men whose habit at a symposium was to gorge themselves to stupidity. There was much personal dignity in de Frontenac, and he possessed a natural eloquence, which suggested the precise word necessary to the occasion. He told the Western Indians that he should prosecute war until the Iroquois should sue for peace. Those who were present had heard that the enemy was sending an army to ravage New France. All that was necessary was, to determine whether they would advance to meet the danger, or wait to receive it. After this address de Frontenac took the hatchet in hand, sang the war-song, and, as a portion of the ceremony included the rapid movement called the war-dance, he must have participated in it. It was the visible sign that he placed himself at the head of his hearers, that he was their chief; and no argument could have been more powerfully addressed to those who followed him. Many of the French officers imitated his example. The Christian Indians of the Sault, of the Montreal Mountain, the Ottawas, the Hurons, the Nipissings, with some Abenakis from Quebec, all gave expression to their devotion and resolution; and the war-dance was gone through in its mazes with an enthusiasm rarely exceeded.

A scouting party under de Clermont was sent forward to Lake Champlain, and the discovery was made that a party of the enemy in force was in the field. The fact was known on the 29th of August.

The expedition organized for the attack of Canada from Albany thus became known to the French. Its history is marked by much of the irresolution characteristic, at that and at a later date, of the efforts in which New York and the other colonies bore part. The English colonies appear rarely to have understood the necessity of making personal feeling subordinate to the requirements of the enterprise before them, and it was with difficulty that the different governments could be led to act in union. Questions arose which, under proper discipline, or controlled by a commanding mind having the power to settle them, would never have obtained consideration. In the New York contingent were to be found two parties, one supporting the revolution, the other discountenancing it; at least in the form which it had assumed. The raids on the northern frontier of New England had alarmed Connecticut, and that province had withdrawn a portion of her contingent for the protection of her own settlements. Winthrop, of Connecticut, had been appointed Commander of the force. Even, if all had been concord, it was not possible, in two months, to have given to a number of men, gathered in different localities from their daily occupations, that concrete character which is cemented by discipline. Unlike the population of Canada, the men of New York were unaccustomed to service; there was no call upon their activity, even for defensive operations. The force had assembled at Albany; but the attempt to obtain provisions had not fully succeeded, and there was a want of canoes. The Iroquois had not joined the expedition to the extent looked for. Amid these unfavourable circumstances the smallpox broke out, causing suffering and death; and its presence becoming known to the more western tribes of the Iroquois, prevented their attendance. Winthrop, accordingly, had resolved not to persevere in the expedition. But he allowed himself to be persuaded by Captain John Schuyler to countenance a raid into Canada.

The French accounts give numbers so at variance with probability, that they can in no way be accepted. One writer speaks of sixteen hundred English invading Canada. According to the New York accounts, the expedition consisted of "twenty-nine Christians," and one hundred and twenty Indians; this number was subsequently increased by thirteen whites, and five Indians, making a total of one hundred and seventy-two fighting men. The canoes were portaged from the Hudson to Wood's Creek, by the side of which, in modern times, the present Champlain Canal has been constructed. The party followed the creek to Lake Champlain, and commenced the descent of the lake, reaching Crown Point on the 24th of August. They continued on their route to the Richelieu, and the appearance of an extraordinary meteor to the south is recorded as having been observed during their voyage. Schuyler describes his arrival three miles above "the sand bank of Chambly." The spies whom he sent out reported that the party of Canadians which had been on watch, had retired. Accordingly, placing their canoes and provisions in safety, Schuyler and his party proceeded across the country to La-prairie, on the 2nd of September, the march being difficult from the softness of the clay. As they advanced, they were astonished at hearing heavy firing. Keeping themselves concealed on their arrival, they sent out spies on the following morning, who returned with the information that the troops were leaving the fort to reap the corn. The intention was to cut off the force from the fort, but the Indians would not wait for the order of assault, and commenced the attack. "They made 19 prisoners and took 6 scalps, among which were 4 women folk."* One of the prisoners explained that the firing had been caused by the Governor having gone away the day previously with eight hundred men, and the men discharging their muskets. Schuyler then fell upon the cattle, killed one

* "Journal of Captain John Schuyler, who voluntarily embarked at Wood Creek on the 13th of August, 1690 [24th of August, N. S.], with 29 Christians and 120 savages, whom he recruited at Wood Creek as volunteers under his command, to go to Canada to fight the enemy." *Doc. Hist. of N.Y.* II., pp. 285, 8.

hundred and fifty head of oxen and cows, and set fire to all the houses, barns and hay, and burned every thing which would take fire. Schuyler relates that he was desirous of attacking the fort, but that the Indians refused to aid him. It was, no doubt, fortunate for him that such was the case. The probability is that he would have been met by overwhelming numbers, and would have had to fight his way through them, or have been annihilated. The fort fired alarm guns which were replied to by Chambly and Montreal.

Schuyler, accordingly, departed with his prisoners. On their route to the Richelieu, two of the wounded French prisoners, unable to keep up, were killed by the Indians. As they sat down to eat, Schuyler records that during their meal they thanked the Governor of Canada for his salute of heavy cannon. On the 3rd of September they reached the Richelieu, and, taking to their canoes, started for Albany, where they arrived on the 10th of September.*

These operations may have been looked upon by the English of New York as being justifiable reprisals for the assault on Schenectady of the preceding February, for they took place only a few months later in the same year, and when that terrible outrage was fresh in the public mind. But it was a poor satisfaction, and extended neither credit nor dignity to those who conceived it, nor, in spite of its boldness, to those who executed it; the very act seemed to cast ridicule on the end originally proposed—the invasion and conquest of Canada—which thus terminated in a miserable raid, without result. If the attack can in the least degree be palliated, it is by attributing it to the memory of the massacre at Schenectady, and the desire of avenging the horrors of that night.

One fact shews the uncertainty of the chances of war; Schuyler's advance was known and steps had been taken to guard against it. De la Bruère, an officer despatched by de

* Schuyler narrates that on the 26th they were at "the little Stone Fort," whence they sent men to Albany in a canoe with the news. He mentions that they reached Wood's Creek on the 28th. It is difficult to establish the locality of this stone fort.

Clermont, had learned that the expedition was on Lake Champlain. The surmise had been that an advance would be made on Laprairie, and a large force, consisting of regulars and militia, had been gathered together to oppose it. A review had been held of these troops on the 1st of September, the day previous to Schuyler's march across the country. Four scouts were sent out to learn if there were signs of the invasion, but they went no further than Chambly, and it must have been the trace of this party upon which Schuyler's scouts came. On their report that there was no sign of danger, the troops and the militia were sent to gather in the harvest. It was against these men, in no way expecting attack, that the onslaught of Schuyler was made.

The Iroquois assaults still continued in other parts of the Province. The commandant of Chateauguay, des Marais, was killed not far from the fort. An attack was made upon some French, on one of the islands at the entrance to Lake Saint Peter, in which they lost nearly twenty men. Montreal was constantly agitated by alarms, most of which, happily, proved false. De Frontenac still remained in that place, waiting for the arrival of the canoes from the west. De la Durantaye appeared on the 1st of October, accompanied by fifty canoes laden with valuable furs, the property of the traders in the neighbourhood of Michilimackinac, and he confirmed by his statements the truth of the allegiance of the Indians. The Governor had now resolved, in company with the Intendant, to proceed to Quebec; while undecided as to the day when he would leave, a letter from his lieutenant, Major Prevost, gave him intelligence which caused his immediate departure, for it informed him of the threatened invasion of New France by Massachusetts.

When the project of the maritime expedition against Quebec was first mooted, as has been said, Massachusetts had not immediately accepted the proposition. There were serious considerations which led the province to hesitate before taking the step. But Phips' success in Acadia had awakened the popular enthusiasm, and all doubts as to the consequences

which might follow passed away. I will relate in their place the events of that expedition, which forms a portion* of the History of Acadia, and has no direct relationship with that of Canada.

Phips returned to Boston the 30th of May, a victor, with the prisoners, and the booty which he had obtained at Port Royal. His good fortune gave such an impulse to the enterprise that its success was held to be assured; and on all sides the expedition was looked upon as feasible. In this state of feeling, a swift-sailing vessel was sent to England to ask for aid and money. The crisis was one when neither could be granted by the home government. There was a French force in Ireland, and civil war was raging there. On the Continent, Great Britain had to range herself on the side of her allies, against the power of France, to prevent the battle for national life being fought in Devonshire and Kent. It is not improbable that to William III., in the existing state of events, the claims of Canada on France were not looked upon entirely as a disadvantage, as New France absorbed some of the strength, vigour and money, which otherwise might have been directed against himself in Europe. England was unable to grant aid to any transatlantic project. Even the Hudson's Bay Company, all powerful in London, with the King's strong desire to gratify the wealthy corporations, could obtain no aid from the Crown until 1693, for the re-conquest of the forts taken in 1686.

Sustained by the feeling that help would be given, and from the elation caused by Phips' success, the preparations were vigorously urged forward. Every engine of influence was appealed to. While it was stated that the plunder from the enterprise would pay its expenses, the religious machinery at the command of New England was not lost sight of. The people were urged to repentance. A public fast was held, and the pulpits resounded with appeals to patriotism and national duty. There was a scarcity of money, therefore subscriptions were asked, but with no great effect; vessels were impounded

* For Phips' operations in Acadia, I refer the reader to Book VI., chapter I.

for the service of the State ; volunteers were called for, but as only a limited number of responses was made to the appeal, it was resolved to have recourse to impressment, which was unflinchingly enforced. As money failed, a further loan was obtained. Thirty-four vessels were to be manned, the principal of which was a frigate of forty-four guns, called the "Six Friends," which in some form had been on service in the West Indies. Phips was appointed commander of the expedition, while Walley, who was a resident of Barnstable, with the rank of major, was placed in command of the land forces. The officers were taken from civil life ; substantial citizens engaged in various pursuits, men working their farms, ship-masters, traders, lawyers, the higher class of mechanics. The total number of men in the expedition, including sailors and the land force, was about twenty-two hundred.

The success of the expedition depended on the blow being struck suddenly, when preparations were least made to meet it ; and those charged with its organization must have entertained this feeling, for great activity was shewn by them. The conduct of Sir William Phips, the leader, does not suggest that he was impressed with this view. There was a period of the year when the enterprise could have been best undertaken, and no consideration should have led to its postponement. The dispatch of the vessel to England asking for aid, caused loss of time, and was in every sense unfortunate. Opportunity was given for the defences of Quebec to be made more complete, and for de Frontenac to exercise his great qualities, in centralizing the force at his command, and awakening general confidence and effort.

On his arrival in Canada, de Frontenac had particularly busied himself in fortifying Quebec on its exposed side to the west. During the winter timber had been cut, and, on the approach of spring, placed on the ground. De Frontenac's original idea was probably to give security to the inhabitants against Indian attack. Judged by after events, the course taken by him might be regarded as providential. The rock fronting the St. Lawrence, turning to the north along the

St. Charles, gave security that no surprise could take place in that direction, except at the two practicable ascents, now known as Hope and Palace gates. De Frontenac had commenced a picket enclosure, following a line from the Intendant's palace to the St. Lawrence, to include what then existed of the upper town to the west of Mont Carmel, on which a mill stood.

De Frontenac had left Quebec in July, having placed Major Prevost in command to complete the fortifications. He was engaged in this duty when, early in October, an Abenaki Indian arrived over land, with the intelligence that thirty-four ships had sailed from Boston, on their way to capture New France, being confident of success, from the ease with which the conquest of Acadia had been achieved. As the expedition against Port Royal had become known in Canada, such an attempt seemed probable to Prevost, and he immediately forwarded the report to de Frontenac. The Governor, on its receipt, started for Quebec without delay; and while on his way he was met by another canoe bringing a second report that the Massachusetts fleet was within sixteen leagues of the city,* and that a barque and a boat, sent from Quebec to gain information, had been captured. On first receiving Prevost's news, de Frontenac had ordered two hundred men to accompany him; he now sent back orders to de Callières to collect all the men he could gather, and to follow him with the utmost dispatch, and, as he passed down the river, to call out the *habitants* who belonged to the militia. Hurrying forward with all possible haste, de Frontenac arrived at Quebec on the 14th of October. His presence gave new heart to the inhabitants, for it was the promise of a resolute defence, and he was greeted with every mark of satisfaction and delight. His first thought was to examine the means taken to defend the city. Prevost had constructed a line of palisades along the River Saint Charles to the Intendant's Palace, the point where the works projected by himself had been commenced. There was a battery of eight guns where Durham Terrace

* Thirty-eight miles.

now stands ; one of three guns at Sault-au-Matelot, and some heavy guns were placed in the lower town along the water.

The fleet left Nantasket on the 20th of August, and reaching the Saint Lawrence had worked its way up the river without pilots. In an effort of this character the persevering energy of Phips was of good account. In other respects he had no idea of the magnitude of the task which he had undertaken. It is questionable even if he counted upon resistance, and his conduct suggests that he had formed the opinion, that, even if it were experienced, it could be without difficulty overcome. From the preparations made by him, he must have thought it not impossible that he would be welcomed as a deliverer, and if he did not hold these views, his conduct is inexplicable. He brought with him Father Trouvé, whom he had taken prisoner at Port Royal, and some other Acadians, in order to avail himself of their assistance when in possession of the country. If, in accordance with the plan of attack, a force strong enough to cause anxiety, had advanced against Montreal, de Frontenac would have remained there to defend the city. With despatch and energy on the part of the New England fleet, Quebec would have been reached, when the place would have been found in an exposed condition ; certainly on the west of the city. But there was no attack directed against Montreal, and time was given to Quebec for making preparations to receive the invading fleet.

As Phips ascended the river, he had seized a small barque proceeding to the Mingan Islands. The vessel contained the wife and mother of Jolliet, who, with Marquette, had first descended the Mississippi from its northern waters. The information which he obtained confirmed Phips in his views. He, however, remained at Tadousac three weeks, a delay which has not been explained, for during this period the wind was favourable. If there was a point on which Phips should have had no doubt, it was, that his success depended on his taking Quebec by surprise, and if he held any hope of his presence being welcome to the Canadians, it was rapidly dispelled. Whenever a boat approached the shore, it was received

by a volley from parties concealed in the bush. Great hostility was everywhere shewn; the whole country was alive, and prepared to resist the invaders.

On the morning of Monday, the 16th of October, the fleet sailed into the basin in front of Quebec. Between nine and ten o'clock, a boat was sent from the admiral's ship, bearing a white flag. Four canoes immediately left the city to intercept it. The boat carried a major, bearing a letter to de Frontenac. He was taken on board one of the canoes and landed at the wharf, where he was received by Prevost. The latter, placing a bandage over the eyes of the emissary, conducted him to de Frontenac's presence. Half a century later, a writer* described a scene of the envoy being taken over masses of rubbish and made to ascend and descend obstructions; how his passage was rendered painful to him and ridiculous to the bystanders, the women laughing and jeering at him, crying out that it was a game of "Colin-Maillard."† The story is not mentioned by contemporary French writers, and is in itself incredible. There could have been little inclination at that trying hour for jest and laughter. Women would not have been allowed to approach the escort. There was no call for such wit, and it would have been mischievous. All men who have served know, that, where *abatis* are placed, some means is left of passing through them with ease.

The envoy was led to the *Chateau*, and received by de Frontenac, surrounded by his staff. The room was crowded with officials and the leading ecclesiastics of the colony. Doubtless among them was Bishop de Laval, then in Quebec. That hour of trial may have done more to change his feelings towards his old antagonist, than years of attempted reconciliation. We may be assured, that no one present felt greater indignation, or was more prepared to resist to the last the attempt upon the city.

* La Sœur Juchereau de St. Ignace. *Histoire de l'Hôtel Dieu de Quebec*. Montauban, 1751, p. 323. M. l'Abbé Latour is known to have corrected the M.S. of this work: of all writers in Canada the most unreliable.

† Blindman's buff.

After the usual courtesies, the letter was presented with due politeness. It has been preserved. It recapitulated that war existed between the two countries ; that the attacks of the French and Indians on the inhabitants of New England, without provocation, had "put them under the necessity of this expedition for their own security and satisfaction ;" that there was a desire to avoid shedding blood. Phips concluded by demanding the surrender of the fort and its stores, with their persons, "upon the doing whereof you may expect mercy from me as a Christian, according to what shall be found for their Majesties' service and the subjects' security." Otherwise, he was resolved to avenge all wrongs by force of arms. An answer was demanded in an hour.

The paper was read and translated, upon which the New England Major took a watch from his pocket. It was passed to the Governor. De Frontenac scarcely looked at it. Upon which the envoy remarked that it was now ten o'clock, and he asked an answer to be given by eleven precisely. There was a general cry of indignation present, especially among the officers around de Frontenac. It was afterwards said that some cried out that Phips was a pirate, and that his lieutenant ought to be hanged. The probability is against the fact.*

De Frontenac's reply was in every way characteristic.

"I will not make you wait so long a time. Tell your General, that I in no way recognize King William. The Prince of Orange is an usurper who has violated the most sacred rights of blood in endeavouring to dethrone his father-in-law. King James is the only sovereign of England whom I recognize. Your General should in no way feel surprise at the warlike operations carried on against the colony of Massa-

* "The next morning, after the fleet arrived, Sir William sent a summons ashore. If it was too pompous, the answer was too insolent. The English were called heretics and told that if it had not been for the revolution, New England and Canada would have been all one. The French say the Major who carried the summons was threatened with a gibbet and had like to have swooned. No notice is taken of this in the English journals, and it is not likely to be true."

Hutchinson Hist. Mass., 1765, I., p. 400.

chusetts, which he lays to the account of the French. For he might expect that the King, my master, having received the King of England under his protection, His Majesty would order me to carry the war into those countries and against the peoples, who had revolted against their legitimate Prince." The Governor-General paused and looked around the room, with his hand drawing attention to the officers near him." He continued. "Even should your General have offered me more easy conditions, and I were ready to accept them, does he believe that so many brave men would consent, and would counsel me to trust to the word of a man, who had not observed the capitulation, which he had made with the Governor of Port Royal; and of a rebel who was wanting in fidelity to his legitimate sovereign, in order to take the side of a prince, who, in the effort to make it appear that he is desirous to be the liberator of England, and the defender of the faith, destroys the laws and privileges of the kingdom, and overturns the English religion? It is this which the Divine justice, appealed to by your general in his letter, will not fail to punish with severity."

The Envoy, as is usual in such cases, asked for the reply to be given in writing. De Frontenac's answer was immediate.

"It is by the cannon's mouth, and by musket shot, that I will send my answer. It is not by the means which have been taken that a man like myself is to be summoned. Let him do his best, as I will do mine."

Phips had now to carry out the threats which he had made. From a prisoner, or from a deserter, he had obtained intelligence that the town could be attacked from the plains above, and that it was at this point the fortifications could be forced. The plan was not entertained. The same spot was adopted by Wolfe, in 1759, as the point of attack, and it is remarkable that, at the period of the later struggle, the contingency was not recollected, and more carefully guarded against.*

It does not appear that any map was possessed by Phips, or

* At that date the fact may only have been preserved in the New England MS. Hutchinson's history was not published until six years later.

that he had any knowledge of the country. There was no plan of campaign ; and, excepting the slight provision of bringing the Port Royal prisoners as interpreters, no course of action had been determined as to the mode of taking possession of the country, which the leader of the expedition at one time supposed he could so easily conquer. The impression is forced upon us, that, if at this date Phips had succeeded, he would have contented himself with plundering the town and carrying back his booty to Boston ; probably bringing with him the principal personages as hostages. Phips had no delicate notions of the line of conduct, which he ought to follow at any time. He was influential with the lower stratum of the population. The one point to present to them was success, and he was more likely to be guided by the advantage which any course of action would bring to himself and New England, than to consider with the eye of a statesman the policy wisest to follow. One cannot but contrast the crude, unformed theories which prevailed in Boston with regard to this attempt, and the clearly defined views of the French Court with regard to de Callières' scheme for the conquest of New York. Louis would have made the country a French colony, at whatever cost of life. He was prepared to disregard every form of suffering, to root out Protestantism and Protestants, as had been done in France, and to consign to misery all who opposed him. We must, nevertheless, concede that, whatever the character of his views, they were based upon policy. Phips had not even a plan of operations. His conduct throughout was marked by irresolution, and he acted from hour to hour as he held to be expedient, trusting alone to chance. His dogged, unflinching New England courage was the sole admirable quality he possessed ; and, whatever the faults of the expedition, it was not disgraced by cowardice : the one word of praise to be said for it.

Many great soldiers have been placed in positions of danger and trial, and they have called a council of war to discuss the emergency. Experience has shown, that it is those only that have trusted to their own genius and desperate determina-

tion, who have risen superior to the difficulties which threatened their destruction. A council of war may present facts and theories in a new light; it has rarely given a bold solution to the enigma of the hour. In such a period of trial, true genius asserts itself, and when the victory has been achieved, it is then understood what dangers have been overcome by wisdom and fortitude.

Any leader fitted for command, sending a declaration marked by the insolence of that of Phips', would at once, on the defiant reply of de Frontenac, have taken steps to shew that he was a man of action. But nothing was done. The ships gave no sign. The one proceeding was that a council of war sat to deliberate on the future. So passed the day.

The discussion ended in the determination to land a force at Beauport. The troops were to advance to the Saint Charles, to ford the river at low water, and pass to the rear of the town. Had the attempt been made on the receipt of de Frontenac's reply, there was at least some prospect of success. Quebec contained only the few troops which had been left under the command of Major Prevost, with a portion of the two or three hundred men who had accompanied de Frontenac. Some troops had been sent to Beaupré, Beauport and the Island of Orleans; also to Point Levis, and around these detachments some *habitans* had gathered. On the day previous to the arrival of Phips, Sunday, the 15th, de Vaudreuil had been detached with one hundred men to keep the ships constantly in sight, and to give notice of their arrival. He had returned at three in the morning, with the intelligence that the ships were close at hand, his men greatly harassed.

Had Phips made a dash at noon of the first day, and had he been the man to direct such operations, it is by no means certain that he would have failed, although he would have had before him his sturdy opponent, who would have spared no effort, and the men would have been inspired with the courage of their General. It was the one chance which was open to Phips and he let it escape.

On the evening of that day de Callières arrived with what troops he had been able to collect. The force consisted of eight hundred regular troops, with a large body of volunteers, *coureurs de bois* and *habitans*, accustomed to the use of arms. Every strong feeling they possessed was appealed to, and all were ready to do their duty in the struggle.

Tuesday, the 17th, was stormy. The river was too rough to land the troops, and the day was passed in inactivity. One of the small vessels, with Captain Savage, who was second in command under Walley, moved towards the Beauport shore to reconnoitre. The receding tide left the vessel firm in the mud. The troops from the shore kept a continual fire on her, and it would have been possible to board her by wading to the middle; but those who were in the vessel felt their desperate condition, and the fire kept up by them was so continuous, that no such attempt was made. With the tide she floated, and returned in safety.

On Wednesday, the 18th, the landing was made on Beauport shore, under Major Walley. The land force of the expedition* was between twelve hundred and thirteen hundred men.

The embarkation had been watched from the fort, and as the destination of the boats was understood, the Montreal and Three Rivers militia "considered the most alert," with some *habitans*, were sent forward. They were about three hundred in number. The ground was uneven, covered with boulders and brushwood. The men were kept in small squads, and fired on the advancing force. Eventually they were withdrawn, a battalion being advanced to cover their retreat.

* This amount is given by Hutchinson, and he had access to official documents. The number is also established by the subsequent pay rolls of the troops. The force has been stated by French writers to be more numerous. De Monseignat speaks of two thousand. Walley, in his short memoir, is precise; he writes "between twelve and thirteen hundred men." Writers of later date need not be named. The landing was made in order and successfully. Walley remarks, "considering how far many of our vessels were from the shore, and the helps we had, never more men were landed in less time." The force "had to wade up to the knees and to the wastes to the flats skirting the shore." There was some opposition to the advance, "from a village over a creek to the right, a party gauled us considerably."

Walley had landed with order and regularity, his troops wading through the slime of the flats. They advanced with steadiness, causing the skirmishers to retire towards the River Saint Charles, with the design of fording it when the signal from the ships should direct that movement. None being given, the attempt was not made. Walley, accordingly, commenced to establish himself in the neighbourhood, for the night's bivouac. Two-thirds of the force took up their stand by a creek, where there was a house and shelter; the remainder were pushed on in *reconnaissance* a quarter of a mile nearer the shore, the better to keep up communication with the vessels. In the house, the men, with the hay and straw found in the barns, were in comfort.

The Canadians lost two officers in the skirmish. Juchereau de St. Denis, the Seigneur of Beauport,* in command of the militia of that place, received a bullet by which his arm was broken. There were ten or twelve of the force wounded, one of whom died. Walley's casualties were set down by himself as four killed, and about sixty wounded. He thought that he had killed from twenty to thirty of the French.† According to the plan determined upon, the vessels were to approach the Saint Charles, and under cover of their fire, the river was to be forded and the attack made. Phips did not, however, bring his ships before the city until late in the afternoon. Three vessels having guns of large calibre ranged themselves higher up the stream, and the firing commenced. The ships mostly directed their shot against the upper town. The batteries replied. One young man only is named as having been killed, and at eight the firing on both sides ceased.

Thursday, the 19th, found the ships in the same position. The firing was commenced at early dawn from the forts, and

* This family still remains in Canada. Its present representative is Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Duchesnay, of the Active Force, formerly of H.M. 100th Regiment.

† The French account is that Walley's loss was one hundred and fifty, according to the report of one of the *habitans*, who visited the field during the night. The statement is not substantiated.

continued vigorously. The ships accomplished nothing. There was rapid firing, but without effect. Many of the shots struck the rock, and so insufficient was the calibre of the guns that, when stone buildings were hit, they received but little damage. On Friday, the 20th, the cannonade was continued. The lower town batteries of heavy guns during the two days' fire caused great damage to the ships. One shot cut away the admiral's flag-staff, bearing his ensign of the red cross. It fell into the water, and was drifted by the tide to the north shore, and taken possession of by the French.

The shot from the heavy guns had told so severely on the ships, that they were forced to retire. The Admiral was not the first to discontinue the contest. One of the large vessels above the town was compelled to haul off. Phips' vessel shortly followed her example. She cut away her cable, leaving her anchor behind. It was the signal for the remainder to abandon their positions, and to drift down with the tide out of range of the shot. At five o'clock the firing had ceased.

Walley had in the meantime remained in the neighbourhood of the Saint Charles. In his report to France, de Frontenac wrote that he endeavoured to decoy him to an assault. So Walley was left untouched. De Frontenac's own words are: "My principal aim was to induce them to cross a little river which they must necessarily pass to reach the town . . . because I was then putting it in their rear . . . and could reach them in order of battle, and drive them to it without their being able to reach their boats, left half a league from the point at which they would have crossed, and they would have had to wade knee-deep in the bed of the river."* He pointed out that by attacking them he would have placed himself at a like disadvantage. It was de Frontenac's belief that during the cannonade, the assault would have been attempted. Every preparation had been made to receive it. There were now three thousand fighting men in the city, one-third of them regular troops, and, had Walley made the attempt, the result must have been disastrous. After the first hours of

* As translated. New York Documents IX., p. 460.

Mònday, he could not at any time have made a forward movement with success.

During the attack Walley had been left in his bivouac uncared for. Indeed, there were no orders to give him. The weather was wet and cold, and the small-pox had appeared. The men were falling sick, and unfit for service. Even the necessary supplies were not available. Instructions had been given for provisions to be sent, but on Wednesday and Thursday the whole force on the ships was engaged in the cannonade. On Thursday night six field pieces, with ammunition, were sent on shore. As there were no horses to move them, they could be used only in the spot where they were landed. An insignificant quantity of biscuit had been sent, with sixty gallons of rum.

On the morning of Friday, the 20th, Walley advanced nearer to the town. He found buildings which furnished better shelter, and an attempt was made to make the place defensible. In this emergency, with short rations, and without orders, Walley determined to visit the Admiral's ship, and gave his lieutenant orders to move forward in the direction of the ford.

The column advanced, and after a time the commander became aware, that a force was in position in its front. The attack, commenced by the French sharpshooters, soon increased to a sharp skirmish, in which the New England troops somewhat suffered. On the side of the French, St. Hélène, in command of a Canadian detachment, fell mortally wounded. As night came on both sides withdrew.

Walley returned, having obtained permission to re-embark his men ; and on the night of the 20th boats were sent from the ships, but Walley was not prepared to place his men on board, so the boats were sent back, and the operation was delayed until the following night.

It was Saturday, the 21st. Now that the cannonade had ceased, Walley looked to be attacked, and he took the precautions which the emergency suggested. He sent out three companies to feel the country lying before them. Meeting a

small herd of cattle, the men killed some of the animals and cooked the carcasses. They again advanced, and were met by the French pickets, whose object was to molest and impede the advance, as skirmishers availing themselves of every protection they could find. De Frontenac never risked his troops unnecessarily. He was not scrupulous in destroying his enemies ; his own men he could not replace, and the lives of his soldiers had to be cared for. His constant instructions were not to attempt hazardous enterprises. His parties were to harass, to devastate, to destroy, but not to risk defeat. The first condition of attack was, that a favourable occasion of making it should be sought, and the enemy taken by surprise. This policy was fully apparent during Phips' abortive attempt. De Frontenac desired to drive away the expedition, but with as little loss to the French as possible. He would risk nothing ; he had certainly twenty-seven hundred men. The New England forces, landed on the Beauport shore, were suffering from cold, many from sickness, disheartened, ill-fed. There is no doubt de Frontenac over estimated their numbers, and writers of that date speak of them, as from two to three thousand. Phips himself was still a formidable enemy ; he had hauled off to refit and repair damages. His firing had been ridiculously ineffective. Nevertheless, he might return the next day, and place his vessels in a position nearer the city, and again attempt a more effective attack. De Frontenac countenanced no effort at Beauport beyond checking Walley's advance. His policy was to wait for an imprudent attack made west of the Saint Charles River, while he patiently made his dispositions to annihilate those who should attempt it.

As evening approached, Walley retired to make preparations to re-embark. He had sent the boats back on the night of the 20th, because he feared that he might be surprised by the early dawn ; and that from want of proper arrangement the men would so crowd together, as to lead to some unfortunate result. During the day he had kept his position, sending out scouts to watch the enemy. He records that in these opera-

tions four men were wounded, one of whom died, and that a drummer left his drum on the field. As evening came on, the advanced parties were withdrawn, and the troops retreated to the river, when the re-embarkation took place. Several of the houses and barns were fired. There was great irregularity in returning to the ships. Walley tells us that he did his best to establish order. The sailors in the boats refused to take any but the men who belonged to their own vessels, while the men, wearied, discouraged, without rations, pressed forward to enter the first boats available. Finally, all the men found place in the boats, but the guns were left behind. With precaution and effort they could have been brought away, for there was no attempt to disturb the embarkation. Instructions were given to the master gunner to see to their transport, but he neglected his orders.

The want of attention to a matter so slight and so easy of accomplishment, establishes the depression felt on the ships being regained; it must have been extreme, for no one intervened to prevent these trophies falling into the enemies' hands.*

Phips again shewed his want of resource, and how destitute he was of the ability called for in these trying circumstances. He fell back on the panacea he resorted to in every difficulty. He called a council of war. It was resolved, that another landing should be attempted after a few hours' rest. But the weather was against the scheme, if it ever was seriously entertained. Quebec remained in doubt and anxiety for forty-eight hours, when Phips floated down with the tide about four leagues below the Island of Orleans. He there repaired his vessels. As he was preparing to leave, one of his prisoners, Madame de la Lande, asked if he desired to take her captive to Boston, and proposed that there should be an exchange of

* Walley thus sums the causes of unsuccess :

"The land army's failing, the enemy's too timely intelligence, lying 3 weeks within 3 days' sail of the place, by reason whereof they had opportunity to bring in the whole strength of their country, the shortness of our ammunition, our late setting out, our long passidge, and many sick in the army; these may be reckoned as some of the reasons of our disappointment."

prisoners. There were sixteen prisoners in all ; Madame Jolliet and her mother, Madame de la Lande, with the crew of the vessel, Grandville and his men, the priest Father Trouvé, taken at Port Royal with other Acadians. Madame de la Lande was sent on *parole* to propose the exchange. The offer was accepted. The English prisoners were women and children, including the two daughters of Clarke, killed at Casco, and Captain Sylvester Davis, who had been brought prisoner from that place.

This rescue of women and children from captivity constituted the one honourable feature in the expedition. Their limited number revealed the painful fact, that the prisoners carried off from Salmon Falls and Fort Loyall, had been murdered, or were kept in captivity by the Indians. They had never reached Quebec, and had therefore been left to the mercy of the Abenakis. But few months had passed since the events had taken place. The fact that of the many prisoners made, the few specified alone remained, is undeniable proof, that those who were missing had been abandoned to the Indians. It cannot be set aside, but must remain with its indelible disgrace.

The exchange made, the New England fleet sailed away.

Some anxiety was felt with regard to the three French ships known to be ascending the Saint Lawrence. They had, however, been notified of the presence of Phips' ships, and for safety had sailed up the Saguenay. They were seen by Phips, but fog and snow storms, joined to the lateness of the season, prevented him from seizing them. After five days' attempt to reach them, he sailed away.

They arrived at Quebec safely on the 15th and 17th of November. They were the "Saint François Xavier," the "Fleur de Mai," and the "Glorieux." They brought the annual supplies to the colony and a large amount of money, and would have proved a rich prize to Phips, had they been taken.

Late as the season was, one of the vessels returned to France to carry the intelligence of Phips' discomfiture.

CHAPTER IV.

The news came with redoubled force to Versailles, accompanied with de Frontenac's assertion, that the conquest of Boston and New York was indispensable to the success of French rule in America. What gave this feeling greater weight, was the sea fight of the previous 29th of June, when de Tourville had successfully engaged the English and Dutch fleets off Beachy Head. Evertsen, the Dutch Admiral, fought with singular gallantry and courage ; the English imperfectly and without honour. The Dutch, unsupported by their allies, had to withdraw, and the fleets retreated along the southern coast. Had the French Admiral shown more enterprise in following up his advantage, it was possible that he might have inflicted serious damage on the fleets. The English ships, however, had been engaged in so limited a degree, that had the attempt been made, the fleet might have retrieved its honour, tarnished in this action owing to the imbecility and the want of good faith of the English Admiral. The news of Phips' repulse before Quebec, therefore gave the more intense satisfaction to the French Court. For a few weeks Louis had the right to believe, that the English sailors were no longer what they had been, and that the hour had come for him to be dominant on the ocean, as he was powerful on land.

At Quebec all was joy and congratulation. Although, as we read the events to-day, it is evident, with the dispositions taken by de Frontenac, that Phips had little chance of success, and that his attack was deficient in every element of conduct excepting courage, in the city the feeling was general, that a great peril had been averted. It was felt that there had been an escape from surprise, when the place was without troops, and with only insufficient means of defence. Even when the

force was gathered together, there was an inadequate supply of provisions to meet the emergencies of a siege. To the authorities and to the inhabitants, the week must have been one of intense anxiety ; and with the prospect of the continuance of the attack, there must have been grave and anxious forebodings. The lower town had been abandoned, except by its defenders. The upper town was crowded with the women and children, and with men from the adjoining country. According to a narrative of the day,* hunger had already commenced to be sensibly felt. Every thing in the shape of food was brought into requisition, and to a great extent, consumed. There was also a deficiency of wood. Little damage was caused by the artillery of Phips ; the population, as usual, proceeded to church during the bombardment, to offer fervent prayers for deliverance. The anxiety, however, was not of long duration, and with the exchange of the captives disappeared.

Unrestrained rejoicing, gratulation, bonfires, and public processions followed. Heaven was believed especially to have protected the true faith, and to have scattered the heretics in confusion. The Virgin was held to have wrought the miracle, and became the object of special adoration. Her image was solemnly carried the round of the churches. The flag of Phips, picked up from a canoe, with the flag brought by de Portneuf in his capture of Fort Loyall, when the prisoners were abandoned to the Indians, were solemnly hung up in the Cathedral, and a "Te Deum" sung with all the pomp of which the service of the Roman Catholic Church is capable. *Feux de joie* of musketry were fired. Cannon re-echoed the triumph. Among the frequent reports, was prominently heard the repeated discharge of the five pieces, left behind at Beauport, as if taking part in the common joy at the defeat of the force to which they had belonged.

One monument of this feeling remains to this day: the church in the lower town of Quebec known as Notre Dame

* *Les Ursulines de Quebec* I., p. 469. Narrative of an Ursuline nun, describing the events of the siege as experienced in the convent.

des Victoires, in the old Market Square. It had been commenced some years previously on the site of an old warehouse of the Company of the "Cent Associés." The proposal was made to complete it by subscription, and to dedicate it for ever as a memorial of the protection of Heaven. In recording the fact, de Monseignat adds, "had the enemy used as much diligence as they might have done, and had they not been detained by the winds, they would have arrived at Quebec to have taken the city unprepared, and would certainly have overpowered it, as the place was unprovided with any force." To this remark the historian must add, other conditions were essential. The attacking force should have been commanded by a more capable leader, and the rude elements of which it was composed, required to be cemented by discipline, and its courage directed and made efficient by able officers.*

The discomfiture of Phips was continued by the elements. The weather became unusually stormy, and the season was marked by a severity of temperature not generally experienced until a later date. The fleet was scattered by tempests ; some of the ships were driven to the West Indies, one vessel was wrecked on Anticosti, two of them were never heard of. Small-pox broke out among many of the crews, while fever added its desolating influence. The loss of life was serious, and the number of deaths has been stated at two hundred.

Phips sailed to Boston himself to bring the news of his defeat. The government was entirely unprepared for so disastrous a return of the force. There never had been the slightest doubt of the success of the expedition, and as the prevalent opinion had been that the "enemy's treasure" would pay the cost of its equipment, so its failure and repulse caused the most bitter disappointment.

* Whatever shortcomings are traceable in Phips as leader of the expedition, his qualities as a sailor stand in marked contrast to the want of professional capacity shewn by the incompetent Sir Hovenden Walker in the unfortunate expedition of 1711. Phips, unacquainted with the navigation of the river, without pilots, carried his ships safely up the Saint Lawrence, and brought them safely back. The losses, subsequently experienced, were owing to the great gales which met the vessels on their return. It is impossible not to recognize Phips' excellent seamanship on the occasion, while his courage was unquestionable.

The soldiers, who remained unpaid and were disbanded, were ready for mutiny. It was not possible to borrow the money required, or to levy it by tax, in time to satisfy the men, impatient to receive it. Massachusetts had, therefore, recourse to "the first bills of credit ever issued in the colonies as a substitute in the place of money." The notes ranged from two shillings to ten pounds. Although taken for taxes by the State, the notes would not pass, even from the first, at face value. Phips is said to have exchanged a large sum at par to give them currency. Nevertheless, the soldiers could obtain for them only from twelve to fourteen shillings in the pound, a discount of more than one-third. As the period for the payment of taxes drew near, the value of the notes advanced. The government eventually allowed a premium of five percent. to those paying their taxes in notes, so for that purpose the issue obtained a higher value than specie, an advantage in no way benefitting the original holder, the soldier.*

Sir William Phips, after remaining a few weeks at Boston, proceeded to England to appeal to the Government to undertake a well organized expedition against Canada, and the Massachusetts Council entrusted to him an address, in which they dwelt upon the urgent necessity of persevering in an aggressive policy.

The winter in Canada which followed Phips' attack was one of privation. The tillage of the country had not been equal to its necessities, for the Iroquois attacks had made it a matter of danger to work in the fields, and the crops had been limited. The provisions which had reached Quebec by the autumn vessels, had not been sufficient for the public requirements; several ships having been taken at the mouth of the Gulf by the English war vessels and privateers. Owing to the shortness of provisions, the troops were, to a great extent, quartered upon the inhabitants. During the winter, on both sides, there was a cessation of hostilities. The expedition

* It was the commencement of a regular issue of such bills, continued until 1749, when the system was abolished. Hutchinson at that date saw a five shilling note of 1690, and its value was eight pence.

against Quebec, with Schuyler's advance from Albany to Canadian territory, imperfect as the attempt was, conveyed an idea of the power of the English Colonies, which de Frontenac could not but recognise. At least, it shewed that on the Hudson they were prepared for hostilities, and that the frontier of New York was not as accessible to Indian attack as that of New England.

In Canada, April is the period when winter passes away. Frequently spring moves forward with rapidity, for all traces of snow and cold at once disappear, and it was at this season that the Indian winter hunting parties were broken up, and the tribe gathered together. In this year the Iroquois had established themselves on the waters of the River Ottawa, where the stream divides itself to wind round Isle Jesus and the Island of Montreal. From this camp parties were sent out to ravage the country. Point-aux-Trembles, ten miles below Montreal, was one of the places first attacked, thirty houses were burned, and such of the inhabitants as fell into the power of the Iroquois were killed. The mission at the foot of the mountain, north of Montreal, was assailed, and thirty-five of the Christian Indians carried away captives. At Repentigny, to the north of Isle Jesus, the Iroquois experienced a serious check. On the news of these outrages, de Vaudreuil gathered together a party of one hundred and twenty men, and patrolled the country in order to defend it from such assaults. The scouts he had sent out, shortly returned with the news of the presence of a band of Iroquois, upon which the French cautiously advanced in canoes to the place where the Indians were reported to be. The spot was one where many waters meet around the islands, and approach to it was not difficult: at one in the morning the French landed, and silently proceeded to the attack. The Iroquois were off their guard; some of them were in the house which they had seized, others lay on the ground outside of it. At that season of the year fires must have been burning, and, some twenty paces from the door, the Indians, wrapped in their blankets and furs, were sleeping around them. De Vaudreuil's party crept up as

close to the place as they prudently could, and deliberately fired. Every Iroquois was killed. The alarm thus given, those within the house prepared immediately for defence. Three of them rushed out, but no sooner appeared than they were shot dead. The remainder kept up a fire from the windows. It was determined to burn the house, which was thatched. In the attack, de Bienville, a son of Le Moyne, was killed, with four of the Canadians. The flames rapidly increased, and, when the house became no longer tenable those within it made a desperate rush to break through the attacking lines. One only succeeded. Five were taken prisoner; the remainder were killed. Of the party, originally forty in number, one only found his way back to his tribe to tell the story. Of the prisoners, one was burned at the place where he was taken; one sent to Point aux Trembles, the scene of the late outrage; one to Boucherville to suffer the same fate; one was given to the Ottawas, and one to the Sault Indians, as slaves.

In the middle of June, de Courtemanche returned from an expedition to Michilimackinac. He had been sent by de Frontenac to the Indians of the upper lakes, to relate the impotent attempt of Phips on Quebec. His mission had been to convey a sense of French power, and to create the feeling that it was the interest of the Ottawas and Hurons to adhere to France. He had exhorted them not to cease in their attacks on the Iroquois, and had received their assurance, that their parties had continuously harassed the Senecas in their hunting and fishing grounds. His mission was successful.

On their side the Iroquois lost no opportunity in endeavouring to detach the Indians of the Sault above Montréal from the French interest. They called on Atoriata, to whom the King had stood god-father, to return, and also on Tamouratoua, of the Mountain bourgade, threatening them with vengeance if they failed to do so. Their appeal was reported to the French. Their inroads were also continued, but on no large scale. Their attacks were made on dwellings which their small parties could surprise, and where opposition was

unlooked for: the unfortunate inmates were killed or made prisoners, and much trouble was caused.

On the 1st of July, 1691, the frigate "le Soleil d'Afrique" arrived. She had cleared the entrance of the river of the privateers which had been cruising in search of prizes, and twelve days afterwards the fleet of du Tast, consisting of sixteen vessels, reached Quebec. The country had seriously suffered from the extreme scarcity of provisions. The people were represented to the King as being in the greatest poverty: in consequence of the war the cost of living had so increased, that, in some instances, families were without bread, and the distress had caused many to crowd into the towns. The fear likewise remained that another attack would be made from New England, and the experience of the past year be repeated.

The appearance of these vessels gave new heart to Canada; and at the same time, some Seneca canoes arrived bringing sixteen chiefs. They had proceeded to Montreal in the hope of finding de Frontenac, but failing to do so, descended to Quebec. Their object was to obtain the necessaries they required, but they were dissatisfied with the high prices asked, and were desirous that they should be reduced. They were hospitably entertained, and were impressed by what they saw. The ships, the movement of the sailors, the roar of the cannon, the bonfires, the illuminations, the *feux de joie*, and the general rejoicing, much astonished them. News had arrived of the capture of Mons, and the event was celebrated by de Frontenac with a *fête*. Thirty of the handsomest women in Quebec were desired to shew all possible courtesy to the Senecas, and what particularly struck the chiefs, was the varied colour of the glasses in which refreshments were offered. Every effort was made to awaken feelings of friendliness, and they were dismissed with presents, and many marks of attention.

The fears with regard to a repetition of the events of 1690, were not entirely groundless, although the operations were not of a character to threaten serious disaster. They degener-

ated into a mere raid, as if in retaliation for the destruction of Schenectady, for no political result could have been looked for from the expedition. The enterprise was determined upon at Albany, and an envoy was sent to the Iroquois, asking them to take part in it. The Iroquois complained, that it was they who hitherto had been led into danger, and they plainly told the envoy that the time had come when the English should take the foremost place, and if they went forward the Iroquois would follow them. The programme of the expedition was laid down, that the English force should advance by Lake Champlain, the more western tribes descending the Saint Lawrence. Events so happened that the latter part of the programme could not be carried out. Major Peter Schuyler, then Mayor of Albany, was placed in command. John Schuyler had led the attack of the previous year. His force consisted of one hundred and twenty English and Dutch, with one hundred and forty-six Mohawks and Mohegans;* they followed the route so often described, by Lake Champlain, and reached the head of the first rapids of the Richelieu, the site of the town of Saint John's. The advance of the Albany party had become known in Canada. De Hertel, with some Indians, scouting along the Richelieu, had seized a Mohawk, from whom he learned that the expedition had started. De Callières immediately sent a force of soldiers and militia from Montreal to Chambly, under command of de Valrenne. It consisted of one hundred and eighty† French and Canadians, with about one hundred and twenty Indians, and orders were given to impede the advance of the enemy. De Callières was of opinion that, if the English did not march on Chambly, an attempt would be made on Laprairie.

De Callières had taken post at the latter place with from seven to eight hundred men, occupying the fort and the country

* Major Peter Schuyler's Journal of his Expedition to Canada. Col. Doc., N.Y., III., p. 800.

† A contemporary writer states the force at three hundred. "Il en envoya un détachement de trois cents tant soldats, Canadiens, et sauvages, commandés par M. de Vallerenne." *Recueil de ce qui s'est passé en Canada* . . . depuis l'année 1682, p. 42.

adjoining. Not far from his encampment, there was a small stream of water, on which a mill stood. Here, the militia were posted with some Ottawa Indians, but they were not provided with tents. The regular troops were quartered at the fort. De Callières at the time was suffering from fever, and was confined to his bed.

On the evening of the 10th of August it commenced to rain. The night was dark. The militia had piled arms, and, for the most part, sought in the mill protection from the weather. There was but an imperfect watch kept. De Belmont says that, including the *habitants* who were assembled on the opposite side of the fort, twelve hundred men were present. Had there been the least caution, such a surprise as followed would have been impossible. We are told that the sentry was sleeping, and that a great deal of brandy had been drunk.* Just before dawn, the Indians forming the advance guard of Schuyler came upon the sleeping Canadians. Killing the sentinel, they rushed forward upon the militia. A general attack followed, when the militia were driven back into the fort. On this alarm, a sortie was vigorously made with the troops which could be rallied. Three superior officers were immediately placed *hors de combat*: St. Cirq, who was mortally wounded, to die in a few hours; d'Hosta, who was killed; and d'Escairac, who died the following day; with fifty men killed and wounded. Another detachment was equally unfortunate, one of those in command, Captain Domergue, and twelve men, were killed. The troops made another attack, which Schuyler repulsed. Seeing that the force was greatly in excess of his own, and that no permanent advantage could be hoped for, he withdrew; his retreat from Laprairie being unmolested. As he retired Schuyler destroyed the crops as far as he was able, and he was engaged in this effort, when a scout arrived to inform him of his own peril. His loss up to that time had been five killed and thirty wounded.

De Valrenne had received orders, if Schuyler did not proceed by way of Chambly, but should advance on Laprairie,

* De Belmont.

to follow in Schuyler's rear, so that the English force would be taken between the two detachments. The French scouts, some hours after Schuyler started, had given information of his movements. De Valrenne lost no time in following the English trail. There was a road from Montreal to Chambly, which had been opened by de Courcelles, easily travelled. The country between Chambly and Laprairie, except in their immediate neighbourhoods, was for the most part uncleared forest; but there was a trail between the two places, along which surprise was easy. Schuyler marched as hastily as he could with caution; the scouts sent out by him soon met those of de Valrenne, and their cries denoted that the forces were face to face. De Valrenne, with much judgment, had taken a position on a slight ascent on which several fallen trees were available as *abatis*, to give the place the character of an entrenchment. Schuyler, not believing that there was so strong a force in his front, dashed at the position. The French, protected by the trees and partially concealed by the thick bush, received the English with a volley at close range, which told with deadly effect. Their own attack made but little impression, the French, on their approach, having thrown themselves on the ground, but Le Ber du Chesne, in command of the Canadians, fell mortally wounded. The English again desperately charged the French, to force them from their cover, and, after a stout resistance, the French gave way and abandoned their temporary entrenchment. The combat was now continued on both sides with a determination seldom recorded in Canadian history. The ground was fought for inch by inch. De Frontenac reported it as the most hotly contested affair which he had known.* The English were in desperate position; to be driven back, and be taken in rear by the Laprairie garrison, was possibly extermination; and in front they had to battle with the obstacle before them in the form of the opposing force. The effort of the French was to hold them where they were, until Schuyler's rear would

* "Depuis l'établissement de la colonie il ne s'est rien passé en Caniada d'aussi fort ni de si vigoureux." M. de Frontenac au Ministre. 20 octobre, 1691.

be assailed ; or to drive the invaders back to Laprairie, scattered before the Canadian advance. Some of the Mohegan Indians fled. The English and the Mohawks desperately continued the contest. Before the attack, Schuyler's men had disencumbered themselves of their knapsacks, in order to fight more freely. At length the English broke through the French, and, facing about, charged upon them, and were able to prevent pursuit.* They continued their march, carrying their wounded with them, the French not undertaking to disturb them ; but the knapsacks and one flag remained behind in the hands of the French as a memento of the struggle. The English left forty-three dead on the field. Schuyler's report of the missing men is twenty-one whites, sixteen Mohawks, and six Mohegans. Schuyler had left twenty-seven men to guard his canoes, which he reached without further trouble. After waiting some time for stragglers to join, he embarked his men. As his force in the skirmish could not have exceeded two hundred and twenty men, he lost every fifth man.

Had pursuit been earlier made from Laprairie, Schuyler could not have escaped. The delay may be explained by the illness of de Callières, which prostrated him, and the loss of his principal officers. When the advance was made, the fight was over, and Schuyler was at the Richelieu. The Christian Mohawks also started in pursuit, but they failed to reach the retreating force. There was an avoidance on their part to engage the New York Indians ; for the Mohawks who were with Schuyler, in many cases, were their own relatives, and there was no desire to come to blows with them. The French in the two affairs had sixty killed and sixty wounded.

The canoe bringing M. d'Escairac to Montreal, mortally wounded, carried the first news of the attack. From the account given, Duplessy, who commanded in the

* Schuyler's description of the danger he escaped is deserving of permanent record. " We broke through the middle of their body until we got into their rear, trampling upon their dead, then faced about upon them and fought them by strength of arm, four hundred paces before us ; and to say the truth, we were all glad to see them retreat." N.Y. Col. Doc. III., p. 800.

absence of De Callières, considered that the result had been disastrous, and he formed the conclusion that the force had been entirely defeated. Without authority, he despatched a canoe to de Frontenac at Three Rivers, reporting such to be the fact. De Frontenac and de Vaudreuil were at a ball when the messenger arrived. The intelligence caused general consternation.* Fortunately, an officer who was present in the action had written to his wife, then at Three Rivers, an account of what had taken place. His letter was the means of somewhat reassuring de Frontenac; nevertheless, the next morning, he ordered de Vaudreuil to Montreal with a hundred men. On his ascent de Vaudreuil met a messenger from de Callières, carrying a letter to the Governor, which informed him how matters stood; De Vaudreuil, notwithstanding, continued his journey.

The raid of Schuyler could only have had in view the hope of creating alarm in Canada, and of causing an uneasy feeling as to the future. It was mere partisan warfare to which, for a time, the struggle was reduced. Doubtless one of its main objects was to reclaim the hold of New York on the Iroquois. It had become necessary to make them feel that the English of Albany had courage and enterprise, and that they, on their side, could carry into Canada the desolation which they themselves had experienced on the Mohawk, and show that the homes of the destroyer were not safe. Considered from this point of view, the expedition was a success; but its only consequence was to make the French more active and vigilant.

De Seignelay, who had acted as Minister since the death of his father, Colbert, died in November, 1690, at the early age of thirty-nine. He was succeeded by the elder de Pontchartrain,† who kept possession of power for nine years. He was a connection of de Frontenac,‡ and his presence as Minister

* “La consternation fut générale.” *Recueil de ce qui s’est passé*, etc. p. 44.

† Louis Phélypeaux, born 29th March, 1643.

‡ Saint Simon in his *Memoirs* mentions the relationship. “M. de Frontenac s’appeloit Buade; son grand père avoit été gouverneur de Saint Germain premier maitre d’hôtel du roi et chevalier de l’ordre de 1619.” [II., 192.] “Il avoit marié

directing the colonies was of great importance to the Governor of Canada, and intervened to protect him from unfavourable influences. It was to de Pontchartrain, from this date, that the despatches were addressed.

The policy of obtaining possession of New York, and New England, was firmly fixed in de Frontenac's mind. He discovered in the political constitution of those colonies, the danger to French rule, which hereafter was to work its consequences. At the same time he totally underrated their strength. He was led to do so by the success, with which a few hundred Abenakis kept in a ferment the northern frontier of New England. These operations will be duly narrated when I treat of Acadia. His successful onslaught on Schenectady had not impressed him with the power of defence possessed by New York, and consequently every plan proposed by him was inadequate to attain the results he hoped to accomplish. The force which he named as necessary to carry out his purpose, might have marched into the country; but such as escaped would have left it only as prisoners.

An event took place in New England which must have had some influence on de Frontenac's views. After Andros had been deposed, Bradstreet, then eighty-six years of age, had been chosen Governor, and through him, Massachusetts addressed a proposition to de Frontenac, that, although war existed between England and France, neutrality should prevail between Canada and New England. The question was complicated by what took place at sea. New England sent out swarms of privateers to prey on French commerce, and many such vessels hovered around the entrance to the Saint Lawrence, to seize French merchantmen freighted with valuable cargoes. France had no soldiers in Acadia. War against

son fils à une fille de Raymond Phélypeaux secrétaire d'Etat après son père et son frère, ayant été auparavant trésorier de l'épargne. Cela fit de Frontenac père du gouverneur de Canada beau frère de M. M. d'Humières et d'Huxelles. Il falloit pourtant que ce ne fût pas grande chose, car on trouve avec les mêmes nom et armes un Roger de Buade huissier de l'ordre en 1641, Sieur de Cussy. [V., 122.]

New England advanced settlements, was carried on by the Abenakis and Micmacs, ever on the watch to surprise some unsuspecting locality. De Saint Castin did not fail to point out that the object of the proposal was to detach the Abenakis from the French alliance, which, in other words, was entirely to take from France the strength possessed by her in Acadia. De Frontenac gave an evasive answer to the proposal, and, although not a refusal, it partook of that character. He declined to treat on any matter, while French prisoners were detained in Boston, and in this category he desired to include the Indians.

The condition of Canada in 1691 was deplorable. Above Three Rivers, the Iroquois continued their depredations, described by writers of that date, under the term *la petite guerre*. Those, engaged in the harvest, were protected by troops as much as possible. There was great want. The fear of attack was always present, and whole families took refuge in the forts. The loss of many heads of families had caused much distress. With the widows and fatherless children, there were those, whose wounds and sickly condition, made them incapable of working. The war was a serious burden on the Canadian *habitant*. He was liable to be called upon to join in any expedition; he served without pay; but obtained some clothes, accoutrements and arms, with snowshoes or canoes. The money to carry on the campaign was sent from France, rarely without complaints from the King. The colony had no money to give towards the defence of the country. What the French-Canadian could offer he readily risked; his life and his blood. Some few of the leading traders made money, but the general condition of Canada was wide-spread poverty.

Under these unfavourable circumstances, it was resolved to develop the fortifications of Quebec, and at this date the defensive works, which, in their completion, have created the fame of the city, were commenced. The *habitants* in the neighbourhood were drafted to work at them, with almost as little pay as was given to the Egyptians at the construction of the

Pyramid of Cheops. Nevertheless, the expenditure for the colony was large in the aggregate ; that of each year being greater than the last, while Louis' resources to meet it were becoming less and less. The King's difficulty in finding money to carry on the war led to desperate expedients, but the demand for money increased and was increasing.*

The confidence personally felt in de Frontenac encouraged Canada in these trying circumstances. The possibility of a united attack from the English colonies seemed always imminent, but, in reality, no such event was threatened. At this date the whole population of British America must have been two hundred thousand souls ; but except in New England and New York no feeling on the subject of Canada existed, and even in these provinces, it was languid and confined to a few. The population of Canada was about twelve thousand. There were not more than twelve hundred soldiers in the country, and on a desperate emergency, the militia and the *coureurs de bois* could furnish three thousand more men. This force possessed good officers, and was under organized control, centred in one person. Hence, there was unity of purpose, and what strength could be brought into the field, could be directed by the judgment of the supreme authority.

In the English colonies there were disunion, jealousy, want of concord ; and, while there was no absence of courage, there was no desire for war. The sword was never precisely turned

* De Pontchartrain, honest in private life, was unscrupulous in the King's interest. He thought little as to the means by which he could obtain money, and of the influence of his policy on the welfare of the people. His reckless audacity for a time passed as genius. He created a multiplicity of offices, many of them hereditary, which he sold. He re-established the sale of taxes. He caused a re-coinage of money, raising it ten per cent. in current value. It was said of his system, that France went back three centuries to revert to the *maltôtier* of the middle ages. Many of the offices held in the time of Mazarin, which had been suppressed were recreated ; some of them ridiculous, as those of the Royal barber and the King's oyster-opener. Nevertheless, they found purchasers. The love of distinction, with the middle order of Frenchmen, assured certainty of payment for this gratification of the national vanity. De Pontchartrain's cynical explanation to the King of his financial policy was contained in the words, "Toutes les fois que votre Majesté crée un office, Dieu crée un sot pour l'acheter."

into the pruning hook, but it was always unwillingly brought down for use. The implement of industry was always preferred. When it became necessary to take the field, the English colonist shewed dogged courage and unflinching resolution. But there were few officers capable of command, and there was no effective discipline.* One particular pursuit the New Englander readily followed, that of privateering; and not only enterprise, but conduct and capacity were found on the part of those engaging in it.

In Canada there were love of adventure, and readiness to embark in any undertaking for the defence of the country, or the punishment of the enemy. In the English northern colonies, there was neither the inclination to enter into aggressive war, nor money to meet its cost. The organization was invariably imperfect; occasionally men came to the front, marked by capacity and judgment, who, if opportunity had been given them to learn the duties they were undertaking, would have become distinguished. But, from the want of oneness of purpose, nearly every effort made was pre-doomed to failure. Without the intervention of Great Britain in the crisis of half a century later, the British colonies would never have succeeded against New France. This was not from want of numbers or want of courage; but because the exacting character of the situation would never have been accepted as a matter of national faith, so as to lead to the extraordinary efforts necessary to success. Neither New York nor New England ever understood the magnitude of the task which they discussed in their council chambers, or the resources which the French possessed, in their condition and form of government.†

* The military inexperience of the New England generals may be described in the words of Marius when he speaks of the Roman forces sent against Jugurtha previous to his assumption of the command: "Ac ego scio, Quirites, qui postquam Consules facti sunt, acta majorum et Græcorum militaria præcepta legere cœperint; homines præposterii." Sallust Jugurtha, lxxxv.

† La plus grande faute que faisoient alors les Anglois dans leurs Colonies, c'est que pour l'ordinaire ils choisissoient mal ceux, à qui ils confioient le Commandement soit des Postes particuliers soit des Provinces entieres. C'étoit presque toujours des Hommes de fortune, qui ne sçavoient point la guerre, qui ne l'avoient

The year 1692 had been marked by many of the attacks I have named. Towards the close of 1691, some Christian Indians had been attacked when hunting. The news being brought to the Sault above Montreal, a force was organized in pursuit; the Christian Indians overtook the Iroquois, released the prisoners, and killed or made prisoners their assailants, four of whom only escaped. On another occasion, the report reaching Montreal that a strong body of Iroquois was in the field, an expedition was formed, consisting of one hundred and twenty French and two hundred and five Indians. With this large force they met a band of fifty Iroquois, and totally destroyed all who composed it.

At the opening of the navigation the lower part of the Ottawa was so beset by the Iroquois, that parties making the attempt to ascend the river found it more prudent not to proceed, and returned to Montreal. The route to the upper lakes was thus almost barred. Some Algonquins, accompanied by thirty-six French, were surprised, and suffered the loss of twenty-one French killed and carried away prisoners. De Vaudreuil was more fortunate. In July, with a force of some

même jamais faite, & dont le mérite étoit d'avoir amassé du bien par des voyes qui ne supposent point les qualités nécessaires pour soutenir le rang, où on les élévoit, & que des Cens de cette sorte n'acquerraient jamais.

D'autre part les Colons Anglois mêlés avec les Etrangers de toutes sortes de Nations s'appliquoient uniquement à la culture des Terres & à leur commerce; ce qui les rendoit peu propres pour la guerre; delà, le mépris qu'avoient pour eux les sauvages, dont une poignée a tenu longtems en échec les plus peuplées, & les plus florissantes de leur Colonies. Toute leur ressource étoit dans notre légèreté, dans notre inconstance, dans notre négligence & dans le peu de concert des nos Commandans, & c'est par-là qu'ils sont demeurés Maîtres de tant de Postes importans, dont nous les avions chassés, autant de fois que nous les y avions attaqués.

Charlevoix, II., Liv. xvi, pp. 197-8.

The readers of this history are themselves capable of judging the truth of Charlevoix concluding remark. No such posts at that time were on the Canadian Lakes. The attacks in Acadia had been directed against exposed settlements taken by surprise; except in the cases of Pemaquid and Fort Loyall. Both were abandoned by the French; the former, however, was rebuilt by New England and retaken by a large force under d'Iberville in 1696. On the other hand, Port Royal, when Charlevoix wrote, had been taken from the French, and as Annapolis, has permanently remained in British possession.

strength, he came upon the Iroquois above Long Sault on the Ottawa, and severely chastised them.

Early in 1693, de Frontenac determined to strike a blow in the homes of the Iroquois. He brought together one hundred soldiers, four hundred picked men of the militia, experienced in the woods, all inured to fatigue, accompanied by two hundred Indians; the whole under the command of de Manteht, de Courtemanche, and de Lanoue. Their final organization was completed at Laprairie, which they left on the 25th of January; they marched on snow shoes, drawing their provisions on long sleighs, following the now known route of Lake Champlain, to arrive on the evening of the 16th of February at the Mohawk villages, within thirty-six miles of Albany. They had eluded discovery. Some French and Indian scouts approached the village. They found the Indians entirely off their guard; some of them were singing. As there was movement in the place the attack was deferred. Watch was kept, until silence shewed that all in the bourgade were asleep. A second village, about two hundred rods from the one first seen, was similarly observed. The main body of the assailants advanced in two divisions, and the attack at the two points was simultaneously made. Both villages were protected by an enclosure of palisades. In each instance, they were scaled, and the gates opened. It was short work to enter, and take possession of both places. Indeed no resistance was offered. The smaller place was burned, and the prisoners carried to the second village. On the following night an attack was made on a village between fifteen and sixteen miles distant, which was likewise destroyed.

The order had been given by de Frontenac to kill the men, but to seize the women and children in order to establish them in the Christian villages. But, owing to little resistance having been made, out of eighty fighting men only eighteen or twenty had been killed. The women and children amounted in number to two hundred and eighty. The Sault Indians were also unwilling to destroy their countrymen in cold blood. They well understood that the instructions of

de Frontenac, if carried out, would make further reconciliation impossible. The Christian Iroquois, at this date, acted as if they desired to retain their independence of the French, so, that in the event of a serious quarrel with the authorities in Canada, they would be able to return to their villages on the Mohawk.

The French force, encumbered with their prisoners, moved slowly. After two days' march, they were approached by some Mohawks whose families had been carried away, and who desired to communicate with their relatives.

Among those who had left Canada in the expedition was a man named Van Epps, of Dutch extraction. At that time he was prisoner with the Sault Indians, and he had been brought with them, to perform their work as a slave. He had watched his opportunity and had escaped, and by his information, the expedition became known at Albany. The news of the assault of the Mohawk villages followed. A party was organized in pursuit of the Canadian force, and scouts were sent on to inform the Canadians, that the object of the advancing column from Albany was not to attack, but to negotiate, as peace had been declared in Europe. No attention was paid to the statement, and the French continued to press forward on their route, as fast as was possible with their prisoners. But the Indians declined to proceed; they expressed their intention to remain, to hear what should be proposed, for they saw the possibility of re-establishing friendly relations with their countrymen on the Mohawk; and they resolved to await the arrival of those whose presence was looked for, so that peace might be assured, and no reprisals would follow. The French were greatly dissatisfied with this determination, but they could only submit.

The available force which had left Albany, on the appeal of the Mohawks, had been placed under the command of Peter Schuyler. At Schenectady their number had been increased, and on his advance he had been joined by some Oneidas. His force now amounted to between five and six hundred men. On the 23rd, intelligence of the pursuit

reached the French leaders. They desired to wait in ambush, and to attack the column on its march. Their progress had been impeded owing to their prisoners, and they feared that, if their own advance were delayed, they must suffer from want of provisions. They considered, also, that, as attacking party, the advantage would lie with them. Their design was to attempt a surprise on the English column at a spot favourable for attack. The French Indians would in no way listen to the proposal. They held that it was better to entrench themselves in the Indian form and await events; so trees were felled and by these means protection obtained.

The Canadian force remained in this position two days before Schuyler's party appeared. The French expected an immediate attack, but Schuyler's Indians were led to act similarly to those with the French. They fortified themselves behind fallen trees, and the two parties remained near each other in this form. Both parties, however, were not equally favoured. Schuyler looked forward to obtain provisions from Albany; every hour increased the difficulties of the French by reducing the limited amount of their rations. The French accordingly resolved on an attack. It was not successful, and, although repeated, it again failed. Schuyler by this time saw how the chances stood in his favour, and, trusting to the situation, did not himself become the assailant. He believed, likewise, that the French would have difficulty in getting across the Hudson, as the ice was then commencing to break up. His own provisions were also exhausted; he had started with but little preparation, and additional supplies were to follow him. A heavy snow-storm came on, and the French saw that it offered them the chance of escape. The Indians themselves began to understand the danger to which they were exposed, and consented to march. The movement was concealed by the falling snow, and the French left cautiously at ten in the day. Schuyler, never looking for such a retreat, was surprised to learn at a late hour that the Canadian camp was deserted. No sooner did his scouts inform him of the fact, than he urged his Indians to follow in pursuit. But they were suffer-

ing from scarcity of food, and declined to move. It was the 28th of March when the French commenced their retreat, but it was not until the 1st of April, when provisions reached Schuyler's force, that the pursuit was renewed.

On the Canadian force reaching the Hudson, they found the floating ice moving down stream, and it appeared as if it would be impossible for them to cross the river. Fortunately, an ice-jam formed a temporary compact mass, to which, in their desperate circumstances, they had to trust themselves. They were thus enabled safely to reach the eastern bank. They followed the portage to Lake George. There they found that the ice would not bear them, and they had to force their way along the rugged shore, cumbered with ice, boulders and tangled brushwood, and it must have proved one of the most trying and exacting marches ever made.

Schuyler pushed forward, and was rapidly gaining on those he was pursuing. The French, hearing of his continued advance, sent back word that, if the pursuit were continued, they would kill their prisoners, and, leaving their corpses behind, would alone make their way rapidly to Lake Champlain. The threat told successfully on the Mohawks and Oneidas. They declined to follow on the march which was to cause the death of their relatives and near connections, some of them even the wives and children of those present with Schuyler. The pursuit was necessarily abandoned ; many of the prisoners, however, managed to escape.

The French hoped at Lake Champlain to obtain the provisions which they had stored, but they were spoiled and utterly unfit for use. The remainder of the march was made under great privation, the men on occasions suffering from positive famine. Some of the strongest of them pushed forward to obtain supplies, which were at once forwarded. But many died owing to the suffering they had passed through. The party did not reach Montreal until the 16th and 17th of March. Some of the sick were left behind at a temporary enclosure constructed for their protection. There is no record that they were interfered with, and eventually they were able to reach Montreal.

De Frontenac treated the enterprise as a success. The expedition had returned with prisoners, and a blow had been struck to convey to the Iroquois the sense of French power. But no permanent effect from the expedition could be looked for. There had been much in the conduct of the Sault Indians to cause disquietude. Their conduct had created the impression they could only be partially relied upon to attack their countrymen on the Mohawk. The tribes there were equally averse to taking part against the Christian Indians. The hope never failed that the quarrel might be accommodated, and that the Mohawks would form one body, when the question of predominance was settled between the rival European nations. The events of the year had shewn what ravages each country could commit on the territory of the other. Both must have felt of what little account such raids were, and that equally on the banks of the Mohawk, and the Saint Lawrence no permanent advantage could be derived from them.

CHAPTER V.

During this period, the furs stored at Michilimackinac had increased to a large quantity; and owing to the River Ottawa, the route followed, having been continually beset by parties of Iroquois, it had not been possible to take them to Montreal. The possession of these furs was of great importance to the traders of that place, for they formed the wealth of the country. A large force was necessary to escort the cargoes in security; but, on the other hand, the constant danger of Iroquois incursions made it inadvisable to reduce the garrisons on the Saint Lawrence.

There were at least two hundred French and Canadians at Michilimackinac, and in the neighbouring territory, roaming about as *coureurs de bois*. De Frontenac, accordingly, determined to avail himself of the service of these men, and form them into a body to escort the furs to Montreal. The Commandant de Louvigny was selected for the duty; and d'Argenteuil, and eighteen French, were despatched to the west, to notify these adventurers, and assemble them together. This small body of men, being held insufficient to cope with the Iroquois bands, known to be in possession of the lower Ottawa, the force was increased by twenty volunteers under de la Valterie, and a party of the Sault and Mountain Indians. The ascent of the river was made without molestation. D'Argenteuil reached the locality held to be free from likelihood of attack, but, on the return of the escort under de la Valterie, they were surprised near the island of Montreal by a large body of Iroquois. De la Valterie and three of his men were killed in the skirmish; and with this loss the remainder reached the city.

D'Argenteuil arrived safely at Michilimackinac. According to his instructions, de Louvigny gathered all the Canadians

he could assemble, leaving only men sufficient to garrison the place. With this force, he escorted safely to Montreal two hundred canoes, laden with furs. The news of his successful descent, reached Quebec on the 17th of August, 1693, as de Frontenac was preparing to ascend the Saint Lawrence. The arrival of these furs was of the greatest advantage to Canada. Every effort had been made to bring down as large a quantity as possible, and those Indians who had no canoes of their own, were aided by the French in the transport of their property. The public joy was loudly expressed, for the country was almost bankrupt. A writer of that day thus describes the public feeling : " For several years Canada had been impatiently waiting for this prodigious quantity of beaver The merchant, the farmer, the rest of the population, were perishing of hunger, although possessing property which they were unable to enjoy. Credit was exhausted, and there was a general fear that these furs, the last resource of the country, would be seized by the enemy during their descent to Montreal. Accordingly, there was no language too strong to praise, and to implore blessings on him, by whose care the property had reached them. ' Father of the People,' ' Preserver of the Country,' titles which for the last four years had been so much used, now appeared wanting in force. Those who could not find words to express their feelings showed their gratitude by the joy visible on their countenances, and which was deeply felt in their hearts."*

De Frontenac arrived at Montreal on the 28th of August. He had been met at Three Rivers by the most prominent chiefs, who had gone thither to pay him this mark of respect. At Montreal he held a Council with the Indians who were present, and the usual ceremonies were observed. They informed de Frontenac that they had come down in obedience to his orders, to hear his voice, and they wished to obtain more favourable terms of trade. The Hurons assured him, that, in

* Autre relation de ce qui s'est passé de plus remarquable en Canada depuis Septembre, 1692, jusqu'au depart des vaisseaux en 1693. 1^{ère} Série MS., Vol. V., p. 105. tributed to M. de Callières.

accordance with his instructions, they were prepared to carry on war against the Iroquois. There was one piece of unfavourable intelligence. The Miamis had received presents from the English through the Mohegans, and it was a matter of anxiety to know to what extent this intercourse would tell on the Indian trade. The chiefs were entertained in turn at the Governor's table, and there was a general feast on the 6th of September. A few days later, the canoes returned homewards. To prevent further tampering with the Miamis by the English, de Frontenac determined to establish a fort on the Kalamanzoo, in Michigan, to which Perrot was sent.

The expedition of Phips had established in de Frontenac's mind the possibility of its repetition, and the Schuyler raids from New York, had shown the country to be accessible to attack from the Hudson. Reports were constantly reaching him from Acadia, of movements which foreboded hostilities. De Frontenac did everything possible to guard against surprise; he extended the fortifications of Quebec, and placed the forts of Sorel and Chambly in a condition of strength, to impede the advance of an invader. De Callières likewise strengthened Montreal by a fort to the east, on some high ground, where Dalhousie Square now stands.

Serious alarm had been felt in Montreal by the reported appearance on Lake Saint Louis, below the Cascades, of eight hundred Iroquois; some scouts even reported that they had seen their camp. De Frontenac immediately despatched de Vaudreuil, with five of the companies then at work at Quebec, and one hundred and fifty of the newly-arrived recruits. It was a serious interruption to the progress of the fortifications of the city. De Callières, on his side, raised eight hundred militia, and went as far as the Cascades.* He saw, however, no sign of an Iroquois force, and it is questionable if any such large number of hostile Indians had been present. But the movement of the troops, was in itself a demonstration of strength, and had the good effect of warning the Iroquois that

* The last rapid before entering Lake St. Louis.

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[Handwritten musical notation on three staves]

مَنْ يَتَّقِ اللَّهَ يَجْعَلْ لَهُ مَخْرَجًا
وَيَرْزُقْهُ مِنْ حَيْثُ لَا يَحْتَسِبُ وَمَنْ يَتَّقِ اللَّهَ يَجْعَلْ لَهُ مَخْرَجًا

in England, two thousand in Massachusetts. The fleet was to rendezvous at Canso by the first of June, and to be joined there by the colonial forces. The ships were then to sail for the Saint Lawrence. The forces, having ascended the river, were to divide ; half to remain to conduct the operations before Quebec ; half to follow the river and proceed to the attack of Montreal. It was hoped that, by making the rendezvous at Canso, the expedition would be kept secret, for Cape Breton was without inhabitants ; and that Quebec might be surprised. The difficulty at this date in British America did not lie in the want of plan, but in the absence of men to conduct enterprises of pith and moment, and, with few exceptions, in the incompetence of the superior officers sent from England in command.

The winter of 1693 was marked by an event which, although without immediate results, silently worked important influences. It was to determine whether ecclesiastical power was to be supreme in Canada, and if excommunications were to be pronounced regardless of all law. In events of this character it is no uncommon argument to adduce the personal respectability of the ecclesiastic, as if it were a ground for condoning the wrong which arbitrary power inflicts. Such considerations must be secondary in any fair consideration of the event. De Frontenac's strong intellect was not to be bewildered by this pretension. No passage of his life was more marked by sense and self-control. There was no ebullition of that temper with which it is the practice to accredit him, and, throughout, he shewed unwavering firmness and judgment.

The Council at this date, almost as a body, embraced the side of the Bishop, no one being more distinguished by his partisanship than the Intendant. M. de Champigny, then the incumbent of the office, will ever hold an unenviable place in Canadian history for his treacherous seizure of the Iroquois at Cataraqui in 1687, in the operations of M. de Denonville. M. de Champigny had shared in the cavalier treatment which the Council received from de Frontenac, when the question of his attendance at their meetings had been considered. But,

whatever may have been the dissatisfaction felt by him, in common with the members of the Council, it found no expression; all discontent having been silenced by the brilliant services of M. de Frontenac in the repulse of Phips. Owing to the public alarm created by this expedition, the fortifications of Quebec, Three Rivers, and Montreal, were extended and made more defensible, with the view of assuring protection against future attacks. The great cost of this work, with its constant absorption of money, was the cause of frequent expostulation on the part of the French King, directed both against de Frontenac and de Champigny : and the Intendant felt that, while he was subjected to censure on account of the operations of the Governor, he had scarcely any voice in determining the character of the expenditure; a position of which he complained bitterly in his letters.

De Champigny had no desire to shew hostility openly to de Frontenac, and was studiously courteous to him. But he regarded de Frontenac as wanting in consideration to him, and, in the contentions with the Bishop, he not only withheld his support from the Governor, but threw the weight of his influence against him. In his letters to the Minister, he expressed his sense of the difficulty of his position, from the disregard which de Frontenac shewed of his official rank. He had been the friend of the Jesuits in the time of de Denonville, and he continued to entertain sympathy with them. De Frontenac had no illusions with regard to the feelings of de Champigny, and in his despatches to France represented the Intendant as acting in concert with the party unfriendly to him in the Council, who were sustaining the pretensions of M. de Saint Vallier. He well knew that the old charges against him of arrogance and wrong-doing were being revived in France. De Frontenac, however, could appeal to the disasters which had befallen the Province during the six years of his absence, in the government of his two predecessors. He was well aware of the extent of ecclesiastical pretension to uncontrolled political power, and he informed the minister how the clergy described as impious all those

who felt themselves called upon to resist extreme measures having their origin in the passions and interests of the clergy. The quarrel led to much ill-feeling, and with a full knowledge of all he risked in the contest, de Frontenac in no way shrank from the responsibilities and hazards, which opposition to this influence was certain to create.

The year had been one of unusual prosperity, especially at Quebec. The cargo of furs which had arrived during the season had given to the citizens money, with relief from their embarrassment, and it was expected, that there would be a continuance of the same prosperous times. The society of the officials of Quebec was always marked by gaiety and good manners. Its characteristics in this respect are especially named by Charlevoix twenty years later.* Several entertainments were given in the interchange of hospitality ; and among the amusements, two plays, " Nicomede " and " Mithridate," were performed. Like all amateur theatricals, the performances were declared to be a perfect success. The circle, of which de Frontenac was the centre, expressed their entire appreciation, and the winter was passed in a round of pleasant amusements. In the month of January, a report was started that the amateurs were studying Molière's " Tartuffe," the principal part to be taken by Sieur de Mareuil, a half-pay lieutenant of the marine corps, who had distinguished himself in the previous performances. There is not a sentence extant to shew, that such an idea was seriously entertained. Bishop de Saint Vallier, and many of the clergy, were not popular with the set attached to the *Château*. There had been frequent unpleasantness on matters of public policy, and, as we read the letters of that day, the officers conceived that they had not been treated with the consideration due to them, and there was little relationship with the clergy, beyond what took place at church ceremonies.

Another point of disagreement arose in the matter of liquor

* " On a trouvé un petit monde choisi où il ne manque rien de ce qui peut former une société agréable." (Letter III., 28th October, 1720.)

being used in the trade with the Indians. The consideration of the morality of the traffic was again being mooted, to the dissatisfaction of men engaged in the practical duties of life, who with responsibilities to face and with obligations to meet, could only regard it from the standing point, of the keen competition of commerce, and the influences against which they had constantly to contend.

The "Tartuffe" report, whether true or false, was precisely of a character to cause annoyances. The very suggestion was aggressive, and was so accepted by the Bishop and ecclesiastics. When the difficulty is considered of putting the play on the stage, such an intention may well be doubted. Of all the comedies of Molière the "Tartuffe" is the most exacting in its production. The character of Elmire can only be taken by an artist of great power, and even the subordinate parts call for finished and careful acting. In after years the author of the life of M. de Laval, Abbé de la Tour, made a positive statement, that the play was acted to ridicule the clergy; and that de Frontenac was desirous of repeating the performance in the religious houses, with the full accessories of dancing and stage effect. The story is pure invention. Such a disregard of decency, could not have escaped the notice of de Frontenac's many enemies. There is a guarantee of its impossibility in the statesmanship of the man, who, by so gratuitous an insult to the Bishop, would have placed himself in the wrong, and have excited the whole Episcopate of France against him.

It is stated on the authority of de Champigny, the Intendant, that the Bishop paid de Frontenac one hundred pistoles,* not to play the piece; that in his presence the offer was made and accepted; and that the money was received and given by de Frontenac to the hospitals. If the

* "Il prit l'occasion que j'étais avec M. de Frontenac pour le prier de ne pas faire jouer cette pièce s'offrant de lui donner cent pistoles, que M. de Frontenac ayant accepté, il lui en fit son billet qui fut payé le lendemain."

De Champigny, 27th October, 1694. Parliamentary MS., Vol. VII., p. 108.
One hundred pistoles were equal in value to one thousand livres.

story were not so positively stated, it would be difficult of belief. After events shew the determined attitude of de Frontenac in the dispute. He acted with an independence of spirit, and firmness remarkable even in a man of his character, totally inconsistent with any such episode.

The first attack upon the *Château*, arising from the circumstances which have been narrated, took place on the 10th of January, when a sermon was preached in the Church of the Lower Town by the *Curé*, M. Glandelet,* against stage plays generally. On the 16th, it was followed by a *mandement*† from the Bishop against impious, scandalous conversation, in which the Sieur de Mareuil is especially named as having acted to make Heaven blush, and in which he is likewise interdicted from the Sacraments. On the same day a Pastoral was issued by the Bishop, in which all plays, even when free from licence of language, are condemned; and especial censure is directed against comedies, described as being impious, impure, or hurtful to one's neighbours. The "*Tartuffe*" is distinctly specified, and attendance at all such places is forbidden. It was followed by a manifesto, "Explanations with regard to Comedy;"‡ a document written with moderation, and evidently addressed to the class not remarkable for extravagance of religious views. It consisted of authorities cited from the Fathers, from St. Cyprian to Saint François de Salles, and from all Councils of the Church, on the subject of the theatre, presenting pages of general condemnation of it; with the argument, that all plays are included in the renunciation made at Baptism of the devil and his works.

On the 1st of February, 1694, the Bishop brought the conduct of de Mareuil before the Council. He stated that frequently, through persons of authority, he had called upon de Mareuil to amend his manners and speech, which had been impious and

* La Motte Cadillac, 28 sept., 1694.

† Mandements Lettres Pastorales et Circulaires des Evêques de Quebec, I., p. 302. Le sieur de Mareuil . . . continue à tenir des discours en public, et en particulier qui seraient capables de fair rougir le ciel.

‡ Éclaircissement touchant la Comedie. Ib., p. 304.

scandalously impure against God, the Virgin, and the Saints, during the period he had been in the country. Accordingly, he had publicly denounced de Mareuil, in order to lead him to return to his duty. The matter was now directly brought to the notice of the Council, in the hope that the Council would act in the spirit of other Parliaments, and suppress these disorders. The Attorney-General followed in the same strain. If there was a place where scandals of this kind should meet chastisement it was in Canada, where the dogmas of faith could be attacked, and manners corrupted. These impurities were worse than the Protestant religion ; and crimes of this character should not pass unpunished. On the part of the King, he desired to know what the words were. The matter was referred to the first Councillor de Villeray,* for his report.

There was so far ground for reproof that about two years previously, at a private meeting of young officers and other young men, late in the evening, when wine had been plentifully drunk, de Mareuil had sung a *Chanson Grivoise*, of a somewhat pronounced character. The circumstances had been brought to the attention of De Frontenac, who reproved

* At one of the meetings of the Council de Frontenac gave great offence by saying that it was useless to think of establishing a butchers' market, when so many travelled through the settlement to buy meat. The remark was held to have personal application to M. de Villeray. Upon which a writer remarks : " You have only to enquire if, in the country, there be a greater huckster than he [de Villeray] ; if he does not resell butter, bread and meat, after having run through all the settlements to buy them ? . . . Is it not a disgrace to see M. de Villeray, the first Councillor, keep a meat market in his house, and make his serving-man deal out the meat, and Madame his wife receive payment for it. Give yourself the trouble to enquire into the matter. . . . It is a strange country ; you ought to know well what it is, from the time you have received intelligence regarding it. Men of honour and of ability have no standing in it. It is only fools and the slaves of clerical domination who are able to live here."

I give the original French of this sentence :

"C'est un etrange pays que celui ci, vous devez bien le connaitre, depuis le temps que vous en recevez de la lumière, on n'y saurait souffrir ni les gens d'honneur ni les gens d'esprit, il n'y a que les sots et les esclaves de la domination ecclésiastique qui le peuvent habiter."

La Motte Cadillac, 28 sept., 1694. Parliamentary MS., VII., 15-58.

de Mareuil. But there is no record to shew that de Mareuil's general life and conduct were discreditably irregular.

On the 8th of February, de Frontenac, duly escorted, took his seat at the Council. He well knew the Bishop's pretensions; and he was in his place to protect the civil rights of Canada, assailed by ecclesiastical authority outside the domain of spiritual duty. The assault was more dangerous because this assumption of power was sustained by a clique of narrow-minded, self-seeking, inferior men.

The petition of Jacques de Mareuil was presented. He prayed that a copy of the Bishop's *mandement* should be considered; and appealed against it on the ground, that the Bishop had exceeded his powers,* and that it should be declared null, the formalities of the Church and the Canons not having been observed. The Canons forbid a person being publicly denounced, without having been admonished several times, in the presence of two witnesses. This course had not been followed. The petitioner set forth that he had performed his Easter duties, that he had attended Divine service,† and had acted as a good Christian. He asked that those who had made reports unfavourable to his conduct should be confronted with him; that, if found guilty, he should be punished; if innocent, his calumniators should suffer. He protested against being accused in secret, for any one so proceeded against, was without power to justify himself. To act on such grounds, was establishing an institution worse than the Inquisition, which had never been recognized in the Kingdom of France. The petition was referred to the Attorney-General.

On Monday, the 8th of March, de Frontenac again attended. Councillor de Peiras had read a petition from de Jordi, to which allusion will hereafter be made, and the Attorney-General was about to address the Council when the Governor placed a paper on the table and requested it be read. It ran: "Before we continue the examination and dis-

* "Appellant comme d'abus."

† "Assisté les jours d'obligation au Service Divin."

cussion of the matter of the *Sieur de Mareuil*, I am unable, gentlemen, to restrain myself from testifying to the Council my surprise on learning, by indefinite and uncertain public report, the conclusions formed by the King's Attorney-General, and the Minute which the Council rendered in consequence of it. I never would have believed such was the case, if I had not examined the minutes of the meeting at which I was not present." He then asked that a copy of the proceedings should be produced. The Attorney-General, on his part, applied for a copy of the Governor's remarks. With regard to the petition of *de Mareuil*, the Attorney-General was instructed to obtain explanation from the Bishop on the subject.

There was a meeting on the 15th of May; *de Frontenac* said that it was not extraordinary that *de Mareuil* desired that his case should be adjudicated on without delay, for it was painful to him to be deprived of the sacraments, and to be considered by everybody as an infamous scoundrel, held up to general horror and detestation. Justice demanded that it should be determined, whether or not he was guilty, and Commissioners should be appointed, to examine into the case. The Attorney-General explained that the depositions were not completed. *De Frontenac* answered that he had no knowledge of any evidence against *de Mareuil*; but he had certainly heard, that, for several days parties had been working night and morning to obtain it. As Governor-General, he was more zealous than any other person for the punishment of vice and scandal; he recommended the Attorney-General to use despatch, and, should he see neglect on *de Frontenac's* part as Governor-General and Chief of the Council, the Attorney-General should call upon him to fulfil the duty exacted by his position. The Attorney-General had the audacity to say that he did not acknowledge the Governor as Chief of the Council; it was a title which the King had decided he should not take; and that the Intendant should not assume the title of President. *De Frontenac* drew attention to the fact that the remonstrance made by him eight days

back had been inserted in the register, in accordance with custom, although the Attorney-General had given the opinion that the registers should not contain useless matter. The Attorney-General made a humble apology, for having objected to what the Governor had claimed to be within his authority. He now asked, that the Council should proceed to its ordinary business, and that a report should be made on a future occasion. The Intendant begged the Governor not to renew the old discussions as to his position in the Council; the King had determined the question on the 29th of May, 1680. As these proceedings would delay the course of justice in the cases to be submitted, it would be necessary to name special days to consider the case. He asked the Governor not to have placed on record what had been said. De Frontenac judged differently, and persevered in his request, that the record should be made, and it was entered upon the minutes.

On the 24th of March it was resolved that all that had taken place should be submitted to the King; and the Attorney-General made the request, that the Governor should abstain from being present; when the paper which on that occasion he presented, was being discussed. On the 29th of March, the matter again came up. The Governor required explanations with regard to the minute of the 24th. He did not see that it sufficiently explained his own position, whether he should continue to act as judge in the case of de Mareuil; moreover, it was indefinite on the subject of the plays which had been acted, and with regard to the course proposed to be taken by the Council. The Council explained, that there was no intention to ask the Governor to abstain from acting as judge, and that there was no desire that he should not be present.

On the 19th of April there was a recess; all business was adjourned so that the year's crop could be sown; and from the 20th of April there was no meeting until the 11th of June, when de Frontenac attended. He expressed himself on this occasion, as he usually spoke, with firmness and unmistakeably. He

considered that the cases of de Mareuil, of Madame Débryeux, and of de Jordi, together with the demand for full information on the disorders and scandals, said to have taken place in the representation of stage plays, were sufficiently important to be laid before his Majesty. It was necessary to determine whether in this case the Bishop had not passed the limit of his authority, and infringed upon the jurisdiction of the King, and, therefore, everyone should personally place his vote on record.

The Attorney-General considered, that as this proposition established a new procedure in the Council, the register should be examined to learn what hitherto had been the practice. On the 23rd of June a petition was presented by de Mareuil, complaining that three months and a half had passed since his first petition had been sent to the Attorney-General. He asked that it should be reported upon without delay, and that he should have honest and immediate justice. On the 28th of June, the Attorney-General reported upon the disorders and scandals, said to have arisen from the performances given by the Governor during the Carnival. The Bishop had not protested in any extraordinary manner against the plays which had been performed, but against those it was announced were about to be performed; and it was the latter he had described as impious and impure. These matters could only be made to appear of real importance, by the part which the Governor had taken; for the Council would not fail to oppose any attempt of the Bishop, if he desired to exceed his authority, to the prejudice of that of the King. On the point of the record of the vote being taken by names, the Attorney-General was of opinion, that it would be contrary to custom, but recommended that the matter should be submitted to France. On the 5th of July the Bishop attended, and demanded to be furnished with copies of the proceedings. The Council adjourned on the 30th of August, until the harvest should be gathered.

The meetings re-commenced on the 11th of October, when the Bishop was present. He stated that he was desirous of

giving expression to his views, but, as neither the Governor nor the Intendant was in his place, he would defer so doing. He would, however, ask to be informed of the opinion of the Council, as it was his intention shortly to proceed to France.

On the Intendant entering, it was agreed that the Bishop should make his explanation in writing. The document is not recorded. At the next meeting, the 14th of October, Dupont reported this paper had been placed in the hands of the Governor, who had replied he had nothing to say further, than that he was surprised the Intendant and the Council having heard it read, had done so without comment.

Later on the same day, the Bishop attended, and expressed the opinion that, after his departure for France, the Governor would shew his displeasure in his treatment of the *Curés*. He asked the Council to take into consideration, what he had written for the protection of himself and the clergy, and to order that the whole case should be submitted to the King; while at an extraordinary meeting* of the same date, the arrest of de Mareuil was ordered. De Villeray was named as a Commissioner to conduct his examination. On the attempt being made to follow out this course, de Mareuil protested against it, on the ground that in October of the last year de Villeray had complained to the Governor, that de Mareuil had struck one of his servants. A quarrel had arisen through de Villeray's man having attempted to interfere with some horses belonging to M. de Frontenac. De Mareuil stated, that the man had impudently remarked, that, neither he, nor his master, cared for the Governor, and he had chastised him. De Mareuil had been accused of saying that the master, as well as the man, deserved the cudgel. The Council overruled the objection, and de Villeray was directed to continue the investigation of the case.

On the 15th of November the extreme course was taken by the Attorney-General, of recommending that de Mareuil should be refused communication with any person; and

* "le Conseil assemblé extraordinairement." Con. Souv. III., p. 923.

shortly afterwards he was transferred to the *palais*, and held in close custody.

On the 29th, the Governor attended with a petition addressed to him by de Mareuil. He demanded that it should be registered. Some feeble objections were made. The Attorney-General remarked, that the Council could not prevent what the Governor-General insisted upon. It was, however, his duty to let the King know, that he had no part in the proceeding, more especially as the petition was replete with statements in opposition to the truth. He asked, therefore, that the document should be submitted before its registration; but de Frontenac summarily closed the discussion. He ordered the registration both of the petition, and his own memorandum accompanying it; and the papers could then be referred to the Attorney-General. After this he retired.

The petition of de Mareuil set forth the whole case at issue. In the month of January, 1694, a report was spread that the "Tartuffe" was to be acted, and that de Mareuil was to play the principal part. The idea, even, of this proceeding threw the Bishop de Saint Vallier into such a passionate rage, that after the sermon of the 17th of January he condemned all comedies and tragedies as bad in themselves; and he forbade every one to be present at the performance of the "Tartuffe," under the penalty of excommunication, for having committed a mortal sin. At the same time the Bishop published another *mandement*, by which he interdicted de Mareuil from entry into a Church, and from use of the sacraments, on account of his impieties and blasphemies against God and his Saints, which the sanctity of the place did not permit him to repeat. This proceeding had been taken, without previous admonition having been addressed to him. The case had been brought before the Council, and all his petitions for justice had been eluded. He had been led to hope, that the matter would be accommodated, and with this end in view, no specification had been made of his crime.

De Mareuil boldly accused the Attorney-General of having

joined the cabal against him, and of acting illegally in not having seen that the forms of law had been observed. He likewise complained that de Villeray, actuated by private enmity, should have been deputed to make the examination of his case; consequently, he had refused to answer the questions addressed to him. He protested against his unjust imprisonment. No specification of his crime had been communicated to him. He had sent a petition through the Attorney-General, which had only after delay been submitted to the Council. He appealed personally to de Frontenac, as to the truth of the grounds, on which he had challenged de Villeray as reporting Commissioner in his case. He protested against the course taken, as contrary to law and justice. He pointed out that the Bishop, having issued the *mandement* against him, could not be accepted as his accuser; that his crime, as it was set forth, did not come within the competence of the Bishop as judge; that the papers had not been submitted; and that it was plain that, if the *mandement* had been made without previous denunciation, and on information which could not be produced, it must be considered as absolutely false, and be pronounced to have been improperly and calumniously presented and published.

He accused the Attorney-General of endeavouring to cover the false step of the Bishop by the ruin of the petitioner, and he charged him in addition, with having gone among those who had known him for years, to endeavour to find evidence as to his life and manners. He declared that the Attorney-General had kept a witness in prison, in order that by intimidation, he might obtain the desired evidence. On the ground that some injury had been done to the Bishop's windows, other persons, who were thought to have knowledge of the matter, had been called upon to testify, and they had been threatened to be chastised, and driven from the city, if they failed to give evidence on points, which, they had been told, were known to be within their cognizance.

He appealed to the Governor-General for justice. He set forth, that he would suffer much by his detention as a prisoner,

should his confinement continue, until the Council obtained the information they desired. He asked for the appointment of another Commissioner to investigate his case, and concluded by a prayer for his release, on his engaging hereafter to present himself immediately, on the demand by the Governor for his appearance.

The memorandum of de Frontenac is as remarkable as the petition, which must strike every one who reads it, by the boldness and ability with which it is written. It can be well understood how the Council, with the Attorney-General, were opposed to the registration of such a paper. It was not simply an appeal to the highest authority in France; it was a record by which posterity can judge, what little protection there was for the individual, in the system of that day, except in the loyalty and devotion to duty of the King's representative.

De Frontenac told the Council, that the affair of the *Sieur de Mareuil* had been marked by so extraordinary and irregular a commencement, that less astonishment must be felt at what had followed. He had hoped, that on the remonstrance made by him on the 8th of March, the Council would have given some reflection to the duties which they had to perform, without inflicting a wound on the authority of the King, and on public liberty.*

He had no desire to screen de Mareuil in any fault he might have committed, and he pointed out that it was his Captain of the Guard, who had been the means of de Mareuil's arrest; that every influence had been exercised to lead the latter to escape, disguised as a sailor, but it was known that the attempt would have drawn down his indignation. For if de Mareuil had committed the fault with which he was charged, he ought not to remain unpunished; and he himself would be wanting in what he owed to the public weal if he did not intervene. The Council were evidently carried away by their

* "Mais seulement que La perquisition s'en fit d'une manière qui fut dans les formes et qui Ne pût donner aucune atteinte à l'autorité du Roy et à la liberté Publique." *Con. Souv. III.*, p. 952.

partisanship. They were neglecting both form and practice, and were led by their private passions; evidently hating the man more than his crime.

"Thus, gentlemen," he concluded, "I have come to declare to you, that I ought not, and that I cannot suffer the *Sieur de Mareuil* longer to be detained in prison; that I shall at once release him on the offer he has made to me; with my assurance to replace him in his present position, when his appeal to the Courts against your judgment, and when the will of the King shall be made known."

That day week, *de Frontenac* sent down the Captain of his Guard, and released the prisoner.

This was not the only difficulty which arose from the pretensions of *Bishop de Saint Vallier* to dominate over the private lives of men, and to claim for his clergy a supremacy in their parishes, in every relation of life, certainly at no time possessed by the clergy in France. On the 23rd of March the Governor brought before the Council the case of the wife of *Jean Débryeux*. The *Curé* of *Batiscan*, *M. Foucault*, had interdicted her, and on her entering a petition against the proceeding, the *Curé* from his pulpit had stated that all those who had given testimony in her favour, were false witnesses. He threatened with prison one *Sans-Quartier*, a corporal of *de Vaudreuil's* company, who still kept up his good feeling towards *Madame Débryeux*; and a man who had sung a song displeasing to the *Curé*, was told that he should be tied to a post, and whipped by little boys, to whom prunes and sugar plums would be given for what they did.

In July, *Madame Débryeux* herself lodged a petition against the treatment she had received; but, the influence of the clergy was so powerful, that she could not find any one who would act as her attorney.

On the same day a petition * was presented by *François de Jordi*, half-pay Captain of Marine, against *Messrs. Fouquet* and *Bouquin*, *Curés* of *Champlain* and *Batiscan*, asking that they should declare the reasons, for which they had inter-

* Appel d'abus.

dicted the churches to him, and praying to be informed on what ground the *mandement* on the subject had been obtained from the Bishop.

Acting on common report, without any scandal having called for their interference, these ecclesiastics had assumed that an intrigue was being carried on by the proscribed parties. In the course taken by them, they had to some extent acted at the dictation of the Bishop. M. de Saint Vallier had, in the first instance, represented the matter to M. de Vaudreuil, and on de Jordi's having been ordered away to Sorel, the Bishop undertook to leave the matter unnoticed; but it became known that Captain de Jordi had again visited these parishes, and the two Curés had considered it necessary to interdict him, and the supposed erring lady, from the church and the sacraments.

During the summer, Bishop de Saint Vallier had visited Sorel. From this place, in a private letter to de Frontenac, the Bishop reported that three officers were absent from the mass of the Sexagesima. Two of them he named, de Jordi and Bourgchemin, as presenting a bad example. De Frontenac, as every gentleman would do, considering that no private communication should be received, where the character of an officer was at stake, placed the letter in the hands of those implicated, and asked for an explanation. The officers easily established the fact, that they were constant attendants at church. De Champigny, in recording the fact,* evidently thought it perfectly justifiable for the Bishop to make an underhand report, and could not understand de Frontenac's loyalty of character, in declining to receive it in that form.

These petitions were referred to France. An extraordinary proceeding on the part of the Bishop was his attack on de Callières. Like de Frontenac, he was a friend of the Recollets, and it was their services which he attended. On an occasion of the admission of some novices, de Callières, then Governor of Montreal, was officially present. The position taken by him in the church was displeasing to the Bishop, who was per-

* Parl. MS., Vol. VII., page 110.

forming the ceremony. De Callières was kneeling at his *Prie-Dieu* when the Bishop approached him, and told him that he was occupying a place which belonged only to M. de Frontenac. De Callières claimed, that as Governor of Montreal he had the right to be where he was. The Bishop indignantly answered that if de Callières retained the position, he would himself retire. De Callières remarked, that he could do as he saw fit, upon which the Bishop angrily left the church, and the superior of the Recollets, Father Joseph, completed the ceremony.

The Bishop ordered the *Prie-Dieu* to be removed.* De Callières had it replaced, and marched a guard to the church to protect it. The Bishop laid the church under edict. The matter not being accommodated, the church was opened by the Recollets on their own authority. The Intendant endeavoured to effect some compromise; but, failing to do so, he pointed out that he was held by his instructions to support the Bishop, and that the Recollets risked losing the favour of the King. The church remaining open, two monitions were given after service in the Montreal parish church, and the interdict on the Recollets' church was continued.

Mention of de Callières' name had been introduced into the monition, in which allusion was made to him, as having improper relations with the sister of the Superior of the Recollets, Madame de la Naudière. De Callières was not the man to submit to this indignity; he drew up a statement, which he ordered a Major of his Staff to publish by beat of drum and affix to the church door during vespers, and he placed a sentry to prevent any interference with it. De Callières, in this proclamation, declared that the statement introduced into the monition with regard to himself was a calumny, of which the Bishop wished to avail himself, in order to authorize

* De Champigny reports this matter as if de Callières' seat had been removed for the sake of convenience. "Il fit ôter le banc de M. de Callières pour placer le sien, parce qu'il se trouvait à la gauche, et avancé vers l'autel, à cause que l'église est fort petite."

his pretended interdict against the Recollets' Church, contrary to their privileges, and that he had presented a petition to the Conseil Souverain, asking that reparation should be made to his honour.*

The matter came up in the Council on the 13th of December, 1694. De Callières petitioned that certain *monitions* and *mandements* should be declared null, and reparation be made him by the Bishop and ecclesiastics. On his side, M. de Saint Vallièr expressed his astonishment that de Callières, by beat of drum, should have published a libel in front of the church during Divine service, and have affixed it to the church-porch, placing a sentry to protect it. The matter was referred to the King.

The French Governors of Canada, at the close of the seventeenth century, were not held back from their purpose, by a few written words from an ecclesiastic pronounced *ex cathedrâ*, when they felt that these utterances were without warrant, and unjust.

D'Auteuil made a report of the proceedings to France. His statements are marked by bad faith, and want of respect towards M. de Frontenac. In order to create prejudice against the Governor, he alluded to the events of 1678-79-80, when disputes arose as to the relative position of the chief officers of the Council ; and he went so far as to say that when de Frontenac desired a particular course to be followed, he allowed no liberty of action, and imputed to disobedience and want of respect any difference of opinion with his views. That those who did differ with him incurred his resentment ; they were deprived of the favours, the King allowed the Governor to dispense, and were exposed to contempt, insults and menaces, and even blows, from persons placed near the Governor, who were sustained by him. Such results

* "Et comme le nom de M. de Callière, se trouve cité dans une de ses monitions à cause du commerce prétendu, dont il est accusé depuis long temps avec la même Sœur du Supérieur des Recollets." De Champigny au Ministre 27 octobre, 1694. Par MS. VII., p. 107.

had taken place, and would again happen unless the authorities in France saw fit to intervene.*

It was, however, all in vain. The papers, when read at the Court, must have impressed those authorized to pass judgment on them, in the same way as they have affected the historical student of modern days. There could be no misconception of the unwise and mischievous pretensions of M. de Saint Vallier. He was himself in France, to hear the expressions of dissatisfaction, which these ecclesiastical pretensions had called forth in Canada, and to offer his explanations on the subject.

The form in which the dispute was settled was so far efficacious, that, although it had threatened at one time to lead to serious complications, the peace of the colony was not further disturbed. But de Frontenac did not obtain justice; neither his service, nor his age, nor the stronger arguments of the undoubted equity and political sagacity of his views, nor the judgment and moderation with which he had acted in subduing the cabal against him, received proper recognition. He was generally sustained in the course he had taken, but at the same time he was warned hereafter to avoid quarrels; an exhortation, as meaningless as offensive, if he was to perform his duty in defending the prerogatives of his position, and to obtain justice for those of humbler rank, from whom it had been withheld. De Champigny was called to account, in language amounting to censure, for not sustaining the Governor: and was instructed to notify de Villeray that his conduct was displeasing to the King. This censure, de Villeray, from the littleness of his character, would ever retain stamped on his memory. The Attorney-General was summarily reprov'd. He was ordered to apologise to the Governor, and told that a repetition of the course which had marked his conduct would lead to his dismissal. De Callières was desired not to interfere in the disputes between the Bishop and the Recollets. His brother was a man of

* 26 October, 1694. Par. MS. VII., p. 99.

influence at Court, and, no doubt, obtained the ear of de Pontchartrain.*

We may trace in these proceedings the consequences generally observable under arbitrary government. In trying circumstances, only the success of a measure, taken to meet an emergency, is considered. The sacrifice of the individual, or the determination to uphold him, often depends on the hidden influences of personal favour and intrigue. No act of de Frontenac's life redounds more to his honour, than his behaviour on this occasion, distinguished by judgment, moderation and firmness. He unselfishly incurred responsibility in opposing the unjust treatment of a man without personal weight, by a swarm of political gad-flies, who sought every hour to sting him to irritation. His conduct, it is true, was approved, but the approval was accompanied by the unjust and offensive recommendation of the necessity of avoiding quarrels.

Independently of the disputes I have recorded, M. de Saint Vallier was engaged in a quarrel with the Quebec Seminary, which led to much unfriendliness of feeling. The Seminary went so far as to represent to the French Court that the Bishop

* We obtain a glimpse of what took place in France relative to this dispute from the Report of M. Tremblay, of the Quebec Seminary :—

“Ce qu'il y a eu de facheux est que les officiers ont fait mettre dans les gazettes d'hollande et de flandre, que M. l'Evesque estoit repassé en france a cause des differens qui s'estoient eslevez entre lui, le Gouverneur les officiers et quelques Communantez regulieres et qu'il venoit remettre son Evesché entre les mains du Roy ; vous ne doutez point que du caractere d'esprit dont il est cela ne l'ait porté a se roidir davantage contre ces faux bruits et a prendre la resolution et la publier partout qu'a quelque prix que ce soit il retournera en Canada.”

“On ne peut estre plus descrié qu'il l'a esté a la cour par des bruits repandus par ces officiers, on a sur tout relevé les cent pistolles donneez pour empescher la comedie du Tartuffe, Chacun en parloit selon son caprice. On ressembloit votre interdit celui des Recollets et de ces officiers. On disoit sur cela plusieurs choses mesme fausses qu'il vaut mieux ensevelir dans l'oubly que les escrire ; Mais ce qui estoit plus fascheux, C'est qu'on prenoit de la occasion de descrire la devotion et les devots comme gens incommode et avec qui il est impossible de vivre en paix, et les personnes mesme les plus sages en prenoient occasion de dire qu'il valoit beaucoup mieux donner les Eveschez a des gens qui neussent pas tant de pieté apparente et plus de bon sens qu'a ces devots indiscrets, qui mettent tout en trouble et en combustion.”

Can. Arch., pp. lxxvi-viii.

was unfit for his position.* We may infer that it was owing to this cause that he proceeded to France in 1694. Père la Chaise was at that time confessor to Louis XIV., and in full power at Versailles. One cause of the disaccord is traceable to the request of M. de Saint Vallier in the days of M. de Seignelay, that all the missionaries sent from France should be directly placed under his authority, and that the appointment of Vicars Apostolic by Rome should be revoked.† The dispute had been settled in 1792 by a commission consisting of Archbishop de Noailles and Père la Chaise, on a petition presented by M. Brisacier, Superior of the Seminary of Foreign Missions, representing the Seminary of Quebec. The pretensions of the Bishop seem to have been generally sustained.‡ M. de Saint Vallier so far obtained control over the appointments made by the Seminary, that, to be valid, they had to be submitted to him; and the Superior and Directors were limited to five in number, their proceedings fettered by the necessity of obtaining the Bishop's authority. The views entertained by M. de Saint Vallier on the subject of the *curés* were sustained, and he obtained recognition of the rank which he had claimed for his Grand Vicaires.

The extent of the dissatisfaction of the Seminary is on record. On the arrival of M. de Saint Vallier at Paris, he was desirous of taking up his residence at the Seminary of Foreign Missions. Père Tremblay was then the agent of the Quebec Seminary at Paris, and we have from him, the Report of what took place. §

* Mandements, Lettres Pastorales et Circulaires des Évêques de Quebec, I., p. 162.

† Mandements. Mémoire without date, I., p. 292.

‡ Edits et Ordonnances, I., pp. 265-269.

§ This important document appears on the Archives Report of 1877. The literary world is again indebted to "Laval" for its publication. Père Tremblay arrived in Quebec in 1687. In 1692, owing to his abilities, he was named agent of the Seminary at Paris; and, it is said, equally from the dislike of the Bishop, who did not find him sufficiently pliable. He held this office until 1728, when he resigned, owing to his total loss of sight. He died in 1741. The good intelligence between himself and the Bishop, in 1695, was certainly not remarkable.

M. de Saint Vallier on his arrival, while declaring that he had returned to France owing to his disputes in Canada with M. de Frontenac, announced his entire reconciliation with the Seminary. To confirm this statement, he desired to take up his abode at the Seminary of Foreign Missions. The proposition was avoided, and his representative, M. de la Pallière, was asked to dissuade the Bishop from making the request. On some former occasion the Bishop had said that the members of the Quebec Seminary were not worthy of the honour of his living with them, and the expression was now remembered. M. de Saint Vallier accordingly took up his residence at the Petit Séminaire de St. Sulpice.

There was at this time in Canada no relaxation on the part of the Quebec Seminary in their opposition to M. de Saint Vallier. A letter of M. de la Colombière was laid before the King, which plainly stated, that neither in France nor Canada, Monseigneur should undertake the duties of a Bishopric, which he was not fit to govern.*

According to Père Tremblay, Archbishop de Noailles and Père la Chaise, formed the opinion that it was necessary to remove M. de Saint Vallier, and they succeeded in impressing the King with this view. The Bishop, however, intimated his purpose, "to return to Canada at any cost." If this unfavourable opinion ever prevailed, it was not persevered in; for in 1697, M. de Saint Vallier returned to Canada in charge of his diocese. The only records obtainable shew that the quarrel did take place, but the narrative of the reconciliation has yet to be given to the world.

Although matters quietly, and unremarked, reverted to their old course, these disputes left their influence on men's minds. M. de Saint Vallier remained Bishop of Quebec until 1727. He was accordingly in that position when Charlevoix visited Canada in 1720. The Jesuit historian gives a pleasing picture of the society at that date; and it was not marked by

* "Il [Père la Chaise] a fait toute l'attention possible surtout à l'avis qui y est que Mgr. soit en France soit en Canada ne doit point se charger d'un Evêché qu'il n'est pas propre à gouverner." Père Tremblay, Archives, 1887, p. lxxvi.

austerity. Of M. de Saint Vallier himself he conveys a favourable impression. He lived in the Hospital as Almoner, and rented his palace for the profit of the poor. Charlevoix describes the society of Quebec as being as distinguished as in any other city. They played games of chance; arranged parties of pleasure in summer in *calèche*, in winter in sleighs. Skating was in vogue.* There was no great variety of news in the country to discuss. The intelligence from Europe came all at once to attract attention for a great part of the year. They conversed on the politics of the past, and formed conjectures for the future. Science and the *beaux arts* had their share of attention. The Canadians, that is to say the "Creoles of Canada," at their very birth breathe the air of liberty, which makes them exceedingly agreeable in the intercourse of life. "Nowhere," wrote the Father, "do they speak purer French; no accent can be remarked."

It is evident that the events of 1694 were not lost on M. de Saint Vallier for society was not again convulsed with the unhappy disputes of those days.

* "L'hiver en traîne sur la niège, ou en patins sur la glace." Letter III.

CHAPTER VI.

De Frontenac, a man of true ability, had no illusions as to the aggressive strength of the Province he governed ; it was not from insolence that his expeditions were undertaken : his policy was dictated by the end he had in view. As a statesman he knew that peace was assured by strength to resist attack, and it was peace he was desirous of obtaining, without uncalled for sacrifices, and on the conditions desired ; he was, therefore, constantly ready to entertain any advances from the Iroquois in this direction. Consequently, when in June an Oneida Chief named Taréha came to Quebec, he was kindly received. He was of the tribe, in which Father Milet had been held a prisoner, subsequently to be elected a chief. In this position Milet had used his influence, to create friendly feelings towards Canada, and one of the results he attained, was the embassy sent to Quebec. De Frontenac asked that deputies from each tribe should attend in order to confer with him. Taréha carried back this proposal to his people, but it did not find favor ; nevertheless, the negotiations were not closed. It is not possible to believe, that any hope of success suggested the offer subsequently submitted to de Frontenac. Taréha with other chiefs returned to Quebec in October, to propose that a meeting should be held in Albany, where the terms on which peace would be obtained, could be discussed. De Frontenac summarily rejected the offer, and gave the Chiefs to understand, that as they had not accepted his propositions when kindly made, he possessed the power to enforce his own policy. The Oneidas thanked the Governor for the courtesy they personally received, and were dismissed with presents. They had been accompanied by an Indian woman, no longer young, Susanne, who had always protected French prisoners. Her desire had been to see de Frontenac ;

and she was likewise the recipient of his bounty. But the attempt to obtain peace failed.

It was still the hope of de Frontenac to detach the Iroquois from the English alliance. He had this view constantly before him, and his efforts were directed to obtain its consummation. Garagontié remained at Onondaga, the devoted friend of the French. Decanisora was of the same feeling; Ouréouharé, who had domiciled himself among the Indians of the Montreal Mountain, visited frequently the bourgade of his tribe, and strove to create a feeling friendly to France. Nevertheless, it was not possible to overcome the sentiment, that the natural alliance of the Iroquois was with Albany. On their part, the Iroquois exercised their diplomacy in an astute endeavour to create a situation favourable to themselves; in which they might profit by friendly relations with both European powers, without cost to their own position.

In 1694 two Onondaga chiefs came to Montreal to inquire of de Callières if ambassadors would be received by de Frontenac. As the reply was in the affirmative, Decanisora with eight deputies arrived at Quebec in May. They were received in the Chamber of the Conseil Souverain with every mark of respect, the leading officials of the colony being present. The calumet was smoked by the Iroquois ambassadors, and the chiefs of the Christian Indians, and wampum belts were given. The orator was Decanisora, whose personal appearance has come down to us; it has been represented that his features resembled those of the bust of Cicero. He was dressed in a military, gold-embroidered, scarlet coat, the gift of the Governor of New York. Claiming to return in safety if peace were not obtained, he pointed out that the war had been commenced by his predecessors; for his own part he desired peace, and that war with its injuries should be forgotten. He spoke on the part of the Five Nations, as well as for the Mayor and Commandant of Orange. He asked that all prisoners belonging to their tribes, who were desirous of rejoining them, should be allowed to do so, while, on their side, the Iroquois would send back all the French, who were willing to return to Canada. The Governor

replied, that he likewise desired peace, but the peace must include the Upper Indian tribes. It was his wish that Father Milet should accompany the next embassy. He also called upon them, within eighty days of their departure from Montreal, to send back all prisoners without exception, men, women, and children, belonging to the French, to the Indians established in Canada, and the upper nations, his allies; "I pledge you my word," added de Frontenac, that I will grant full liberty to any Indians who may desire to return with you, and that I will surrender all prisoners." He told them that the English and the Dutch had nothing whatever to do with the war between him and the Indians, and that, if the Iroquois desired to make further proposals within the eighty days named, any person authorized by them to negotiate, would be received in Canada; but he would listen to no proposal to include the English in the peace. He warned them against the poison which the English and Dutch would instil to counteract the good disposition of their minds. The ambassadors were kept at Quebec, under the pretence of being present at a series of ceremonies, the real motive, however, was to gain time in the interval so that the crops could be harvested. Treated with distinction, the chiefs were dismissed with such gifts as they looked for. No result was obtained, but de Frontenac hoped that it was a step in the direction of obtaining peace in the future.

Fletcher was then Governor of New York. A separate treaty of peace between the Iroquois and Canada was in no way to be desired by the English Colonies; and, hearing of the negotiations, he summoned a Council at Albany, to consider what was reported to have taken place. Commissioners from New England and New Jersey attended, with the leading Chiefs of the Iroquois. Decanisora related what had happened at Quebec, in the interview with de Frontenac. Fletcher put the pertinent question, if the negotiations were in themselves to be considered to be in the interest of peace. The answer of the Iroquois was, that they could not carry on the war unless they received assistance. He had described

the negotiations as they had taken place. What did the Governor think of them ?

Fletcher replied that he was not himself opposed to peace, but any answer as to its final acceptance was beyond his authority. The King, his master, alone had the power to give his consent to its establishment. He recommended the Iroquois on no account to permit the reconstruction of Fort Frontenac. He perfectly understood the importance to the French of this foothold on Lake Ontario, and he warned the Iroquois, that it would lead to their servitude as a race, if they allowed the Fort to be restored and re-occupied; he could only regard their failure to resist this step, as an abandonment of the English alliance. He promised, that if, in such an emergency, the Iroquois were drawn into hostilities owing to their endeavour to prevent its re-establishment, he would march at the head of his troops to aid them. He called upon them not to enter into separate negotiations, and urged upon them, that the policy they favoured should be agreed upon, and be debated at Albany. The Iroquois pleaded their weakness; they were unable to make head against the French, who were constantly receiving new soldiers. They needed allies, and the question was: Would the New York authorities help them in the contest ?

Whatever may have been Fletcher's opinion as to the wisdom of aiding the Iroquois, he was powerless to adopt such a policy. There were but four companies of regular soldiers in New York, imperfectly officered and disciplined. In every attempt he was thwarted by the Legislature. The people had no disposition for war, the cost of which would fall upon themselves. Fletcher wrote that there were people enough to drive the French from Canada, but "they were crumbled into little governments," and so disunited that they had scarcely afforded any assistance to each other, and "now seem in a much worse disposition to do it for the future." His position as a royal governor was regarded with jealousy; he could obtain no vote of money to maintain troops. His own view was that five hundred men from the colony were neces-

sary for the protection of the frontier. In 1694 the Assembly consented to grant him one hundred and seventy men. In the position in which he was placed, he felt that it was the true policy to give a spirited support to the Iroquois, and prevent the re-appearance of the French at Cataraqui, and, if necessary, to send a well equipped expedition to Canada. The Iroquois, at this date, had no desire for amicable relations with the French, but, unsupported by Albany, they had no alternative but to consider de Frontenac's readiness to make peace on his own terms.

From the first day of de Frontenac's return, he had set his heart on the re-possession of Fort Frontenac at Cataraqui. He was more than ever convinced of its importance, and, in his interview with the Indians, he had slipped in a phrase, that he was glad to see they desired the "replanting of that beautiful tree, under the shade of which you formerly smoked in such peace, and transacted such good business." This was Fort Frontenac, and he proceeded to say, that he would set about the work as soon as possible. The Indians perfectly understood his meaning; they saw that he was bent on the restoration of the fort. With this purpose in view, in 1694 he had organized an expedition to ascend to Lake Ontario. Workmen were engaged to execute the necessary repairs; munitions and provisions had been collected, and troops detailed to form a garrison. The organization was complete, even to the choice of a leader, the Chevalier de Chrisasy. As the force was on the point of being despatched, de Frontenac received orders from France to furnish a detachment to de Serigny and d'Iberville, in an expedition to Hudson's Bay against Fort Nelson. I will give the history of this expedition in a subsequent chapter, when I attempt to relate the events, which took place in Hudson's Bay. It is enough to mention here, that, in order to prevent delay, and that the expedition should start that season, one hundred and twenty volunteers were detached from the Cataraqui expedition, and transferred to the force of de Serigny. A body of the Indians of the Sault was likewise drafted for this service. The

remainder of the force detailed for Cataraqui, being insufficient to carry out the original design, the men were for the time sent to their homes.

The remark of de Frontenac, which Decanisora had reported to Fletcher, had been accepted by the latter in its full significance, without power to prevent the execution of the project. As the Iroquois had obtained from the English Governor mere vague promises and words of advice, and felt their position to be one of danger, with only their own resources to rely upon, they called a Council at Onondaga, to consider the situation, in every way threatening to them. The Indians of the Western Lakes, the Ottawas and the Hurons, were becoming directly under French influence, and the furs of Michilimackinac were being safely sent to Montreal. De Frontenac had found the true mode of bringing them there; by an escort strong enough to protect them. The western hunting expeditions of the Iroquois had even been harassed by the Ottawas and Hurons; and the demonstration of de Callières and de Vaudreuil near the Cascades had made them feel that there was a large force in the field to withstand any hostility from their side. Their only opportunity lay in raids on remote dwellings, in attacks on small parties ascending the Ottawa, and in assaulting some ill-protected place, when its inhabitants did not look for hostilities.

It was manifest to them that their true interest was to drive the French back to the east of Three Rivers; and, as that was now impossible, to prevent further advance westward. To permit the re-establishment of Fort Frontenac was in every way detrimental to them. Their interests, sympathies, and feelings were with the English; and, had they been able to recognise that a determined effort would be made at Albany to drive the French from Montreal, they would have cast their fortunes on the English side, and have unhesitatingly marched forward with such a force. But New York, if not unequal to such an enterprise, was certainly indifferent with regard to it. Fletcher was without power to enforce the views he entertained; and in not giving assistance to the Iroquois he abandoned them to circumstances.

The proposals of de Frontenac were discussed at the Indian Council. The Cayugas and a strong party of the Senecas advocated their acceptance, with the reservation that peace should be made with the French alone, and that it should not include the Western Indians; their objection to the re-establishment of Fort Frontenac was likewise decidedly expressed. They remembered that it was from this place that the expeditions of de la Barre, and de Denonville had started, and that it had been the scene of the treason, by which numbers of their tribe had been seized by de Champigny, and sent to the galleys in France. It was resolved, that another deputation should be sent to Quebec to discuss these several points.

Among those who were included in the mission was Ouréouharé, who had returned to his tribe in the hope of influencing the discussions for peace. The deputation had to use dispatch in reaching Quebec, for only three weeks of the time allowed by de Frontenac remained. The Iroquois carried with them thirteen prisoners, including two of the brothers de Hertel. Among the Senecas was Joncaire, who, when a French captive, had married a squaw, and had become a chief. His name was hereafter prominently to appear in the history of those days. Some of the deputation arrived on the 1st of September. On the 10th, Ouréouharé with other chiefs followed. De Frontenac met them on the 22nd at Montreal; Ouréouharé was the spokesman. He stated that they had brought back the prisoners; and that the other three nations had proceeded to Orange to consult on the terms of peace, that the prisoners were being collected; and considering that the Governor might be impatient, he had arrived in advance with the assurance that Decanisora would shortly follow. They warmly exhorted de Frontenac to continue in sentiments of peace, and, in their figurative language, asked him to overturn the big caldron suspended in the air, so long kept boiling.

The embassy being without powers to conclude a treaty, no result was attained. De Frontenac, on his part, adhered

to the conditions he had named, and the chiefs returned home. A month later, Taréha arrived with the Jesuit father Milet, who had been nine years with the Oneidas. There had been at least this advantage gained, that, during the negotiations, the country had remained undisturbed, tillage had been uninterrupted, and many of the Western Hurons and Ottawas, without interference, had arrived at Montreal for the purposes of trade. The extent to which their interests had been consulted by de Frontenac had been diligently impressed upon them. They had been assured that he would make no peace in which they were not included. These Indians, on leaving Montreal for the West, were accompanied by several Frenchmen, among whom was La Motte Cadillac, on his way to take charge of the fort at Michilimackinac. It is from his pen that we have the account of the Indian negotiations, and he relates with ability and justice the policy of de Frontenac. No man, he tells us, better understood the temper of the Indians; in the midst of hostilities, he obliged to sue for peace, with every token of submission, an unfriendly nation which had never taken this step with a French Governor. In old days the tribes had offered two belts, one of war, one of peace, with the proposition: "Choose; it is one to us. They now use different language. It is: Grant us peace;" a course this proud nation would not have followed, if it had not suffered serious loss, and felt itself on the brink of ruin. At the same time de Frontenac had not been lulled into security; his forts had been strengthened and were better guarded, while the measures taken by him to bring down the furs from the upper country had given prosperity and happiness to Canada: a contemporary view that history must confirm.

Nevertheless, de Frontenac's policy, not only did not obtain credit in France, but to some extent was looked upon unfavourably. His desire was to encourage the French to more activity among the Western Indians, to build up a power at Michilimackinac, to re-establish Fort Frontenac, and generally to assert French authority west of Montreal. The Bishop, M. de Saint Vallier, and the Intendant, de

Champigny, disagreed with this view. The Bishop looked with extreme disfavour on the life of the *coureur de bois*. The Intendant, a man of narrow mind, who had entertained the opinions of M. de Denonville, ranged himself on all occasions on the Bishop's side. M. de Ponchartrain had now been five years in power, but his financial operations at home made Canada a subordinate consideration. As de Frontenac had his enemies in the colony, we may be assured that many private letters were written to France, in which his bold, statesmanlike policy was subjected to unfriendly criticism, and the true situation kept out of view.

The opinion had become strong at Versailles, that the negotiations undertaken by the Iroquois were insincere, and that their object was to lead to the postponement of the expedition, which they believed was being organized against them. De Frontenac was blamed because he had allowed an attempt on the part of the Iroquois to detach the Western Indians from the French alliance. It was known in France that if the Iroquois did not precisely mistrust the English, they had not full confidence in their power to sustain them; and the opinion was expressed, that the true policy for the French in Canada was to wage war against them by invasion or by harassing forays; and the proposed re-establishment of Fort Frontenac was condemned as a diversion of funds required for more useful operations.

Later, the King addressed a despatch to Canada, expressing his astonishment that time had been spent in vain negotiations, and, as they had not succeeded, he peremptorily urged the continuance of the war.

The political events in New York had now assumed a character to give fresh courage to the Iroquois. In June, 1695, a session of the Legislature had been held, when Fletcher sent a message to the effect, that all the colonies had been called upon to contribute to the expenses of the war, and that the Five Nations were to be sustained in their struggle against the French. The intelligence, conveyed to the Iroquis bourgades, re-animated their courage, and, as

peace was not concluded, the attacks harassing the French settlements were re-commenced.

It was plain to de Frontenac that the situation was assuming another character, and that more active operations were necessary to sustain his policy. The key to such an enterprise, he felt to lie in the re-establishment of Fort Frontenac. He was aware of the objections which were being urged against his design, and he determined to carry it out before he received express orders to abandon it. Prominent in this opposition was de Champigny, whose memoir* against its re-construction shews that he entirely misunderstood every argument, that could be advanced to sustain the project. He contended that the fort would be useless in time of peace, as the Iroquois would carry their peltry to the English, who gave more for it than the French; and that the trade which the fort would encourage was in opposition to the principles on which the colony should be governed. Men should not seek the beaver. The beaver trade should seek the colony, to be exchanged for the necessaries of European manufacture required by the Indians. He dwelt particularly on the difficulty of sending provisions from Montreal to sustain the garrison; it never entered his mind that settlers could be grouped round the fort to produce corn and meat. As a frontier post, he contended that it was dangerous and expensive to hold, and would exact a large force to garrison it.

In 1695, disregarding the arguments which had been advanced against his policy, de Frontenac raised one hundred and ten men in the governments of Quebec and Three Rivers. He increased his force by thirty-six officers, fifty men of the militia, two hundred soldiers, and two hundred Christian Indians; and the expedition placed under the command of the Chevalier de Chrisasy, started towards the end of July.

No enterprise could have been more satisfactorily carried out. De Chrisasy, after having accomplished all that was required, returned to Montreal in twenty-six days, without the

* Col. Hist., N. Y., Vol. IX., pp. 591-4. Memoir concerning Fort Cataraugy, 6th November, 1695.

loss of a single man. He found that the mines had made five breaches in the walls. Gathering the old mortar taken from the ruins, he re-mixed it, adding to it some clay to increase its volume. By these means he was enabled solidly to rebuild and restore the masonry. Timber required for the construction of the new outhouses and for firewood, were cut and hauled to the fort. The whole building was placed in good condition in eight days. Leaving a garrison of forty-eight men in the restored fortress, capable for a limited period of resisting an organized attack, de Chrisasy, with his main force, descended the Saint Lawrence. The expedition had been kept secret, having been planned and carried out with celerity; the first news which the Iroquois had of the event was, that Fort Frontenac was again in a condition to threaten them, as in old time.

When the despatch from France arrived which set aside the recommendation of de Frontenac for the reconstruction of Fort Cataraqui, he was enabled to make the plain statement that the work had been completed at little cost in a few days without loss. He reported with regard to his future operations, that it was not his intention this year to act hostilely against the Onondagas, for he was without sufficient force, and he did not consider it advisable to leave Montreal exposed to an attack of the English, by the way of Chambly. He saw little advantage in burning a number of wigwams; for the Indians, with their wives and families, would retire farther south into the forest. He instanced the expedition of de Denonville, as a proof that the destruction of the Iroquois villages and with the supplies they contained, did not remove the power of attack by those who had inhabited them.

When Fletcher was informed of de Frontenac's success he did not fail to see how threatening the step was to English interests, and he felt great anger that the restoration had taken place. The Iroquois asked for the assistance of five hundred men, and proposed to attack the fort. Fletcher had not the men at his command, and there is little indication that his character possessed the spirit of enterprise to undertake such an

expedition. He might, at an earlier stage, have despatched an engineer officer with a party, to destroy entirely the walls as they then stood, so that its re-occupation would have been impossible without rebuilding the structure; a work of expense and danger.

The re-occupation of the fort was regarded by the Iroquois as a renewed declaration of hostilities, and they returned to their aggressive expeditions, which they undertook when they could do so with safety. Men were carried off and killed at La Prairie, Boucherville, and Cap St. Michel. In the west they endeavoured to establish a firm alliance with the Ottawas and Hurons. At Quebec there was constant distrust with regard to these Indians, for it was strongly felt that their alliance with the French was only imperfectly accepted, and was always in danger of being abandoned. It could only be kept in force, by the able men de Frontenac sent up to Michilimackinac, by incessant care and watchfulness, and by means of the *coureurs de bois*, wandering over the country. Owing to their intimate relations with the several tribes, they were enabled to maintain a kindly feeling to the French, in many cases affirmed by the domestic character of the connection. After the unsuccessful expedition of McGregor and the Albany traders in the time of Dongan, to obtain a foothold on the shores of Lakes Huron and Michigan, no similar attempt had been made; the country had been left entirely to Canadian control. The high price demanded for the articles the French furnished to the Indians, remained a constant source of complaint, and in the deputations which waited on de Frontenac it was brought prominently to his notice as a serious ground of dissatisfaction. One of the strong arguments advanced by the Iroquois to induce the Western Indians to form an alliance with them, was the more efficient, and profitable manner in which goods could be furnished from New York. Some of these tribes at one period had resolved to establish themselves on the Wabash. They had been led to that step by the threats of the Sioux; for, as the more Western Indians came within the operations of

French enterprise, the complications in dealing with them increased.

One of the Huron chiefs, Le Baron, had not only little friendly feeling to the French, but was even desirous of entering into cordial relations with the Iroquois; he did not, however, openly avow his feelings, and even went down to Quebec with a deputation, as if devoted to French interests. At this very time his son was engaged in a mission to the Senecas. "We come," was the purport of the mission, "to make peace with you. The chief at Michilimackinac has told us lies; he has made us kill one another. Our father has betrayed us, we will listen to his voice no more." The Senecas sent ambassadors to Michilimackinac, and again affairs assumed a threatening attitude. But La Motte Cadillac met the emergency with ability. He decried the power of the Iroquois, and opened his stores to sell his goods cheaply, and in some cases with the promise of future payment. By this time the French had obtained such an influence over the Indian mind, that so long as men of ability conducted the negotiations, their power was assured, and could not be disturbed.

Nevertheless, the Ottawas and Hurons were constantly agitated by these opposite feelings. On the one side, there was the cheapness of the goods from Albany, while the activity of the French officers at Michilimackinac threw a greater weight in the opposite direction. There was a Jesuit Mission at this place, with several stores and many Indians established there, a fort with a respectable force, and the constant presence of the *coureurs de bois*. All of this did its work in affirming French power.

The policy adopted by the French was to destroy every Iroquois who visited the post; for it was held that their presence was caused by the hope of successful negotiation for an alliance with the Five Nations. The policy was not simply to make such overtures a matter of danger to all engaged in them, but to render negotiations impossible by the enmity which the French trusted to create between the tribes to the west of Michilimackinac and the Iroquois.

On occasions of this character, it was frequently the French who themselves took the initiative in the torture of the prisoners, they determined should be burned. There was no hesitation on their part in the adoption of this cruelty; and making every allowance for the difficulties of their position, the indifference on all occasions shewn by them to human suffering is a stain on their rule not to be obliterated. The advantages of an alliance with the Iroquois were being well considered by the western tribes, in comparison with that, with the French. If it had been believed by the Ottawas and Hurons that France could not cope with Iroquois strength, the weight of their support would have been thrown upon the English side. The threatened combination was to be broken up only by creating suspicion, distrust and the desire for revenge. The destruction of every Iroquois arriving at Michilimackinac, promised to attain this result, as well with the tribes of those who suffered the wrong, as with the men who were induced to commit it.

There had been a proposition on the part of the Chiefs who had not confidence in the French, that an English post should be established on Lake Erie, and there had been mention of a Council to be held at Detroit, to consider with the Iroquois what course was the best. The authorities in New York were unable in any way to understand the situation. If at that day, a well organized force had taken possession of a trading post on Lake Erie, so that it could not have been attacked except by a powerfully constituted expedition, the western Indians would have rallied to its support. With the limited resources which de Frontenac had at his command, he would have been compelled to remain quiescent, without making an attempt against it, for the effort would have been beyond his strength.

No such considerations prevailed at Albany. Those who saw the exigencies of the situation failed in obtaining attention to its requirements. The policy by which it should have been met was neglected, and this inactivity led both the Hurons and Ottawas to remain under the control of the

French. A few years later the Five Nations, which until the government of de Callières, had been found on the English side, ceased to maintain the alliance. They accepted an independent treaty with the French, and refused to assist in attacks upon Canada.

What de Frontenac specially felt, was the necessity of destroying in the mind of the Western Indian, all belief in the prowess of the Five Nations. The necessity of striking such a blow, and the positive instructions of the King to commence hostilities, determined him to hasten the expedition. His first intention was to carry on his operations in winter, in the hope that the women and children could be seized, and held as hostages to force the Onondagas to accept his terms. Preparations were accordingly commenced in the autumn of 1695. But snow fell early in the winter of 1695-1696, in unusual quantity, to the depth of seven feet near Cataraqui, weather rarely experienced; and it was resolved to defer the expedition until summer. The preparations were therefore not commenced until spring, and by June they were completed.

The final organization was made at Isle Perrot. The whole of the troops had been gathered together by the 6th of July, and the order of march determined. The Indians were five hundred in number. A large force of them formed the advance guard, which further consisted of four battalions of regulars; four hundred men. The *bateaux*, manned by Canadians, conveying the baggage and provisions, followed. De Callières was in command of the advance-guard. He had with him two field pieces and mortars on *bateaux*. The main body consisted of de Frontenac with his staff, and four battalions of Canadian Militia of which de Ramezay was in command. They were of greater strength than the regulars. The rear-guard, under de Vaudreuil, was composed of two battalions of regulars and some Indians. The whole force was between twenty-two and twenty-three hundred men.

On the 9th of July the Cedars rapids were passed, on the 13th the expedition had reached the water above the Long

Sault, on the 16th it arrived at La Galette.* On the 18th the troops were at Fort Frontenac. They remained here until the 26th, when the advance was continued. Twenty-six men were left behind, owing to injuries received in ascending the rapids. On the 28th, the force came to the mouth of the Onondaga River. Scouts were immediately sent along the banks on both sides. The ascent of the stream was attended with difficulty. Marching from dawn to dark, the column only made five leagues in two days ; something over twelve miles. On the first portage being reached, de Frontenac, in his seventy-sixth year, who cheerfully bore all the privations of the expedition, had commenced to march with the troops, when fifty Indians placed him in a canoe, and with yells of joy carried him across the distance. On the 1st of August the troops arrived at the Oneida river, when they had drearily to wade knee deep in mud over some stretch of ground. The stream narrowed as Lake Onondaga was approached. At this spot they discovered an Indian picture on birch bark, showing the advance of the force, with two bundles containing 1434 cut rushes, to denote the number of warriors ready to defend the country. De Callières moved along the west shore of the lake in regular order of battle, de Vandreuil passed to the east, and finally the junction of the two was made. There was no opposition to landing ; and Levesseur, the engineer officer, traced out a fort, to which timber had to be drawn a mile. The scouts reported that they had come upon trails leading to the Cayuga and Oneida bourgades ; from which it was inferred that the women and children had retired thither, and that those tribes were in the field to help the Onondagas. One hundred and forty militia and regulars remained to guard the fort. Among the Indians of the expedition were two Senecas previously taken prisoners who had been domiciled at the Christian Missions. They both deserted ; and through them the Onondagas had full knowledge of the presence of the French.

* Prescott.

On the night of the 2nd of August, a bright flame had been seen; whether an accidental fire, or the wilful destruction of the village, could only be surmised. The army encamped near the well known salt-springs. "They produced enough of salt," writes the chronicler, "to make us wish that they were near Quebec; the cod fishery would then be very easy in Canada." On the 4th, at sunrise, the order of battle was formed. De Callières, on horseback, according to one authority, commanded on the left, de Vaudreuil on the right. The centre consisted of two battalions of militia. Two battalions of regulars composed the wings. De Frontenac, carried on a litter,* preceded the guns, which were kept between the two divisions. The formation was two deep. By the evening the village was reached; as had been surmised, it was found to have been burned.

In the morning two squaws with a child, who had escaped nine days previously, joined the French. They belonged to the Montreal Mountain Indians. An old woman was also captured by the scouts; as the poor creature could not march, she was killed. Two days afterwards a young Frenchman appeared; he had been seven years a prisoner. He reported that the families of the Senecas were ten leagues off; that scouts were on the watch, and that, on the advance of the French, the Indians would retire farther back into the forest.

The Indian corn-fields, which extended two leagues from the fort, were entirely destroyed; all the grain and property found in the *caches* were seized or rendered useless. One old man was taken prisoner, and the Indians determined to burn him. De Frontenac, never cruel but from policy, desired to save the prisoner; perhaps there was some sympathy of age, but he was unable to intervene between the Indians and their prey, without creating discontent which might have proved embarrassing. They were intent upon burning the old man; the Christian Indians equally with the others. The prisoner met his death like a stoic. Not a murmur escaped him, and his tortures were extreme. "Learn ye French dogs," he cried,

* Bourriquet.

“and ye Indians, dogs of dogs, what you may have to endure, and when you are placed in the same position, remember me.”

On the 9th, de Vaudreuil returned from the Oneida country, where he had been absent for two days and a half on a reconnaissance with six hundred men. As he reached the fields of Indian corn of the first Oneida village, he was met by deputies of the tribe. They asked him not to destroy their crops; and they undertook to keep in good faith the promise that they made to de Frontenac, through the messengers sent on the 5th to obtain peace. De Frontenac had acceded to the demand, on condition that their families would settle in Canada; further telling them, that if they were not ready immediately to proceed thither, to send five hostages; and if they failed to do so, he would force them to submit to his conditions.

It was owing to this embassy that the expedition of de Vaudreuil had been undertaken. De Vaudreuil's answer to the request to spare their crops was, that if they came to Canada they would not require them, and he set his men to work at their destruction.

While in this place he heard that the Mohawks, accompanied by three hundred English, were advancing to assist the Onondagas. De Vaudreuil prepared for the emergency, but no attack was made. After destroying the crops and the village, he returned to de Frontenac, bringing with him four French prisoners and thirty-five Oneidas. An unfortunate Mohawk, who had deserted from the French, was also discovered; he was burned. Some of the Indians who had remained behind for plunder, were attacked, three of them were killed, but they could not be scalped.

The object of the expedition had been attained, and the return march commenced. The Fort constructed for the protection of the canoes was razed. On the 12th of August Lake Ontario was reached; on the 15th the force was again at Cataraqui. De Frontenac had availed himself of this opportunity to increase the accommodation of Fort Frontenac. He constructed a building containing a chapel and officers' quarters; a bakery; some stores in which he placed provisions

for eighteen months. On the 20th the expedition arrived at Montreal.

The only loss experienced was by the overturning of some *bateaux* in descending the rapids, when three of the militia were drowned.

In New York nothing had been done for the protection of the threatened Iroquois. As early as July the proposed advance was known, and, had Fletcher been animated by the spirit of Dongan, it is probable that de Frontenac's expedition might have assumed a different character, and have attained a less favourable result. It must be remembered, that the claim had been preferred to this territory as belonging to England, and news was received that it was threatened with invasion. The course taken by the colonial authorities of New York is a proof of the indifference felt with regard to the Mohawk valley and the country west of it, and establishes their incapacity to understand the political consequences of the events that were taking place. The period was but sixty-three years before the final conquest, and there was no policy entertained by the British Colonists in relation to the northern portion of the continent, which, so long as it was held by the French, imperilled their lives and fortunes, and even placed in danger their national existence. Massachusetts was compelled to take some action, owing to her population pushing forward northern settlement, and from the check it experienced from time to time by the attacks of the Abenakis. Her expedition against Canada had been made in vindication of her rights on the Atlantic coast, and had been called forth by the destructive raids of the earlier part of the year 1690. The effort was one for self-defence; and in the assault of Quebec, she had alone in view the safety of her frontier.

There was no union among the colonies, and to the last the conduct of Pennsylvania led to disastrous consequences. The want of united effort paralyzed every operation, and it was only by the earnest intervention of the Mother Country that this want of concord was overcome. There always remained a strong feeling, that the contest with Canada for

any possession of territory was a question regarding which, the individual Province was without responsibility.

On the 20th of July,* the subject was brought before the Council in New York. Fletcher asked for four hundred men. The minute runs: "The Council doe approve thereof, but affirm the impossibility for want of money, the Revenue lessened by the decay of trade, and great backwardness in bringing in the taxes." Their neighbours also had denied assistance. A second Council was held on the 7th of August; the report of the invasion was confirmed. Mr. Allen, of Connecticut, had heard the news from a French prisoner, and Colonel Ingoldsby had sent from Onondaga notice of the French attack. The Governor gave his opinion that their force should be sent to Onondaga to cover the frontier, and to "shew our zeal for the preservation of the Onondagas, which will give them encouragement." The Council again objected. No men had been sent from the neighbouring colonies; only a small sum of money from Virginia and Maryland. It was harvest time, "it would be grievous to take the people from their labour; and there was no money to answer the charge thereof." The conclusion reads like a mockery: "Do therefore advise, that a letter be wrote to the Indians to give them encouragement, and to acquaint them the King of England has sent them some presents, and desire them to be watchful."

On the 12th of August, the Governor stated that the Indians had asked for assistance. Again there was no money. As the Council were of opinion that men could be found, each of the four members personally undertook to raise two hundred pounds.

On the 3rd of September, Fletcher officially reported the termination of the affair to London. He stated that neither Connecticut nor New Jersey would send a man, and that it had been resolved to supply the Onondagas and Oneidas with corn. In August Fletcher arrived at Albany; calling together his Council, he proposed that an expedition should be sent to

* The dates given are according to the new style of 1752.

the Indian territory, but the Council considered that as the French had retreated, it would be an unnecessary charge.

It was agreed that the Onondagas should be informed, that on the news of the invasion the Governor had proceeded to Albany, and on his arrival had heard that the enemy had departed. They recommended that an Indian Council should be called to meet within two months, and it was resolved to supply the Onondagas and Oneidas with corn at the charge of the Government.

The Meeting took place at Albany on the 9th of October, the "covenant chain" was renewed, and presents were given. The Onondagas spoke out plainly, that, if the King would not send forces to destroy Canada, they must make peace for themselves. Commissioners were named to treat with them, and all Fletcher could do, was to promise to represent their views in London, and endeavour to obtain a favourable reply from the King. He closed his remarks in a way certainly agreeable to them. "I now take my leave of you," he said, "and give each of you a keg of rum for a dram, to comfort you on the way home, and a coat to keep you warm in the winter."

The Assembly met on the 27th of October. Fletcher told the Council "that he expected Albany to have been attacked by the French Governor, but he contented himself with a poor insult over our naked Indians and retired. Yet he destroyed the castles and corn of those two nations, who must perish this winter unless relieved by us. You all know that they have been true to his Matye's (Majesty's) interest in joyning with the Province against our common enemy the French, and unless encouraged, may be compelled by poverty to make their peace with them."*

Some thoughtful men in the Province, may have six years later, remembered Fletcher's words when the Five Nations made a separate peace with de Callières at Montreal, abandoning their political relationship with the English of New York on the Hudson and the Mohawk.

* Vide Doc. Hist. N.Y. I., pp. 323-355. "Frontenac's Expedition, 1696." A narrative of the proceedings taken by the Province of New York on this occasion is given in some detail.

CHAPTER VII.

De Frontenac had determined to follow up his operations with another blow, but there was a scarcity of provisions. The operations of the previous year had interfered with the tillage of the soil, and there had been but scanty crops. The price of food was excessive, so there was difficulty in obtaining rations for the troops. They were consequently scattered throughout the country in quarters, in order that they might be fed. De Frontenac also had received instructions, to prepare for an expedition, concerning which precise orders would be sent to him; in consequence, he kept his troops so distributed, that they could be immediately assembled. In September 1697, the arrival of a war-ship informed him that the design had been abandoned.

A powerful fleet had sailed from La Rochelle, under the command of the Marquis de Nesmond, with the object of attacking Boston. It consisted of ten large ships of war, a barque and two fire-ships. The scheme was complicated by de Nesmond's instructions to proceed to Plaisance, in Newfoundland, there to meet the English fleet, which might be looked for to be present in those waters, in order to re-establish the Newfoundland settlements, destroyed by d'Iberville in 1696.* Should no vessels be present, de Nesmond was to cruise in search of them. As it was expected so commanding a force would meet with little opposition, the programme was, that on the destruction of the English fleet, assumed as a consequence, he was to proceed to Pentegoet, and there receive a detachment of fifteen hundred troops sent from Canada; regulars, militia and Indians.

The French had obtained correct plans of Boston, owing to the residence there of de Meneval and the Chevalier d'Aux

* D'Iberville's operations are given in another place.

when prisoners. At that time the city had seven thousand inhabitants. During the summer, most of the young, vigorous men, engaged as mariners and fishermen, were absent; and the conclusion was formed, that at this season there were not more than eight hundred able-bodied men present, mostly untrained and unaccustomed to war, from whom only imperfect resistance could be anticipated, if any were offered. No doubt was entertained that an attack on the city with sufficient force would meet with immediate success.

Boston in the possession of the French, the country northward was to be occupied by the Canadian troops; all the places were to be plundered and destroyed, settlement was to be entirely uprooted, and all trace of the rule of Massachusetts annihilated. The country was to be reduced to a state of nature. If time permitted, New York was to be attacked, and possession taken of the country.

Before starting, de Nesmond also received instructions to aid de Villebon, then besieged, it was thought, at Naxouat. Moreover, when de Nesmond arrived at Plaisance, a quick sailing vessel from France brought him additional intelligence and instructions. He was informed that eighteen English vessels, loaded with salt, had left Portugal for Newfoundland, and de Nesmond was not to allow them to escape. It was further suggested to him that, if he destroyed the English fleet, before leaving Newfoundland, he might sail up the eastern coast, and burn all the English trading vessels which he met.

Delays in leaving France, and contrary winds prevented the arrival of de Nesmond at Plaisance until the 24th of July. There was no English fleet and no tidings to be obtained of it. A council of war was called. It was considered inadvisable to proceed to Boston, in ignorance of the movements of the English fleet, and that, as no junction could be made with de Frontenac before the first days of September, and there would be then but fifty days' provisions remaining, it would not be possible to carry out the operations as they were laid down.

De Nesmond accordingly ordered M. des Ursins to proceed to Quebec in command of the Canadian ships which the fleet had convoyed, and to communicate to M. de Frontenac the determination which had been formed. M. de Nesmond, with his ships, returned to France without having accomplished any one of the objects which he started to attain.

Early in May 1698, Richard Coote, Lord Bellomont, who had been appointed Governor of the Provinces of New York and Massachusetts, arrived at the city of New York. Being an Irish peer, he had obtained a seat in the English House of Commons, where he had gained the character of an honourable and independent man, and had obtained general respect. He immediately addressed M. de Frontenac and announced his appointment, informing him that peace had been proclaimed in October of the previous year. His journey had been tedious, he having been driven by contrary winds to Barbadoes. He informed the French Governor that he was sending back the French prisoners in his possession, and would give orders for similar treatment of those held in captivity by the Indians, and if necessary would despatch them under escort to Montreal. He said, he did not doubt that de Frontenac would order the release of the King's subjects both Christian and Indian, so that friendly correspondence, unrestricted trade, and all the results of peace would be secured. The bearers of this communication were Delius, the Minister at Albany, and John Schuyler, who have left a report of their journey.

They arrived at Montreal on the 15th of May, carrying with them twenty French prisoners, whom they delivered into the hands of de Callières, and there they heard that six Iroquois Indians were in prison. A short time previous a skirmish had taken place, in which twenty-four of the Iroquois were killed; the six prisoners had been wounded in the fight and taken to Montreal; Schuyler asked for their release, de Callières declined to liberate them without an order from de Frontenac; moreover he told Schuyler, that he was expecting deputies from the Iroquois to sue for peace, who would themselves bring back their French captives. Schuyler con-

tended that the Iroquois were the King of England's subjects, and that they could not make peace. Some conversation took place, in which both parties persevered in their views.

Two days later the envoys left for Quebec, arriving there on the fourth day. They were received respectfully and kindly by de Frontenac, the officials, and the clergy. The Superior of the Seminary stated, that at an early date it was his intention to go to Albany, and to send missionaries among the Iroquois. He, however, received the reply, that the Five Nations were in religious matters under the direction of the Minister of Albany, who was taking care of them, and had instructions from the Lord Bishop of London, to whose diocese they belonged.

The Albany envoys demanded the release of both Christian and Indian prisoners, with the establishment of reciprocal trade. De Frontenac readily consented to set free all English and Dutch prisoners. The Indians, he said, he could not liberate, until their deputies had presented themselves to make peace, in accordance with the promise made by their envoys at Quebec. Schuyler repudiated the idea that the Indians who had arrived at Quebec should be held to have represented the Five Nations. De Frontenac contended that the Iroquois had been always under French rule ; while Schuyler, on his part, put forth the claim that the English had always possessed control over them. De Frontenac closed the argument by saying that it was evident that he and the Earl of Bellomont would never agree, and that the matter must be reported to the King. Schuyler then demanded the release of the six wounded Iroquois at Montreal, but de Frontenac refused compliance. He had contrary orders from the King on the subject, and if the Iroquois did not arrive to make peace, it would be his duty to go to their villages and to make them peaceable. Schuyler replied that if de Frontenac did not feel disposed to satisfy de Bellomont, he would not answer for the inconveniences which would arise. We are told also in this report that when the English prisoners were called upon to appear, they unanimously refused, with the exception of two or three,

to return to Albany. Many of them had been led to adopt Roman Catholicism, and this feeling was doubtless strongly appealed to. No Protestant, known to be such, could obtain toleration under French rule anywhere. For the English prisoners to have remained in Canada, they must have abandoned their creed and their country.

Schuyler gives an account of Quebec. The envoy did not find the fortifications extraordinary, nor was he much impressed with the place. He thought that, were it not for the convents, the seminary, the Bishop's house, and other religious edifices, it would scarcely merit the name of a town. The mounted guns did not exceed forty. There were two bishops. The Jesuits, secular priests, the Recollets, and lay brothers, exceeded two hundred in number. He formed the opinion that the inhabitants were not wealthy, and the only currency was paper money.

The envoys were the bearers of a letter from de Frontenac to Bellomont dated the 8th of June, which stated that he had not received official confirmation of the peace from France; nevertheless, he would deliver up the Dutch and English prisoners. With regard to the release of the Iroquois, it was a question, which, in the form it was submitted, he could not understand. Last year, they themselves had appeared to negotiate peace with him, and it was unnecessary for Lord Bellomont to interfere in the matter. The Iroquois had formed a part of the King's dominion, before the English had taken New York from the Dutch. The French missions from Canada had been established there for forty years. His own orders on the subject were precise, and he could not act in opposition to them.

On the 24th of August, Lord Bellomont again addressed de Frontenac. He said that he had returned from the frontier of the Five Nations, and they had professed fidelity to the English Crown. Moreover, they had complained of the outrages committed on them by the French, and that since the peace, ninety-four of their people had been killed and carried off. Lord Bellomont expressed his astonishment that de

Frontenac desired to continue war with the Indians, since it was an infraction of the treaty, and that for his part he would not suffer the French to treat them as enemies. "I have, therefore," adds Lord Bellomont, "given them orders to be on their guard, and, in case they be attacked, to give no quarter either to Frenchmen or Indians, having promised them assistance each time they require it. Moreover, to place them in a condition to defend themselves, and to repel those who will attack them, I have furnished them with a quantity of arms and munitions of war." Lord Bellomont called upon de Frontenac to forbid his missionaries interfering with the Indians, who had represented to him that they were overwhelmed and tormented by them against their will. "If you do not," he said, "cause acts of hostility to cease, you will be held responsible for any consequences which may follow." The Indians were willing to place in his hands a hundred prisoners, on condition that they were assured of the liberation of their own people. Lord Bellomont alluded to the attack of the Indians on the 15th of July on men engaged in their harvest, who had been scalped. He asked de Frontenac if it were true that the French Indians were to receive fifty *écus* for each scalp.

On the 22nd of August he again wrote, informing de Frontenac that he had learned from the Onondagas, two renegades of the Mohawks had been with them to say that, if they did not proceed to Canada in forty days, "to solicit peace from you, they may look to see you marching at the head of an army to constrain them. I, on my side, do even this day send my Lieutenant-Governor with the King's regular troops to join the Indians to oppose any hostilities you will attempt, and if need be, I will arouse every man in the Provinces under my government, to repel you and to make reprisals."

To prevent any miscarriage of his letters, and any misunderstanding with regard to the ground he had taken, Schuyler was again despatched to Quebec in September, to insure their delivery.

The old dispute as to the Iroquois therefore remained unad-

justed by the peace, to cause further complications. "My lord threatens me," said de Frontenac, "but I am not afraid. My lord Bellomont claims the Five Nations of Indians, which is none of his due." He asked the strength of Lord Bellomont's government, which included New England and New York. Schuyler replied: "By common report, my Lord could raise one hundred thousand men; y^e Count said he alwayes understood the same."

On the 23rd of September, the day for the proclamation of the peace, Schuyler dined with de Frontenac. In July, when de Frontenac was in Montreal, he had received tidings of the Treaty of Ryswick, with instructions for a "Te Deum" to be sung, and it was now the ceremony took place. The prominent personages at Quebec were present at the Governor's banquet; the higher clergy, the officers of rank, the chief officials. De Frontenac proposed the health of King William the Third and Queen Mary; Schuyler proposed the health of the French King; de Frontenac then gave the health of Schuyler.

Peace was formally proclaimed "with all y^e acclamacôns of joy imaginable, y^e castles and y^e shippes in y^e road discharging all their cannon; y^e night ended with illuminacôns and other demonstrations of joy."

Two days later, Schuyler left for Albany. Hearing that the Iroquois had sent envoys to Montreal to treat for peace, he proceeded to that city to learn if such were the fact; he found the report untrue, so he returned homeward.

He was the bearer of a letter from de Frontenac dated the 21st of September, 1698, which informed Bellomont that commissioners had been appointed to determine the limits of the countries, and that the Indian question was one entirely different from that of the peace. He was perfectly well informed of the sentiments of the Iroquois; not one of the Five Nations pretended to be under the dominion of England, nor desired to be so. "Therefore, sir," he continued, "am I determined to pursue unflinchingly my course, and I request you not to attempt to thwart it, by what would turn out in your case

to be useless efforts. All the protection and aid you have declared to me you have already afforded, and will continue to give to the Iroquois, in opposition to the terms of the treaty, will cause me no great alarm, nor oblige me to alter my plans. They would rather, on the contrary, engage me the more to prosecute them. You will be responsible in the face of Heaven and the King, your master, for whatever unfortunate result may follow, for you will be the sole cause of the bloodshed that will ensue." *

This letter may be described as the last important act of de Frontenac's life. On the 25th of October, he joined de Champigny in a despatch to the King, in which a narrative is given of the correspondence. He there said that no step would be taken by which the treaty would be infringed, and that everything would be held in readiness to execute the orders, which he asked should be sent him.

De Frontenac was now in his seventy-eighth year, when he was attacked by severe illness. If he had in any way been suffering from indisposition, there was no expectation that it would be attended by danger. There were those about him, who hoped to succeed him in his office, and, had there been indications of a fatal termination of the attack, the news would undoubtedly have been sent to France by the last ships. The dangerous nature of his malady must have declared itself, after the letter written jointly with de Champigny. There are no details of his complaint, and we do not know its name or character. From the rapidity with which it advanced to end in death, it is not impossible that it was a general break-up of his constitution.

On the 22nd of November he knew death was upon him and dictated his will. Except fifteen hundred *livres*, which, he bequeathed to the Recollets for masses for himself and Madame de Frontenac after her death, he left all that he was worth to his wife. His heart he desired to be placed in a leaden or silver case to be sent to her, in order to be

* 1st Series MS. Documents Archives Department, V., p. 513.

deposited in the family vaults of the Church of Saint Nicolas des Champs.

During his illness he had become reconciled with the Intendant de Champigny, and had given him a crucifix. He left a *reliquaire* to Madame de Champigny. He was attended in his last hours by the Recollet Father Goyer, "in a Christian spirit receiving the last sacraments." He died at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th of November, in the perfect enjoyment of his faculties, with quiet composure.

According to his direction, he was buried in the Recollet Church, not in the Cathedral: a preference, which after years showed offended some of the clergy.* Bishop de Saint Vallier attended to perform the leading part in the ceremony. The Recollet Father Goyer preached the funeral sermon to a large congregation, dwelling on the great qualities of de Frontenac, and, whatever adverse criticism may advance, they were indisputable.

His death made a profound impression on the whole community, not the least striking feature of which was the suddenness with which it had come to pass, for it could not have been apprehended three weeks earlier. The poor especially bore evidence to his charity and generosity; those who had intimate communication with him must have felt that they had lost a friend not to be replaced. His last hours had evoked only feelings of charity, while the undoubted service which he had rendered the country must, now that he was no more, have every where found recognition. Peace, it is true, had been proclaimed, but there were other difficulties, which the higher officials knew well had to be met, when his ability would be missed. The sorrow shewn, when his remains were placed in the church vault, was as genuine and as deeply felt as in every sense it deserved to be.

De Frontenac's character, looked at with the breadth that history admits of, cannot fail to command respect from nearly every point of view at which it may be regarded. His

* I allude to the offensive commentary on his funeral sermon in MS. attributed to M. l'Abbé de la Tour.

memory has been assailed by the admirers of the men he opposed, and by those who favour the ecclesiastical pretensions and school of theology, which, de Frontenac neither in his personal, nor official relations would countenance. Their censure takes the form of assailing characteristics held secondary in the career of a public man. He has been accused of extravagant pretensions to power, of the adoption of a policy for his private ends, of violence of temper, and of an exaction of personal consideration without true dignity. Even if these faults be conceded, he still stands forth the most prominent of French Governors. If he personally exacted what was due to his position, it was in accordance with the feeling of his time, and sprang equally from the conviction of its political necessity. Personally, he had no exaggerated theories of his own dignity. It is also urged that he was unscrupulous in pursuit of his objects. It was not an age delicate on points of conscience, but his whole career furnishes the proof, that, in the policy followed by him, it was not his private interest he consulted. The great stain against his name is the ruthless massacres which he authorized.*

His conduct on these occasions in no way sprang from a cruel or revengeful nature; it was calculated on the emergency which he had to meet, and may be attributed to the school in which he was reared, the maxim of war then recognized being that anything whatever that caused disaster to an enemy was permissible.† His nature was genial and kindly. With those who served under him, there was implicit confi-

* It is an act of justice to de Frontenac's memory to point out, that this system of destructive war, was at that date a recognized principle of inflicting injury on an enemy. Thus, the great Duke of Marlborough, in no way marked by cruelty, and whose humanity in the care of the wounded, was a strong feature in his character, a few days previous to the crushing defeat of the French and Bavarians at Blenheim, wrote to his wife on the 30th July, 1704: "We send this morning three thousand horse to his [the Elector of Bavaria's] chief city of Munich, with orders to burn and destroy all the country about it. This is so contrary to my nature, that nothing but absolute necessity could have obliged me to consent to it, since these poor people suffer for their master's ambition."

Bohn's Coxe's Marlborough I., p. 183.

† "Tout ce qui nuit à l'ennemi."

dence in his conduct, courage, and consideration of their just rights. There was never doubt or hesitation when he was present, and the success of his government may be attributed to his own energy and ability. He was invariably affable. He had the happy faculty of always saying what was right and proper. There is in his correspondence a dignity of language well worthy of imitation, and in the justification of his acts and policy, he always writes with modesty and force. He found Canada on the verge of ruin. For nine years, in the midst of war, with feeble resources, with limited assistance from France, embarrassed often by impracticable schemes which had their origin at Versailles, he upheld the power confided to him, and retrieved the Province from the calamities threatening to overwhelm her, and even obtained a prestige over the rival English colonies in excess of the strength which he could bring into the field. He did not gain this result at the expense of the system of Government which he administered. Property was secured, justice rendered between man and man, law enforced, and no one, whatever his position, was allowed to oppress the people.

His second government had a different character from that of his first term of office. On the first occasion, his position and authority as Governor were disputed by Duchesneau the Intendant, sustained in his efforts by M. de Laval. The members of the Council were encouraged to act in opposition to him. The antagonism which he experienced from the Abbé de Fénelon and M. Perrot forced him into the assertion of his position. In the second period of his office, no such personal difficulties presented themselves. The disagreement with Bishop de Saint Vallier had its origin in de Frontenac intervening to prevent the undue exercise of ecclesiastical authority, at variance with the laws of France. He had no personal interest in the controversy; from the desire alone of protecting an individual, whom he held to be unjustly assailed, and from the conviction that the course pursued by the Council was dangerous as a precedent, he assumed responsibilities which common natures would have avoided. The records

establish the ability and judgment, joined with moderation, which he showed on the occasion.

Whatever the Intendant might write to France concerning the Governor, de Champigny treated him with habitual courtesy and deference. One point at issue between them arose, with regard to the policy to be observed as to the Indians of the West. De Frontenac's view was to hold possession of the country by *coureurs de bois*; he looked upon their presence as a confirmation of French authority. He knew that the French laboured under the disadvantage of selling goods dearer than the English, and likewise that the Indians were sensible of the fact. Accordingly, he desired to see the station at Michilimackinac well attended, so that the trade would be more general, and more advantageous to the Indian. His theory was to extend the number of such posts. The Intendant would have limited them to Michilimackinac and Saint Joseph, and only have permitted a certain number of French to reside there; none of whom were to be allowed to trade on their own account, and he desired to regulate everything from Quebec.

De Frontenac's main policy was to exclude the Albany traders from all relationship with the Western Indians. A large force of *coureurs de bois* on an emergency could be gathered to prevent such traders obtaining any foothold. For any expedition from Albany to have succeeded, it must have been formed on so extensive a scale, as to have almost made it impossible. These wanderers, on their appearance at Montreal, were a troublesome population. De Callières, who had seen much of them under their worst features, was desirous of reducing their number, and to some extent supported the views of the Intendant. De Champigny was much influenced in his opinions by the missionaries, who saw in the presence of these men interference with their own labours. One of his arguments was, that they injured the cause of religion. De Champigny was invariably the supporter of the Bishop's opinions, whatever form they assumed. He was desirous of seeing a firm hold gained by the Church on the government,

and the tone of life of the community, at whatever cost to its general policy.

It is the misfortune of humanity, from time to time, to find in every creed extravagant pretensions to control much, which, if ecclesiastics are wise, they will only reprove, when called upon by circumstances justifying the attitude they may assume; when acting in the spirit of right they make contradiction difficult. The majority of men, certainly those who have been students of history, will not accept an impossible standard of life. They see little to be commended, in the reproof of that which is in itself but gaiety and lightheartedness, and they experience a revulsion of feeling when ordinary events and duties are complicated by religious observances. There is always a recoil from these extravagances, and there are few acts in public life which more tend to make the judicious grieve.

In the French Canada of that date, some of the religious authorities claimed to be all dominant. The power of the ecclesiastics was great, and few risked the penalty of the weight of their displeasure. The obloquy cast on de Frontenac's name has arisen from his vindication of a sound public policy freed from this influence.* De Frontenac sincerely believed in the truth of the creed which he professed. As the Recollets confined themselves to their religious ministrations, and were marked by no political aspirations, their order was the one to

* A contemporary writer, La Motte Cadillac [Vol. VII., MS. Par. Lib., pp. 56-67], 28th September, 1694, speaks of de Frontenac, viewed from this standing point: "He would have had less difficulty if he had not abolished a "hieriche," a house constructed by the Seminary of Montreal to imprison young girls of profligate life; if he had permitted them to take soldiers, and assign them officers to tear away at midnight wives from the side of their husbands on account of their having been at a bal or masque, and in this "hieriche" to scourge them (*fesser*) till blood came; if he had in no way protested against the curés, who went their rounds with soldiers to oblige women and girls to go to their homes at nine o'clock; if he had been willing that there should be a prohibition against wearing lace, and if he had said nothing when the communion was refused to women of quality for wearing a "Fontanges;" if he had not opposed the excommunications which were scattered broadcast; if he had only appointed his officers in accordance with the views of the communities . . . he would soon have been on the list of saints, for they are cheaply canonized in this country."

which he gave his confidence and support. His own view was, that government required a strong hand, but it should be that of the State ; such was the character of his own administration. There was no political representation ; legislation emanated from the authorities. The Council acted as a Court to adjudicate on matters submitted to them. The powers of the Governor in fact really depended upon the will of the King ; but any ordinance issued by the Governor, until disallowed by the monarch, was supreme. The promulgation of a law constituted its legality. All police regulations were matters of proclamation. There was restriction in every direction of life. No one could leave Canada without a pass ; no one could proceed from one locality to another in the Colony without a permit. Men were liable, on every occasion of necessity, to be drafted from their farms, to serve on an expedition without pay, being allowed only their rations, and furnished to some extent with clothing and with arms. There was no specie ; all payments were made in paper. There was little of individual freedom ; men were ordered arbitrarily to support their parents and to pay sums of money to younger brothers and sisters ; families were forbidden to sell a gun, unless every member of the family, including the son of fourteen years old, and their servants possessed fire-arms ; a servant leaving a family in which he had engaged to serve, or who failed to show proper respect, was compelled bare-headed and on his knees to ask pardon for his trespass ; the value of gold coins was established by ordinance ; men placed in offices of position had to undergo an examination as to their lives, manners and orthodoxy ; judges were ordered to visit the mills constantly to note if there were proper scales and weights ; the price of bread was determined, each loaf had to be marked with its weight ; there was a regulated price for wine ; pigs found running loose in Quebec were confiscated to the *religieuses* of the Hotel Dieu.

In a system of government of this kind, the character of the Governor must ever be the important feature, to control both social and political events. During the second period

of de Frontenac's rule, the country was beset by danger and difficulty. In every trial de Frontenac successfully coped with the perils he had to meet; keeping the Province in its integrity uninjured, even extending its limits; dispensing to the inhabitants as much security as it was possible to give, while he successfully defended Canada from outward attack. It is impossible not to recognize the commanding ability, patriotism, and even genius, which marked his career.

Charlevoix has left his epitaph in a few words, "After all, New France owed to him all that she was at the time of his death, and the people soon perceived the great void he had left behind him."*

* "Après tout, la Nouvelle France lui devoit tout ce qu'elle étoit à sa mort, et l'on s'aperçut bientôt du grand vuide qu'il y laissoit." Liv. II., XVII., p. 237.

BOOK VI.

ACADIA TO THE PEACE OF RYSWICK.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF DE CALLIÈRES AND
DE VAUDREUIL, 1698-1725.

CHAPTER I.

I have now to describe the events which took place in Acadia, from the date of de Frontenac entering upon his second government in 1689. His operations were not confined to Canadian interests; he saw likewise the importance of shewing activity in Acadia, to retain the Micmacs and Abenakis in their allegiance to France, and to confirm them irreconcilably in their enmity to New England.

I have stated that early in 1690 three expeditions were organized by him. One from Montreal to Schenectady has been described. I have to relate those which left Three Rivers and Quebec. The destination of both was Acadia. The party which left three Rivers was not numerically large. It consisted of fifty-two men, half of whom were French; the remainder with the exception of five Algonquins were Abenakis, and were under the command of Francois de Hertel; three of his sons served under him. The party was two months on the march before reaching the spot attacked. The leaders started with no particular destination in view; their mission was to destroy, and they were to trust to some favourable opportunity which should offer. In the territory which they were approaching, every Abenaki Indian they met was a friend, and a foe to those against whom they were advancing. The Abenakis had been confirmed in this sentiment by Father Thury and the two Bigots; consequently, the French expedition was certain of receiving intelligence of any movement unfavourable to it, in time to guard against, or avoid its evil influence.

Surprise must be felt at the conduct of Massachusetts in this emergency. Years were required for her people to learn that war is an art to be studied, and to be conducted according to acknowledged principles; that it is a condition in which

caution should never slumber, and where prudence and foresight will often supply the place of numbers; and that without discipline and well considered combinations, great qualities lead only to the sacrifice of those distinguished by them. On the American continent this estimate of military capacity is still far from being generally recognized. Twelve months had not passed, since, from want of ordinary precaution, Fort Pemaquid had been taken, and the memory of the disaster at Dover was yet fresh. Nevertheless, the opinion prevailed that mere courage, or, in some cases, the affirmation of its possession, was sufficient to constitute a soldier. Disaster upon disaster happened to New England, owing to this unfortunate belief; and it was on these occasions that the best and bravest of her sons were sent forward to be slaughtered.

After long wandering about in search of a locality where an attack could be safely made, de Hertel heard that Salmon Falls was open to attack. The place is now known as Berwick, in New Hampshire, seven miles from the present town of Portsmouth, then called Piscataqua from the river of that name, at the mouth of which it is situate, and even then a place of importance. De Hertel, after his descent of the Kennebec, had long prowled about before he found his prey, for he only arrived at Salmon Falls on the 27th of March.

The settlers were grouped about the river. The place contained two picket forts, constructed for protection against Indian attack. One of the houses was also large and capable of being fortified; no watch was kept, and it may be said that surprise was invited. De Hertel divided his party into three small squads, and in the first grey of the morning when every one was sleeping, the attack was made. There was no time to collect the slightest force for defence; what resistance was made was of no avail. It was simply to defer the victim's death for a few seconds, for he was overpowered by numbers. All found in the houses were killed, shot, or cut down by the tomahawk. They numbered thirty persons, men and women,

old and young. The party of de Hertel spread itself through the small settlement, laying waste its whole extent. All the houses and barns were burned : Salmon Falls ceased to exist. Twenty-seven houses and two thousand head of cattle are said to have been destroyed ; fifty-seven persons, old and young men, women and children, were carried away as prisoners.

The Canadians rapidly retreated, and had not proceeded far on their route, when as usual, the Indians brought them news of what was being done. The destruction of Salmon Falls had been reported at Portsmouth ; in consequence, a force had been rapidly organized and was advancing to attack them. De Hertel placed himself on the bank of what is now the Wooster river. In front of him was a stream only to be crossed by a long narrow bridge, in itself establishing that no ford was to be found in the vicinity. The party in pursuit, consisting of one hundred and forty men, attempted to pass from the opposite side of the stream ; they were received by a continual fire. Two of the Portsmouth party were killed, eight wounded. The skirmish continued until dark, when de Hertel retreated safely, to reach an Abenaki village. A Frenchman and an Indian on his side were killed ; the eldest son of de Hertel was wounded by a musket ball in the thigh. Three days later, the scouts he sent out reported that they had met three men from New England on their trail, and killed them. There is no English account of this loss.

Intelligence could always be obtained at an Abenaki village, and on his arrival de Hertel was informed that, a few hours previously, a French party had passed onwards towards Casco Bay. He determined at once to join it. He sent his nephew Gatineau with twelve men to escort the prisoners to Canada. His son, he left at the village to recover from his wound. He despatched de Maugras with five Algonquins to the Saint Francis mission. The latter were never heard of.

The expedition, of the presence of which he had been informed, had left Quebec in the last days of January, under the command of de Portneuf, the third son of M. de Becan-

cour. His cousin de Courtemanche de Repentigny was his lieutenant. It consisted of fifty French and Canadians, and sixty Abenakis from the Chaudière. Like de Hertel, they were to depend upon the information which they could obtain, as the guide to future operations. De Hertel joined de Portneuf; nothing however was undertaken during April and May. A reconnaissance was made on the Quinibecqui, where they met some Indians, who reported that they had had a skirmish with the English in which they killed six of them. Finally, de Portneuf received intelligence, which led him to believe that there was a probability of making a successful attempt on the settlement of Falmouth in Casco Bay, now the city of Portland, known by the French from the Indian corruption of the true name Koskebee. Everything promised success. The fort, "Fort Loyall," * had been constructed on a high point of ground on Falmouth neck, not far from the river Casco. A village of a few houses had grown up, with a mill and a meeting-house. Three small outlying block-houses had been constructed for additional protection. For about two or three thousand feet, the land along the river had been cleared; to the north the settlement was skirted by the forest. The fort, mounted with eight pieces of cannon, earlier in the year had been garrisoned by Captain Willard and one hundred men. Contradictory accounts are given why this force had been removed; but the fact is established, that by an order from the Massachusetts Legislature, Captain Willard and a part of his force were withdrawn. There is a letter extant from Sylvanus Davis, who subsequently took command, asking that "the town may not bee deserted." The Indian scouts had learned the unprotected condition of the settlement, and intelligence of the design to attack it was sent to the Abenakis and Canabas, with a summons to attend. On the 25th

* Fort Loyall was constructed at the foot of Broad, now called India street, on the south side of Fore Street, in the present city of Portland. The high ground removed to admit of the construction of the Grand Trunk station was, generally speaking, about thirty feet above the present level. Siege and Capture of Fort Loyall, by John T. Hull. Printed by order of the City Council.

of May, the several parties came together within four miles of the fort.

All the force in Falmouth, available for defence consisted of one hundred men, mainly occupied in the cultivation of the land. As settlers, they had a large number of women and children. With few exceptions, they were not enlisted men, and discipline in the military sense of the word in no way existed. Captain Sylvanus Davis, a man engaged in trade and owning a store in the village, was in command, and during the four days siege conducted the defence.

On the morning of the 26th, two Frenchmen and two Indians of de Hertel's force, killed a Scotchman named Robert Greason, living four miles from Casco. His family, seeking protection in the fort, gave the first notice of the presence of the enemy. The few soldiers and men of the place gathered in the fort and block-houses, and the Canadians, seeing that their presence was known, made preparations for the attack. Thirty men, under Lieutenant Thaddeus Clarke, were sent forward to reconnoitre. As they advanced towards a lane where the Canadians had concealed themselves in ambush, they suspected that there was danger in their front, as the cattle would not enter the wood as was their custom. The few men passed on through the open, towards a fence where de Portneuf's men were concealed. The Canadians waited to receive them until within a few yards' distance, when they fired. Half of the thirty fell, some dead, some mortally wounded, among the former Lieutenant Clarke. The attacking force rushed on the survivors, four only of whom reached the fort, all wounded. Some Canadians who pursued them were exposed to the fire from the fort, by which one was killed and one wounded.

The orders given by de Frontenac to de Portneuf, had strictly forbidden him to attack any fortified place, and in that way risk the loss of men. So the day passed without anything being attempted. On the side of the defenders the block-houses were abandoned, and the whole of those present in the settlement took refuge in the fort, including women and

children, to the number of two hundred. The number of fighting men was seventy.

The writer of the French narrative* of the occurrence has stated that the fort was besieged in the regular form of approach, and that trenches and parallels were rapidly run up, in order that the palisades could be threatened with fire. This statement of a fact, impossible under the circumstances in which it is narrated, has been followed by modern writers. No such proceeding could have taken place. On the 26th the Canadians came upon the ground, and the sortie of the thirty men was made. On the night of the 26th the fort was called upon to surrender. The answer was given that it would be defended to the death. "Our people," says de Monseignat, "lay during the night of the twenty-sixth and the twenty-seventh on the beach, within fifty paces of the fort, under cover of a very bold bluff, so that they had no fear of the enemy's continual cannonadings and heavy fire of musketry." On the night of the 28th the fort was again called upon to capitulate. The narrative supplies us with the rapid succession of events. The demand was to surrender fort, stores and provisions, under promise of quarter. Six days were asked to consider the summons. The night only was granted. In the meantime, the attempt had been made, by collecting materials from the houses, with the addition of a barrel of tar which had been found, to set fire to the palisades surrounding the building which bore the name of a fort. This proceeding is evidently the approach alluded to. They had pushed forward this inflammable pile, on some carriage over the "fifty paces" distance from the spot where they had commenced it, protecting themselves from the fire of the beseigers in the advance, as best they were able, carrying the mass forward, to bring it in contact with the palisades, where it could be fired. Then the heart of the garrison failed them; they saw a body

* M. de Monseignat, Comptroller-General of Marine and Fortifications, a protégé of Madame de Maintenon, to whom his letters were addressed. N. Y. Col. Doc., IX., p. 471.

of four or five hundred men; all apparently Indians. In a few minutes this large, well-prepared mass of dry fuel, supplemented by the barrel of tar, would be lighted; and the commandant, who, a few hours before, had declared that he would defend himself to the death, hoisted the white flag of surrender.

The fort capitulated, the gate was opened, the commandant with seventy men, and several women and children, marched out. The majority of them, in accordance with the remorseless French policy of the day, were handed over to the Indians. The Commandant Davis, two daughters of Lieutenant Clarke killed on the 26th, and some others, were carried to Quebec.* On the following day, the 30th, the guns were spiked; the fort was burnt to its foundation; the houses which dotted over a mile and a half of ground, were given to the flames. On the 1st of June, de Portneuf, with the force, withdrew. Many of the prisoners had been immediately killed by the Indians, and their bodies left† where they fell. The remainder were carried off to a dreary captivity.

Monseignat, the writer of the French narrative, states, that a few hours after the surrender, four vessels from Massachusetts entered Casco Bay, with the object of relieving the fort, and that, seeing no English colours flying, they tacked about and sailed away. Some vessels, certainly, did appear, but they were not of the character supposed. They consisted of two sloops, with about fifty men, and two shallops, which, owing to news of the destruction of the place, had been sent from Portsmouth to learn the condition of Casco. They

* They formed the principal part of the prisoners exchanged with Phips after his unsuccessful attack. According to Mr. Hull, p. 82, some "could not resist the allurements of the Catholic Church." Vide ante p. 245.

† The bodies of the slain remained until 1692, when an expedition was sent to Pemaquid, under Church, to rebuild the fort. In the narrative of the operations it is stated, "in that way they stopped at Casco, and buried the bones of the dead people there." A note adds, "That is, the bones of those who had been destroyed there by the savages under the Sieur Hartel, 18th May, 1690."

Quoted by Mr. Hull, p. 80.

approached sufficiently near the shore to receive the fire of the attacking party, and to see the fort and village in ruins, and then returned to report what they had observed.*

Davis has given an account of his surrender. Although not a soldier, he was not deficient in courage and conduct. Placed in a position of danger in an advanced post of settlement, in order to hold the country and to defend it from attack, he was without resources to meet the emergency. His force was insufficient in number and character, and the "fort" was a mere palisaded building, sufficient to be a protection against an ordinary Indian attack. Davis was likewise without that higher determination and ability, by means of which, the dark hour of life is met and overcome, and he was paralyzed by the presence of women and children. His account is, that, believing the attacking force to be Indians, he asked if there were any Frenchmen among them. Those he addressed said that they were Frenchmen. The query was then made, whence they came? Would they extend quarter "for men, women and children, wounded and sound," and give them liberty to march to the next English town, with a guard for their defence, with this assurance they would surrender? "Also," continues Davis, "that the Governor of the French should hold up his hand, and swear by the great and ever-living God, that the several articles should be performed. All which he did solemnly swear." The terms of the capitulation were disgracefully broken.

Montcalm's fame, under circumstances more complicated, still suffers from the stain caused by the ruthless cruelty of this same tribe of Indians, sixty years later, on the surrender of Fort William Henry, at the head of Lake George. His conduct appears without a taint in comparison to that of de Portneuf, who, in violation of the terms he solemnly swore to maintain, remorselessly handed his prisoners over to the

* Letter dated Portsm^o, 2nd June, 22nd [May], 1690, signed by Charles ffrost, Nath^l ffryer, Ric^d Martyn. Vol. 36, p. 77, Mass. Archives. Quoted by Mr. Hull, pp. 88-89.

Indians of the expedition. In spite of de Portneuf's gallantry and resolution of character, his conduct on that day has left on his name the brand of infamy, not to be effaced.

When these events took place, Massachusetts had only indifferently recovered from the depression, which preceding events had caused. Her outer settlements had been attacked under circumstances when their destruction was almost certain. Her smaller craft had suffered from the cruisers and privateers, which found refuge in Port Royal. She could command little money, and was not in a condition to meet the cost of a contest, to a great extent forced upon her. The Province was still suffering from the effect of King Philip's war, and the attack on her northern frontier; and the loss of Pemaquid should have taught her public men, that settlement, even south of the Kennebec, was accompanied by positive danger. The principle of placing efficient garrisons under able men, enforcing discipline, was no doubt, advocated by many of the more elderly, who remembered the first founders of the colony; men who to severe manners united the qualities of the statesman, while many were capable of ably directing troops in the field, and were true leaders of men. Massachusetts was, moreover, impressed with the conviction that her strength was on the sea, and relied, for a certain and unfailing resource, on her population engaged in the fisheries.

Great irritation was felt at the destruction of Salmon Falls. The Indians who were present were considered as having been encouraged by Port Royal, and the place was looked upon as the spot, where the French privateers found refuge, and obtained provisions. The determination was formed, to send an expedition to destroy it. No ulterior policy was contemplated, in order to make the conquest permanent; and no steps were taken to do so. To judge by what took place, the enterprise may be regarded, as an act of retaliation for what happened in March, at Salmon Falls. Seven vessels were obtained, a frigate of 40 guns, two sloops of 16 and 18 guns, with four smaller vessels. They were manned by two hundred and eighty seamen, with the addition of four hundred men

drawn from the militia, and the whole were placed under the command of Sir William Phips.

Phips' principal quality was his desperate, unflinching courage, and his excellent seamanship. As one chosen to carry out an enterprise, calling simply for unswerving fortitude, he could not have been surpassed. He had scarcely a single qualification for the higher duties of a general: statesmanship, power of combination, readiness of resource in a crisis affecting masses of men, came in no way within his powers. The two enterprises identified with his name shew capacity for the minor duties of his position, blended with an inability even to understand what is called for, in one placed in command. At eighteen, he was a labourer on a farm, and could neither read nor write. He took to the sea and became a ship-carpenter, and was afterwards established at Boston. He had heard, that there was a Spanish galleon wrecked on the coast of one of the West India Islands, and became impressed with the feeling that the treasure could be recovered. He had married a widow of means, and was thus enabled to appear in England full of the project, which he sustained with a rude eloquence. Furnished with a vessel, he sailed to the scene of the venture. There was a mutiny on board, which he resolutely quelled, and, although from the unsafe condition of the vessel, he was forced to abandon the search, he did not leave those seas until he had gained the full information which he considered would lead to future success. Such proved to be the case. He obtained another ship, and, in a second voyage, discovered the treasure. He behaved well in all the relations connected with it. He was knighted, and such was the impression made by him in London that, subsequently, he was appointed Governor of Massachusetts.

The expedition under Phips on the 19th of May arrived at Port Royal, of which De Meneval was in command with a garrison of between sixty and eighty men. The fortifications were without importance, the cannon not even mounted. De Meneval, nevertheless, summoned the inhabitants to his aid, and called upon them to retire within the fort to prepare

for defence; only a few accepted the invitation. The majority advised that the fort should be abandoned, and that the population should retire up the river, where the New Englanders could not follow. De Meneval accepted this view; and steps were being taken to place provisions and property in a brigantine lying near the wharf, when Father Petit, a priest who had been long in Acadia, came upon the scene. He was accompanied by a younger priest named Trouvé. Petit was at this time sixty-one years of age, and, although a Frenchman by birth, was a priest of the Quebec Seminary, having been ordained twenty years, eleven of which had been passed in Acadia.*

In his view, this course would not better matters, and he persuaded de Meneval that it was useless to attempt anything against such a force, with the power of resistance which he possessed; and he offered to arrange as to the terms of surrender. On the receipt of Phips' summons, Father Petit proceeded to his ship. It was agreed that the garrison with their arms and baggage should be sent to France, that the inhabitants should remain in the enjoyment of their property, and that the Church should be respected. Thus, while private property should in every case be left untouched, public property would be ceded. De Meneval himself went on board Phips' vessel to ratify these conditions. During the time he was absent, some French soldiers forced their way into the public store-house, in which a quantity of property had been placed, some portion of it belonging to private individuals. On this proceeding being made known to Phips, he declined to ratify the terms of the capitulation, on the ground that a part of this property was carried off and concealed, and doubtless there was an attempt to obtain possession of that which was valuable; but be the facts what they may, Phips' conduct was certainly very discreditable. He had not the excuse of being driven by the emergency of the situation, to do what was unworthy of himself and his flag, for his force

* On his return to Acadia, he there remained until 1700; he died in the Seminary of Quebec in 1709. *Æt.* 80.

was overwhelming. He landed a large body of men and arrested the Governor, the priests, and many of the soldiers, to carry them prisoners to Boston. He plundered the houses. The Church was robbed of its ornaments, the altar destroyed, the images broken ; while useless, offensive insults were indulged in, shewing the petty malignity of those who committed them. Phips may not have been responsible for this contemptible conduct, for the discipline of New England was always loose and bad ; but the non-observance of the terms of the capitulation and the hard treatment of the prisoners were his own acts. There was this redeeming feature : none of the settlers, none of the garrison were killed in cold blood after the action. Massachusetts had no Abenaki Indians to whom the captives could be given over. But, the outrage in another direction, was not less reprehensible, and no writer of credit can vindicate or explain it away.

The inhabitants were called upon to take an oath of allegiance to William and Mary, and, contingent on so doing, the enjoyment of their liberties was promised. The English flag was hoisted. Such of the French settlers as would not accept the new order of things were pillaged. A council was formed from the inhabitants, and Chevalier, a sergeant of the garrison, was made its president. The council was bound by oath, to carry out the law under the Crown of England, and the Government of Massachusetts. Nobody was to be persecuted for his religion.

Phips sailed for Boston, but, previous to his departure from Port Royal he sent one of his captains, Alden, to take possession of Saint Castin's place on the Penobscot, and of La Have. There was no opposition at either place ; he next proceeded to Chedabucto, where the fort was garrisoned by fourteen men, under Captain Montorgueil. For a time some resistance was experienced, but it could not be effective against the force sent. The garrison obtained honourable conditions of surrender, one of which was that they were to be conveyed to Placentia, Newfoundland. The fort was destroyed, but the settlers were left unharmed. The property

of the Fishing Company was seized, and their loss by the attack was estimated by them at fifty thousand crowns.

Phips arrived at Boston on the 30th of May, 1690, the day when the New England settlements at Fort Loyall were being destroyed, and the captives slaughtered. He had with him as prisoners, de Meneval, the priests Petit and Trouvé, with fifty-nine soldiers. The conquest of Acadia had been made. No attempt to take possession of the territory followed; indeed, it is questionable if Massachusetts had the strength to engage in any operation involving political responsibility. On the main coast, her forts had been unable to resist attack, her settlers had been surprised, to be killed or carried away into captivity, their houses burned, and whole settlements extirpated. By extending her operations to Acadia at Port Royal, Massachusetts would have widened the area of her government, possibly for the history of Salmon Falls and Fort Loyall to be repeated. The expedition had ended in Phips sailing away, with what money and booty he could carry off. With this fact to guide us, how are we to estimate the project of the attack on Quebec in October of the same year? It may be, that it was fortunate for those engaged in it, that it failed. We have before us the policy, if such it can be called, of Massachusetts, in the successful attack against Acadia. In no way, did her government enforce her hold of the country, which conquest had placed in her grasp. With moderate aid from England, it was in the power of Massachusetts, to have made Acadia as English, as New Hampshire or Connecticut. By holding it in possession and colonizing it, French attack on the frontier settlements on the Atlantic Coast would have been greatly moderated, if not totally checked.

We have de Meneval's account of what took place.* He describes Phips on landing as being greatly angered, at having granted such favourable terms, to a force so little capable of resisting him. He relates, how the place was plundered, and

* *Mémoire présentée à M. de Ponchartrain par M. de Meneval.* 6 avril, 1691. *Quebec Doc. II.*, p. 40.

himself robbed of his clothes and five hundred pistoles. At Boston he was confined in the same house with the priests, but he was allowed no intercourse with them; while the soldiers were thrown into prison. Not even a shirt was allowed him.* During the three months that Phips remained in Boston, previous to his departure for Quebec, de Meneval's appeal to the Council against Phips' want of faith failed to obtain any hearing, owing to the strong feeling of the body of the people on the subject. Subsequently, it was entertained by the Council, who, according to de Meneval, were desirous of doing him justice, but were deterred by Phips from interfering. All they could promise was to submit the matter to London.

The soldiers were released, and were allowed to work for their bread. Some of his money, and the worst portion of de Meneval's clothes were returned to him, and he obtained a passport to proceed to London; but he was constantly thwarted by Phips in his endeavour to obtain a passage. Finally, he succeeded, and had taken his place on a vessel, when he was arrested. Owing to the intervention of the Council he was released. On Phips' return from his unsuccessful attempt on Quebec, he strove to influence the common people to have de Meneval again arrested; but in this design he was opposed by the respectable classes. Phips shortly after left for London, to explain his failure before Quebec, and there was then no opposition to the departure of de Meneval. He obtained a passage on a small vessel which, under pretence of leaving for England, was proceeding to France in the interest of Dongan, who, from his personal and religious relations, had little sympathy with the revolution, and desired personally to establish himself in France.†

Phips has been represented, as one deserving to hold a distinguished place in history. He was in many respects an uncommon man; he had energy, and, within the field of his

* "Sans leur vouloir rendre seulement une chemise de toutes les hardes qu'il leur avoit prises." p. 41.

† Memoir of de Meneval to de Ponchartrain, 6th April, 1691 [Quebec Doc., II., p. 43], by which it would appear that Dongan had remained in New York, and had not returned to England on his recall.

capabilities, self-reliance. His patriotism was sincere and honest, and his political life was undoubtedly consistent; but his influence was unfortunate. He caused only discredit and disgrace, and a large amount of debt to his native country, to which he was sincerely devoted. The record of events, except in the one quality which he possessed, in common with many humble men who sailed under him, that of undaunted courage, does not obtain for him all that has been claimed.

A few days after Phips' departure from Port Royal, on the 14th of June, a French vessel, the "Union," arrived with merchandise, provisions, arms, and presents for the Indians, and with ten soldiers for the garrison. De Villebon and an engineer officer named Saccardie were likewise on board. The knowledge that Phips, with a powerful squadron, was in Acadian waters, suggested to de Villebon that he was unsafe where he was, and that he should proceed to the Saint John and ascend that river to fortify himself at Jemseg. Perrot, the former Governor, and des Goutins, the judge, accompanied him from Port Royal. On their arrival at the Saint John, the vessel was detained by the tide and a contrary wind. De Villebon, anxious not to lose time, accompanied by some of his men, went up the river to Jemseg.

While in this situation two privateers, who were hovering on the coast, attacked the French vessel, having followed her from Port Royal. They had committed much devastation at that place, taking what plunder they could lay their hands on. They destroyed nearly thirty houses, and further, hanged two of the inhabitants, who would not disclose their wealth, as a terror to the others. They seized this vessel at the Saint John and made prisoners of those remaining in her. Perrot they personally illtreated in order to obtain his money, for he had made a large fortune by the fisheries and traffic. The vessel was subsequently taken by a French filibuster, by which means Perrot obtained his release.*

* Charlevoix in his eighth letter to the Duchesse de les Diguères, 20th of March, 1721, speaks of Perrot's daughters as women of great distinction. Mme. la Comtesse de la Roche-Allard, et la Presidente de Lubert; so he must have carried his wealth to Paris.

De Villebon retired to Jemseg, exerting himself to keep the Indians faithful to France. Subsequently, he proceeded to Quebec, and was one of those who stood by the side of de Frontenac on the day of his memorable reply to Phips. He returned to France, by the vessel which bore to Versailles the record of de Frontenac's success. In July, 1691, he was again at Quebec. In September, accompanied by de Bonaventure, he reached Port Royal, whence he proceeded to the Saint John; he there heard of a New England vessel being on the coast; concealing the position of his own ship until she appeared, he gave chase and captured her. Colonel Edward Tyng, lately appointed Governor of Port Royal was on board. He had visited Port Royal, and seeing that there was no protection against the Indians, the inhabitants not being willing to aid in the defence of the place, he was returning to Boston, but previous to doing so, was visiting the Saint John. With him was John Nelson, a nephew of Sir William Temple, a prominent citizen of Boston, who had accompanied Tyng, to advise him in his Government of Nova Scotia, of which he possessed some knowledge. There was also a merchant named Alden. The latter was permitted to return to Boston, on condition that the fifty-three men taken at Port Royal should be surrendered to de Villebon. Alden subsequently arrived at the Saint John in a brigantine. De Frontenac reported* that Alden landed only six of the men, on the plea that the remainder were not desirous of returning, and that he had tried to kidnap de Villebon. Alden's son had also been made prisoner, and with Tyng and Nelson was sent to Canada. There were several English prisoners in Quebec, and to save the colony the expense of maintaining them they were sent to France; Tyng was included in the number, and shortly after died there. Nelson, who was to play an important part in the history of those days, remained at Quebec.

De Villebon hauled down the English flag, and re-established French rule in Port Royal; but he had not sufficient force to garrison it. He and his brother de Portneuf accord-

* 15th of September, 1692. N. Y. Doc. IX., p. 531.

ingly went to Jemseg; he had only fifty soldiers, and with this force he was expected to keep possession of Acadia. His trust was in the Indians, but he found them unsettled and dissatisfied. In December, 1690, six of the Chiefs had agreed to a five months' truce with New England, and in May were to make an exchange of prisoners. The French missionaries, however, had not been idle, and the old Indian ferocity and jealousies had been successfully awakened. In June, they had been induced to attack Wells, a settlement north of the Piscataqua, and had been driven off. On the failure of the enterprise, they had wandered about, committing ravages as opportunity offered, carrying terror through the advanced settlements.

De Villebon entered into communication with Thury, who was with the Indians of the Penobscot, engaged in his religious duties, counselling war and massacre, and even accompanying the Indians in their expeditions. It was resolved between them that an attack should be made on York. The very condition of de Villebon's appointment, was that he should ravage the English settlements. The few Frenchmen with him were to be employed in no other way, and de Villebon was to show an example of his devotion by energetically carrying out his instructions. The Abenakis were to be turned to war as an occupation, to obtain for themselves a better subsistence than by the chase.* At this juncture, some effort was necessary to awaken their hostile feelings, and to strengthen their dependence on France; the safest policy for this end was to create in them an unconquerable hate to New England, so that they would have the conviction that their only safety lay in French support.

With this view the attack was determined on. Powder and shot were freely given, at the same time that Father Thury was delivering his religious exhortations, to strike down their

* Le Roy au Sieur Villebon, Versailles, avril, 1692, "affin que les Canibas ne s'employent qu'à la guerre et que par l'économie de ce que vous avez à leur fournir, ils y puissent trouver leur subsistance et plus d'avantage qu'à la chasse." Que. Doc. II., p. 83.

enemies. The party consisted of one hundred and fifty Abenakis, their number being increased by some Kennebec Indians. They left the Penobscot in January, and on the 4th of February, they reached York, a collection of houses along the coast, extending to the banks of a small river a few miles north of Piscataqua. The population consisted of something over three hundred souls; the principal among them being their minister, Dummer, who lived on the coast. Some of the houses were imperfectly fortified.

As dawn approached the snow began to fall thickly, and the assailants prepared to carry out their purpose. They had remained in the forest all night without fire, to avoid detection, and their blood was so stagnant with cold, that any movement was a relief. As they cautiously went forward, they were led by the sound of an axe to where a young boy had commenced chopping. They seized him and after gaining what information they were able, killed him. They continued in silence to the outskirts of the village, and when all was ready, they rushed forward in a body with their war whoop. Dummer, in the act of mounting his horse, was shot dead at his own door. One of the fortified houses, in which were only women, was at once taken. The ordinary houses were entered, their inmates killed. Those who were able to do so made for the four fortified houses, and prepared to defend themselves. The Indians did not approach them. They scattered themselves over the other dwellings, and killed all within them, pillaged them of their contents, and then burned them. They killed the horses and cattle, and passed over the ground, to destroy everything in the form of civilized life, in the circuit of the few miles round the place. The French accounts give one hundred killed, including the women and children, while eighty were taken into captivity. The English accounts give forty-eight killed, and seventy-three carried away. The Indians allowed some aged women and some children, from three to seven years old, to return to one of the fortified houses.

The Abenakis under French leaders had again destroyed an unprotected settlement, left without means of defence. It

was no new event in Massachusetts, but no proper steps were taken for the defence of the population. The men in authority in New England were impotent to provide a remedy. It is they who were really responsible for these disasters, and they are accused by modern United States writers of "closing their ears against the piteous appeals for assistance that came from those they should have protected." *

The contrast between Canada and New England in the selection of men for duty, and in the possession of defined views is striking. In Canada those best able for their work were chosen. They had youth, energy, and courage, and had been taught to consider every proceeding to be fair for the assertion of French power; that those who had intruded on French soil, strangers, foreigners, aliens in language and faith, had no claim to consideration as human beings, but should be held as wild beasts to be hunted to extermination, or their return made impossible by death or captivity. Hard, remorseless to the very depths of cruelty as this policy was, its execution was assigned to men who felt pride that it had been entrusted to them; who cheerfully bore privation, who patiently sought for, and waited for their opportunity, who were foremost in the attack, and who could be relied on for their devotion, intelligence and courage. All these partisan leaders, lay and clerical, must be recognized as well chosen instruments. D'Iberville, de Portneuf, de Contrecoeur, de Villebon, de Villieu, the two Jesuits Bigot, the Seminary Priest Thury, were men of ability, and on that account selected.

In Massachusetts it was the reverse. Men obtained prominent positions from their wealth, their political importance, their relationships; and nearly every scheme undertaken by Massachusetts failed in its purpose. Her sturdy population were ready to fight for their territory, their nationality, their Protestantism. They had passed through no slight tribulation. King Philip's war had been serious teaching for them. It was plain that north of the Piscataqua the Indian was a treacherous foe; nevertheless settlement was pushed forward regardless

* Siege and capture of Fort Loyall. John T. Hull, p. 79.

of consequences. To the individual, isolated from his fellows little protection could be given ; but where communities had been formed, some effort might have been made by sending the right men to enforce watchfulness and care. With organization, prudence and discipline, the valour of the settlers defending their homes would have repelled every attack. There was only reckless indifference, without any directing power to turn the courage of the inhabitants to account. The men sent from Boston, as a rule, were incompetent and from their ignorance irresolute. A proper organization on the part of Massachusetts, leaders of vigour and character being selected, would have rendered any attack from the Abenakis on an armed community, impracticable.

CHAPTER II.

De Villebon at an early date* pointed out that had New England obtained peace with the Indians, after Port Royal had been taken, Canada would have been exposed to extreme danger, from the facility of reaching Quebec by the Saint John, a march of from ten to twelve days; and that New England would have been constantly informed of the state of Canada, and the force available to defend it. On the other hand, the enmity of the Abenakis injuriously affected New England; they prevented fishermen entering ports to get wood and water, or to obtain shelter in bad weather; but had the English obtained a foothold in Port Royal, they would easily have attracted the Indians to trade with them, and have influenced them to abandon French interests. The principle by which Acadia was to be held by the French, was that the hostility of the Abenakis should be constantly kept at fever heat, and the doctrine laid down by the French King acted upon, that they were to find the plunder of a settlement more profitable than the labours of the chase. The destruction of Wells was determined upon. There had been an attack on this place by the Chief Moxus, with two hundred men, but it had been foiled by the resolute conduct of the defenders.

After the massacre at York the Abenakis had retired to their villages to enjoy their spoil. De Villebon was then on the Saint John, completing the fort of Naxouat,† opening up by these means, communication between Acadia and Canada. When April came, and the rivers were free from ice, the chiefs, with a hundred of the warriors, attended, to receive presents and praise. There were congratulations and

* 12th October, 1691. N. Y. Doc. IX., p. 506.

† Opposite the site of the present City of Fredericton.

feasting, and it was agreed, that a rendezvous should be held at de Saint Castin's residence, Pentegoet, for the organization of the proposed expedition.

The remonstrance of de Meneval, at the King's request, with de Saint Castin had not been without influence. De Saint Castin was no longer young; he had arrived in Canada an ensign in the Carignan-Salières regiment, and must now have been fifty. He resolved to change his manners; he sent away the squaws, the leading feature of his establishment, and married the daughter of the chief of the Penobscots, Madockawando. His place had been plundered by Andros in 1687, but when Pemaquid had been destroyed in 1689 by the Abenakis, Pentegoet was again occupied by him. The conquest of Acadia by Phips exposed de Saint Castin once more to interference from Boston. But, the unfortunate policy of Massachusetts in entering into the expedition against Quebec, instead of driving every Frenchman not accepting her rule from the territory she had conquered, and by these means permanently holding it, had revived the old struggle to threaten new massacres. De Saint Castin's place of Pentegoet, was of all others, adapted as a rendezvous, for any aggressive enterprise; and here in the first days of June, the Canadian leaders with their contingent, and the Indians met. There were four hundred fighting men, and they proceeded by land to Wells, which lies some miles north of York. During the preceding summer, the country in this locality had been laid waste, and those who could escape had made their way to Wells, and passed across the Piscataqua. Wells formed a small settlement along the coast, with five fortified houses, and, when their fears were awakened, the inhabitants took refuge in them. The distance between York and Wells is some twenty miles, and the intelligence of the massacre at the former place, had created the impression of danger to themselves, and added to their resolution and caution.

On the 20th of June, 1692, three small vessels with supplies arrived; they had not long been at the wharf when cattle were seen running wildly, many of them wounded, into the open.

It was evident that Indians were present. The most important of the fortified houses was that of Storer surrounded by palisades, where fifteen armed men had been posted under an officer of Massachusetts, Captain Convers. He had been placed in his position by the chief officer of the force in Boston, Elisha Hutchinson, who, after the massacre at York, had taken steps to make Wells defensible. Events proved that no wiser selection could have been made.

Fourteen men were on the vessels, but they remained on board to defend them. During the day the families of the settlement were moved into Storer's house, for danger was anticipated. Thirty resolute men were there to defend it, and a sharp look-out was kept.

On the morning of the 21st, the doubt became certainty; one unhappy man whose name is preserved in his fate, John Diamond, was early proceeding towards the vessels, when he was seized and dragged away. No surprise had been attempted. It is however possible that the Indians had prowled up to the deserted houses, and from their condition had judged that their presence was known, and that preparations had been made to receive them. They had accordingly not commenced the attack at dawn as was their custom. They had sent out scouts with the view of obtaining information, and it was a party of these scouts who had seized the unfortunate man Diamond.

The Indians now crowded forward over the cleared ground, having previously been addressed by a French officer inciting them to the attack. They divided themselves into two bands; one advanced to the onslaught of the house, one against the vessels which had stranded with the falling tide. Diamond had told them that there were thirty men on board, and the attack on the sloops was made with caution. They commenced firing, protecting themselves behind a pile of boards; some shooting arrows. The men on the vessels fought with such cool determination, that the attacking party could make no progress. Finally, the Canadians formed a shield of plank, which they fastened to the back of a cart they had found, and under

the direction of one de la Brognerie, were pushing it forward towards the sloops that they might set fire to, or board them. A wheel sank into the mud, and the cart remained immoveable; de la Brognerie endeavoured to extricate it, and while exposing himself to do so, was shot dead. Another of the party, also a Canadian, was killed. The tide was now rising, and all chance of success was hopeless, the party therefore broke away towards the house; some in their retreat were brought down by the fire of the sloops.

The little garrison had thus to resist the attack of the whole force, as they rushed on, yelling, shrieking, and firing. The spectacle carried with it a certain terror. One of the party within muttered something about surrender, "Say that again," said Convers fiercely, "and you are a dead man." In the meantime the fire was incessant. With a leader like Convers in the fort, all was determination; the women brought ammunition while the men stood to their ground, and, without halt, loaded and fired. The savages became discouraged. One of the assailing force, dressed as an Indian, called upon Convers to surrender, and they would grant favourable terms. Convers replied that he wanted no terms. He was there to fight, and with this defiance the struggle was renewed. Shortly afterwards, the firing ceased, the attacking force felt that it was in vain to continue, and they commenced to retire. There was, however, still the hope of destroying the sloops. Accordingly, they constructed a fire-raft, and sent it down with the tide. It was caught by the shore. The Indians had learned the danger of attacking the vessels, so they kept aloof. There was now nothing to be done, but burn the unoccupied houses, and the church, and kill what cattle they could see, by shooting them. There was one thing which remained; the prisoner Diamond was there, for them to torture and to burn. This duty performed, the foiled allies, Canadian and savage, retreated, leaving their dead behind them. On de la Brognerie's body a purse was found, stuffed full of relics, pardons and indulgences.

This skirmish shews what the men of Massachusetts would have done, if Boston had placed the right men in command.

A change of Government took place in 1692 in Massachusetts which influenced the fortunes of Acadia. In the early stages of political existence, Massachusetts had acted almost independently of the Mother Country. The first founders who obtained the charter had been mostly guided by the desire to find a home across the sea, where they would not be persecuted for the religious opinions which they held. The colony, however, made but little advance until Johnson, Winthrop, and other families of good repute and estate, took part in the project, with the condition, that, if they passed over to America, they would carry the charter with them, and would be fully empowered to conduct the affairs of the Commonwealth as they held expedient, without interference from England. The principle was conceded. But the mode in which the people carried on their affairs excited attention, and in 1638 a demand was made for the surrender of the charter. The English civil wars prevented this design being carried out. During the Protectorate, Massachusetts found favour in England ; and, accordingly, between 1640 and 1660, the Commonwealth became virtually independent, and completed a system of government ; and, as Hutchinson says, instead of making the laws of England the ground work of their code, they preferred to base it on the law of Moses. They established a representative legislature and a judiciary, with power to determine capital offences ; and the Government was one of persecution against all who did not entertain its religious tenets.

For the first thirty years, the gentry of the country were chosen for office. But new men forced their way upwards, many without *status*, and not distinguished in character. One of their preachers called this new blood that of "creeping statesmen."

The Restoration came, and the dominant party received a check to their authority. Complaints were made of the exclusive character of the Government ; the charter was, never-

theless, confirmed. Toleration was enjoined in religion, and a change took place in civil matters. Difficulties arose from the claim preferred by Massachusetts, to engage in foreign trade uncontrolled by the Home authorities; difficulties never to cease while the connection with Great Britain remained. There were no Custom Houses. The Governors scarcely exercised any restraint in this respect, although the power to enforce the laws in operation with regard to trade, was lodged in their hands. The opinion was also expressed, that the laws of England had no force in the colony, beyond what its Legislature gave them; although the charter set forth, that no law could be made not in accordance with the law of England. After much pressure, an Act was passed in 1676 declaring the Acts of the English Parliament regulating trade, to be in force. Eventually, on the ground that these Acts were not observed, and from other causes, in 1684, the charter was declared to be forfeited.

On the news of the Revolution reaching Massachusetts, in 1689, the authorities asked for the re-establishment of their charter on the old basis, and proceeded to act as if it had never been abrogated. The request in this form was not entertained, but a new charter was given. The territory which it embraced was greatly enlarged. It included the old colony, with New Plymouth, the territory now forming Maine and Nova Scotia, and extended to the Saint Lawrence. Under the older charter the Governor's position was little more than that of a member of the Council, with the power of giving a casting vote. He could not adjourn the Council, although he could call it together, and he signed commissions as a ministerial act. By the new charter, the Governor had the right to call together or adjourn the assembly. He did not take part in the debates; he had no seat in the Council. On the other hand, no act was valid without his consent, and he had the right of making appointments.

On the 14th of May, 1692, Sir William Phips arrived as Governor. The appointment is not mentioned approvingly by any class of writers, and there is little in his government

to call for respect. He was unfit for the position, but he was representative of the dominant class which had obtained control. After his departure, in 1690, he had proceeded to England, entrusted with a petition asking for aid to conquer Quebec. If he had failed in the Saint Lawrence, he had not lost his fleet in the attempt, and he had in the previous months conquered Acadia. He appeared in London as the foremost man in his colony, having been knighted for previous services. His bluff, free manner suggested the possession of natural ability, which required but experience to be made useful. He knew the country, he was present to represent its requirements, and he had impressed those whom he met, as being precisely the man for the crisis. The appointment grew naturally out of the situation in which Massachusetts had placed Phips in England, and was evidently dictated by the desire on the part of the Imperial authorities to satisfy the Province, and obtain a competent person for the office. During Phips' stay in England, the policy necessary to the preservation of Acadia was discussed; and the advantages which the American possessions generally conferred on the mother country, and their character and condition were brought to the attention of the English ministry. It was from this date that their importance became more assured in the councils of the empire.

Among other considerations, the position of Pemaquid attracted attention, and Phips was directed to construct a fort on the site of the old stockade building which stood there. It remained in the ruinous condition in which it was left after it had been surprised in 1689, when commanded by Weems. The fort was now rebuilt of stone and mounted with cannon. A garrison of sixty men was placed there, and it was anticipated that it would greatly check Indian inroads. The cost was borne entirely by Massachusetts.

At this time, arose in New England, to paralyze her strength and to convulse the country in every part, that extraordinary infatuation known in history as the "Salem witches." The mania commenced in February, 1692, when a daughter and a

niece of, Paris, the minister at Salem, complained of suffering torture. These young girls gave circumstantial accounts of the pain they suffered, from the presence of persons known to be in other places. The influence was set down to the powers obtained from the Evil One, by men and women who had sold themselves to him, soul and body, bound by the compact to torture their fellows. With an ignorant, superstitious community, where extraordinary intervention is attributed to Providence, in the minor and unimportant events of life, a belief often grows up in an opposite power, exercised by natures fiendish and malevolent, intent on influencing the condition of their fellow-creatures, to injure, to torture and to consign them to eternal misery. When the question of this influence was first agitated in New England, so strong a belief in its possibility was expressed by the mass of men, that none dared deny it, without risk of being included among the guilty. The question of its existence was submitted to a company of ministers, and they hesitated to affirm, that a curse so ridiculous was impossible. As it happens in such cases, a terrorism arose to crush all opposition. Accusations were made in all directions. Parents incriminated their children; children their parents; a wife was found to charge her husband with witchcraft; a husband the wife. By the month of May, more than a hundred women of Salem, Beverley and other places, many of them of reputable character, and of good family and circumstances, had been placed in jail. On the 1st of June a woman was tried, and in ten days was executed. On the 30th of June five women were brought to trial; one was found not guilty. The court expressed so much dissatisfaction with the verdict that the jury returned to amend it, and to find the poor creature guilty; the only example on this continent where this ignoble course was followed. They were executed. On the 5th of August six more were tried. Five were executed; one of them, a married woman, Elizabeth Proctor, was reprieved, owing to her condition of expectant maternity. Her husband was hanged. On the 9th of September six were found guilty; four were executed. On the 17th of Septem-

ber four more suffered. Thus nineteen persons, all protesting their innocence, were ignominiously hanged. Another prisoner was subsequently tried; he refused to plead. He was nevertheless adjudged to death.

This madness could not continue; and by January, 1693, it had passed away. At the sessions, bills were found against fifty for witchcraft, including one or two men. They were shortly afterwards released, and the horrible feeling ceased to prevail.

Although the public mind recovered its health sufficiently to avoid the commission of further judicial murders, it long hesitated to acknowledge the full extent of its error and its crime. It clung to the explanation that some peculiar circumstances had created, and some special influence had encouraged the popular feeling. As the generation responsible for this terrible scourge passed away, the fact came to be recognized that there had been a monstrous fraud, springing from the petty influence of children playing a part to obtain sympathy; that the credulity and ignorance of those among whom it happened, encouraged the delusion until it obtained irresistible force, to develop into a terrorism. In a minor way, to this day, many opinions are seen to operate on the world's conduct, when truth and sense are set at defiance. But the revulsion, if slow, is certain, and the whole machinery of wrong and injustice is eventually made manifest, to the shame of those who have profited by it.*

During the continuance of this unfortunate hallucination, the energies of Massachusetts were misdirected and paralyzed, when it was essential to her well-being that they should have been healthily and actively exercised, to hold the territory she claimed to be hers, and which she alone was taking means to people.

* "A little attention must force conviction that the whole was a scene of fraud and imposture, begun by young girls, who at first, perhaps, thought of no more than being pitied and indulged, and continued by adult persons, who were afraid of being accused themselves. The one, and the other, rather than confess their fraud, suffered the lives of so many innocents to be taken away through the credulity of judges and juries." Hutchinson II., p. 62. [1767.]

During de Meneval's imprisonment at Boston, he received much attention from Nelson. Indeed, it was the latter who had endeavoured to obtain the restitution of his property by Phips,* and de Meneval had lodged at Nelson's house. Consequently, when a prisoner in Quebec, Nelson obtained much liberty. In Canada, great apprehension had been felt that another expedition would be sent from Boston, and it had been determined to prevent any such step, by keeping its force employed in resisting attacks on New England, in spots where the country was vulnerable. From the circumstances which attracted his attention, Nelson felt that the crisis was serious, and he induced two soldiers to desert, to be the bearers of a letter giving warning of the threatened hostilities. They left in the middle of September, accompanied by three Dutch prisoners from New York, who had been seized near Montreal. Nelson was suspected of having aided in their escape. He was known to be well acquainted with the condition of Canada, and he knew that no reinforcements had arrived. Parties were immediately sent out after the missing men, both by the Kennebec and Lake Champlain, and a reward was offered for the apprehension of the fugitives. They however, arrived safely at Albany, whence they proceeded to Boston, carrying Nelson's letter conveying warning to the Massachusetts government, that an attack was designed against some of the seaboard towns.

The fort of Pemaquid had only been imperfectly completed, and it was resolved to destroy it before it was further fortified. An expedition had been organized, in 1692, to carry out the project; the ships the "Poli" and "Envieux" arrived at Mount Desert, and received the Indians who were to take part in the attack. D'Iberville was in command. On his arrival at Pemaquid, there was an English armed vessel in the harbour; d'Iberville reconnoitred the place, and afterwards sailed away. His inaction has certainly not been explained, and on this occasion he shewed a want of enterprise which was unusual in his career.

* Quebec Doc. II., p. 340.

The arrival of the two deserters from Quebec led Phips to endeavour to kidnap de Saint Castin. The latter, well known in Boston as one ready to undertake any operation for his own advantage, but most zealous for French interests, was looked upon as one of the chief causes of the raids, and as inciting the Indians to the cruelty they practised. Had Phips succeeded, de Saint Castin's seizure would have exercised no influence on the contest; his place would have been supplied, and the attacks would have been continued. The attempt only shews the shallowness of the policy adopted at Boston.

Colonel Church, a New England officer who had distinguished himself in the King Philip war, and now held a command, in an expedition a short time previously had captured two French families settled at Edgemoragan to the east of Penobscot, and they had been carried to Boston. The men had been approached and asked to join the plot; they apparently entered cordially into the scheme, and consented to leave their families behind them as hostages. The two deserters from Quebec, by name du Vignau, and Albert, were associated with them. The men were to find their way to Pentegoet, and to represent themselves as escaped prisoners, by which means de Saint Castin would be thrown off his guard, when an opportunity would be taken to seize and carry him away prisoner.

Whether the two Acadians actually entered into the plot, and their courage failed them when at Pentegoet, or whether from the first they accepted the offer in order to obtain their freedom, they revealed the design on their arrival. The two deserters were accordingly arrested, sent to Mount Desert and shot.

The Indians of the mainland, and of Nova Scotia, under pressure of want, began to visit Pemaquid, and to trade there. The restoration of the fort had somewhat shaken their confidence in French power, while the failure of d'Iberville to attack it, had given an exaggerated idea of its strength. The Indian mind is unreasoning, and passes from one extreme to the other. In the spring of the year, Convers, who was a

determined soldier, had protected the frontier along the Saco, and had built a fort at the falls. In all directions the Abenakis were depressed. The position of Pemaquid seriously interfered with them; for, from its advanced position, it was a bar to their passing in canoes along the coast during the period of hostile operations. They looked upon the erection of the fort as specially directed against them, and they felt its presence the more that there were no means of avoiding it.

The Indians having shewn a desire for peace, negotiations were commenced, which took the definite form, that in August thirteen chiefs arrived at Pemaquid, to meet commissioners sent from New England to arrange terms on which peace could be concluded. These chiefs claimed to represent the Indian tribes of the whole present State of Maine, from the Saco to Passamaquoddy Bay. Undoubtedly, many were sincere; the fact is admitted by Thury.* They were dissatisfied with the French, who, they saw, were using them for their own purposes, and they could not but feel, that their interests lay on the side of the English. Several men of the tribes were in captivity, and their relatives desired to obtain their freedom, for this was a point on which the Indians were peculiarly sensitive. In other respects, the movement was not genuine; many of the more northern tribes were under the leadership of Taxous, a chief of great personal strength and of some character, the unchangeable adherent of the French, by whom he was constantly courted. These were the tribes under the influence of the missionaries, who rejected all overtures for peace and declared for war.

The chiefs who attended at Pemaquid entered into a treaty

* “nos Sauvages qui les favorisoient . . . il y en avoit parmy eulx et mesme des plus considérables, qui s'estant laissez gagner par des caresses, belles parolles et presens des Anglois agissoient sy je l'ose dire de concert avec eulx et travailloient à establir une paix solide entre les deux nations, et sy ce party ne s'estoit formé et n'eust faict coup avant les nouvelles d'Europe, ces sauvages n'auroient jamais osé branler, et je puis dire que l'on peut, sans crainte de faire un jugement téméraire, croire qu'ils se seroient accomodez avec les Anglois et auroient faict la paix avec eulx.” Lettre du R. P. Thury à M. le Comte de Frontenac á Penhemeover le 11 septembre. Quebec Doc. II., p. 161.

of peace. Their prisoners were to be released, they engaged to live in amity with New England, and five hostages were to be left in Pemaquid in token of amity. Such a treaty, if carried out, would have been the death-blow to French power in Acadia. France had but few soldiers to hold the territory, and it was on the Indians alone that she could count to keep it. There was no plan of campaign of attacking fortified posts, and carrying on the war, with the view of taking possession of the country by advanced garrisons. The policy was to make settlement by New England impossible. Thus it became the principle by destruction and devastation, and by Indian incursions, to establish a system of terror; to kill, or to carry away captive all the settlers that were found on the land. It was the mode of war which they had carried on during the last four years; Dover, Salmon Falls, Fort Loyall, York, had each been the scene of systematic massacre. It was the one feature of Acadian warfare during the quarter of a century, preceding the Treaty of Utrecht. The record of Acadian history as respects the French, shows a ferocity and a disregard of human life and suffering which must ever call for strong condemnation. Not that in other wars, ruin and suffering have not been caused to those inhabiting the scene of their operations; but nowhere can be found the extreme cruelty and remorselessness to be traced in the operations of the French in Acadia.

In 1692, de Villebon had commenced the erection of the fort of Naxouat on the Saint John River. Jemseg had been found subject to inundations, and had been abandoned. It was here, that the news of the Indian treaty with Boston reached him. At once, he sent out invitations to the chiefs to attend him. Taxous was treated with marked favour. Presents of unusual value were given, every feeling of jealousy and pride was appealed to. On the Kennebec and the Penobscot, the two priests Bigot and Thury, unceasingly urged the tribes to war, so that the measures taken to secure peace would be fruitless.

Early in the spring of 1693, the minister had written to de

Frontenac, expressing his disappointment at the failure to attack Pemaquid, and had expressed himself unfavourably on the uncertain character of the Indian relations. He desired that in Acadia, they should continue their attempts * against the English, and he would send presents to them as hitherto. Forty soldiers were to be garrisoned at Naxouat, to be actively engaged in the warfare, or jointly with the savages. Among other instructions, the King gave positive orders that de Portneuf should not be sent back to the Saint John.† De Champigny, the previous autumn, had written to the minister concerning de Villebon, to the effect that he had ill-treated many of the *habitants* on the Saint John, who, in consequence, had returned to Quebec. De Champigny had likewise complained, that he and his brothers had obtained control over the whole trade, and had exchanged furs in Boston for merchandise; de Portneuf had been specially reported for his irregularities.‡ De Champigny had written to de Villebon on the subject, but the latter, in his reply, had retorted on his accusers. Fortunately for him, the Recollet almoner of the fort had given his testimony in defence of his commander; but not a word was said in vindication of de Portneuf, and hence his disgrace, and his removal.

The minister had ordered that de Courtemanche should be sent in his place; the selection, however fell on de Villieu, who left Quebec in October, arriving at Naxouat at the commencement of the winter of 1693, charged with the especial duty of directing the operations of the Indians. On the first of May

* Diversion.

† “Le roi ne veut pas que le Sieur de Portneuf retourne à la rivière Saint Jean.” Que. Doc. II., p. 110.

‡ “Ils luy imputent de s'estre attiré toute la traite dans son fort, et d'avoir envoyé deux de ses frères qui sont avec luy dans les bois pour y traiter où l'un nommé Portneuf a entretenu un villain commerce avec une sauvagesse, au sçu et à la vue des gens qui estoient avec eulx . . . Trois missionnaires prestres me marquent à peu près tout ce que les habitans ont raporté du désordre de Portneuf et m'en font de grandes plaintes. D'un aultre costé un Recollet qui servit aumosnier dans le fort du Sieur de Villebon parle fort avantageusement de luy, mais à l'égard du desordres (*sic*) du Sieur de Portneuf il n'en dit rien.” Que. Doc. II., pp. 93-94.

de Villieu ascended the Saint John to Midoctek, and called upon the chiefs to prepare for war. It was the home of those most inclined to hostilities; they declared that they had never taken part in the peace negotiations, and they only wanted the opportunity to fight. A feast was given, and de Villieu remained with them until the 5th. He ascended the stream to the Eel River, which he went up; and, portaging to the Mattawambeag, he descended that river to its mouth, east of Passamaquoddy Bay. He passed by land directly across to Madaonekik, the village of the chief Taxous, whom he found perfectly prepared to join in any hostile enterprise. Together they went to the village of Panouenkek, where, on the 10th, they met the missionary Bigot, with three Abenakis, one of whom, on the part of his tribe, expressed readiness to fight. De Villieu used every argument to confirm this view, and suggested that they should immediately proceed to Naxouat, to receive the presents to be presented. On the 16th they started to rejoin de Villebon at that place, and arrived in six days. A feast was given, and the presents distributed. On the 25th of May de Villieu again left.

According to de Villieu, the enterprise found no favour with de Villebon, who consented that two only of the French should take part in it, and they deserted a few days afterwards. De Villieu plainly says that this course was followed to lead to its abandonment. Nevertheless, he determined to persevere, and continued on his route, living as an Indian with Indians; finally, they reached Pentegoet on the 3rd of June.

Among the chiefs who arrived two days later was de Saint Castin's father-in-law, Madocawando, who assured them that the Governor of Boston would bring the prisoners on the 5th of July, to be given over to their tribes. The feelings of those present were influenced by this intelligence; many declared that they were unwilling to undertake anything against the English, until they clearly saw that they had been deceived. De Villieu exerted himself to remove this impression, and pointed out that the engagement was a mere stratagem to bring them together, for the purpose of attacking them, when

they were unprepared to resist. Moreover, that it was a mere attempt to gain time, the English being unable to return their children, as many of them had been given to officers, who had carried them across the sea to Europe. The Indians remained unpersuaded. Madochawando had succeeded in influencing the meeting.

Thury, who was present, threw his weight on the side of war; but he was embarrassed by the knowledge that a Protestant minister had arrived at Pemaquid to teach the children to read and write. De Villieu proposed two courses: one to attack the English and seize several of them, and by holding them, obtain their own prisoners in exchange; the second, that if no expedition were resolved upon, the prisoners they possessed should be exchanged for those held at Boston. In the discussion of these propositions, it was suggested that a canoe should be sent to Boston, to learn if their people had been sent to Europe; a chief offering to make the enquiry. It was accepted by all who were not desirous of continuing the war, and obtained general concurrence: for the moment, de Villieu felt that he had no course but to return to the Saint John, where he learned, that, on the 8th of the month, Edierimet and Madocawando had been on board a frigate of 24 guns, in which Phips had visited the coast, and had remained there for two hours. They had thrown their tomahawks into the sea, upon which all present had grasped hands, drunk to one another's health, and taken supper in company. Both de Villieu and Thury considered from this fact that peace was concluded, and a letter was received from the Jesuit father Bigot, confirming the intelligence.

But Thury was not one to be perplexed by news contrary to his wishes and policy. He was a master of intrigue; he knew every fold of the Indian character, and he was without a scruple in effecting his purpose. There were still open to him those feelings of jealousy and distrust, which are never in vain appealed to by a master hand, especially when exercised to influence the Indian mind. In this form he approached Taxous. He pointed out, how ill treated the chief

had been by peace having been made without his consent and participation. The appeal to Taxous' sense of dignity at once excited his anger: he said that Madocawando, if he wished, might make peace, he was for war, and left the meeting.

De Villieu also obtained information that the Boston trader, Alden, in a sloop of forty tons, had arrived on the coast. In the hope of seizing the vessel and the crew, he hastened to the harbour, but on his arrival he saw her white sails in the distance. He returned to de Saint Castin, with whom he remained until the 16th, when he ascended the Penobscot, and narrowly escaped being drowned. The spot where his canoe upset must have been near the town of Bangor. He received serious injuries, and lost all his property, including his arms. The accident led to an attack of fever, which kept him on the spot until the 23rd, when he continued his journey to the village, where it had been agreed another meeting should be held. He arrived there on the 26th, and on the following day gave a dog-feast, when the usual dances and songs took place. Thirty of the connections of Madocawando declined to join in the ceremonies; one of them even turned them into ridicule. The perseverance of de Villieu was in no way exhausted. Every effort was made, to induce Madocawando to take part in the hostile expedition, neither persuasion nor presents being spared. Finally, he agreed to accompany it, on condition that it should be deferred for one day.

The party, which consisted of de Villieu, the priest Thury, the French interpreter, and one hundred and five Indians, left on the 30th of May, with the design to proceed to the mouth of the Kennebec to meet some Abenakis. On the 9th of June de Villieu, with three Indians, approached the fort of Pemaquid. They carried with them furs to barter, while he, disguised as an Indian, paddled about the harbour, and made a reconnoissance of the position of the fort, its harbour, and where mooring ground could be obtained. Their strength having been increased by seventy Abenakis, they continued their march to the south.

They had now to determine in what form they could carry on their operations, and the place which they should first attack; a council was held. The deliberations lasted for three days, but nothing was concluded. Some of the Indians desired to make an attack north of Boston; others were of the opinion that several settlements should be assaulted simultaneously. Finally, it was agreed to leave the conduct of the expedition to its more youthful members. On the 22nd they advanced ten leagues; they had now been for some days stinted in provisions, many began to murmur, many even threatened to return home. On the 23rd they advanced twelve leagues; the men were suffering from hunger, and few of them more than de Villieu himself. Scouts were sent out to ascertain if any place in the neighbourhood was unguarded; it was reported that the adjoining settlement could be surprised, as no watch was kept, and no precautions were taken against attack.

The place in question, Oyster River, now bears the name of Durham, and is some twelve miles from Portsmouth, not far from the Piscataqua. The unfortunate inhabitants had heard that peace with the Indians had been proclaimed. Not a single person in the village believed that an attack was possible. It was a thriving and prosperous community, and, with organization, possessed the means of self-defence. It contained a church and a mill; several unconnected dwellings had been constructed along the stream, twelve of which were to some extent fortified, but the place was without a soldier. It was bright moonlight when the signal for advance was given. The surprise was complete. Two of the protected houses were entered without resistance, and their inmates killed. Seven of the houses being vigorously defended, the Indians did not attempt to attack them, but contented themselves with firing on them from a distance. The assault was made on the scattered houses without protection, in which the inmates, among whom were women and children, awakened from their first sleep, became unresisting victims.

De Villieu himself has given us a narrative of his operations.

The whole force was divided into several small bands, which simultaneously made the attack. "We killed," he says, "one hundred and four persons, and made twenty-seven prisoners in sixty houses, which were pillaged and burnt; a quantity of cattle were killed."* The force then retired to a spot which they had fortified in the Indian way, so that they could defend themselves in case of pursuit. No attack was made and they regained their canoes.

There was a dispute about the booty. The Pentegoet tribe were dissatisfied with their share of the prisoners, a less number had fallen to them than to the others; and they had acted under the direct orders of de Villieu. They now resolved to divide themselves into smaller detachments. Some forming themselves into knots of five and six proceeded in the direction of Boston, to attack remote dwellings, and to make ravages where possible. Some reached the Merrimack, and attacked Garton, within forty miles of Boston. They were driven back from the house of one Larkin, but they successfully attacked the isolated and undefended houses, and carried off forty persons. In August, the same bands killed ten or eleven persons at Kittering.

De Villieu learnt from his captives that, the day previously, the inhabitants at Oyster River had been assembled, and been told by the chief officer of the place, that peace with the Indians was obtained, and they could now safely work upon their lands. They were told to hold themselves in readiness to join the expedition, which King William had sent orders for them to undertake, to make themselves masters of Canada. He further heard that two vessels had started from England, one of which had been sunk by the French cruisers, and the other had safely arrived; that the militia had been called out, and an invasion was to take place from New York.

This intelligence seemed of such importance to de Villieu,

* "On tua cent quatre personnes et l'on y fit vingt sept prisonniers dans soixante maisons qui furent pillées et brûlées et quantité de bestiaux tués, puis on se retira dans le lieu où la séparation avoit été faite le soir précédent."

Que. Doc. II., p. 142.

that he hurried to Canada to report to de Frontenac. On his way he saw Bigot, but de Villieu lost no time, and reached Montreal on the 26th of August. At a public audience, the Indians, who accompanied him, presented de Frontenac with thirteen English scalps, and de Frontenac received them as a welcome and desirable gift. On the 16th of April, 1695, de Villieu was officially thanked for his conduct, in a letter addressed to him by the minister; but in a letter of the same date to de Frontenac, he is blamed for his conduct to de Villebon, and for endeavouring to make profit out of the pay of the soldiers, and the provisions granted for the use of the expedition.*

At this date a serious pestilence broke out among the Indians, from which they died in large numbers. Their suffering for a time gave quiet to the country. There was little molestation from them in 1695. De Villebon at Naxouat considered himself safe from attack, and, for a short period, hostile operations were limited to the efforts of the cruisers to keep the coast free from the New England fishermen. There was a war-ship of the navy present, but the service was also performed by privateers. New England, on her part, sent out vessels of the same character, whose only pursuit was piracy. They sailed under no flag, the nationality of the owners of the property taken was not considered, for the one object of these rovers was plunder.

At this date, Massachusetts took the important step of petitioning the English government to be freed from the obligation of maintaining Port Royal. On the mainland, the territory to the north of Massachusetts had been included within the charter of the Province, and the council desired to that extent to limit their authority. Nova Scotia, accordingly, became dissevered from New England. It was owing in a great measure to this expression of opinion, that, by the Treaty of Utrecht, Nova Scotia was constituted a distinct Province.

In June, 1695, de Villebon called a meeting of the chiefs at Naxouat; they were fourteen in number, representing the

* Quebec Document II., p. 176.

tribes as far as the Kennebec. Thury was present. There was feasting for three days with a distribution of presents. The Indians were, however, dissatisfied. They complained that they had to pay high prices for goods purchased, while their furs were rated low. Their trade relations with the English were much more satisfactory, and with this lever, had statesmanship been exercised at Boston, the Indians could have been detached from France. The duty of the public men of Massachusetts was, if only as a matter of policy, to observe the most inviolate good faith with the Indians, and to treat them with consideration; and, while holding an effective force in the field to check attack against the settlements, and on all sides to maintain unrelaxed vigilance. The situation, without doubt, was trying, and called for unremitting watchfulness. The main influence possessed by the French was through their missionaries. They unfailingly appealed to the lowest superstition of the Indian, and to that jealousy and distrust, which a few words of cunning and deception can always awaken. The constant theme of the Acadian French of every condition was the bad faith of the New Englanders, their treachery, the danger of intercourse with them, their designs, under pretence of trade, to lead them to remain unprepared, and then attack them. The massacres which had followed any successful Indian raid led them to expect, in any reverse, treatment similar to that which they themselves had meted out.

At this meeting, de Villebon promised redress on the points complained of, and urged the necessity of making incessant attacks on New England to assure their own safety. While the resolution was formed to continue the war, in view of concealing their purpose, and of lulling Massachusetts into security, some of the chiefs proceeded to Pemaquid, on the pretence of receiving the prisoners, who, they maintained, it had been promised should be given up. The Commissioners who were present, refused to entertain the demand until the English prisoners were produced. The chiefs affected to think that, in accordance with their demand, the men should

have been present and set at liberty; consequently, they left in dudgeon. Many of them continued to prowl about the fort, and it became dangerous for any of its inmates to leave it for any distance.

In February an event took place at Pemaquid, which must have been heard of by the French with the greatest satisfaction. No act could have been more in accordance either with their desire or their interest. Stoughton, then Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts, was the chief executive officer. Phips had left Boston on the 28th of November, 1694, and had died in England on the 1st of March, 1695. Stoughton had become impressed with the feeling, that it was desirable to obtain possession of the persons of the chiefs who were the most troublesome, and were regarded as the leaders of the war party. He had determined to effect his purpose by an act of treachery, as false in policy, as it was contemptible from its low cunning. Stoughton sent a message to these chiefs, reproaching them for having broken the peace, and summoned them to attend at Pemaquid, to deliver their prisoners and to receive their own in exchange.

The Abenakis Indians, at Bigot's dictation, returned an insolent reply. Thury was the missionary with the Penobscot tribe, and either could not or did not attempt to control them. Some of the chiefs, accordingly, went to Pemaquid; several were known to have been present at the massacre of Oyster River. But be they who they might, they came to the English fort on the pledged word of the English Governor for their personal safety. They should have been regarded as envoys, and their persons held sacred under the guarantee of the summons. Captain March, a good officer, had lately been removed from the command of Pemaquid, and one Chubb had been placed there. No appointment could have been more unfortunate. On this occasion, he shewed himself as deficient in judgment, as during the course of the same year he proved that he was without conduct, or courage. He met the Indians, outside the fort, and received at their hands the English prisoners brought by them; then under the pretence of presenting the

gifts which he assured them he had been charged to offer, he proposed a conference nearer the fort. He had placed men in ambush, and when the opportunity offered, the force rushed forward and endeavoured to make the chiefs prisoners. Some were killed, some were seized, two alone escaped. This ill-judged breach of faith revived to intensity Abenaki hostility, in itself sufficiently strong; hostility, which, with judgment, forbearance, and a rigid fidelity to every engagement entered into, if not entirely removed, might have been modified and quieted. It threw the Indians entirely into the hands of the French; and it must be remembered that it was by Indian attack alone that the contest for the possession of the territory had been carried on. If the Abenakis and Penobscots, had been treated with strict justice, and had had no wrongs to avenge; every chance of attack on their side being firmly guarded against, Massachusetts would have remained undisputed mistress of the country to the Saint John.

The course taken at Pemaquid justified every assertion of the French with regard to the treachery of Massachusetts. It made the Indians more hopelessly the instruments of the French priests, and confirmed them in enmity to New England, which increased, as its instigators were able to satisfy it by massacre and plunder.

But their success in night raids and surprises gave the Indians no actual relief in the condition in which they were placed. They remained dissatisfied as to their relationship to the French; and reference to the reports of those who were engaged in directing them proves what might have been accomplished by Massachusetts, if her councils had been governed by wisdom, prudence and moderation. That the massacre of settlers, awakened in their sleep by the war-whoop, should have occasioned feelings of rage, and a desire for revenge, may be imagined; but it is not by giving way to impulse, and by the treacherous slaughter of savage races, that good government is promoted. Treachery begets treachery, and reprisals are followed by reprisals. The hand of authority may be firm, strong and heavy, but it should be marked by

strict justice and unwavering good faith. Thury plainly wrote to de Frontenac * that, if some quick remedy were not applied, either on the side of Canada or France, the Indians would in a year be lost to Acadia. This representation of the situation did not fail to work its influence. Early in April, the Minister wrote, that, the following year, Pemaquid would be attacked, and preparations were commenced to carry out the project. It was to be considered as the commencement of a more thorough occupation of the country; and the destruction of this advanced fortress was to be followed by vigorous steps to hold Acadia by something more than Indian raids.

In the spring of 1696, two ships of war left France for Quebec; the "Profond," and the "Envieux," under the command of d'Iberville, and of Bonaventure. At Quebec they received an additional force of about eighty regular and colonial troops. After cruising past Cape Breton, and capturing some vessels, they arrived at the Baie des Espagnols, Sydney, on the 26th of June, where thirty additional Indians were received. They were sailing towards the Saint John, when they came upon two light-armed English frigates, with a New England tender. The attack was commenced by the English, who found themselves engaged with vessels of nearly double their weight in guns, and manned by double their force. The French vessels each carried 44 guns. After a fight of three hours and a half, the "Newport," carrying 24 guns, was dismasted and taken. The "Sorling," of 34 guns, with the tender, favoured by the fog and the night, escaped.

On the following day the French vessels, with their prize, reached the Saint John, and de Villebon came down from Naxouat to receive them. He was accompanied by Father Simon, and one hundred and fifty of the Saint John Indians, who were taken on board by Bonaventure. On the 2nd of August they reached Pentegoet. There they were joined by Thury, and de Saint Castin, and one hundred and thirty

* Quebec Doc. II., p. 162.

Penobscot Indians, and an immediate attempt against Pemaquid was determined upon.

A feast was given by d'Iberville to three hundred Indians, and the expedition was organized. The fort possessed a certain strength, but was incapable of resisting artillery, and it had no casemates. The garrison consisted of ninety-five men lately called out as militia. The condition of the fort in every respect was well known to the attacking party. The commander, Chubb, was inexperienced and unfit for his duty. He was the same person who had seized the Indian chiefs, and was now, in another direction, to give an equally discreditable proof of his incapacity.

The place was summoned to surrender on the 14th of August. The reply of Chubb is indicative of his character, and, to the men opposed to him, remarkable for their courage and resolution, was enough to shew with whom they had to deal. It was that he would fight, if the sea were covered with French ships, and the land with Indians. Among the besiegers was de Saint Castin, who wrote to Chubb—the probability is that he well knew him—that the Indians who were present were resolved to be revenged personally on him for the seizure of their chiefs, and that if he made any defence, the garrison would be slaughtered.

The guns were landed, and batteries constructed. The Indians found what protection they could obtain, and fired on anyone in any way exposing himself. During the night the guns and mortars were placed in position, and, by three the next day, everything was ready for the bombardment. After a discharge of five shells, the *chamade* was beaten, and a parley asked from the fort.

At five o'clock, the fort surrendered, on condition that the garrison should be landed at the first English fort. Chubb and his men marched out, and de Villieu with sixty Canadians took possession of it. To the honour of d'Iberville, the conditions were faithfully observed. The prisoners were placed on an island to assure their safety. The Indians were greatly enraged, owing to one of the chiefs seized by Chubb having

been found in a cell strongly ironed. Among the papers obtained in the fort, the order was found containing instructions to arrest the chiefs, so far relieving Chubb from having been the originator of the treachery. It was at Boston, that this disgraceful and impolitic step had been planned.

The captured cannon were carried to the ships; the arms with the ammunition were given to the Indians. The fort was destroyed, the walls were mined and blown up, the buildings burned. Two days were further given to the completion of the destruction.

About this date, two English war-vessels, the "Arundel" and "Boston," arrived at Boston. On the "Sorling" reaching that port, the loss of the "Newport" became known, and the belief arose that the next attack would be directed against Portsmouth. Accompanied by the "Sorling" and a merchantman of 20 guns, after taking on board some militia, these ships sailed northward, in search of the French vessels. Not finding them before Portsmouth, the English ships continued their cruise. As they came in view of Pemaquid, they saw the vessels of d'Iberville and Bonaventure, which had not long left that fort, keeping as close to the shore as possible. Sail was made to intercept them, but night came on, and the English ships were not able to reach the French vessels, and a fog arose, which permitted them to escape. The English force was so much superior to that of d'Iberville, that he considered his safety lay in avoiding an engagement.* He made his way to Newfoundland. The English vessels returned to Boston; one capture they did make, a small shallop, in which were de Villieu and twenty-three soldiers.

The loss of the fort was unwelcome news at Boston. Chubb was, on his arrival, placed under arrest for cowardice and misconduct. He remained some months in prison, when he was released. Hutchinson expresses doubts, whether with a better man, the fort could have been more successfully defended; certainly, a better attempt might have been made.

* Hutchinson, in his history, draws attention to the fact, that Charlevoix has incorrectly represented the English squadron to consist of seven ships.

Shortly afterwards, an expedition left Boston, to retrieve the disgrace of the surrender. It was placed under the command of Colonel Church, whom I have mentioned as doing good service in the King Philip war. His force consisted of five hundred Indians and New England militia. They reached Chignecto, and landed at Beaubassin. One of the principal inhabitants, Germain Bourgeois, saw Church, and pointed out that, at the time of Phips' invasion, the population had engaged not to attack the English, and had been promised protection; the order was accordingly given not to molest the inhabitants. They would, however, give no intelligence where the Micmacs were to be reached, the tribe which Church specially desired to chastise, as they had been prominent in the late forays against the New England settlements. All information being refused, Beaubassin was treated as an enemy's country. A proclamation was discovered posted on the church door, on the part of the Governor-General of Canada, shewing the shallow ground, on which appeal for protection was made.

As it was felt, that reprisals should be made for the merciless attacks on the English settlements, this unfortunate locality had to pay the penalty. Church remained there nine days. A great many of the houses and barns were burned. The church met the same fate, but no men and women were given over to Indian slaughter. This reprisal was a useless act of passion, in every way impolitic, and confirmed the Acadians in their hatred to New England. The treatment was identical with that, which the French had meted out again and again to the New England communities; but the fact could not warrant the devastation and the misery which marked Church's operations. The act was one of cruelty, and it would have been an avoidance of pain to the English historian, if it did not fall to his lot to record it.

Church proceeded to the Saint John, where his intention was to interrupt the construction of the fort, and, if possible, to attack and destroy the fort at Naxouat. At the Saint John there was an ensign named Chevalier in charge, with a small force. Church landed in such strength that he could not be

opposed, and the French soldiers retreated to the woods; Church, therefore, contented himself with the destruction of the materials which had been gathered. On his side, Chevalier lost no time in sending a messenger to de Villebon to inform him of Church's presence. He was returning to the coast to see in what condition matters were, when he was met by a party of the invaders; and, resisting an attack to seize him, he was killed. Some of his men were taken prisoners, one of whom pointed out where twelve cannon had been buried. They were found, and placed on Church's vessels. It is plain that Church saw that he was in no condition to attack Naxouat. It was late in the season; he was without tents, and, although they had guns to move, he had no means of transport. Few of his vessels could ascend the river, owing to their draught; and the delay which would have arisen in framing rafts for his guns, and forcing them up stream at that period of the year, must have been a strong argument against any expectation of success. Accordingly, he abandoned the attempt, and started on his return to Boston.

He had not gone far on the voyage when he was met by an expedition bound for the Saint John. Stoughton had instructed the "Arundel," with a provincial ship and a transport, to sail to the Saint John, and commence operations to drive de Villebon from Naxouat. Colonel Hawthorne was in command, with two hundred men, and, on meeting Church, ordered him to return with him. Church was unwilling to do so, for he lost his rank, as the force was now constituted, Hawthorne being his senior. No doubt, he represented the impossible character of the enterprise with the appliances at their command, but Hawthorne was determined to carry out his orders, and on the 18th of October, four of the smaller vessels with troops ascended the river. The men were landed near the fort, and a battery with two field-pieces was constructed. Had the fort been taken by surprise, there might have been some chance of success. De Villebon, however, was not one to be entrapped. His military career had been distinguished by surprises of his enemy when least expecting attack, and he

must have foreseen the possibility of an attempt of the same character. He had a garrison of one hundred men, and, unless against guns of heavy calibre and a large force which could cut him off from supplies, his fort was perfectly defensible. Moreover, he was a professional soldier, capable of defending his post with skill, and possessing the courage to do so. He had been, to some extent, prepared for the contingency by Chevalier's message. He had sent to the next mission for aid; and thirty-six Indians immediately obeyed the summons. The inhabitants in the neighbourhood were warned of the danger, and told to hold themselves in readiness to seek the protection of the fort, and on the evening of the 16th he was joined by some dozen *coureurs de bois*.

Thus prepared, de Villebon could well resist the insufficient means of assault brought against him. The two small guns made little impression on the stockade. As night came on, the weather became cold, and the New England soldiers lit their camp fires. Their light furnished a target for Villebon's men to fire grape, and the shots became so mischievous that the fires had to be extinguished. The men had no tents; it does not appear that they were even provided with proper clothing, for they suffered from cold. On the 19th, the cannonade was continued, when one of the two guns was dismounted. That night the besiegers' fires were lighted out of the range of the fort cannon, but it was only with the design of deceiving de Villebon. During the night the New England force re-embarked, and commenced the descent of the river; and, on the morning of the 20th, their camp was entirely deserted. The French loss is named as three. The English had eight killed, and seventeen wounded. The expedition had been undertaken without forethought or preparation. If the New England theory was to the effect, that the defenders of French forts would surrender them with little or no defence, like the commanders at Pemaquid and Fort Loyall, it proved a woeful miscalculation.

The design of the French Court to attack Boston has been spoken of. In Acadia it had the effect of keeping the Indians

at their villages, to be ready for service, and no raids were proposed or encouraged; during the year there was comparative quiet in the northern English settlements. Of the tribes that had passed from Beaubassin Bay to Penobscot, some few were encouraged to activity. The parties were directed by René Damours and de Portneuf, and the priests St. Cosme, Simon, and Chambault were present. They made an onslaught on Kettering, and again on Wells, but their success was limited to killing some few of their opponents. In September, 1697, they attacked Lancaster, and between twenty or thirty persons were killed or carried away; among the number was Whiting, the Minister of the town. Andover, twenty miles from Boston, did not escape. Among those who were killed was Chubb, who had surrendered Pemaquid, and who was much hated by the Indians, owing to his seizure of the chiefs at that place. He had established himself here with his family. His death was regarded as a special mark of triumph, but there is no ground for the belief that his presence led to the attack.*

Haverhill had been attacked in March. It is in the narrative of the captives taken at this place, that we have the story of Hannah Dustan. She had been confined of a child, the week previously, and a neighbour, Mary Heff, was nursing her, when they were seized. With a boy, they fell to the lot of a family of two warriors, three squaws and seven children. The women adopted the desperate resolution of making an effort to escape, in the depth of the night, while their captors slept. At the same moment, the two men and a woman received their death-blow; the remainder were immediately killed. The dead were scalped, and the women reappeared at the settlement with the scalps.† An old squaw and a very young child were left unharmed.

The Treaty of Ryswick was proclaimed at Boston, on the 21st of December, 1697; and from this date the French could not give the Indians, whose allegiance they claimed, acknow-

* Hutchinson.

† Hutchinson records the fact as an incident of the war.

ledged encouragement to continue their ravages. The Abenakis and Penobscots had learnt the advantages obtainable by such operations; for, in the words of the French King, they were more profitable in the gain they brought, than the more limited spoils of the chase. They now felt that they were abandoned by their allies. It may be supposed, that they understood imperfectly the terms of the peace as laid down by the treaty, maintaining, that they were bound by no engagement, except the one made by themselves. War had become a necessity to them; unsustained by the French, they dreaded that the peace would lead to their extermination. But the missionaries could no longer openly incite them to massacres, or personally lead them in their forages.

It was resolved at Boston, to make the best arrangement possible and conclude peace with them, so that quiet would be restored, and to accept such conditions as the Indians would agree to. In October, Major Convers and Captain Alden met the chiefs at the Penobscot, to discuss the preliminaries of a treaty, of which one of the conditions was, that all captives should be restored. The dubious assent was given that such prisoners held by the Indians, as desired to return, should, unmolested, be permitted to do so. During the winter, the peace was definitely arranged. In the spring of 1699, several captives returned. "Many," adds Hutchinson sorrowfully, "remained, male and female, who mingled with Indians, and contributed to a succession of savages, to exercise cruelties on the English frontier in future wars, and perhaps on some of their own relations."

The Treaty of Ryswick was pregnant with future difficulty. The English considered that their territory extended to the Saint Croix; de Villebon, on the part of the French,* declared the Kennebec River from the head to the mouth to be the boundary; the river to be free to both nations. Massachusetts had already abandoned her jurisdiction over Nova Scotia. De Villebon also claimed the fishing grounds along the coast, and Bonaventure was sent to cruise, and to seize all vessels taking

* 5th September, 1698.

fish in what de Villebon asserted to be French waters. By the seventh article all conquests were to be restored; by the eighth, commissioners were to be appointed to settle "the limits and confines of the land to be restored on either side," and "likewise for exchanging of lands, as may conduce to the mutual interest and advantage."

Here were the seeds of future dispute, but it is doubtful, if they would have been adjusted, or have led to war, when in September, 1701, James II. died, and Louis acknowledged his son to be King of England. At this date, the French King had no desire to renew the war. He had made peace, only four years earlier, from inability to continue the struggle. He re-opened the contest, to re-unite the passionate sentiment of the whole of England to be directed against him, with a bitterness of hate, that can be traced even in modern literature. War recommenced; another twelve years' struggle for the possession of America was to take place before peace was again proclaimed; and even then the question was not finally to be determined.

De Villebon died July, 1700.* He was a man of energy and great ability, distinguished in the unscrupulous school, in which he had been educated, as remorselessly cruel. With slight means at his disposal, he protected and assured French interests in Acadia. During his rule he obtained great advantages over the neglected, ill-defended frontier of New England. That Massachusetts was not driven back from the territory of which she had taken possession, was not owing to any wisdom and forethought shewn at Boston, either in the measures conceived, or the choice of the instruments to carry them out; but to the indomitable and hardy character of her settlers, who remained unappalled by reverse and trial, and who, in every difficulty, steadfastly and unflinchingly held their ground.

In 1693, the whole French population of Acadia was one thousand and nine souls.

* Charlevoix. On 20th October, 1700, de Villieu speaks of him as being dead. Que. Doc. II., p. 336.

CHAPTER III.

The death of de Frontenac was communicated by Prevost, town major of Quebec, without loss of time to de Callières, de Courtemanche being the messenger. De Callières had looked forward to succeed de Frontenac, but he was not alone in the expectation; both de Vaudreuil and de Champigny were aspirants for the distinction, de Callières consequently saw that, to attain his end, some special effort on his part was necessary. Giving out that he was writing to Quebec, he addressed letters to France, and prevailed upon de Courtemanche to undertake their delivery. It was in the closing days of navigation. De Courtemanche started in his canoe professedly for Quebec, but at Sorel, by night, he left the Saint Lawrence and ascended the Richelieu, to proceed by Lake Champlain to Albany. He descended the Hudson to New York, where he obtained a passage in a vessel bound for England, and so reached France.* De Callières' brother, who had been one of the principal negotiators of the treaty of Ryswick, on the receipt of the letters from Canada, waited upon the King, to inform him of de Frontenac's death, and asked the government for his brother. His own influence and character, together with his brother's eminent services, sustained the request, for it was unhesitatingly granted.

In Quebec, the non-return of de Courtemanche attracted attention. The navigation was closed, and he did not appear. De Vaudreuil and de Champigny entertained suspicions

* Letter de Callières to the Minister, 2nd May, 1699. [Vol. VIII., Parl. MS. Doc., 2nd Series, p. 378], in which he mentions his application sent by de Courtemanche. He speaks of having served twenty years in the King's army, and fifteen in Canada. Also his letter to Bellomont, 9th of September, 1699. [Vol. VIII. MS., p. 404], in which he thanks Bellomont for the assistance given to de Courtemanche to proceed to France.

that they were the victims of some intrigue,* and they received special information which led them to take steps to protect their interests. They immediately sent off the Sieur Vincelot† with despatches, reporting de Frontenac's death, and furnished him with money and letters of credit, instructing him to proceed over land to New England, and there obtain a vessel and sail for France with all possible haste. These letters were addressed to M. de Ponchartrain, who was ignorant that de Courtemanche had arrived. Indeed, the latter only succeeded in reaching Paris, a few hours before Vincelot. The Minister reported the death of de Frontenac to the King, who replied that he knew the fact, and at the request of M. de Callières, had granted the government of Canada to his brother.

During the winter, when the appointment was in abeyance, Canada was divided into the two parties, the supporters of de Callières and of de Vaudreuil. An incident shewed this feeling. So soon as the spring came, before the arrival of the ships, de Callières, who, by his position, had assumed charge of the government, assembled the troops at Montreal for a review, and ordered that in the march-past, the salute made to the Commander-in-Chief, should be given to him. De la Durantaye, who was in favour of de Vaudreuil, pointed out, that the salute, due to the Princes and Marshals of France only, ought not to be given; and de Vaudreuil, acting on this view, so notified de Callières. De Callières arrived on the ground in his *calèche*, for he was a sufferer from gout, and ordered the march-past to take place. De Vaudreuil replied that as it was contrary to the orders of the King, he could not comply unless the order was given in writing. A drum was brought upon which the order was signed, and the salute was made.‡

* "Ils se défièrent d'un tour de Normand joint à quelques connaissances qu'ils eurent." Recueil, etc., p. 58.

† De la Potherie to the Minister, 2nd of June, 1699. Vol. VIII. Parl. MS., p. 387, Vincelot is mentioned as having been despatched from Quebec under the circumstances named.

‡ Letter of de Vaudreuil and Le Roy de la Potherie to the Minister, "le dernier mai 1699." Parl. MS. Doc. VIII., p. 385. The occurrence is here related with the remark that, if the salute had been granted to M. de Frontenac, it was not his due.

De Vaudreuil did not lose hope of the appointment; discussing the probability shortly after with an officer, who told him, that, from the news which had arrived through Albany, he believed M. de Callières would be named, de Vaudreuil replied that "he would taste it with but one tooth." * When the appointment was known, some of the partisans of de Vaudreuil felt some embarrassment, among them de la Durantaye, who resigned his commission to be appointed to the Council at Quebec, the small emoluments of which constituted his sole support. De Vaudreuil was named Governor of Montreal, and de Ramezay Commander of the Forces.

The appointment of de Callières was notified from Versailles, in a letter addressed to himself and to de Champigny. The King expressed the wish, that the Governor and the Intendant should live in amity, and he informed them, that he could only place confidence in their representations jointly made. He directed that, in case of difference of opinion, each should express his views in a separate despatch.

The death of de Frontenac became known to the Iroquois, and in spring they sent a deputation to Canada, nominally to express their sorrow for his loss; they had, however, ulterior views. They desired to learn, to what extent they would be affected by the peace lately proclaimed. They brought three prisoners to Montreal, and invited de Callières to conclude a separate peace with them, and to return what prisoners of their tribe he held. They asked that Father Bruyas and de Maricourt, who had been adopted into their tribe, and some Indians of the Mountain and the Sault, should proceed with them to Albany, where the treaty would be signed, and the prisoners exchanged. De Callières, true to the policy of de Frontenac, refused to accept these conditions. He told the Iroquois, that peace only could be discussed at Montreal, and that they must comply with the conditions which M. de Frontenac had imposed, before de Maricourt and Father Bruyas could visit them. He granted a truce of sixty days for the consideration of his decision.

* "Qu'il n'en taterait que d'une dent." Recueil, etc., p. 59.

On the appointment of de Callières becoming known, the Iroquois sent a second deputation to congratulate him, but no steps were taken towards the establishment of peace. An opportunity, however, was offered to de Callières of influencing them through their jealousies. He had received from Versailles a letter addressed by William III. to the Earl of Bellomont, directing that there should be a cessation of all hostilities between France and England on account of the Iroquois, and, if necessary, the forces of New England and New France should be united to compel the five nations to remain at peace. The writer of this letter could have little anticipated the use to which it was to be applied. It had been sent through the French ambassador to Canada, in order to shew the desire of the English Court, thoroughly to carry out the treaty; and the design was, that it should be forwarded to Albany, and all misunderstanding removed. Bellomont had been made acquainted with the facts; and previous to the receipt of the letter a correspondence had taken place between the Governors. It was no unimportant weapon to place in the hands of the French, for it was certain to be used without scruple in the form most conducive to their advantage. In place of accepting this communication in the spirit in which it was written, as a mark of good faith and good feeling, de Callières sent a copy of it to the Onondagas and Senecas. The policy of the French, was to detach the Iroquois from the English alliance; and there was no surer mode of attaining this end, than by creating the belief that the tribes were about to be sacrificed by the authorities of New York; and that the latter had been instructed no longer to give them countenance and protection. An attempt had been made to awaken their jealousy, by attributing to Schuyler the remark made when in Canada, that the Five Nations were not the allies, but the slaves of New York. This statement did not make much impression; but the King's letter to Lord Bellomont was of a different character. It went to the extent, of the abandonment of the Five Nations by the English in the hour of need. The French also had assured the tribes on the Western Lakes, that

they were included in the peace, and that if attacked by the Iroquois, the French would intervene, and carry hostility into the Iroquois territory. The Five Nations were thus wrought upon to believe, that the English were in no way to aid them in such an emergency; while the French were prepared with the Ottawas and Hurons, on slight pretence, to attack them. In July the Five Nations resolved, with a view to their own protection, to send deputies to Canada, to make peace with de Callières.

Bellomont had in June called a meeting of the Sachems at Albany, and had exerted himself to the utmost to re-assure them of the friendly feelings of New York. He pointed out, that it was better for them to be included in a general peace, than to enter into engagements on their own account. Joined with New York, a treaty to which they were a party could not be violated, without the whole of those subscribing it being affected. This argument was not lost, and, had it been possible, they would have recalled their messengers, but it was too late. They, however, so far modified their views, as to insist on the exchange of prisoners taking place at Albany. As on the previous occasion, this condition was resisted; but it was resolved to send to the Onondagas commissioners from Montreal, empowered to make a preliminary settlement. The commissioners were de Maricourt, Joncaire and Father Bruyas. They were received with unusual ceremony, when de Maricourt presented the chiefs with four fathoms of tobacco. A feast of venison and ground Indian corn followed. No representatives of the Senecas, or of the Cayugas, were present. The Oneidas, although expected, did not arrive. The envoys were however brought into contact with the French prisoners, to discover, that most of them refused to abandon the savage life which they had adopted.

A council was called, and, when it assembled, a messenger from Lord Bellomont arrived. He cautioned the Onondagas, against subjecting themselves to French influence, and requested their attendance at Albany in twelve days, in order that their relations with the English authorities might

be discussed. The presence of this envoy, one of the Schuylers of Albany, caused embarrassment in the negotiations. The French were, however, never wanting in address, and they availed themselves of the presence of Schuyler himself, to awaken Indian jealousy. They pointed out, what they called the haughty tone of the message, and strove to create the feeling, that the English looked upon the Iroquois as slaves, and were striving to prevent them from holding intercourse with other nations when they desired so to do. Father Bruyas declared, that while the French Governors told their Indian children everything, the English kept them in the dark.

When the Council again met, Decanisora requested the English to attend. He told them, that he desired their presence, in order that they might learn, that he was about to proceed to Quebec to plant the tree of peace, and that on his return he would attend at Albany. The Canadian deputies were to accompany the party, except Father Bruyas, who offered to remain at Onondaga to conduct the religious services there. The offer was refused, and the Onondagas told Father Bruyas that the English had engaged to send missionaries to instruct them. If the religious assistance was not accepted, they agreed to receive a blacksmith, to remain with the tribe to give the material aid of his calling.

The Oneida Indians held themselves aloof; Joncaire, however, succeeded in influencing several of the Senecas to accompany the embassy; and on their arrival the deputation started, carrying with them the few captives willing to return to civilization.

There were in Montreal, for the purpose of trade, several of the Western Indians, who were witnesses of the reception given to the Iroquois. The inhabitants did not conceal their gratification at their presence, for it was regarded as an affirmation of peace; to them a matter of serious import. It affected every relation of life; not simply relieving them from danger and its attendant anxiety, but opening out for the future an enlarged field for enterprise, promising an assured reward. Every demonstration of satisfaction was shewn. The

Western Indians did not feel equal complacency, It was an intimation to them that their own importance was lessened; there was jealousy and dissatisfaction on their parts as they looked upon these lively marks of joy, and it was not in the best of humour that they remarked, that the fears of the French led them to shew more respect to their enemies, than love made them testify to their friends.

On their arrival, the chiefs were addressed by de Callières. One of the Onondagas replied, expressing a strong desire for peace, and as a proof of this feeling stated, that the Miamis and other Western Indians, who had acted hostilely towards them, had not been attacked. One of their requests was, that an armourer should be sent to Fort Frontenac, and that the place might be supplied with goods, to be furnished as cheaply as they could be obtained from Albany. De Louvigny had been appointed commandant at Cataragui. The value of this fort in affirming French power, was beginning more fully to be recognised, and the determination of de Frontenac to maintain it better to be appreciated. It having been discovered that de Louvigny had traded with the Iroquois, he had been placed under arrest by de Callières. One of the requests made by the Onondaga envoys was, that he should be released and restored to his position. They likewise brought a child with them, to be educated in Canada; and they expressed the intention to give over to him the management of their affairs, when he had gained the proper age. De Callières, in accepting the charge, answered the various demands as satisfactorily as he was able, and undertook to request the Ottawas to deliver up all the prisoners belonging to the Five Nations in their possession.

Finally, on the 8th of September, 1700, peace was signed between the French and the tribes of Iroquois who were present, as a distinct obligation, apart from all reference to New York. The assembly was held at Saint Gabriel, in the Seignorial house of the Seminary of Saint Sulpice. The figurative expression of the settlement arrived at was, that their father gave them a porringer, with a knife to cut the

meat, and a *micouanne* to eat the soup or sagamite.* The attainment of this peace was a marked diplomatic success; a moral victory over the English, hereafter to be followed by important consequences. It was an assertion by the Onondagas of independence of New York control, and on the part of the French a recognition of their separate and distinct national existence.

The French population amounted only to 15,000 souls; even with this limited number, the possession of Canada could be considered to be perfectly assured against disturbance by Indian attack. De Courtemanche, with Father Angelan, were sent to inform the Western Indians that peace had been made with the Iroquois, to enforce its general acceptance, and obtain the release of the Iroquois prisoners before the month of August, in order to admit of their exchange with those held by the Five Nations. De Callières directed that the prisoners should be brought to Montreal, and the exchange made in his presence. One special duty assigned to de Courtemanche was, to quiet the hostilities which had commenced in the west, irrespective of the Iroquois. The Ottawas were at war with the Sioux, who had themselves destroyed a village of the Miamis; and on all sides, whether from revenge or policy, the 'most antagonistic feeling affected the different tribes.

De Tonty, at that period in command at Michilimackinac, was instructed to order the French and Canadians in the neighbourhood to return to Montreal. M. de Frontenac was never influenced by M. de Champigny in this respect; but, during his government, de Callières had expressed disapprobation of the course followed by the *coureurs de bois*. Now that de Champigny was admitted to the position of joining in all representations made to Versailles, his views obtained greater weight. The assent of de Callières must have been reluctantly given, for only a few months previously he had

* Recueil de qui s'est passé, etc., p. 60. "Que leur père leur donnait une gamelle, dans laquelle il y mit un couteau pour couper les viandes, et une micouanne pour manger la soupe ou sagamité."

written to the Minister, in relation to the efforts of the English of New York to trade with the Western Indians, that the only remedy against the enterprise was to re-establish the system of granting licenses to traders in the West, for those obtaining them acted as a garrison in the country.*

Twenty only obeyed this order, eighty-four resolved to cast their fortunes on the Mississippi. Thirty of them at that time had already descended the river with ten canoes, carrying away the furs in their possession, in reality the property of the traders in Montreal, who had advanced the means by which the furs had been obtained. The example was followed by those who remained behind; and thus the first result of the reversal of de Frontenac's policy, was this loss to Montreal. The men refused to submit to what, in their view, was the monotonous toil, privation and poverty which marked the settler's life. De Champigny's interference with trade in order to carry out his theory, that beaver should seek Canada, not the Canadians seek the beaver, led to the peltry finding its way to the Mississippi. D'Iberville was at this date in Louisiana. It will be my duty, in another place, to describe his voyages. He received the skins, giving powder in exchange for them, while some of his men traded with the Canadians in goods.

D'Iberville wrote to Montreal and recounted the event. De Callières in much anger reported to the King what had taken place, stigmatizing the conduct of these men as open robbery. He expressed his surprise that d'Iberville had not communicated with him, and that he had not himself been notified, that the new Mississippi colony was independent of the general government of Canada. He recommended the arrest of these men, and, that unless they returned to Canada by the following July, they should be sent to the galleys; likewise, that, as the trade in beaver strictly appertained to Canada, no furs should be sent to the Mississippi.

* De Callières to the Minister, 2nd June, 1699. Parl. MS. Doc., 2nd Series, VIII., p. 393. "Je ne vois pas qu'il y eust d'autres remèdes pour empêcher ces enterprises, que le rétablissement des corps qui serviraient de garnison dans ces quartiers-là."

Now that peace with the Iroquois had been obtained, de Callières felt that it was necessary to profit by its advantages. He had heard that Bellomont designed to construct forts in some of the villages of the Five Nations, and he asked instructions as to the course he should take. His views were, that, if France could not obtain the boundaries which were in his view desirable, the country should be declared neutral, and that the Indians should be left at liberty to choose their religious teachers. De Callières had no doubt that the choice would be made in favour of the French missionaries, who went among them, and became identified with their pursuits, and were domesticated in their villages. The English missionaries lived mostly at Albany. There is little record of their zeal or devotion; their very names are unknown.

The French missionary priest took a pride in his calling, and was impressed with the political significance attached to his position, and the influence which he could exercise. Many, indeed, in this view lost sight of the moral obligations of their position, forgetting that they were ministers of the religion of peace, and became apostles of cruelty and bloodshed. But their devotion to the duties entrusted to them was, in most cases, unfailing; many were marked by great diplomatic talent and judgment, and they included men who attained their ends by moderation, without violent counsels. With others, especially those controlling the Abenakis on the frontier of New England, it was painfully the reverse, and a long record of bloodshed and devastation clings to their memory.

De Callières reported * the case of de Louvigny, who had been placed in command at Cataraqui, with injunctions not to engage in trade. From private information, de Callières became acquainted with the transactions in which de Louvigny had embarked. When the cargo of peltry arrived in

* October 16, 1700. It was the first letter addressed by de Callières to the younger de Pontchartrain. The elder Louis Phélypeaux had succeeded de Seignelay in 1690. In 1699, he was appointed Chancellor, and his position was transferred to his son Jérôme, who filled the office until 1715.

Montreal, it was seized and placed in the King's stores. De Louvigny and the other officers in the post were relieved and placed under arrest. It may be remembered, that his release was one of the requests made by the Onondagas. A contemporary* mentions the affair, in a way to relieve de Louvigny of discredit. On his arrival at Cataragui, the Iroquois who visited him offered to bring peltry to the fort, in place of carrying them to the English. As these furs amounted in value to 60,000 *livres*, it appeared to de Louvigny a matter worthy of consideration, and he addressed himself to a trader of Montreal named Soumande. The latter accepted the enterprise, and sent up the necessary goods for barter; and, in order to prevent official interference, obtained the interest of the Aide-Major Clerain. The Jesuits of the Sault heard of this transaction, and brought it to the notice of de Callières so repeatedly, that the Governor was forced to order the seizure of the cargo, and instructions to act were given to Clerain. Instead of notifying Soumande, in whose interest he was supposed to be, he changed sides,† and made the seizure. The operation was favourably looked upon in Montreal, as it diverted to that city 60,000 *livres* of property which otherwise would have found its way to Albany. Le Corne relieved de Louvigny at Cataragui.

De Callières proposed to bring de Louvigny before a council of war; de Champigny, on the contrary, desired to submit the case to the Conseil Souverain; de Callières unwillingly agreed to this view, for he considered de Louvigny to have been guilty of disobedience of orders, and was unfavourable to him in the military, as in the commercial, consideration of his conduct. The Council confiscated the furs, but left to the consideration of the King the question of any personal sentence. De Louvigny appealed against the decision. De Callières, on his part, protested against the lenity as injurious to discipline, and asked that regulations should be laid down for the treatment of cases of this character. He suggested

* Recueil de ce qui s'est passé, etc., p. 60.

† "Tourna cassaqué."

that the property confiscated should be granted to Madame de Frontenac, as the transaction had taken place on land assigned, for advances made by her husband to de La Salle, for the construction of the fort.*

The harvest of 1700 proved singularly unproductive. Owing to the demand of the services of the men elsewhere, the land had become neglected, and had been imperfectly cultivated by women and children. Throughout the colony there was a scarcity of the necessaries of life. In the country settlements, many were reduced to live on roots, while in the cities, this poor resource was not available, and the suffering was greater. Even those who in ordinary times were in easy circumstances, underwent privation. Fortunately, there was no war, but there was positive want.

The peace encouraged the Iroquois to resume their hunting expeditions on the northern shore of Lake Ontario. On one occasion, with their ancient arrogance, they infringed a law of Indian life. One of their parties attacked a beaver meadow, bearing the customary mark, in token that it had been taken possession of by some Ottawas. The principle was recognised with Indian hunters, that those first discovering a beaver dam and placing a mark to denote possession, obtained control of it, free from interference. It could only be disturbed in cases of extreme hunger, when a beaver could be taken and eaten. The aggrieved party, the Ottawas, being the stronger, attacked the Iroquois, who, in violating the custom, had inflicted the injury, and carried away some of them as prisoners.

The Iroquois proceeded to Montreal to lay their complaint before de Callières, and to demand that the prisoners should be released. De Callières promised his interference to obtain for them satisfaction, and they returned to their homes to await the result. In the month of May, a deputation again appeared to repeat the demand for redress, and, what in reality was the true object of the delegation, to ask if it were true, that there was an intention to construct a fort at Detroit. . It

* MS. Parl. Doc., Vol. VIII. De Callières to Minister, 7th October, 1700, p. 117 ; de Louvigny to Minister, 6th November, 1700, p. 107.

had long been the purpose of de Callières to carry out this policy, and he had so reported to the King. While in every way possible he strove to satisfy the Iroquois with regard to the conduct of the Ottawas, he took higher ground on the subject of the fort at Detroit. He declared it to be French territory, and that neither the English, nor the Iroquois, had any right to interfere regarding it. It was not his intention to permit the English to take possession of the country, as they were desirous of doing. He should himself occupy it, for the advantages it offered, for the benefit of France and her allies. He was desirous of establishing peace in the west, and had instructed the officer in command to accomodate all quarrels between the tribes, and to obtain for all freedom to hunt. Whether the English were acquainted with his purpose or not, was not of importance to the Iroquois. It might be expected, that the English would endeavour to hinder his operations, and prevent the success of his project. What he asked from the Iroquois was, not to interfere in the quarrel between the French and English, but to keep themselves neutral.

The chiefs promised this neutrality, and requested that the deputation of last year should again proceed to their *bourgade*, to aid in bringing the French captives to Montreal. Father Bruyas, de Marincourt and Joncaire, accordingly returned with them. On their arrival they found a messenger from Bellomont, Abraham Schuyler, requesting the chiefs to attend a conference at New York with the English Governor.

A Council was summoned, when Father Bruyas was requested to escort the released prisoners to Montreal, and to conclude the general peace so happily begun last autumn. Bruyas pointed out that, if the Iroquois were absent in the general assembly, their voices would not be heard. Three days afterwards, Decanisora informed the French deputation of the willingness of the tribe to release their prisoners, and of their desire equally to live in peace with the two countries. Five deputies would, therefore, leave for Montreal, and three for Albany. When the question arose of bringing the prisoners together and arranging for their departure, five only

consented to rejoin their countrymen; the remainder preferred to remain in their savage life.

Joncaire, always active and capable, had proceeded to the Cayugas and Senecas, and had succeeded in similarly influencing them. He appeared with the prisoners he had prevailed on to return, and the whole party started for Montreal, where they arrived on the 21st of July. On the following day a motley crowd of Western Indians, who had been assembled at Michilimackinac by Father Angelran and de Courtemanche from around the western lakes, disembarked at Montreal. Many of them clung to the desire to continue the war. The Potowatomies, the Outgamis, the Hurons, the Miamis, were united in this wish. The Illinois and the Kaskaskias were also present, the latter desirous of attacking the Kansas. De Courtemanche was in command of this curious combination, which included some of the Lake Michigan tribes. They were in one hundred and fifty canoes, and the the Indians numbered little short of eight hundred men. Thirty canoes, in descending the river, were left behind at different spots.

Among those present was Kondiaronk, "Le Rat," the Huron chief, who, in de Denonville's day, had "killed the peace." He had become a Christian, and was devoted to French interests. Although suffering from severe illness, he had descended with his tribe; the fatigues of the journey in his weak condition had taxed his strength, incapable of resisting this strain upon it. When the Council met, he was one of the principal spokesmen, and in his figurative language announced to de Callières that the journey had been made only from the desire of seeing him.

The Council met on the 25th of July, 1701. After the request universally made, that merchandise should be given at a moderate price, Kondiaronk, and a Miami chief, Chickikalolo, complained that they had brought down their prisoners to exchange them, but that those of the Iroquois had been left in their villages. Each chief who spoke repeated the reproach, with the accusation that the Iroquois had broken faith.

The Iroquois explained that the majority of the captives, from having been taken in early youth, did not know their parents, and hence it had not been possible to bring them. The remark even increased the ill feeling. Finally, the dissatisfaction was somewhat removed, and, from the generally felt desire for peace, discord was avoided. On the 1st of August, while a Huron chief was speaking, Kondiaronk was suddenly taken ill. Remedies were administered to him; when he had recovered, he was placed in an arm-chair in the centre of the meeting. He addressed those present, dwelling upon his own efforts to obtain a permanent peace, pointing out its advantages, and how indispensable it was to all concerned. He concluded by impressively appealing to de Callières, that hereafter he would so act, that the confidence they had placed in him should not be a matter of reproach. He remained at the meeting until its close, when he was carried to the Hotel Dieu, where he died the following night, receiving the rites of the Roman Catholic Church.

There is much in Kondiaronk's last hours to recall that Roman fortitude, which stoically sank all thoughts of self in the consideration of the public weal. His journey to Montreal in ill health was only in the interest of his tribe. The one consideration was whether peace or war was to prevail; the former involved the abandonment of hostility against the hereditary enemy of his race. The Iroquois had driven his ancestry from their homes and possessions, almost to entire destruction, from which his tribe was slowly recovering, to regain some political consequence. Knowing that he was held in esteem by the French, he had been sustained by the hope of directing their counsels to the common benefit; he had felt that it might be necessary to arouse, or restrain his tribe, in forming the policy of the future. To perform this last act of devotion to their interests, he sacrificed his life.

Kondiaronk's body was exposed in the dress of his rank, that of a captain of the marine corps, for which he received pay and allowances. He was buried in the parish church of Montreal; the leading officials, headed by de Vaudreuil, a

large staff of officers, the troops in the garrison, with the Indians present in Montreal, attended the ceremony.

The non-production of the prisoners by the Iroquois, remained a matter of dissatisfaction. On their side, the representatives of the Five Nations complained of the disbelief with which their explanations were received. They declared that if an engagement on their part to return the prisoners were accepted, there should be no cause for regret that their word had been trusted. De Callières dwelt on the ground of complaint which they themselves had furnished, by failing to bring their prisoners with them. He undertook, however, as far as possible, to remove the objections entertained by the Western Indians, and to soothe the discontent they felt.

The death of Kondiaronk, the dramatic circumstances under which it had taken place, his last words, pleading for peace, and his earnest advice to keep friendly relations with the Iroquois, greatly influenced opinion; and the tribes of the western lakes accordingly agreed to accept the arbitration of de Callières.

The general conditions being accepted, it only remained to sign the treaty formally. There was the additional reason that it was the hottest season of the year, and one of those periodical maladies with which the Indians were afflicted from their want of care and cleanliness, began to show itself. The French inhabitants likewise commenced to feel uneasiness, for the presence of these tribes under these circumstances was not desirable. Accordingly, on the 4th of August, a general assembly was again called, when the final ceremonies took place.

Outside of the city, a space was artificially enclosed with young saplings, with a covered pavilion at one end. The Governor, the Intendant, M. de Vaudreuil, the principal officials, the officers of the garrison, the clergy, were in attendance. All the accessories which could give weight to the ceremony were observed. De Callières addressed the Indians, thirteen hundred in number, regularly marshalled and placed by tribes. He told them that last year peace had been estab-

lished, but at that time the Hurons and Ottawas alone were present. Accordingly, he had called upon the other tribes to meet him, in order that they might solemnly bury the hatchet; and the hour was come to do so forever. Hereafter, he would be the arbiter in their differences, and, in the event of any tribe having to complain of injury, he would himself exact satisfaction from the aggressor.

The speech was translated to the Abenakis, the Algonquins, the Hurons, the Ottawas, the Illinois, the Miamis and the Iroquois. Wampum belts were given, and each tribe expressed its satisfaction and adherence to the views of de Callières. The chiefs in turn advanced, and transferred to de Callières the Iroquois prisoners they had brought. All were dressed in conformity with the custom of their tribes. One was covered with a buffalo's head and horns; another over a face daubed with vermilion wore a shabby peruke which took the place of a hat, and the wearer gravely raised it to salute de Callières. The unrestrained laughter which followed, he accepted as applause. The hair of another was formed into a pyramid to represent the comb of a cock, from which flaunted a red feather. One wore a large robe of beaver to trail behind him. But, however dressed, the chiefs advanced imperturbable, calm and self-contained, fully impressed with their own power and authority. Each addressed some words to the Governor. It was now the turn of the Iroquois to declare themselves. Expressing himself satisfied with all that had been done, the speaker gave his assurance that the tribe would fulfil its engagement. "As to the slaves which we have not brought," he continued, "you are masters in this matter, and you will send to seek them."*

The calumet was brought; it was passed to de Callières, to de Champigny and to de Vaudreuil, each of whom smoked from it ceremoniously, to shew his acceptance of the treaty,

* "Ononthio, nous sommes contents de tout ce que tu as fait : voilà nos paroles pour t'assurer que nous serons fidèles à remplir nos engagements. Quant aux esclaves que nous n'avons point amenés, tu en est le maître, et tu les enverras chercher."

and it passed from the French to the tribes of the west, on to the Iroquois. A "Te Deum" was sung, a feast was given, and presents were distributed to the Indians. The Iroquois were specially exhorted to remain neutral in any future difficulty between the French and English, and not to allow forts to be constructed in their territory. De Callières explained the establishment of the fort at Detroit, and stated that it was his policy to exclude the English of New York from proceeding thither.

A few days after the tribes had separated, a deputation of the Mohawks arrived, and declared their acceptance of the treaty. There remained only one condition to complete the triumph of the French; the re-establishment of the Jesuit missions. Early in 1702, news was brought of the death of Garaconthié, and a deputation arrived from Onondaga, asking that a mission should be established. De Maricourt had succeeded in obtaining the introduction of the French priests. If the Onondagas did not show remarkable fervour as converts, the missionaries themselves carefully watched French interests, to counteract the influence of New York; and it was no little owing to their efforts that this influence failed to increase in strength.

The peace following the Treaty of Ryswick proved of short duration. In September, 1701, James II. died at St. Germain, when Louis XIV. recognised his son, under the title of James III., as King of England.

When this act had been performed and its significance understood, an attempt was made to explain it away. The ceremony was spoken of as an act of courtesy to an unfortunate family, near relations of the King; the title meant nothing, and was without significance; there was no intention to insult the English government; the Treaty of Ryswick would be observed, and no attempt to weaken the authority of King William would be permitted in France.

It was in vain. The English ambassador at Paris received instructions to quit France without taking leave. The French ambassador was ordered to depart from London. When

the news became known in England, there was a feeling of intense indignation, of passionate rage, even of amazement, that so wanton an insult should have been directed against a powerful nation. These feelings were to some degree intensified by the conduct of the French King in having disregarded, a few months previous, the Treaty which he had entered into with regard to the Spanish succession. —

In 1698, negotiations had been carried on to obtain a settlement of this question, the main principle of which was, that the crowns of France and Spain should not be placed on one head. Charles II., then King of Spain, was shattered, body and mind. His eldest sister, who had married Louis XIV., on the ceremony taking place, had renounced, in her own name and on behalf of her posterity, all claim to the Spanish crown ; an act confirmed by the Cortes. The younger sister had become the wife of Leopold, Emperor of Germany, and had likewise made a renunciation of her rights ; but the act had not been confirmed. The daughter of this marriage was now the wife of the Elector of Bavaria. The Emperor Leopold was himself a son of the daughter of Philip III., and was thus cousin to the Spanish King. —

To prevent Spain from becoming the appendage of either Austria or France, the Emperor offered to transfer his rights to his second son, the Archduke Charles ; on his side, the King of France desired that the younger son of the Dauphin, Philip, Duke of Anjou, should ascend the Spanish throne.

In Spain, the country immediately interested, the prevailing sentiment was that the Empire should be kept intact, and transmitted to the next monarch in no way dismembered. The King accordingly made a will, naming the Electoral Prince of Bavaria his heir. Shortly afterwards, the Electoral Prince himself died, and the question was thrown back into its old complications. A new treaty was entered into by the three powers, the Emperor, Holland and England, by which it was agreed that Spain, the Indies, and Netherlands should be possessed by the Archduke Charles, and that France should receive an equivalent ; the Milanese or some acquisi-

tion, Lorraine being named. The news was received in Spain with great indignation. The Ambassador in London was instructed to remonstrate with the English Ministry, and he carried out his instructions so insolently that he was ordered to leave the country, while the English and Dutch Ambassadors were curtly dismissed from Madrid.

On the 3rd of November, 1700, Charles expired, having bequeathed the Spanish throne to Philip, Duke of Anjou. Louis had not a moment's hesitation in breaking the Treaty with England and Holland, and sent his grandson to take immediate possession of the throne.

James II. died on the 16th of September, 1701, and in the ten months' interval, between the assumption of the Spanish Crown by the Duke of Anjou and that event, there had been little to shew that the English people felt particularly aggrieved by this union of the two Crowns, or were prepared to resent it at the cost of blood and treasure.

William himself was fast sinking from disease. He was only fifty-two, when the judgment has reached its fullest power, and, in ordinary circumstances, the physical strength is little impaired. His impulse had been at once to declare war, but he felt that he could not command public feeling. The leading men in England were sullen and discontented. "There was a deadness and want of spirit in the nation, universally."* And it was in this condition of feeling that the King of France insulted the English nation by acknowledging as King of England a child, a foreigner, and a Roman Catholic, "bred up in the principles of the most arbitrary government."†

The revulsion of feeling was immediate. William returned to London the first day of November, 1701. His presence created an enthusiasm, only drawn forth on important occasions in Great Britain. Deputation after deputation from

* Somers.

† Queen Anne's Speech in the House of Lords, 1st April, 1708, after the unsuccessful expedition of Chevalier de Forbin against Scotland in the interest of the Pretender.

every part of the country waited upon him, to express loyalty and devotion from all ranks. On all sides were to be met marks of attachment to his person, and joy at his safe return. After some deliberation, he determined to dissolve parliament, and writs for a new election were issued.

Parliament met in December. It was soon discovered that its character represented the public feeling so powerfully awakened. William had previously formed another coalition on the continent, and what was required was its affirmation by the English parliament. The Commons voted war supplies, and resolved that the army and navy should each consist of 40,000 men, a total of 80,000 men. The Lords declared that they were prepared to support resistance to the encroachments of France, and protested against the French King's declaration in favour of the Pretender. The Pretender himself was attainted by Act of Parliament. These measures were only the preliminaries to the declaration of war.

On the 20th of February, William was riding in Hampton Court Park, when his horse stumbled, and fell on his knees. The sudden jolt threw the King from his seat, and he broke his collar bone. The injury was serious; the more so, that on his return to Kensington, the jolting of the coach dislocated the fracture, and it had to be reset. He became dangerously ill. On the 28th of February, the Commons listened to his last message, which called upon them to effect the union between the kingdoms of England and Scotland.

On Monday, the 8th of March, between the hours of seven and eight of the morning, the great King died. He met his end with the calm fortitude which marked his noble life. To all who approached him he shewed gracious and thoughtful kindness; no superstitious terrors disturbed his last hours, but he had no wish to die. He desired to live to take part in the struggle to which he had devoted the best energies of his genius and strength. No complaint escaped him. From time to time he appeared silently to be engaged in prayer. Bishop Burnet and Archbishop Tenison remained with him to the last; to them he expressed his belief in the Christian

religion, and he received the sacrament from them; and it was they who knelt when all was over to repeat the commendatory prayer of the Church of England. .

Anne ascended the throne. The declaration of war followed on the 4th of May; a war to continue the whole of her reign, except the sixteen months preceding her death.

The western continent could only wait the result of these complications. They were known, and much uneasiness was felt with regard to the future; but the signal for action had to be given from Europe. The western territory, consequently obtained much of the attention of the Governor of Canada. De Callières and de Champigny had recommended the establishment of several posts around the lakes, where the Indians could deposit their peltry in exchange for goods.

Detroit had already been established. In June, 1701, la Mothe Cadillac, with a Jesuit father and one hundred men, was sent to construct a fort and to occupy the country; hence he is spoken of as the founder of that city. In 1686, a fort had been constructed to the south of the present city, where Fort Gratiot now stands, but it soon fell into decay and was abandoned. It was not the site selected by Cadillac. *

The King was opposed to this policy.† He pointed out that with the establishment of these remote posts, traffic would be drawn from the settled portions of the Province; and that as those engaged in it, would remove to the newly established centres, the Colony would lose a portion of its population, and much of its strength. He objected also on the ground, that the expense of the garrisons would be serious, and that there was no security that the officers and soldiers would not engage in trade. Notwithstanding this unfavourable view, authority was given to de Callières for the establishment of

* Modern enquiry establishes that the site was in the centre of the city, on the present Jefferson avenue, in the neighbourhood of the Exchange, and is described by la Mothe Cadillac as being three leagues from Lake Erie, and two from Lake St. Claire. The fort was surrounded by a picket fence. Its fate was, to be destroyed partially by fire in 1703, to be rebuilt in 1716-1717, and at intervals extended.

† 3rd May, 1702.

such posts, when the Intendant likewise considered that they would prove of advantage. One settlement of this character was attempted by the Sieur Juchereau on the Wabash, who took Father Mermet with him, but owing to illness breaking out among the Indians, and their intractable behaviour, the project was abandoned the same year.

M. de Champigny had for some time been dissatisfied with his position. He had felt disappointment at the selection of de Callières as Governor, and a contemporary writer tells us * that their personal relations were not free from difficulty; accordingly, in 1700, he sent in his resignation. It was not, however, accepted until two years afterwards, when M. de Beauharnois† was appointed, greatly to the satisfaction of M. de Callières.

De Callières was then able to report, that the Iroquois had promised to take no side in the war, and would sell their furs and buy goods equally with Montreal and Albany, and, that in spite of protests from Albany, the Jesuits had remained at their posts. Father Lamberville was with the Onondagas; Fathers Garnier and Valiant with the Senecas. Matters were not so tranquil on the western lakes. The Sioux had commenced war against the allies of the French, and hostilities had broken out between the Saulteurs and the Foxes.

The long expected news that war had been declared, at length reached Canada. De Callières' endeavour was to embroil the Indians with the English; on the other hand, he hesitated to undertake any enterprise against Albany, until he felt assured, that there was no possibility of the Iroquois returning to their old alliance. De Callières gave immediate attention to the extension of the fortifications of Quebec; for after the expedition of Phips, fears of an invasion from the British Colonies never passed away from Canada. While engaged in carrying out this duty, he died on the 20th of

* “Ne s'accommodaient pas bien ensemble, ce dernier commença à solliciter son congé qui ne vint cependant que deux ans après.”

Recueil de ce qui s'est passé, etc., p. 60.

† 4 novembre, 1702.

May, 1703. He had long been a sufferer from gout, and the attack in this case proved fatal.

De Callières' name stands high in the list of Governors. Charlevoix, who may be accepted as giving the opinion of that time, describes him as the most perfect General that the Colony had possessed, and the man from whom it had received the most important service.* He came to Canada, a cadet of a noble family, under the auspices of the Seminary of Saint Sulpice in 1684, to be Governor of Montreal. Owing to his long service in the continental wars, he obtained the position of second military officer in the province. In 1687 he was in command of the camp at Saint Helen's Island, when de Denonville organized his forces for the attack on the Iroquois. In 1690 he assumed command in Montreal. He had, therefore, been twenty years in the country occupying the most prominent positions, and had carefully studied its requirements. In view of encouraging trade he was strongly opposed to the tax of one-fourth levied on the beaver. He recognised that the only mode of retaining the Indians in the French interest was by trading with them, and, that it was necessary to receive the beaver at its valuation by the English. He also pointed out the geographical advantages for the establishment of Louisiana by the route of the western lakes. Vessels could be constructed on Lake Erie as on Lake Ontario, and could navigate these waters to the head of Lake Michigan. Here a force could land to reach the Illinois, and make a connection by that river with the Mississippi. He revived the scheme for the conquest of New York and New England; for it was well understood, at an early period in the history of New France, how adverse to its prosperity was their possession by a foreign power. His peace with the Iroquois was the result of his ability and judgment; but the Governors of the English provinces were so hampered by their legislatures that, whatever their ability, they acted under great disadvantages in any contest with the French Gov-

* “le général le plus accompli qu'eut encore eu cette colonie, et l'homme dont elle avait reçu de plus importants services. Charlevoix II., p. 288.

ernors, accountable only to the King of France. De Callières avoided difficulty with the religious orders; but he did not countenance their pretensions. His quarrel with Bishop de Saint Vallier, in the Recollet Church at Montreal, was not of his seeking, and he did not hesitate to bring the matter before the Conseil Souverain. He was hampered by the limited allowances he received, and, stating that his office had caused him personally a heavy expenditure, asked in vain for an increase of income, to meet the expenses which he had incurred in furnishing his residence and for the cost of living, for, owing to the bad harvest, provisions were dear. No Canadian Governor had cause to be particularly thankful for the treatment he received from the French King, and de Callières was not an exception to the general rule.

The government of de Callières was unmarked by incidents which attract attention, so that his name remains but little known outside the circle of the students of history. But his integrity, his personal honour, his prudence, and his capacity in every relation of life, have obtained for him a reputation without a stain. He was buried in the Recollet Church at Quebec.

CHAPTER IV.

On the death of de Callières, everything pointed to de Vaudreuil as his successor. De Champigny had left the country. De Vaudreuil had himself been an applicant for the office; he was connected by marriage with some of the principal personages of the Colony, and he had been upwards of sixteen years on active service, having taken a leading part in its affairs. He had been present in the defence of Quebec against Phips, and had commanded one of the wings of the de Frontenac's expedition against the Onondagas. He had been constantly engaged in the defence of the Province, and had shewn activity and enterprise in the several incursions of the Iroquois. At this date he held the position of Governor of Montreal, to which he had been appointed on the promotion of de Callières.

Although he was elevated to the position on the 1st of August, 1703, the appointment did not take place as a matter of course. The King hesitated to nominate de Vaudreuil, owing to his wife being a native Canadian, from the fear that his government might be injuriously affected by the relationship. The Minister, however, succeeded in removing the objection; and it is a curious fact that, three years later, de Pontchartrain felt it necessary to remind M. de Vaudreuil of the circumstances under which his appointment had been made.*

One of de Vaudreuil's first efforts was to confirm the Iroquois

* "I must observe to you here that his Majesty felt some difficulty in resolving to confer on you the Governor-Generalship of New France, on account of your wife's family, which is in that country, and his Majesty only consented on the assurance I have given him, that you would act towards your wife's relations as if they were no connections of yours. Should you depart from these principles, you will expose me to his Majesty's reproaches, and you ought even to be apprehensive for the consequences." De Pontchartrain to de Vaudreuil, Versailles, 9th June, 1706, (as translated), N.Y. Doc. IX., p. 778.

in their friendly feelings, the more so as he had ground for belief that opposite influences were at work in Albany. Joncaire was again sent among the Senecas, and he remained with them three months. On his return, he brought with him one of the chiefs, who represented himself as authorized to express feelings friendly to the French. De Vaudreuil, however, deemed it advisable to send Joncaire to pass the winter with the tribe, that he might better watch French interests.

The instructions sent to de Callières, had been not to make an attempt against Albany, for fear that it might embroil the Iroquois with the French, and de Vaudreuil himself was likewise guided by this policy. No indication had as yet been given by the Five Nations of any desire to break the peace. In the autumn, a chief of the Onondagas, who visited Quebec, expressed this feeling, and the desire to retain the Jesuit missionaries in their villages; it was, therefore, the wisest policy in no way to disturb these established relations.

Such was not the feeling with regard to the Abenakis; and steps were taken to awaken their old hatred to New England: and, as de Vaudreuil expressed himself, to engage them in a quarrel, for they were wavering, and might become friendly to Massachussets. Bands of this tribe, directed by Canadian priests and officers, ravaged the eastern New England frontier. Any small bodies of men, or the crews of vessels seeking shelter in a storm, if poorly manned, when met by these parties, were killed or carried off prisoners. De Callières had declined to countenance such proceedings. He had felt that the political significance of these attacks, was of little account. They inflicted injury and created suffering; but he failed to understand that the death of a few score of men, and a few score more carried into captivity, would have any influence on the contest. In this view he had been sustained by the Minister at Versailles.* The population of New England at this date was over 100,000; that of New York over 30,000. The total population of Canada was 15,000. Nevertheless, the frontier of New England was kept in terror by a few

* 15th of October, 1703, N. Y. Hist. Doc., Vol. IX., p. 755.

hundred Indians. Boston would not understand the necessity of keeping up a force of trained soldiers in forts on well chosen sites, under experienced and capable commanders. The authorities acted on the principle that, a few men taken from the fields, or from their trades, and marched directly to the front, were competent for defence; and that an officer, whose chief merit was that he had political influence, was a fit person to command. Nevertheless, the French policy of making the country untenable through the settlers' fears had failed; for the ground was tenaciously held by the hardy population of Massachusetts, and not an acre of land had been abandoned.

De Vaudreuil gave these raids his support. In the winter of 1703-1704 he organized the attack on Deerfield, the most northern settlement of Massachusetts on the River Connecticut. The party advanced up Lake Champlain and ascended the tributary Ouinoisqui* to its sources, and thence descended to the River Connecticut. They followed that river on the ice, until the settlement was reached. On the 29th of February Deerfield was surprised and attacked, the population killed, or carried away as prisoners. The narrative of the expedition will be included in the events which took place in Acadia.

Severe sickness had passed over Canada: the small-pox had been prevalent, and had continued its ravages until the middle of 1703. Nevertheless, twenty canoes of Western Indians arrived at Montreal for the purpose of traffic. Several Hurons, under the guidance of a chief known as *Quarante Sols*, had established themselves in the neighbourhood of Detroit, and the French had reason to believe, that, although this chief expressed attachment to them, he was desirous of entering into trade relations with the English through the Miamis. De Vaudreuil had formed a strong prejudice against the post at Detroit. He considered that it offered facilities for commerce with the English; it was his opinion that the place could only be held by a large garrison, and the expense

* In modern times known as Onion River. It falls into Lake Champlain a few miles north of Burlington.

of maintenance would prove burdensome. His policy was that of de Champigny, that trade should seek the cities of the colony, and that advanced posts were mischievous. He considered that the population in Canada was too limited for settlement to be permitted in the West ; even if its number had been greater, the contrary view would have found no favour either at Versailles or Quebec.

The Ottawas in the neighbourhood of Detroit became unmanageable, shewing a spirit hostile to the Iroquois ; the Miamis were similarly affected. Influenced by this enmity, the Senecas and Onondagas began to doubt whether peace were possible, but Joncaire and Father Vailant succeeded in calming this feeling ; and, commissioned by the Senecas, they both descended to Montreal, to complain to de Vaudreuil of the hostility of the Ottawas, and to ask satisfaction.

The chiefs of the Five Nations were summoned to Albany, to consider the policy of declining to allow Roman Catholic missionaries to remain among them, and with the view of inducing them to join in resisting the attacks of the Abenakis in New England. They desired to obtain the consent of the Western tribes to pass through their territory to trade with Albany ; but no result was attained, and the meeting was adjourned.

While Joncaire was active among the Senecas, de Longueuil, with the Onondagas, was engaged on a similar mission ; he had taken the place of de Maricourt, who had died a short time previously. Both were sons of Charles Le Moyne, and were held in great favour by the tribes. De Vaudreuil desired that these Canadians should be present at Albany during the conferences, for they had been adopted into the tribes, and could by right attend with the other chiefs. As de Vaudreuil promised to obtain satisfaction for the injuries of which the Iroquois complained, and spared no effort to maintain their good feeling, he hoped that the influence of Joncaire and de Longueuil would prevent the adoption of any policy hostile to France.

The authorities at Albany attempted by counter intrigues

to influence the Indians of the Christian settlements in Canada, of which there were three villages: at the Sault Saint Louis; the mountain north of Montreal; and at the Sault au Recollet, north of the island. Schuyler offered them lands in the neighbourhood of Albany, and sent them wampum belts, with the proposition that they should enter into an alliance with the English and commence trade with them, and pledge themselves not to attack the New York settlements. De Ramezay, Governor of Montreal, however, hearing of the attempt, was able to cause the belts to be returned, and the negotiations to be discontinued.*

The Iroquois had flattered themselves that they would be able to act independently of both the French and English, and, by the weight of their partisanship, now thrown on one side, now on the other, to improve their own condition. Their policy towards the two countries differed in its character with regard to each. Their ancient enmity to France, and their distance from Montreal exacted a ceremonious declaration of amity; and the presence of the Roman Catholic missionaries exercised great influence on their relations with Canada. With the English, their attention was given to avoid embarrassing engagements. For the present they expressed the wish for peace, clinging to the neutrality they hoped to be able to observe. They even affected to desire, to aid in establishing friendly intercourse between the two nations.

While the English of New York thoroughly understood the influence of the Roman Catholic missionaries, and objected to their ministrations, they took no means to combat their influence. If they had sent Protestant ministers to satisfy the religious wants of the Iroquois, they would have instructed those they ministered to, and have made some attempt to civilize the race. The devotion of the Roman Catholic missionary, wherever he appeared, immediately made itself felt. His presence was a comfort and a satisfaction to those with whom he lived, even outside the sphere of his religious duty.

* De Vaudreuil and de Beauharnois to the Minister, 17th November, 1704. N.Y. Doc. IX., p. 764.

As a rule he was selected for his ability, and from his fitness for the service he had to perform. There is scarcely a position, which exacts in a greater degree, the union of pre-eminent qualities than that of missionary. He must be of pure life, active, earnest, with judgment and self-control, observant and devoted. The success of the French in their policy towards the Indians was to a remarkable extent, owing to the distinguished ability of the priests selected for this work. Appeal to religious influences, either as a duty or a policy, was neglected by the English; and to this day, on this continent, it is to be feared that the duty is not thoroughly accepted by the Protestants, while the Roman Catholics continue to be impelled by their old traditions to activity and exertion.

The French made every effort to conciliate the Iroquois and maintain them in friendly feeling. A band of Ottawas had attacked some Iroquois near Cataraqui. This wrong was one of the grievances for which redress had been promised. The Ottawas on their way back to Michilimackinac in 1705, bringing their Iroquois prisoners with them, had to pass the fort at Detroit. DeTonty was then in command, in the absence of La Mothe Cadillac, and he demanded their release. On the request not being complied with, although the Ottawas were sustained by some thirty of their countrymen at Detroit, DeTonty directed Vincennes, one of his officers, to obtain them by force. With a party of twenty soldiers from the fort he attacked the Ottawas and delivered the prisoners, who were sent back to their tribe, the Senecas.

In 1704, some of the Abenakis had been induced by de Vaudreuil to remove to Canada, and to settle on the River Becancour, opposite Three Rivers. Their own country was no longer tenable by them. Owing to the repeated massacres which they had committed on the frontiers of New England, hostility was so strongly directed against them, that they held it advisable to establish themselves in Canada, where they were offered protection, to be available for any enterprise, however ruthless its character.

This policy was not generally approved. De Ramezay

wrote to the Minister,* that the settlement had cost much money, and had not been for the interest of the King. The Abenakis had ceased to be at command for any expedition against the English. They had become lazy and dishonest, and already had outraged two women. He considered it necessary for the missionaries skilfully to use their influence, to induce them to return to their old habitations, and he thought that the money expended would have been better employed on the fortifications of Quebec.

When the men who composed the expedition against Deerfield had passed some days in repose, and had recruited their strength, they were again organized for another raid. The settlement to be attacked is not named in the joint despatch of the Canadian authorities, but North Hampton, south of the Piscataqua, was the place designed. The Abenakis were desirous of roving about in small bands, but the chiefs were unwilling to see the tribe divided. Moreover, de Vaudreuil felt it advantageous to keep together a large force of French and friendly Indians, the better to impress the Iroquois with a sense of his strength, and so retain their good feeling. The force was organized under de Beaujours; it consisted of one hundred and twenty-five Canadians, with many of the most active French officers. Including the Indians, there were between seven and eight hundred men present. The customary instructions were given, that, on reaching the height of land, the destination of the column might be changed; it could be directed against any place where an attack could be advantageously made. When near the spot selected, it became known that information had been received of their advance, and that surprise was not possible. The place had been put in condition to receive the assault, and was no longer to be defended by a handful of men resting from their labours. De Vaudreuil in his report states, that the known defection of a deserter caused a panic among the Indians. The explanation cannot be accepted. The inference is more probable, that their scouts brought information that the place would be reso-

* 12th October, 1705.

lutely defended by a strong garrison. Whatever the cause, the Indians declined to advance, and abandoned the main body, to separate into small parties. The French portion of the force, accordingly retreated. This event shews what Massachusetts might have effected on her frontier with prudence, organization, and the maintenance of a few companies of trained men, properly officered. But the community was again lulled into security, and four years later the disaster of Haverhill was to follow.

In 1703, a change was made in the constitution of the Conseil Souverain. When originally established, in 1663, it had consisted of the Governor, the Lieutenant-General, the Bishop of Petrea, and five Councillors, to be appointed conjointly by the Governor and Bishop. It was this joint authority which created the difficulty between de Mésy and the Bishop de Laval, when the difference of view arose as to the advisability of removing members of the Council, and reconstituting it.* In 1675, the number of the members of the Council had been increased to seven;† the appointment of the Councillors was then made by royal authority, independently of the Governor. An ecclesiastic was to be constantly present, either in the person of the Bishop or his representative.

In 1703 a further change was made.‡ Five additional Councillors were appointed, one of whom was to be an ecclesiastic whose special duty was to guard the rights of the Church.§ The Council is named as "le Conseil Supérieur,"|| and was to be composed of the Governor, the Lieutenant-General, the Bishop, the Intendant, and twelve Councillors; eleven laics

* Ante Vol. I., p. 321. † Ante Vol. I., p. 434.

‡ By Royal declaration of the 16th of June. Registered in Canada on the 29th of October, 1703.

§ "entre lesquels il y aura un conseiller clerc, lequel étant toujours en fonction sera plus instruit, et plus à portée de veiller à la conservation des droits de l'Eglise." [Edicts and Ordonnances, I., p. 300.] No ecclesiastic could take the place of the Bishop. The Grand Vicaire could only be present as *Conseiller Clerc* and when attending, would simply rank as Councillor.

|| The declaration is addressed "à nos amés et féaux conseillers, les gens tenant notre dit conseil supérieur."

and one ecclesiastic, and to have the same rights and follow the same proceedings [*séances*] as the Councillors of the Parliament of Paris, with the same fees.

In June, 1704, an "Order" was issued, which sets forth that the King had been informed that the Superior Council of Quebec, in the administration of Justice, did not follow the practice of the Kingdom. Accordingly, he laid down forms of procedure.* De Monseignat signed the registration as Chief Clerk of the Superior Council. It was the title by which the Court was subsequently known, "Le Conseil Supérieur."†

An event happened in the summer of 1705, which in some degree influenced the future of Canada; the capture of the French vessel "La Seine." She left La Rochelle as the

* The Attorney-General was personally to address the Court, on which the president and judges should meet, and discuss the case in private out of hearing of the Attorney-General. When the argument was presented in writing, the Attorney-General should reply in writing, with the right of personally addressing the Court.

† On the 24th of October, 1707, and on the 25th of November, 1709, the term "Conseil Souverain" is retained in the registration of the Royal Edicts: but on the 6th of October, 1710, the words "Conseil Supérieur" are used. [Edicts and Ordonnances, Vol. I., pp. 305, 321, 323.] I have been unable to learn if any special proceedings were taken to enforce the change; whether the use of the word "Souverain" was retained in accordance with custom, or on the theory that it extended greater authority. It is certain, however, that after 1703, the "Conseil Supérieur" was the legal recognised title.

I have to acknowledge my obligations to Mr. J. C. Langelier, of Quebec, who, at my request, was good enough to examine if any authority for the change of title can be found. He has been unable to discover any such instructions, either in the proceedings of the Superior Council, or among the "*Edits, Arrêts et Déclarations des rois.*" He further informs me that the Fifth Volume of the "*Jugements et Délibérations,*" commencing in 1705, will be published as those of the "Conseil Supérieur."

Mr. Langelier has referred me to Mr. Parkman's Old Regime, p. 267, in which the subject is alluded to. On the authority of Cheruel, "*Administration Monarchique en France*" I., p. 100, Mr. Parkman states "that the same change had just been imposed on all the high tribunals of France." Even admitting this fact, Mr. Langelier is of opinion that, some special notification on the subject must have been sent to Canada, although none is known to be extant.

I have equally to thank Mr. F. C. Wurtele, of Quebec, for his assistance in this investigation.

escort of several merchant vessels, carrying a cargo of supplies for Canada to the value of a million of *livres*. Among the passengers was Bishop de Saint Vallier, who had been absent in France since 1700, and several ecclesiastics. On the 26th of July the French vessels met some English ships of war, and a naval action took place ; some of the merchant vessels escaped ; "La Seine" was carried a prize to England. M. de Saint Vallier remained a prisoner there for five years. The English Government offered to exchange him for the Baron de Méan, Provost of the Chapter of Liege, whom Louis XIV. had seized and held in captivity. The offer was not accepted, so the Bishop remained a prisoner.

The capture of "La Seine" caused much distress in Canada ; for, owing to the loss of the cargo, the country was without clothing and many necessaries. Until this date, no effort had been directed to the culture of textile plants, and the growth of flax and hemp had been neglected. It was in this emergency that attention was turned to them, so that the country should in itself possess resources to supply its requirements. Madame de Repentigny is especially named among those who endeavoured to introduce among the humbler classes the means of supplying themselves with these essentials, by weaving coverings, blankets and a heavy drugget, obtained from the wool of the Canadian sheep. The fibre of a nettle* was found to make a cloth which, if deficient in fineness, possessed strength. A substitute for flax and hemp was sought in the bark of the white wood and the cotton tree. The experience of this want of flax and hemp subsequently led to their cultivation, and the privations arising from the capture of "La Seine" were the cause of a relaxation of the regulations previously enforced with regard to home manufactures. France hitherto had insisted on the right of supplying Canada with every manufactured article ; the law forbade their production in Canada. Even the wool gathered on the Saint Lawrence was shipped to France, to be returned in the form of coarse

* See note at the end of chapter.

cloth, and all clothing necessarily was exceedingly expensive in the colony.

In the midst of the trouble arising from the loss of "La Seine," changes took place in the Government. M. de Beauharnois, having been named Intendant General of the Marine in France, M. Raudot, who had been previously a Councillor of the Board of Excise,* was appointed his successor, and arrived in September. He had under his immediate control the administration of justice and the proclamation, and enforcement of the ordinances of police. M. Raudot was accompanied by his son, a young man of twenty-five, to whom was assigned the duties relating to finance. On their arrival, M. de Vaudreuil was officially installed, for, until that date, his commission had not reached Quebec, and had not been registered.

One of the last events which M. de Beauharnois had to report to France, was the destruction of the Seminary of Quebec. Four years previously, in November, 1701, it had been destroyed by fire, when the pupils were out for a holiday, the few priests left behind being at vespers. One person only was in charge of the building, and he had made a fire that the room might be warm on the return of the boys. A burning log fell on the pine floor, and the building was soon in flames. Fears were even entertained for the church, but the connection between the buildings was torn down, and the fire was confined to the Seminary. The walls, which were of massive stone, on the whole remained but little injured. During the succeeding four years, the walls had been restored, and, where necessary, rebuilt. The interior was on the point of completion, when, owing to the carelessness of a workman with his pipe, that fruitful source of loss of life and property by fire and explosions in mines, the flames burst forth in a room where the carpenters had been working. In a few hours the whole building was in ashes. M. de Laval, then eighty-two years old, had his residence in the Seminary, and was assisted from

* Cour des Aides.

it to be taken to the Jesuits' College, in which he passed the last three years of his life.

It is at this time, we meet the name of one who was to play a leading part during the ensuing years, pre-eminently distinguished by ability, who early perceived that the power of the English colonies lay in their union, and that if they were to pursue a career of prosperity and peace, it was necessary for them to combine their scattered strength, to withstand the advance of French power. It was owing in no small degree to his efforts that the first important steps were taken in this direction. They were inoperative at the time, from many circumstances, but they were the forerunners of that union which, half a century later, was to work such important results. I allude to Samuel Vetch.

He was the third child of a minister of the Church of Scotland, and was born on the 27th of December, 1668. The family were extreme Presbyterians, and had been more or less implicated in the troubles of the time. Involved in the Rye House plot, the father had sought refuge on the Continent. Samuel and his elder brother were educated at Utrecht. Both joined William in his expedition to Torbay, in 1688. When the 26th Regiment, the Cameronians, was raised, the elder brother obtained a commission in the regiment, as Samuel did at a later date. It was composed of stern Puritans, carrying to excess their religious principles, in defence of which, they gave memorable proof of their mettle and courage at Dunkeld, on the 21st of August, 1689, in the action which terminated the first Jacobite attempt in Scotland.

Having this experience, Vetch proceeded with the regiment to the Continent. He was present at the terrible fight of Steinkirk, the 3rd of August, 1692, and of Landen, the 26th of July, 1693. He served until the Treaty of Ryswick, in 1697. In 1698 he joined the ill-fated scheme of Paterson to colonize the Isthmus of Darien, and, on the capitulation of those engaged in it, went to New York. He there attracted the attention of Lord Bellomont. On the 20th of Sep-

tember, 1700, he married a daughter of Robert Livingston, Secretary for Indian Affairs, and was thrown into the centre of New York politics. Becoming engaged in trade, he was interested in a vessel proceeding to Quebec with a cargo of wine and brandy, which was wrecked off Rhode Island. He became involved in a charge of illicit dealing. His name appears to the petition to the King, charging Lord Bellomont with partiality and corruption. For the next two years of his life he was resident at Boston, and it was at the desire of Dudley, then Governor of Massachusetts, that he proceeded to Canada on a special mission.

After the assault on Deerfield, in February, 1704, Dudley wrote to de Vaudreuil that, although he looked for war, he expected that it would be carried on in accordance with the Christian religion, and not against poor peasants, women and children, many of whom had been dragged into cruel captivity; that he had two hundred prisoners whom, they themselves said, he had fed better than they were treated in France, and had sent them back; while at this time de Vaudreuil had made it a glory "to massacre my poor women and children." * Such conduct in Europe would be held to be barbarous. Dudley called upon de Vaudreuil to ransom the captives held by the Indians, and return them to him. He, himself, would not want opportunities to treat French prisoners with less consideration than he had shewn, and he also had Indians at his disposal to destroy them.

He again wrote to de Callières, calling attention to his first letter. He was sorry to hear that the Indians in the service of the French were so much their masters, that they could not be restrained. † He asked for good treatment of the English prisoners. Last year, he had made an exchange with de Brouillan. He expressed his surprise, on assuming the government, to learn that, in the last war, the French

* 10th of April, 1704. Quebec Doc., Vol. II., p. 411. "Vous avez fait gloire de tirer et de massacrer mes pauvres femmes et enfants."

† 21st of August, 1704. Que. Doc., II., p. 425.

Indians were paid money for every Englishman's scalp, as if Christians were to be looked upon as wild beasts, destined to destruction.*

Dudley, receiving no reply, turned to another channel. His previous letters had been sent by way of Albany. When he again wrote,† his letters were entrusted to the care of two parties, Livingston and Shedden. He stated that he had one hundred and fifty prisoners, and, as many of his captives belonged to Port Royal, he proposed Penobscot should be the place of exchange. If this proposal were not accepted, he asked, as it was winter, for a letter to be sent overland to Casco Bay, naming the time and place, where the exchange should be made.

Early in 1705,‡ de Vaudreuil acknowledged the three letters. He received Livingston courteously, and expressed willingness to arrange for the exchange of prisoners. But, as Dudley was controlled by his Legislature, de Vaudreuil asked to be given some assurance, that the return of the French prisoners would certainly follow the arrival of such as he would send. He himself was supreme in Canada, and could

* I must enter my protest against the course taken by the editor of the Quebec Collection of documents, in appending a partisan note to this statement. The duty of a person in his position is to be punctiliously free from any such impropriety. In not the best of French, he remarks : " L'écrivain oublie ici, que les Anglois payaient pour les chevelures pour les prisonniers de guerre des sommes trois fois plus fortes que ne payaient les Français." [*Voyez plus bas.*] [Vol. II., p. 426.] The note does not state the truth. There is no record of the authorities in the English colonies having deliberately planned and effected the destruction of women and children, or even of having proposed such a policy. The Legislatures of Massachusetts and New Hampshire offered a bounty of twenty pounds for every *Indian* prisoner under ten years of age, and forty pounds for every older prisoner or his scalp. The mode of warfare followed by the Abenakis led to this policy. Massachusetts committed many errors, but cruelty of reprisal cannot be counted among them. Dudley's words are remarkable, as shewing how free from all accusation in this respect the Province stood. I copy the translation : " Je ne saurois accorder que l'on prétende que les prisonniers soient laissez entre les mains des Sauvages, parce que je ne souffre pas qu'un sauvage me dise qu'un prisonnier chrétien est à sa disposition." Que. Doc. II., p. 426.

† 20th of December, 1704.

‡ 26th of March.

keep his promise.* He dealt lightly with the reproaches of Dudley, claiming that the French had never assassinated any person in cold blood, as the commander of the English fleet had killed Gourdault in Acadia. In offering a price for scalps, his predecessors had followed the example set by the English.

De Courtemanche returned with Livingston and Shedden. He was to ask that the French prisoners were to be sent to Port Royal, and to give a pledge on the part of de Vaudreuil to return the English prisoners, as soon as he should hear of the arrival of those delivered by Dudley. He was to insist that Baptiste, a noted privateer, should be included, or no exchange could take place. He was also to obtain sureties for the return of the prisoners, who had been sent to England and Jamaica, and to ask justice and reparation for the murder of Gourdault and his six men.

The policy adopted by the French towards the English prisoners at this date did not permit them to hold a religious service according to their creed. The spirit of Roman Catholicism under Louis XIV. denied the consolation of prayer to a captive, unless he received it from a Roman Catholic ecclesiastic. While the rigours of the prison were maintained with regard to the stern Protestant, who adhered to his faith, whatever his sufferings, they were mitigated to those who were willing to become proselytes, and to accept the teaching offered them. To an unhappy prisoner, oppressed by hard treatment, deprived of all religious consolation, except such as a strong nature, in the dark hour of despair, can draw from its own prompting, can it be a wonder that several accepted the only solace offered them, and apparently received as the truth, the teachings which were to extend to them ease and liberty? Under the Treaty of Ryswick, such as

* “mais comme vous avez un conseil où vous n’avez que votre voix, et que souvent les sentiments en sont partagés, vous ne devez point trouver mauvais que je prenne des assurances pour les prisonniers que vous me renvoyez, d’autant plus que de mon côté étant seul le maître, je suis toujours en état de tenir la parole que j’aurai donnée.” Que. Doc., Vol. II., p. 430.

these, preferred to remain in Canada. These "conversions," as they were called, were made the matter of special representation to the King, who granted to those professing the new belief, letters of French naturalization. The argument put forth to establish the truth of a doctrine, based upon the abandonment of the faith of their youth, by these unhappy prisoners in the troubles and adversities which oppressed them, must with any candid mind have little weight. No more, in short, than the conduct of the French and English who clung to savage life, establishes that that primitive existence is of a higher order than the teachings and aspirations of civilization and morality.

De Courtemanche arrived at Boston in the beginning of May. He made himself in every way acceptable, and no better person could have been selected for the message. On his return, he was the bearer of letters to Quebec from Dudley, setting forth that no prisoners had been sent to Europe, or to Barbadoes, except by their own desire. He proposed that the exchange should take place at the Island of Mont Desert. Baptiste, he said, was a scoundrel, not worthy that he should be claimed by de Vaudreuil, or retained by Dudley; he would accordingly be included in the number. Dudley declined to repay the money given by the French to the Indians for their English prisoners. If the French permitted the English captives to be held by the Indians, the English would direct similar treatment to be awarded to the French, "so your people will have to accept the life of the savage equally with mine."

Dudley strongly disclaimed that there was any limit to his powers. He had all the just and reasonable authority which an English Governor could desire, and obtained just and reasonable obedience. But his people, by God's grace, were ten times more numerous than the French, which increased the difficulty of government.

De Courtemanche returned by sea, and induced young Dudley, the Governor's son, to accompany him. Captain Vetch also went, on the part of Massachusetts, to aid in the final arrangements. The vessel belonged to Vetch, and it was afterwards made a reproach to him that, he had under-

taken the voyage for no other purpose than to carry on trade with Quebec. De Courtemanche was also the bearer of a pipe of sweet wine,* which Dudley hoped would prove good. He carried with him a copy of a treaty between the Governors of Martinique and the Leeward Islands, to shew that it was in conformity with the treaty which Dudley proposed, so that during the war Massachusetts and Canada should be at peace.

It was with the latter mission that Vetch was more particularly entrusted. Some writers have expressed the belief that Dudley was insincere, and that his only desire was to gain time. Those who follow the correspondence can form no such opinion. It is evident that both de Vaudreuil and Dudley entered into the negotiation with good faith. The difficulty was, that it took a form different from that which in the first instance it presented. Dudley's proposition was confined to Massachusetts, of which he was Governor, and on that basis de Vaudreuil treated. The presence of Vetch in Canada meant no more than this offer. As the negotiations advanced, de Vaudreuil saw that peace with Massachusetts alone, conferred more advantages to that colony than to Canada. Therefore, when he drew up his articles of truce,† of which Vetch was the bearer, he added that the treaty was offered conditionally, on the Governors of New York and the other colonies accepting it, and that it should be signed before the end of February. The answer of Dudley might have been foreseen, that he had no authority to act except for himself, and that the other Governors must be consulted.

The treaty consisted of nine articles: Truce by land and sea; no assistance to be given to any nation with which either was at war, and no hostile passage to be allowed through the territories of either; passports to be granted to vessels desirous of visiting either country; no merchandise to be brought to New France; there was to be free navigation from the Straits of Belleisle to Cape Breton; vessels fishing, or loaded with fish oil, on the coast of New England, on the coast of Acadia,

* Vin de liqueur.

† 6th of October, 1705.

or in the gulf and river of the Saint Lawrence, to be liable to seizure; Indians not to be allowed to hunt in large parties; parties infringing the treaty by violence of conduct to be punished; prisoners to be exchanged, including the Indians held by the English.

Vetch remained at Quebec from August to the middle of October; having ascended the Saint Lawrence to reach that city, and returning the same way. His experience of colonial life in New York and New England must have soon taught him how impossible it was for such a treaty to be accepted. Considering that future hostilities were inevitable, he keenly observed all the points of defence, and where the exposed places lay. Educated at Utrecht, he must have known French well, for the continental politics of Holland were so mixed up with France, that that language formed an important part of education. He had been actively engaged in service since his twenty-first year, and had always mixed in good society. He was now thirty-seven years old, in the prime of life. In after-time, he spoke of the completeness of the knowledge of Canada, which he had obtained. It is certain, that his representations went far to influence the adoption of the offensive operations which followed; that they failed so ignominiously at the threshold of the enterprise cannot be made a reproach to him.

Vetch visited Montreal, and de Ramezay wrote to the Minister on the subject, complaining that in Quebec he had been left at liberty to obtain all the information desired; whereas, in Montreal, de Ramezay had taken care that he should always be accompanied by an officer and an interpreter.* There had been old dealings between Vetch and de Ramezay. Vetch, when engaged in his commercial operations four years previously, had advanced de Ramezay the amount of his appointments, paying him in card currency, and had received authority to draw his money in France. The war broke out, and the power to obtain the money had been again given by de Ramezay to another person in France. It was the object

* Quebec Documents, Vol. II., pp. 447-450.

of Vetch in visiting Montreal to be repaid this advance, but de Ramezay professed himself not in the condition to give it back, without the approval of the Minister.*

De Vaudreuil reported to the King† the negotiation which had taken place between himself and Dudley, and the Minister made some caustic remarks regarding it. He hoped that the negotiation was not an excuse for the two Governors to engage in trade, and he trusted that a knowledge of the country would not be obtained to be used against the French. Owing to the length of time Vetch had stayed in Canada, some twelve weeks, he had applied to be allowed to land merchandise, to the value of one thousand *écus*, in order to pay his expenses. He explained the presence of the merchandise, by stating that he was proceeding with it to St. John's, Newfoundland. The Minister remarked that the goods had not been intended for Newfoundland, as Vetch had stated in his letter; but had been brought to pay the expense of the voyage, in which de Courtemanche had returned to Quebec; and, that by the seizure of ten barrels containing beaver and seal skins, which were being taken on board the ship, it was plain that Vetch not only desired to pay his debts, but to trade in furs.

At the end of April, de Vaudreuil, with Raudot, reported to Versailles Dudley's reply, that he must confer with the Governors of the other provinces, and had not been able to do so. De Vaudreuil, conceiving the proceedings had been taken to gain time, had allowed several small parties to start to make war on New England territory. It was a policy, he said, which would have a good effect on the English; for it would bring them to terms, and would be profitable to the Indians, who, owing to the dearness of merchandise, and the cheapness of furs, were quite naked, and would clothe themselves at the expense of Massachusetts.

Dudley sent fifty-seven prisoners to Port Royal; de Vaudreuil despatched forty-three prisoners, to be forwarded to

* "lequel [de Ramezay] n'est pas en état de la rendre à present sans l'approbation de Monseigneur." Quebec Doc. II., p. 448.

† 19th of October, 1705.

Boston, to be withheld until all French prisoners, without distinction, were released, a condition which included the Indian captives. Baptiste, the privateer captain, and one Fenoe, were not produced. De Vaudreuil, while demanding these conditions, entered into no engagement on the subject of the English held by the Abenakis; all he would undertake was to endeavour to obtain their release. There is allusion to money matters between de Vaudreuil and Dudley, difficult to explain. De Vaudreuil mentions that Shedden had obtained 750 *livres* on the draft given him by Dudley, to be repaid by the latter to Louis Marchand, specially sent in a vessel to Boston. If any opinion can be formed on such meagre evidence, it suggests a relationship between the Governors, of the character to which de Ponchartrain had alluded.

De Vaudreuil, in his letters to the Minister, was careful to justify himself. During the whole period of French rule, letters were constantly sent to France, impugning the motives and characters of public men of every rank and condition. Nearly every official in a prominent position was the writer of such letters; his criticisms were broadcast, with little regard to where they fell. De Vaudreuil took the course of calling upon his mother-in-law, Madame de Marson, to ask the Minister's permission to confer with him on de Vaudreuil's behalf.

The Iroquois, although not changing their attitude, were dissatisfied; no satisfaction had been given for the chief killed by the Ottawas near Cataraqui. The latter tribe, whether misjudging the passive policy of the Iroquois, or urged on by their old enmity, were desirous of engaging in war. De Vaudreuil, to pacify this feeling, sent up a younger brother of de Louvigny to Michilimackinac. He was successful in obtaining some Iroquois held there as prisoners, whom he brought away. The Iroquois, summoned to receive these members of their tribe, attended at Montreal, to set forth their cause of complaint against the Ottawas. After some delay, a deputation of the Ottawas also appeared, who asked pardon for having attacked the Iroquois on Canadian territory. They

engaged to give the satisfaction demanded, by ceding some of the prisoners taken from the more western tribes, to replace the Iroquois they had killed. Father Marest returned with them to enforce, as he best could, the observance of this condition.

The quarrel which broke out between the Miamis and Ottawas, threatened to cause greater difficulty. The fear was that a local tribal war would turn the whole West into an Indian battle-field of race, and that the Iroquois would take part in the contest. The West was the source whence Canada received her furs, the staple of her trade, and the effort was unceasing to prevent their passage to Albany. War between any of the tribes would exercise the most depressing influences, and the greatest watchfulness was put forth to prevent any such contingency. The Ottawas in this case were the complainants. They represented to de La Mothe Cadillac, the commandant at Detroit, that the Miamis had killed several of their people. They were told that justice would be done them. Shortly after, de Cadillac left for Quebec, without steps having been taken to give the satisfaction demanded; but he had said that they could have nothing to fear, so long as his wife remained at the fort. Madame de Cadillac, shortly afterwards, left to join her husband, and much significance was attached by the Ottawas to her departure.

De Tonty, the lieutenant of de Cadillac, had been replaced by a sergeant named Bourgmont, with little experience of Indian character. The departure of Madame de Cadillac caused the Ottawas anxiety, and they looked upon the event as the forerunner of the attack they dreaded. In answer to their expostulations with Bourgmont on the subject, they received the most discouraging replies. In order to gain their confidence, Bourgmont proposed that they should join with the Miamis, the Iroquois, and the Hurons, in a war against the Sioux. The Ottawas regarded the Miamis as the enemies who had killed their people, without reparation for the injury. The Iroquois were their ancient foes, and, accordingly, they considered the proposal to be a plot for their destruction.

With the Indian mind, suspicion frequently becomes conviction; in this case their sensitiveness was increased by the false reports which, without investigation, they believed. Accepting the situation as fraught with peril, they discussed among themselves the necessity of attacking the Miamis, and anticipating the threatened danger. The older chiefs thought that the best course would be to ask Bourgmont for explanations; the younger, influenced by a chief named Le Pesant, were encouraged to take active measures. It was agreed that they would appear to prepare for the expedition against the Sioux, but, on the first opportunity, would attack the Miamis.

An incident led them to act on this impulse. A deputation went to the fort, to ask if news had been received from Montreal. Bourgmont in no way understood the significance of the question. One of the Ottawas passing through the courtyard, being bitten by a dog, struck the animal. Bourgmont, attracted by the yelping, ran out, and attacked the Indian so savagely that, in a few days he died from the injuries he had received. The Ottawas came to the conclusion that, if they were to escape the plot formed against them, they should no longer delay taking steps for their own protection.

Pretending to take part in the expedition against the Sioux the march was commenced, the chiefs only being in the secret of what had been determined. At a short distance a halt was made, when the true design was declared; upon which the main body returned towards the fort, in the direction of the Miami village established in its neighbourhood. Meeting six Miamis, they attacked and killed five of them; one escaped, and his cries alarmed those left in the village, who immediately sought protection in the fort. They were pursued by the Ottawas, and, as the latter were looked upon as the cause of the tumult, the fire of the fort guns was directed against them, and several were killed. Father Constantine, a Recollet, the almoner, was at the time returning with some soldiers, and, coming within range, was also killed. In the skirmish which followed, thirty Ottawas fell. The main body

retired to their village; the attack was not resumed, and the Ottawas proceeded to Michilimackinac, where others of the tribe were domiciled.

La Mothe Cadillac, and his family, returned from Montreal with a convoy of provisions, and some additional force to make his presence unmistakeably felt.

The complications in this quarrel increased. The Iroquois, whether pondering on old feelings or excited by new causes, having resolved to attack the Ottawas, sent a deputation to de Vaudreuil to announce their determination. The Governor resolutely told them such a course could not be permitted. The Ottawas despatched messengers from Michilimackinac, to declare that they were encamped at that place, and would defend themselves if driven to do so. It was the endeavour of de Vaudreuil to quiet the storm. Joncaire was sent to the Iroquois, while a message was despatched to the Ottawas, in which they were reproved, but at the same time assured of French protection. De Cadillac was called upon to exercise caution, and to watch the situation carefully. He had, however, taken a step which threatened to increase the trouble. As he was ascending the river, he heard of the events which had happened at the fort; and when in the neighbourhood of the Seneca country, fearing that his own force was not sufficient for the emergency, he had enlisted the aid of one hundred and twenty of that tribe, who accompanied him to Detroit.

The presence of the Iroquois did not tend to quiet the sensitiveness of the Ottawas; and when summoned at Michilimackinac to attend at Detroit, they replied that they had no business to take them there, and would send chiefs of their tribe to Montreal to give an account of the late proceedings. As there was no prospect of the services of the Senecas being required, de Cadillac after satisfying them, not without difficulty induced them to return home.

In June, 1707, the Ottawas arrived at Montreal. The chief, Le Blanc, was the spokesman, and he endeavoured to justify what had taken place. De Vaudreuil demanded the surrender

of Le Pesant, as the cause of the difficulty; but his tribe would not abandon him. The Governor insisted on his surrender, and the Ottawas were told that they had committed a crime against the community of nations, and must make reparation at the spot where it had been committed. Le Pesant was eventually given up to de Cadillac, with the understanding that no ulterior steps would be taken. As a matter of form, he was put in irons, but, on the prayer of the chiefs for his pardon, he was set free.

If the Ottawas were satisfied with this clemency, it was the reverse with the Miamis, who demanded the sacrifice of Le Pesant. De Cadillac however would only consent that Le Pesant should be retained at Detroit. The Miamis shewed their resentment of this forbearance to the extent of killing three Frenchmen in the neighbourhood of the fort. At one time it seemed probable that war would be declared against the Miamis; but war in the West was of all things the most dreaded, and accommodation of every difficulty was sought, so that it might be averted. De Vaudreuil, while reporting * to the Minister the high-sounding language which he had used, that French blood was not to be paid for by beavers and belts, and that only obedience to his commands and reliance on his benevolence would be of avail, laid down the principle that the interests of the colony called for peace among the Indian nations, and that every means must be sought to obtain it.

At Detroit, de Cadillac acted on this principle. His first intention had been to chastise the Miamis, and preparations were made for an expedition against them. They shewed themselves willing to satisfy his demands, and in his desire to avoid hostilities he accepted their explanations, and agreed to terms of peace. The result did not meet his anticipation, for the insolence of the Miamis so increased, that de Cadillac felt constrained to take measures to coerce them. His force, consisting of French and Indians, about four hundred in number, attacked the Miamis who had entrenched themselves. Their defence was not of long duration, and they submitted

* 24th July, 1707.

to his terms, that they should not act in opposition to the policy of the French, nor engage in hostile operations against other tribes.

During the summer of 1707, Clérambault d'Aigremont received special instructions to visit some of the western posts.* His report throws much light on the condition of Canada west of Montreal. At Cataraqui the Iroquois village consisted of six cabins. De Tonty† was the commandant. The chiefs complained that they could obtain no consideration without giving peltry to the commandant. The commissary was de la Gorgendière, who, when questioned by d'Aigremont, did not bear testimony in de Tonty's favour. Three canoes of the Mississaguets had lately arrived. De Tonty had obtained beaver from them, by giving them brandy, and his treatment so displeased them that they left to carry their furs to the English. He sold brandy to the soldiers at eight *livres* the measure, which in Montreal cost five *deniers*, and he extorted money from the pay of the men on pretence of discount. Notwithstanding his frauds, de Tonty was greatly in debt. The advantages derived from the fort were recognised, but a greater number of Iroquois settlers were reported as desirable; and the impolicy of allowing the English to obtain any foothold on Lake Ontario was forcibly represented.

At Niagara, d'Aigremont was met by Joncaire, when the policy of constructing a fort was discussed. Joncaire pointed out that several Iroquois would establish themselves in the neighbourhood. The French would thus always be kept informed of what was taking place in the Seneca villages, and the preparation for an adverse expedition would be immediately known. It was believed that the moose, bear and deer-skins would be brought to Niagara by the Iroquois, and that the Miamis would send their furs there. At the same time the beaver would be diverted from Detroit, and, owing to the cheaper rate of English goods, would pass to Albany.

* N. Y. Hist. Doc. IX., pp. 819-824.

† Not Henri, the friend of de La Salle, who died in 1704 at Fort Louis Mobile, but his younger brother, Alphonse.

The use of a schooner on Lake Ontario would, however, cheapen their carriage to Detroit. What was more dwelt upon, was the political importance of Niagara. It was held that in connection with it a fort should be established at La Galette, where all the pork and grain required could be obtained, and, thus the passage of supplies up the tedious and dangerous navigation from Montreal would be avoided. With these establishments, it was suggested that Fort Frontenac might be abandoned, and d'Aigremont considered, that by the establishment of Niagara, La Galette would be preferable. He recommended that de Longueuil or Jonquière should be sent there. The former he believed to be the more capable and disinterested. Jonquière he considered as devoted to his private interests, and he adds sententiously, "private interest is often injurious to public affairs, especially in this colony." Jonquière received from the royal stores powder, lead and other articles, to the value of 2,000 *livres*, to be divided among the Five Nations at his discretion. Many believed that he sold the stores, or received peltry in exchange for them. He had brought down last year two canoes full of furs. D'Aigremont did not know if de Vaudreuil had any share in the venture, but he was under the impression that de Vaudreuil was interested in trade. The Indians were allowed to obtain *eau de vie* at Montreal, and much merchandise was sent up to Michilimackinac in the canoes carrying the supplies for the missionaries. The canoes were furnished by de Vaudreuil, and it was believed the venture was his own, in connection with de Cadillac.

D'Aigremont was particularly severe against La Mothe Cadillac, who, he asserted, was hated by the troops, the *habitants* and the Indians, all of whom regarded him as a man led by personal considerations. De Cadillac had proposed the formation of companies of Indians, regularly officered; d'Aigremont expressed himself strongly against the project, which he conceived to have been suggested from motives of personal aggrandisement.

The letter of d'Aigremont did not fail to work its effect.

De Tonty was removed from Cataraqui. The advantages of an establishment at La Galette were recognised ; it was not held expedient to construct any fort at Niagara. De Cadillac had foreseen difficulty from the visit of d'Aigremont, and had felt it necessary to anticipate his report. He had written to Versailles that d'Aigremont had not passed sufficient time at Detroit, to appreciate the explanations which de Cadillac had submitted. The Minister, in his letter to d'Aigremont, expressed the opinion that de Cadillac looked more to his own advantage than to the good of the colony ; adding that it was the intention of the King to recall the troops, and to leave de Cadillac to do with the fort as he saw fit. This design was not executed. De Cadillac had pointed out that it was desirable some means of communication should be established between Lakes Ontario and Erie ; accordingly, instructions were given for an examination to be made of the project, and the post at Michilimackinac was ordered to be maintained.

Finally came those instructions which nearly every official of any standing received, to supply secretly irresponsible information, even to the vilifying his superior or brother officials. "You can, without fear, inform me what intrigues you hear are being carried on, about M. de Vaudreuil, and the principal officers of the country. You owe that to the confidence I repose in you. You need not fear that I will compromise you." * .

In 1708, the attack of Haverhill took place, on the 29th of August. I will in another place relate the details of it. This expedition had the effect of awakening Massachusetts to the necessity of organization and effort. Viewed from this standing point alone, the impolicy of these raids becomes manifest. They obtained no result, while they awoke intense, undying enmity. The indignation they caused was communicated to the mother country, and, in connection with the

* De Ponchartrain to d'Aigremont, Versailles, 6th of July, 1709. Who can wonder at the spirit of intrigue traceable in French Canada to the last ? Never was there such ground for the application of Pascal's saying, " Si chacun savait ce que chacun disait, il n'y aurait pas d'amitié."

American provinces, a policy of aggression was determined upon, which proved fatal to Canada. From the imbecility, and incompetence of the New England commanders, failure had hitherto resulted. But the end was certain ; to be consummated in the ordinary life of a man ; for, in less than half a century, the contest was ended, and New France on the northern part of the continent became no more than a past fact of history.

THE TEXTILE PLANTS OF THE DOMINION.

With the exception of hemp and flax, no fibre plant is cultivated and brought into use in the Dominion. I am indebted for the following information to Mr. James Fletcher, whose labours in Botany and Entomology have, in connection with the Government experimental farms, obtained honourable recognition.

The American lime, [*Tilia Americana*] or Bass wood, is closely allied to the European Linden, of which the bast, or inner bark, is manufactured into matting, cordage, and hassocks for churches. It is made into door-mats, and employed by gardeners for protection of plants from frost, also to shade greenhouses from the sun. Strips of bast are, to a great extent, used in Europe for tying up plants and for purposes when coarse string is required; and, from being wider than string, it does not cut tender plants, while, from being tough and light, it is serviceable in this form. The Russian and Swedish peasantry weave the fibre into coarse cloth for ordinary clothing. In the Southern counties of England ropes are made from it. It is also used for making fishing nets. One of Cicero's MS. is said to have been written upon the inner bark of the lime-tree.

The French word *ortie* is translated by the English word "nettle," with which there is an affinity to the word "needle," that with which one sews. It was the nettle which supplied the thread in former times to the northern European nations, and even in the seventeenth century was applied to that purpose in Scotland. It yields one of the best fibres for textile purposes. In Sowerby's English Botany we find the following passage:—"Campbell, complaining of the little attention paid to it in England, says:—'In Scotland I have eaten nettles, I have slept in nettle sheets, and I have dined off a nettle table-cloth. The young and tender nettle is an excellent pot herb. The stalks of the old nettle are as good as flax for making cloth. I have heard my mother say that she thought nettle cloth was more durable than any other species of linen; the fibre being produced in less quantity than that of flax, and being somewhat difficult to extract, accounts perhaps for the fact that it is but little used in Britain, though in some countries it is still employed.'" There are two species of the nettle in Eastern Canada, either of which may have been brought into use in the eighteenth century: *Urtica gracilis*, a tall species, not uncommon in many localities, and *Laportea Canadensis*, an abundant plant in low woodlands.

The *Cotonnier* is the name given by French Canadians to the milk-weeds, of which genus there are several species. *Asclepias Cornuti* and *A. incarnata*, both of which are common, produce a fine fibre. They are herbaceous, perennial plants, attaining a height of about three feet, and bear showy, sweetly scented blossoms.

Mr. Fletcher's information suggests that the subject of Canadian textiles should be examined by those competent to estimate their commercial value, for, if capable of being profitably worked, we are neglecting a valuable industry.

CHAPTER V.

Vetch's observations in Canada had shewn him the limited character of her resources. The population was something more than 17,000 souls, and several hundred of the younger men were with the western tribes of Indians beyond the lakes. The fortifications of Quebec were then of no formidable character, and although the Canadian militia were capable of good service in irregular operations, and in expeditions where endurance was called for, they were without the higher discipline so necessary in a continuous campaign, when something more important than a raid is attempted. The sagacity of Vetch early suggested to him the power which the British Provinces* possessed from their population and resources. The difficulty was to induce the Northern Provinces to consider a policy in any other light, than according to the extent it would affect the personal interests of their inhabitants. They could

* The style "Great Britain" was first adopted the 1st of May, 1707. The Articles of Union between England and Scotland were signed by the Commissioners of both Kingdoms, the 22nd of July, 1706. On the 3rd of October, the last Scottish Parliament met, when the articles were ratified. Towards the close of the year tumults occurred in Edinburgh, and some of the other towns in Scotland, secretly fomented by the Jacobites. The Articles were ratified in England on the 6th of March, 1707. On the 1st of May, the Queen attended a solemn service at Saint Paul's. It was a day of thanksgiving, and never in our history has there been cause for more devout feeling. A few days afterwards, the title "Great Britain" was adopted. On the 23rd of October, 1707, the first parliament of Great Britain met. [These dates are old style.]

In the present crisis in the history of the empire, the perusal of the Royal Speech on the occasion of the assent being given to the measure may, to some extent, throw oil on the troubled waters of political strife.

"It is with the greatest Satisfaction, that I have given my Assent to a Bill for Uniting *England and Scotland* into One Kingdom.

"I consider this UNION, as a Matter of the greatest Importance to the Wealth, Strength, and Safety of the whole Island; and, at the same Time, as a Work of so much Difficulty and Nicety in its own Nature, that till now, all Attempts which have been made towards it, in the Course of above a Hundred

not recognise the necessity of union of strength and purpose, or of moulding the hardy population into disciplined soldiers. They could not understand that by some sacrifices of the present, a rich reward lay in the future, if not for themselves, for their children.

Had there been such accord, the strength of British America would have earlier made itself felt. It required some extraordinary influence to call out this latent feeling. There was no desire on the part of the British colonist to be aggressive. His one thought was to extend trade, and to live quietly and prosperously. In New York, the effort to establish trade relations with the western lakes had been defeated: but the immense extent of the richest soil in the valley of the Hudson, blessed with a fine climate, would for years have sufficed to satisfy the demand of settlement. Albany and Schenectady were frontier posts of trade, and it was not until a quarter of a century later that the valley of the Mohawk attracted attention. There was no collision between New York and Canada. The one ground of dispute was the position of friendliness or antagonism which the Iroquois were to assume to each of them respectively. Each government spared no effort to maintain its influence. There was likewise the desire of both to obtain the furs of the West; and the cheapness of English goods gave the British colonist an advantage, against which the French could with difficulty contend.

New York, however, could not forget the attack upon Schenectady. It was strongly felt that the province was as

Years, have prov'd ineffectual; and, therefore, I make no doubt, but it will be remember'd and spoke of hereafter, to the Honour of those who have been instrumental in bringing it to such a happy Conclusion.

"I desire, and expect from all my Subjects of both Nations, that from henceforth they act with all possible Respect and Kindness to one another; that so it may appear to all the World they have Hearts disposed to become One People.

"This will be a great Pleasure to Me; and will make us quickly sensible of the good Effect of this UNION.

"And I cannot but look upon it as a peculiar Happiness, that, in my Reign, so full a Provision is made for the Peace and Quiet of my People."

The Reign of Queen Anne. Boyer, p. 283.

open to onslaught by way of Lake Champlain by winter as when the lake could be navigated. It did not add to the general security to know that, with this exposed point on the frontier, there was an enemy to the north, possessing courage and endurance to carry out the most difficult enterprise; but the feeling with regard to such an attack was strongest at Albany. The general population of the province was led by the one sentiment, that no one was called upon to make any sacrifice or exertion, in advance of his daily duty of striving to increase his individual prosperity, and to obtain political status and power.

In New England, the destructive power of New France had been brought to the comprehension of every person on the sea-board in the Northern settlements. Privateers had seized her shipping; her fishermen had been driven from the seas where they sought a catch, or their vessels and cargoes seized and confiscated; if a crew in distress had sought refuge in some cove, or if land had been visited for wood and water, and the crew were too weak for their own protection, bands of Abenakis or Micmacs had surprised and killed them. Settlers on the northern New England territory, in single homesteads and in villages, had been attacked in the dead of night to be killed, or while the grey of the morning struggled with the light of the burning houses, to be carried away captive by bands of Canadians and Indians; attacks, which had lasted for twenty years. The King Philip war, which had raged from 1674 to 1676, had been stamped out; but the Abenaki feud was unending. When pressed by numbers, they took refuge in Canada; and it was from their villages on the Saint Francis and the Becancour, that they were incited to these forays. It was to Canada these attacks were traceable, for it was there the perpetrators of them found protection.

Vetch, on his return from Canada, dwelt on the chances Canada offered for being assailed. He had there learned all the circumstances of Phips' expedition, and formed the conclusion that not simply vigour and courage, but professional skill and capacity were required for any enterprise against Quebec to

succeed. He had seen the poverty of Canada: the admitted powerless condition of France to assist the colony was known, and he formed the conviction that a thoroughly organized expedition against Quebec must attain its end. In 1708 he went to England. He arrived at a time when the proposition to destroy French power in North America could not fail to gain attention, when sustained by reliable and detailed information. The war on the Continent had continued for six years with an uninterrupted series of successes. Marlborough had steadily advanced in his career of victory. Blenheim and Ramilies had been won. Sir John Leake had raised the siege of Gibraltar the year after its capture, and, while Vetch was in London, the news arrived of the victory of Oudenarde.

Vetch's proposition for an expedition against Canada to be undertaken by a British fleet and army, the colonies to contribute their quota of men, obtained favour; and it was resolved that 3,000 British troops should be sent, sustained by a powerful fleet. Early in January, 1709, Vetch was despatched in a frigate to New York, with instructions to the several governments; Massachusetts and Rhode Island were to put in the field 1,200 men, Connecticut 350, New York 800, New Jersey 200, Pennsylvania 150. To increase the good disposition of the North American provinces, those engaging in the enterprise were promised, in the event of success, special advantages with regard to trade and possession of the soil.

By May, the troops of Massachusetts and Rhode Island were ready at Boston. Vetch had been directed to shew his instructions to Colonel Nicholson, who was to join as "a volunteer," and Vetch was to introduce Nicholson at the Councils held with the several Governors.

A plan of operations was formed. Nicholson, with the troops collected at Albany, amounting to fifteen hundred men, was to advance by Lake Champlain to the attack of Montreal. Three months' provisions were to be obtained, and deposited at Wood's Creek, a tributary of the Lake, accessible by a portage from the Hudson. Vetch, with the rank of

Colonel, in command of the New England troops, was to accompany the naval expedition to the Saint Lawrence. Several English officers had left England with Vetch, to be distributed among the newly raised battalions. Flat-bottomed boats, each capable of landing sixty men, were built, and eight months' provisions obtained.

Francis Nicholson, who was to command the expedition from Albany, had been some years in America. In 1688, he had been appointed by James II., Lieutenant-Governor of New York, when Andros was Governor. He had endeavoured to oppose the Revolution, and complaints of him had been sent to England by the militia. In 1689 he was deputed by the Council to proceed to England to report to the King the condition of affairs in New York. During his stay in London, Colonel Bayard, a prominent personage in New York politics, wrote to him with regularity, and in one of his letters* recommended an attack on Canada. It was probably owing to Nicholson bringing this subject to the notice of the Lords of Trade, that he was subsequently appointed Commander of the Forces; for "he had not seen troops in the field in his life."† Nicholson was subsequently Governor of Maryland. In 1700, he visited New York, when he endeavoured to establish a common standard of currency for all the Provinces, and in 1703 became Governor of Virginia.

When the expedition was determined on, Lord Lovelace was Governor of New York and New Jersey. Colonel Nicholson was specially mentioned in the dispatch announcing the expedition, as one with whom the Governor should confer in company with Vetch. They were both of great assistance in obtaining the grant of £3,000 from the New Jersey House of Assembly. All the Quakers voted against the bills. New

* "Its, therefore, most certaine that these English Collonies will never be at rest or safe till those ill designes of the French be stifled, by the subdueing and invading of Canida, which easily might be accomplished with some small assistance from England, by Water from New Yorke and by land from hence."

Albany, 5th August, 1689. N.Y. Hist. Doc., III., pp. 611-12.

† The expression of Governor Hunter. 18th October, 1714. N. Y. Hist. Doc., V., p. 451.

York raised £14,000. Pennsylvania would do nothing by reason of the principles professed by the members of the Legislature.

During these negotiations, Lord Lovelace died;* and was succeeded as Governor by Mr. Robert Hunter. The preparations were energetically persevered in, and every effort made to place the troops in readiness. Events, however, determined that the expedition could not be carried out. The troops remained at their quarters in Boston, daily expecting the arrival of the ships. The month of September came, and the fleet had not appeared. Vetch, considering that the season was passed when the attack could be made, called a meeting of the Provincial Governors at Rhode Island. Shortly after the conference, a vessel arrived from England, on the 11th of October, to inform the Colonial authorities that it had been necessary to send the troops to Portugal,† and that the enterprise must be postponed. The Colonial governors were left to determine if they would send an expedition against Nova Scotia with the force they possessed. As the Commander of the British men-of-war on the station would not entertain the proposition, the New England troops returned to their homes.

Nicholson advanced towards Lake Champlain, his force increased by a large body of Indians. Excepting the Senecas, who had been influenced by Joncaire, the remaining Iroquois

* Lord Lovelace had been appointed in the place of Lord Cornbury, the 28th of March, 1708: he died on the 6th of May, 1709, from a severe cold caught on the man-of-war in which he had taken his passage. One of his sons died before him. His eldest son and successor a fortnight afterwards. Hist. Doc. N. Y., Vol. V., p. 39.

† The Military operations in Spain after the battle of Almanza, in 1707, had not prospered. In 1709, there had been a serious reverse. On the 17th of May the English and Portuguese troops, under the command of the Earl of Galway, and the Marquis de Frontiera, advancing from Elvas, and passing the River Caya, met the Spanish army, commanded by the Marquis de Bay, in the plain of La Gudina. Two battalions of English infantry, abandoned by the Portuguese horse, laid down their arms, and the rest of the force could only retire with difficulty. Accordingly, it had become necessary to reinforce the army in Portugal, so that in 1709 no battalions could be sent to Canada.

had agreed to take the field against the French. The negotiations had been conducted with great ability by Abraham Schuyler. It has been said that it was only by accident the expedition became known: that Père de Mareuil, the Missionary at Onondaga, having been instructed to leave his mission, and it not being possible to descend the St. Lawrence from the danger attending the passage, had returned by the way of Albany, and there learnt the facts to communicate them to de Vaudreuil. This statement cannot be accepted. The Saint Lawrence was quite undisturbed by hostile parties. There is a letter from de Mareuil to Father d'Heu * who was with the Senecas, in which he states that as there was a certainty of war with the English and the Iroquois, he had accepted the protection of the Governor's brother, Colonel John Schuyler, and had proceeded to Albany. He invited d'Heu to follow his example. There is a vote of the New York House of Assembly, that a decent provision be made for the French Jesuit and his servant who had surrendered themselves.

De Vaudreuil was in Montreal in January,† where he had gathered his best troops; the militia being notified to be ready to march on the first orders. A reconnaissance had been made by a strong force, but nothing could be heard of any hostile advance.

De Lamberville, the missionary with the Onondagas, saw such evidence of unfriendly feeling that he thought it advisable to proceed to Montreal. On his departure, his house and chapel were burned. Joncaire heard in June of de Lamberville's proceeding, and was exceedingly indignant. He wrote to de la Fresnière, commandant at Fort Frontenac,‡ that de Lamberville by his flight had placed them in a terrible state of embarrassment. It was not necessary to give the alarm in Canada, for there was no cause for despair. Joncaire, however, sent what few soldiers were with him to Cataraqui, as

* 16th of June, 1709. Hist. Doc. N. Y., IX., p. 836.

† 23rd of June, 1709, p. 824. ‡ 14th of June, 1709, p. 838.

he did not feel assured of their safety. Shortly afterwards, accompanied by Father d'Heu and forty Senecas, with the blacksmith, he proceeded to Montreal.

On the part of the French, it was virtually a withdrawal from the territory. Had the attack on Montreal been successful, every Seneca would have immediately become an adherent of New York. This course had been taken by Joncaire under great pressure. When he arrived at Montreal, he found that it was de Vaudreuil's intention to order the abandonment of Fort Frontenac, but his influence led to a change of policy, and the place was revictualled and reinforced.

In May, de Vaudreuil organized some Abenaki scouts, whom he pushed forward to reconnoitre on Lake Champlain. The English, on their side, had sent out scouts, and the two parties met. The French scouts were, in two instances, surprised with loss of men, and the French lay claim to a subsequent success, but little was done on either side. In June, a Massachusetts officer named Whiting, of Dunstable,* was seized and carried to Montreal. Intelligence was obtained from him that the fleet was expected from England, with a force of six thousand men. The news was sent to the Intendant at Quebec. The *habitans* were recommended to place their property in security, and every one capable of bearing arms was ordered on the first news of the enemies' ships to repair to Quebec, with all the provisions he could collect; and the same instructions were sent to Three Rivers. From two English prisoners, subsequently taken, de Vaudreuil learned that ten leagues above the Little Fall [Whitehall] the English were constructing a house and redoubts, *bateaux* and canoes.

As the news became confirmed that troops were being collected at the head of Lake Champlain, de Vaudreuil determined to attack them on their march. He organized an expedition of fifteen hundred men, under the command of de Ramezay. The advanced guard, under de Montigny, consisted of fifty French, and two hundred and fifty Abena-

* Twenty-seven miles from Boston.

kis, with one hundred Canadian militia under de Rouville. One hundred Royal troops followed under de la Chassaigne ; de Ramezay commanded the main body of five hundred Canadian militia. The rear-guard, formed of Christian Indians of the Sault and the Montreal Mountain, was under Joncaire.

When we consider this organization, it is impossible not to contrast it with the course pursued in similar circumstances in New England and New York. Every man in a prominent position in de Vaudreuil's force had distinguished himself by his capacity and fitness for command. The opposite of this system was to be seen in the English colonies. If we except the Schuylers and Vetch, not a name suggests itself as even reaching mediocrity. The New England men had simply the dogged endurance and courage of their race. Even with the preponderating force brought against de Subercase at Port Royal in 1710, it is questionable if it would have been successful, except for the utterly defenceless position in which the garrison was placed from want of food.

De Vaudreuil's plan of campaign was not to wait to be attacked. There was no fear of the arrival of ships before Quebec at that season ; and, consequently, he was able to concentrate his forces in Montreal : and he resolved to destroy the boats and seize the provisions collected on Wood's Creek, not far from its junction with Lake Champlain.

While Nicholson was waiting at Whitehall for news of the arrival of the fleet before Quebec, and for instructions to march forward, he did not neglect to send out advanced scouting parties down Lake Champlain, to learn what was before him. De Ramezay's design was to seize Crown Point, and, on approaching the place, he detached some scouts, who unexpectedly came on a British picket of one hundred men. De Ramezay had landed in the meantime above Crown Point ; the British detachment pursued the scouts until they were within range of de Ramezay's force, and were received by a sharp fire, upon which they retreated. In the night, two Dutchmen who had lost their way were taken prisoners, the

only result of the expedition, which was not further followed up.

De Ramezay, in his report to de Vaudreuil, represented that, from his failure to destroy the entire detachment, the alarm had been given, and a surprise was not now possible; he had, accordingly, held it inadvisable to proceed.

Canada, at this date, was ill prepared to meet such an invasion. In the Government of Montreal there were twelve hundred men between the ages of fifteen and sixty, the limit within which men were liable to be called to the field; at Three Rivers, four hundred. In the district of Quebec, twenty leagues above and below the city, the number available for service was two thousand two hundred. Exclusive of the detachments at Fort Cataraqui and Detroit, there were but three hundred and fifty regular troops in the country, two hundred and fifty of which were at Quebec. The sailors were five hundred in number; making a total force of four thousand eight hundred men. After deducting the men incapable of service, and those left to protect the women and children, de Vaudreuil would have had three thousand three hundred and fifty men. He required one thousand men to defend Montreal, and would have had only two thousand three hundred and fifty men available for the defence of Quebec.*

The news of the threatened attack caused great anxiety. As the summer was passing away and the ships were not heard of in the Gulf, and Nicholson remained stationary at the south end of Lake Champlain, the hope began to be entertained that danger had never existed, or that it had passed away. In the middle of August, news came from Bic, one hundred and seventy miles below Quebec, that the vessels had been seen; the alarm proved false. De Vaudreuil, however, did not relax his watchfulness, although frequently discouraged by many who could not think an invasion possible.

At the same time, he received intelligence that it was the intention of the British to construct a fort south of Lake

* De Vaudreuil to de Pontchartrain. N.Y. Hist. Doc. IX., p. 883.

George and to seize Crown Point. He remained at Chambly to be present at any operations which might be necessary. The troops under de Ramezay were moved to this station till the close of the year, when the men were dismissed to their homes.

The importance of Chambly as a point in the defence of the country now became fully recognised. It had been reported to de Vaudreuil, that one part of the scheme of invasion by Lake Champlain, was to descend the River Richelieu to Chambly Basin, making the necessary portages, to re-embark at Chambly; the expedition would then descend the river to its junction with the Saint Lawrence at Sorel, whence the main stream would be followed to the Island of Montreal, where the British troops would be landed. In 1710, the following year, the stone fort of Chambly was commenced.*

A meeting of the Provincial Governors was held at the close of the autumn, when it was resolved to send agents to London with Vetch and Nicholson, to urge upon the Imperial Government the necessity of organizing without delay the attack on Canada. The Massachusetts Government considered it advisable in the meantime to make an attack on Port Royal, the conquest of which was in fact the conquest of Nova Scotia. In 1710, that expedition took place, which I will describe later, in the account of the events in Acadia. On the 5th of October, a formal capitulation was made by the fortress, and with it, Nova Scotia passed from the rule of the French for ever.

In 1711, the attempt to invade Canada was repeated, to end in disaster with but few parallels in English history. There are records of incompetence and failure, painful to peruse, but it is nowhere possible to find more flagrant incapacity and senseless misconduct, than were shown on this occasion. The expedition is seldom alluded to by English historians, and on

* These traditions of the importance of Chambly prevailed during the period that Imperial troops remained in Canada. To the last, large garrisons were quartered at Saint John's and Chambly.

this occasion the narrative would be willingly omitted ; but its record is unavoidable. At the time, it created as "great a noise as if the fate of Britain depended upon it." The naval commander was Sir Hovenden Walker.*

The attack on Quebec in 1711 had been advocated in London by Nicholson, who arrived there in the autumn of 1710, after the conquest of Port Royal. In honour of the Queen, the new conquest received the name of Annapolis. The project, when first proposed, had been supported by Godolphin, and had he remained in power to organise it, it would have been differently constituted. The friend of Marlborough, connected with him by marriage, his ally in political life, he would have referred to the great Duke the selection of the principal

* Walker published a volume in his vindication. It is not easy to find a worse written book, or one more difficult to be understood. One fact it makes plain, the ignorance, folly and incompetence of the man whose name it bears. We learn from this volume that Walker possessed a small property in Huntingdonshire, where he was a justice of the peace. In the war previous to the peace of Ryswick, he had been a prisoner in France ; and at the period of his appointment was on half pay. Sir Thomas Hardy had been first named ; but, owing to the change of Ministry, in an evil day Walker was appointed.* He describes himself as the scapegoat of official blundering. "A stick," he says, "must be found to tie to a dog's tail, to hoot him out of the parish." He endeavoured to explain away the unhappy results for which he was responsible, by dwelling on the impracticable character of the expedition, and the insufficient means taken to carry it out. If he ever reproached himself for his failure, he carefully concealed the feeling ; there is not a sentence in his book in admission of his shortcomings ; he could not recognise that he had committed a fault.

The unfortunate event proved Walker's ruin ; his name was struck from the navy list, his half-pay taken from him. England became painful, so painful to him as a residence, that he emigrated to Carolina. There his position was so unsatisfactory that he went to Barbadoes, where he died. Walker imagined he replied to the outcry against him, by retorting on his assailants that they were acting "as if there had been no great difficulty in getting with a fleet to *Quebec*, and that the taking *Placentia* in our way to *Britain* had been as easy as a Citizen riding home in his chaise from *Hamstead* or *Highgate* calling at a Cake house by the way, to regale himself and his spouse with a Glass of Cyder and a Cheesecake." Page 28.

* "The admiral is your Walker's brother, the midwife." Swift's Journal, 28th of April, 1711. Sir Chamberlain Walker was a celebrated accoucheur of that time.

officers. When the fleet left England in April, 1711,* Godolphin was no longer in power. On the 8th of August, 1710, Godolphin received a letter from the Queen, taking from him his post as Treasurer, and requesting him to break his staff. Harley and St. John consequently became the heads of a new ministry, and held supreme place.†

The Parliament which met on the 25th of November, 1710, bore the impress of the agitation called forth by the sermon of Sacheverell;‡ the members returned were generally of the Tory and high Church party, and the Whig administration which had lasted two years and a half, were dismissed or resigned.

There are crises in history which have altered the whole current of after events. In my humble judgment, the dismissal of Godolphin was of this character. Godolphin would have brought his clear intellect and his powers of organisation to the selection of proper men, and to guarding against every contingency. What talents Harley possessed did not run in this direction. He was supreme in creating hidden influences, dexterous in the management of men. In all the practical duties of statesmanship he was incapable; he knew his own

* "Our expedition fleet is but just sailed; I believe it will come to nothing. Mr. Secretary frets at the tediousness, but hopes great things from it, though he owns that four or five princes are in the secret, and for that reason I fear it is no secret to France." Swift's Journal, 28th April, 1711.

† The date of the appointment of Sir Hovenden Walker is the 3rd of April, 1711.

‡ Sacheverell's sermon on the 5th of November, 1709, awoke a contest which this charlatan could never have foreseen. He denounced Godolphin under the name of Volpone; with equal indecency he attacked the Bishops who opposed the persecution of the Nonconformists, and condemned the Revolution, asserting the doctrine of passive obedience. Sacheverell was impeached and found guilty; to receive the mild sentence of being inhibited from preaching for three years, while his sermon was condemned to be burnt by the common hangman. The high Church party took up his cause, and the cry that the Church and Crown were in danger led to great agitation. All classes of society were affected. Continued and serious riots took place in London, Bristol, and other places. Hallam remarks of the impeachment "that it was of high importance in a constitutional light, and is not only the most authentic exposition, but the most authoritative ratification of the principles upon which the Revolution is to be defended."

deficiencies, and was averse to assuming responsibility outside the circle of parliamentary intrigue.* While the choice of the leaders fell to him, the organization was undertaken by St. John. Brilliant, false, with no spirit of statesmanship, with unbounded self-assertion, vain, fickle, without experience in the duties he was undertaking, without honesty, with the commonplace intellect of Harley only to hold him to account, there could not have been a more unfortunate choice than St. John to conduct these operations.

Had the command been given to capable men, the deplorable shipwreck on the northern shore of the Saint Lawrence would not have happened. Canada had no power to resist such an armament. Relief from France was unattainable, and it is not possible to withstand the conviction, that, if the enterprise had been wisely conducted, French rule on this continent must have ceased at that date.

The Commander of the land forces, whose memory, with that of Walker, bears the shame of the failure of this expedition, was General Hill. He was the brother of Abigail Hill, Mrs. Masham. There were four brothers and sisters of the family, distant cousins to the Duchess of Marlborough, who had placed the eldest girl in a position near the Queen, as a tire-woman, in the belief that her fidelity could be relied upon. Abigail eventually obtained such influence over the Queen, as to supplant her patroness, and, by aiding Harley in his intrigues, succeeded in obtaining the dismissal of the Whig ministry, and was able to exercise control on the history of this continent. Her younger sister, appointed laundress to the Duke of Gloucester, remained with the Court after his death. She is repeatedly named by Swift in his Journal, and succeeded in gaining the good will of this man, so difficult to please. The younger brother obtained a place in the Customs.

The elder brother was General Hill, who, in 1711, was placed in command of the troops in America. The Duchess of Marlborough has described him in her "Vindication:" "Her [Abigail Hill's] brother, whom the bottle men after-

* For a further account of Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, see Appendix.

wards called honest Jack Hill, was a tall boy, whom I clothed (for he was all in rags) and put to school at St. Albans." "I afterwards got my Lord Marlborough to make him groom of the bedchamber to the Duke of Gloucester, and though my lord always said that Jack Hill was good for nothing, yet, to oblige me, he made him his aide-de-camp, and afterwards gave him a regiment."

In January, 1710, on the death of Lord Essex, the lieutenant of the Tower, Marlborough recommended the appointment in his place of the Duke of Northumberland, and that the colonelcy of the Oxford regiment vacated by the Duke should be given to the Earl of Hertford. The Queen, acting on the counsel of her secret advisers, appointed Earl Rivers, and sent orders to Marlborough to name Colonel Hill to the regiment vacant by Rivers' nomination. The Duke asked for an audience with the Queen, and represented the injury done to the service by promoting so young an officer as Colonel Hill, over seniors of higher rank and longer service. He pointed out that it was a personal mortification to him for the brother of Mrs. Masham to receive so extraordinary a favour. "It is, Madam," were his words, "to set up a standard of disaffection to rally all the malcontent officers of the army." The Queen listened with indifference, and said coldly, "You will do well to advise with your friends."

Marlborough, greatly mortified, left London, and absented himself from the Council meetings. But the intriguers, before the step was taken, knew perfectly well the powerful hold they possessed over the Queen's mind.

It was Marlborough's determination to resign his command if Colonel Hill's appointment were exacted. He addressed a letter to the Queen, in which he expressed the mortification he had experienced, and, alluding to Mrs. Masham's interference in military employments, wrote, "I hope your Majesty will either dismiss her, or myself."

Somers waited upon Her Majesty, and stated the case in plain language, representing the great services of Marl-

borough; but the Queen remained passive and unimpressed, and gave every indication that she would not abandon her purpose.

With all the Queen's obstinacy, she quailed before the storm, when she saw it was threatening her. Marlborough's letter, finally placed in her hands, strongly excited her fears. The Under Secretary, Boyle, told her that, if the Duke of Marlborough retired from the command of the army, her crown was in danger. There was great excitement in all quarters. Hints had been given in the House of Commons that a motion would be brought forward against the favourite, and that an attempt might be made to stop the supplies. The wiser of those caballing with Harley saw the political danger arising from the resignation of the Duke of Marlborough, under the circumstances in which it would have been made. The Queen, accordingly, summoned Godolphin to her presence to inform him that she would not insist on the disposal of the regiment to Colonel Hill. It was only by this concession she could save her favourite. The regiment was given to Colonel Meredith; but Mrs. Masham's brother was indemnified for his disappointment by a pension of one thousand pounds a year, to which he had as much claim as he had to promotion from his military services.

Later in the year, after the celebrated movement of Marlborough between Arras and Cambray had forced the French lines, the difficulty reappeared. When Marlborough laid before the Queen his recommendations for the promotion of officers, the Brigadier named was the single officer before Colonel Hill, and the list of Colonels stopped at three names short of that of Mr. Masham. When the despatch was submitted to the Queen, she remarked that these two names should not be omitted. In order to include Colonel Hill among the promotions as Brigadier, she ordered that all the Colonels of 1705 should be included. Walpole, who had received these orders from the Queen, wrote to Marlborough, suggesting that he should accede to the Queen's wishes with regard to Masham, in a spirit of conciliation, in the hope that

the promotion of Hill would not be pressed. Such propitiation did not attain its purposes. Mrs. Masham had the cunning to suggest that the refusal to meet the Queen's wishes was disrespectful to her. The Queen, accordingly, ordered three more commissions to be made out for Colonels Gore, Hill and Honeywood. Walpole, however, did not fail to represent that there were twenty German and Dutch Colonels senior to Hill, who would not serve under him; and he dwelt upon the difficulty which this course would entail upon the Duke. The Queen, nevertheless, obstinately adhered to her purpose. "I am very well assured," she said, "that there can be no ill consequences from it any further than people have a mind to make them, and I will have it done."

Marlborough was at this time on the Continent. He was impressed with the conviction that a firm line of conduct was called for. He had been affected by the remonstrances of his friends against his compliance in the case of Mr. Masham, and, being sustained by their opinion, he determined resolutely to oppose the nomination of Hill, and in this spirit he wrote to England. But Godolphin's want of moral courage paralyzed all earnestness of purpose. He implored Marlborough to comply with the Queen's desire. The Queen had gone so far as to declare, that she would sign the commissions independently of the Commander-in-Chief. Walpole, communicating this intelligence, sustained Godolphin's view. With reluctance, Marlborough officially sanctioned the rank, which enabled Harley, a few months later, to appoint General Hill to the duties, in the execution of which he so painfully failed.

Swift knew "Jack Hill," as he always speaks of him, perfectly well. We get glimpses of his character, as a man living a life of ease in the fashionable set of the day. We learn, that in November, 1710, Hill's black footman, Pompey, was a candidate for speaker to the footmen. In that day the footmen in attendance on the members of Parliament formed themselves into a body, and, as a burlesque, debated the public matters as they came before the House. Pompey had the Court and Tory interest in his favour; Swift directed his servant Patrick

to get him votes. Hill played a leading part in society, giving and receiving dinners. On an occasion when Swift was to dine with St. John, who allowed him to name the company, Hill was included in the list. In spite of his failure, the Court honours fell thick upon him. He was appointed Lieutenant of the Tower, Governor of Dunkirk, and a Privy Councillor.* It will be seen, however, that, in spite of this support, he did not escape the condemnation of his contemporaries.

Such was the man to whom was confided one of the most important expeditions which ever left the shores of Britain. His one qualification was Court favour, obtained through his sister, Mrs. Masham. Harley was one of that class of politicians who, in a political appointment only recognise the chance of affirming their position. To such men the claim of merit and of service is an unknown factor in their combinations. Writers who find cause for alarm in the advance of democratic influences in the executive direction of a government, must recognise that no more disastrous consequence could be possible under any constitution. The history of this continent is fertile in records of the evils arising from the exercise of prerogative in the advancement of incompetence; while modern politics furnish as flagrant violations of justice on the part of inferior men, in the interests of themselves and those who sustain them. There is only one safeguard for a nation, patriotic, educated, honest public opinion, in itself irresistible. Through the influence of a royal waiting-woman, "Jack Hill," without a single qualification, was placed in his high position. He had good nature, and was pleasant company when, in those jovial days, he met men of his self-indulgent habits. In the hour of trial, he proved himself to be destitute of moral courage, without resources, incapable of directing the enterprise he commanded, and cowed to death by a misfortune which, with a great mind, would have called forth spirit and determination.

On the 24th of June, the fleet was assembled at Boston. It

* Boyer's History of Queen Anne, pp. 534-588-605.

consisted of fifteen ships of war and forty-six transports and store ships. Seven regiments of the line had been embarked, Kirke's, Seymour's, Hill's, Disney's, Windresse's, Clayton's and Kane's,* making a total of five thousand men, with artillery and marines. Two Massachusetts regiments accompanied the force; they were placed under the command of Vetch, then Governor of Annapolis, who had been specially summoned to Boston to accompany the expedition. A formidable body of men for the service for which it was destined, so that success was on all sides looked for.†

* Except Clayton's regiment, disbanded in 1712, and Kane's, in 1713, the remaining regiments have retained their places in the Imperial Army List. Kirke's is now the Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment [the 2nd]; Seymour's the King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment [the 4th]; Hill's the Devonshire Regiment [the 11th]; Disney's the Worcestershire Second Battalion [the 29th]; Windresse's the Hampshire Regiment 1st Battalion [the 37th].

I have to acknowledge the courtesy of Lord Wolseley, who, on my application, kindly obtained for me this information. It is also given in the records of the 4th Regiment, p. 41.

It is customary to speak of these troops as having passed through Marlborough's campaigns. The 2nd, 4th and 11th Regiments of the Line, up to 1708, were in Spain and Portugal. The 2nd was in the Low Countries for a few months only, in 1702. The 2nd and 11th were present on the unfortunate day of Almanza, the 25th of April, 1607. The 4th was at the taking of Gibraltar and subsequent defence. I have been informed that there are no printed records of the 29th and 37th Regiments. Clayton's and Kane's having been disbanded in 1712 and 1713, it is not easy to obtain information concerning them. A Brigadier Kane was at Blenheim, and highly distinguished himself. Five regiments only were sent from Marlborough's army. On the 27th of March, 1711, St. John wrote to the Duke, "Your grace, my lord, has fully answered all the queen's intentions relative to the five regiments by the orders you have been pleased to give, and, I hope, by this time embarking at Ostend, the convoy being gone with a fair wind and mild weather." Most probably these regiments left the encampment of the allies at the plains of Sens, the plan of that year having been to penetrate over the frontier on the sides of Arras and Cambray.

Difficulty had been experienced in obtaining recruits, so much so, that on occasions recourse had been had to the law to obtain them. A bill had been introduced for raising a sufficient number of troops from such persons as have no lawful calling or employment,* and, under the authority of this statute, the parish officials had been literally enabled to press men to serve in the ranks.

* Stat. 4, Anne, Chap. 10.

† The dates given are old style.

On the 30th of July the fleet sailed from Boston. The means of defence possessed by de Vaudreuil, taking the extreme view of the case, were limited; three thousand three hundred and fifty fighting men, with the advantage of the presence of many excellent officers. The plan of campaign was, that Canada should be simultaneously attacked at Quebec and Montreal by twelve thousand men. What resistance could have been offered, if the expedition had been entrusted to men of capacity, and the troops animated by confidence in their leaders?

Vetch has left a memoir of the expedition.* Much embarrassment had been felt from the commencement with regard to the pilots; there were few mariners who knew the Saint Lawrence, and for the most part they shrank from the responsibility of piloting the war-ships through the intricacies of the navigation. There were no greater obstacles than Kirke or Phips had to contend against. Both were men of high qualities; and whatever the defects of Phips as a general, in placing his men in the field, he was a bold, able seaman. He knew the dangers of navigation, and was sleepless in his vigilance in meeting them.

Vetch introduced to the Admiral's ship, the "Edgar," one Captain Bonner, who had been appointed pilot. Vetch himself was on board the "Despatch." On the 3rd of August the fleet was off Cape Sable, when the Admiral sent for Vetch, and directed him, as he had some knowledge of the coast and the river, to lead the way; three small vessels were to accompany him. By keeping two of these vessels a league in front, a mile apart, one on each bow, and a third advancing ahead, the direction which the fleet should follow would plainly be given. Moreover, by following this order of sailing the mode of anchorage would be established, the vessels carrying the pennants according to the colours of the divisions.

These regulations were acted upon until Cape Canso was passed. As the fleet were sailing by the coast of Cape

* Journall of a voyage designed to Quebeck, from Boston, in New England, in July, 1711. Samuel Vetch, Collection Nova Scotia Hist. Society, IV., p. 108.

Breton, the three cruisers which had been despatched from Boston, the "Sapphire," the "Chester" and "Leopard," were met. The "Sapphire" was the smallest frigate in the fleet. When near the island of Saint Paul, to the north of Cape Breton, Vetch went on board the "Sapphire." The captain requested him to remain on that vessel. Vetch pointed out that he was in the "Despatch," and as, owing to the stormy weather, there would be difficulty in transferring his stores, he must continue on the vessel in which he was. Shortly afterwards Vetch received a written order, that when the Admiral desired him to go on ahead, the signal would be given for him to do so; two days afterwards the lieutenant of the "Sapphire" came on board with an order to Perkins, the master of the "Despatch," to obey the signals of Captain Rouse, of the "Sapphire." The wind continued fair, and they were making for the mouth of the Saint Lawrence, to pass to the south of the Island of Anticosti, when, at midnight, the Admiral gave orders to tack, "to the great Surprizall of all the fleet, and which, indeed, proved the accidental cause at least of all our misfortunes, in losing so much time of fair wind which would have carried us into the River."

As the fleet advanced the wind shifted, so they were driven into Gaspé Harbour. They arrived there on the 18th of August, and passed three days taking in wood and water. There was a French ship from Biscay in the Bay, unrigged, receiving a cargo of fish. She was seized, with the intention of bringing her off, and the crew were made prisoners. It was found impossible to pilot her through the channel, so she was burned with the houses and stores ashore.

On leaving Gaspé, on the 21st of August, there was very little wind; the sea was calm, but there was a thick fog. From time to time, the fog lifted to some extent, but no land could be seen. Two days later, there was a fresh south-east wind; no land had been visible since the departure from Gaspé. Some of the pilots recommended bringing-to until morning; the fleet, however, continued under sail, and on the 22nd of August the Admiral's ship was leading the way.

Any one casting his eye on the chart of the Saint Lawrence may observe that, about 270 miles below Quebec, Point des Monts stands prominently out on the north shore. The coast to the north of Anticosti continues in an easterly direction from the Mingan Islands, until meeting the Seven Islands, when it trends southerly with a western inclination for some hundred miles, to terminate at Point des Monts. At this spot the river becomes narrowed to twenty-five miles, the opposite point on the south shore being thirty or forty miles below Matane. If the line of coast as shewn on the map be considered, the most superficial knowledge of navigation will suggest that the course of a vessel ascending the river from Gaspé is to keep in sight the southern shore, or during a fog to navigate on this course. It is idle to speak of the river not having been known to the pilots who joined the expedition at Boston. Without consideration of the early navigators, of whom the tradition alone remains, Cartier had ascended the river in 1535, and since 1608 vessels had yearly reached Quebec, with no better indications to guide them than Walker possessed. So gross was his blundering, that it is difficult to explain how the course taken by him was selected. If the fog made it impossible to determine his position precisely, the greater vigilance should have been exercised to guard against a casualty. Vetch described his anxiety. "I do say," he writes, "that Coll. Dudley and Capt. Perkins, commander of the *Despatch* friggatt, where I was aboard, will attest how uneasy I was att the course the fflag steered that night the Disaster happened, and that I often told them that I wondered what the fflag meant by that course, why he did not steer West, and West by South—however, wee were so cautious as to keep astern, by which we Escaped the misfortune that happened to severalls." The Egg Islands, in the direction of which the Admiral's ship was steering, are a group of small islands, some twenty miles north of Point des Monts, entirely out of the course the ships should have taken. The vessels were thirty miles out of their true course, running directly on to land.

On the evening of the 22nd of August, the fog was thick ; the pilots had directed the vessels to be turned southward, to avoid the north shore and to keep to the channel. There was no suspicion of danger in the admiral's ship. As Walker was retiring to bed, the captain of the frigate came down to report that land was not far from them. Without examining into the weather, totally setting out of view that no land had been seen since Gaspé, as if the most ordinary matter, Walker ordered the fleet to steer to the north. It was to advance on certain destruction. By Vetch's description there was no storm ; there was only the roll of the large mass of water of the Saint Lawrence, at this spot sixty miles wide. The fog broke from time to time, for the light carried by the admiral was visible, so when the report was made that land could be seen, the disaster might have been averted by ordinary prudence. Goddard, a captain of one of the regiments on the admiral's ship, at the request of Paradis the pilot entered the admiral's cabin, and earnestly requested him to come on deck to see where they were going. Walker simply laughed at him and his fears. Again Goddard went to him and in the extreme of earnestness implored him "for the Lord's sake come on deck or we shall certainly be lost, I see breakers all around us." Thus appealed to, Walker came on deck in his dressing-gown and slippers ; there stood the shore before him ; but still he could see no land to leeward. The moon at this time broke through the fog, to show the long range of coast with breakers directly in his front. Walker was barely able to extricate his ship and gain sea-room ; his signals were not seen by the fleet, or were misunderstood. Eight transports sailed directly among the reefs of the Egg Islands, and were wrecked.

We have no picture of that terrible night, but it is believed that in two hours the havoc was consummated. Of those present in these vessels, 884 of the troops alone were lost, 499 were saved. Of Windresse's corps, 192 men were drowned, only seven or eight escaped. Vetch heard the firing of the guns, which he knew intimated the peril of the ships. It was not until the 25th of August, he learned the extent of the

disaster: he writes, "I confess the account I had aboard of the Generall of the terrible Tragedy did Extreemly surprize and affect me." *

The disaster was terrible enough without exaggerating it. There is scarcely an event in the annals of our navy with which it can be compared. Writers following the example of Charlevoix have unduly magnified the misfortune. Charlevoix was in Canada nine years after the event, so he must have given the narrative as he heard it. He speaks of three thousand bodies lying on the beach; among them, those of several families of Scotch emigrants sent out to be established in the country after its conquest. There were no emigrants on the fleet. The bodies of the women found were some of the unfortunate soldiers' wives, who, from time immemorial, have accompanied every expedition of the British army, to be present in disastrous reverses.† The French discovered the wrecked eight vessels. What property was not lost, fell to their share. If any guns were obtained, they must have been those belonging to the transports, for the artillery were not included in the misfortune.

On the 25th of August, a council of war was held, to determine if the expedition should be abandoned or not. It is not

* The official account of the loss, confined to the British regiments, is as follows:—

Ship.	Regiment.	Embarked.	Lost.	Saved.
Chatham	Brigadier Hill	701	60	40
Isabella Anne Katherine. . .	Colonel Windresse.	700	192	7 or 8
Marlborough.	" Clayton.	700	130	30
Smyna, Merchant	" Kane.	700	200	30
Samuel and Anne.	Lieut.-General Seymour	702	142 10 150	7 or 8 188 180
Nath. and Elizabeth.	" "			
Colchester	" "			
	Colonel Kirk	700		
	" Disney.	800		
Content, New England Ship, Victualler.		15	...	15
Total.		5018	884	499

† The records of the 2nd Regiment state that thirty-four women of the 4th, the 37th, Colonel Kane and Colonel Clayton's Regiments, were drowned. The records of the 4th give the number of twenty women drowned as belonging to that regiment alone.

difficult to conceive that confidence in Walker was entirely lost, and, although it was conceded that the strength of the land force was sufficient to carry on the enterprise, the question was raised whether the navigation of the river was possible. Vetch told the Admiral that Sir William Phips went up with seventy sail, twenty years back, much later in the year, for he did not arrive at Quebec until the 9th of October, and that there was not a man in his fleet who had been there before. The Admiral asked Vetch if he would undertake to carry up the fleet. "I told him I never was bredd to sea, nor was it any part of my Province, but I would doe my best by goeing ahead and Shewing them where the Difficulty of the River was, which I knew pretty well."

There was now an opportunity for General Hill to shew of what material he was made, and if the objections to his promotions were personal and unjust; that, even if he owed his advancement to Court favour, he possessed qualities which established his claim to consideration. There have been many men that have led lives as frivolous and purposeless as his, who, in the hour of trial, have shewn the innate nobility of their nature. Hill had now that opportunity which so many of us, during years of depression and trial, hopefully look forward to, never to meet. He was experiencing that reproof of chance which is the true proof of men. Had a battle been fought, he might have counted on casualties as serious as had been caused by the wreck. The men might have been disheartened; but a great general would have risen above the mischance, and would have imparted to his followers his own determination and resolution. Hill was no such man. He accepted the failure. He had no patriotic feeling with regard to any deplorable result, which might come to pass in North America from the miscarriage of the enterprise. His own weak nature led him to regard as insuperable the difficulties which scores of officers under him, would have faced with undaunted courage. He would listen to no expostulation. The council of war acted as is generally the case; it was resolved to abandon the enterprise and return to Boston. The "Sapphire"

frigate was ordered to sail to Boston, with an express to be sent to Nicholson, to prevent him proceeding down Lake Champlain. Vetch still, however, hoped to see this decision reversed. He addressed a letter to Walker, asking him again to consult with the captains and pilots on the point of proceeding to Quebec. "As to the late fateal Disaster," he wrote, "that happened, it cannot, in my humble oppinion, be in any way Imputed to the Difficulty of the navigation—but to the wrong Course we steered, which most unavoidably Carrd us upon the North Shoar: who Directed that course you best know, as to the navigation from hence to Tadousac, it was never thought upon to be any Difficulty att all more than to Return to Capt Brittonne" (Cape Breton). He added that he was certain that General Hill and the Colonels would be of opinion that there was force sufficient to reduce the place, and that to return without further attempt would be a fatal consequence to the Crown and the British Colonies.

We can understand the depressing feeling caused by the incapacity of Walker. The fleet without a head, in the truest sense of that word; joined to the argument of shortness of provisions as a reason for the return home; with a self-indulgent general of the land forces, without force of character, unendowed with resolution and moral courage to obtain personal weight; all these influences led to the wish to avoid responsibility. The admiral cast the pall of his pusillanimity over the whole expedition. He was sustained in his opinion that the attempt to navigate the Saint Lawrence, up which the French were sailing every year, was a matter of the greatest danger, and in all respects impracticable.

No one can read the decision of the Council of War, without a feeling of contempt at its cowardice. The disaster had been serious and was depressing, and, as Vetch expressed himself, no one could fail to attribute the loss of the ships to the right cause: steering on the wrong course. There had been no hurricane to scatter the fleet. There was a French pilot named Paradis on the admiral's ship. Walker, who sought excuses for his conduct in every direction, never hinted that

the man, in a Spartan spirit, to save Canada had risked his own life that the fleet might be destroyed. The calamity must be solely attributed to the imbecility of Walker. So far as the pilot appears on the scene, it was by his direct intervention that the admiral's ship was saved. With the experience of the severe winters of Massachusetts to guide him, Walker nevertheless formed the opinion that in Canada the ice would embrace the whole depth of the river, extending to fifty and one hundred fathoms, and idiotically formed the conclusion that the only mode of preserving ships "was to secure them on dry ground in frames and cradles until the thaw." It can scarcely be credited that Walker, in his published Journal, spoke of the wreck on the Egg Islands of eight vessels, with the loss of some portion of their crews and nearly nine hundred British troops, as having been the means of saving the country from a great calamity. His language has rarely been equalled in folly:*

The fleet reached Sydney, and a Council of War was again held whether Placentia was to be attacked. Vetch gave his opinion that at that season of the year it was not safe for vessels to lie outside the harbour, and, unless the larger vessels were prepared to break down the boom across its entrance, the attack would be hazardous. News was also received that the *Feversham*, and the three store-ships laden with provisions which had been despatched from New York, had been lost on the rocks off Cape Breton. The store of provisions was therefore considered insufficient, and it was resolved

* "That though we met with so considerable a Loss at our entrance into the River of St. *Lawrence*, yet it seems as if Providence designed that, to prevent much more fatal Mischiefs, which must have happen'd inevitably had we arrived safe in *Quebec*; because by that time our Provisions would have been reduced to a very small Proportion, not exceeding eight or nine Weeks, perhaps not above six, at short Allowance: Whereas we could not have had any Relief in less than ten Months, if so soon; and the *Feversham* and the three Storeships with the Provisions being cast away in their Passage, we were entirely disappointed of our Expectations in them, so that between ten and twelve-thousand Men must have been left to perish with the Extremity of cold and hunger, wherefore by the Loss of Part, Providence saved all the rest." Or, he added, from dread of famine, they would have been driven to march to New England. p. 25.

to take back the New England forces, and that the British troops should be carried home. Previous to leaving Sydney, then known as Baie des Espagnols, Walker committed the folly of erecting a cross with a Latin inscription recording the title of the Queen of England to the country; the one political act of this disgraceful expedition.

The fleet left Sydney on the 15th of September. Swift has recorded its arrival in England on the 6th of October, and the impression made by the news of the disaster. St. John felt great mortification on hearing of its failure, for it had been organized under his instructions. Hill and the admiral were considered "as having made wrong steps;" but, in official language, the loss was represented as having been caused by the tempest having driven the ships upon the rocks. Hill was greatly blamed by his friends for "want of conduct." One cause assigned for the return of the expedition was the want of provisions; the squadron, to lull suspicion, it was said, had not been victualled for so long a voyage, and the Colonies had not the means of making good the want. Could it have been possible more forcibly to express the incompetence of those who organized the enterprise, and of those to whom the command had been given?

* "The news of Mr. Hill's miscarriage in his expedition came to-day, and I went to visit Mrs. Masham and Mrs. Hill, his two sisters, to condole with them. I advised them by all means to go to the music meeting to-night, to show that they were not cast down, &c., and they thought my advice was right, and went. I doubt Mr. Hill and his admiral made wrong steps; however, we lay it all to a storm, &c. I sat with the secretary at supper; then we both went to lord treasurer's supper, and sat till twelve. The secretary is much mortified about Hill, because the expedition was of his contriving, and he counted much upon it."—Swift's Journal to Stella, 6th of October, 1711.

"Jack Hill is come home from his unfortunate expedition, and is, I think, now at Windsor. I have not yet seen him. He is privately blamed by his own friends for want of conduct. He called a council of war, and therein it was determined to come back. But they say that a general should not do that, because the officers will always give their opinion for returning, since the blame will not be upon them but the general. I pity him heartily."—Journal 12th of October.

"I was to see Jack Hill this morning, who made that unfortunate expedition; and there is still more misfortune; for that ship which was admiral of the fleet is blown up in the Thames."—Journal, 16th of October.

Misfortune attended the enterprise to the last. On the 9th of October the fleet arrived at Portsmouth, when the troops were landed. On the 15th of the month, the Admiral's ship, the "Edgar," by some accident blew up at Spithead, with "about Four Hundred Seamen and Thirty of the Inhabitants of *Portsmouth*, who went on board that Ship to make merry with their Friends." * Swift tells us the accident was caused by "the carelessness of some rogue who was going, as they think, to steal some gunpowder."

Whatever censure was privately passed on General Hill, he suffered no loss of prestige. No blame was cast upon him; the tempest and the shortness of provisions were sufficient public explanations of his want of success. The Admiral was not so fortunate, and he was driven from England, to die a broken-hearted man in a West Indian island. The important events which were taking place, and the care bestowed by the Ministry on the suppression of the true facts, not only succeeded in preventing the history of the expedition from being generally known at that date, but has likewise led to the omission of mention of it in history; for the disaster is but charily recorded in a few lines in our national annals.

It is easy to conceive the feeling of joy in Canada, when the intelligence of the disaster was confirmed. It was considered that Providence had specially intervened to protect the province and to save the true church. The news of the expedition had reached Quebec, where the inhabitants had lived in the daily expectation of seeing their enemies appear. The wind remained favourable, time passed, and no hostile ships were heard of as being below. People began to think that it was a false alarm which had idly threatened the invasion. On the 15th of October, a report was spread that two large vessels were fifteen leagues above the city, and that, on boats having attempted a landing, the people had fired upon them. The alarm rose to its height, for the ships were held to be the fore-runners of the fleet. "On that day," writes the Mère Ignace,

* Boyer, p. 510.

“we were completing a *neuvaine** at Notre Dame de Pitié, to which we had assiduously attended. On leaving mass we were agreeably surprised to meet passengers from France, who assured us that they had seen nothing in the river but the King's vessel, ‘Le Héros.’” The news of the wreck of the transports soon reached the city, and a barque was despatched to learn what the loss had been, what the extent of the failure of the British in attempting to ascend the Saint Lawrence. Exaggerated reports were brought back, scarcely necessary in the magnitude of the failure. Mention is made of General Hill having distributed in some of the parishes proclamations inviting the French-Canadians to acknowledge the authority of Queen Anne. It is not impossible that some such proclamations were found in the wrecks, but the only place visited by the fleet was Gaspé, and there was no settlement on the southern shore within two hundred miles of the scene of the wreck.

In the height of the gratitude felt to Heaven for preservation from this peril, it was resolved to make a collection to construct a portico to the Church in the lower town of Quebec, to which the name of Notre-Dame des Victoires was given.

The preparations had been vigorously urged forward in Albany. Colonel Nicholson had arrived in Boston on the 17th of July, 1711, and had lost no time in communicating with Hunter, then governor of New York. Hunter† reported the fact to St. John. He had just returned from an interview with the Five Nations; he had heard Joncaire and de Longueuil were in the Indian country, and that they had constructed a block house. Accordingly, he had sent Colonel Schuyler to demand that the French should be sent away and the block house pulled down; all which they performed, though with some difficulty. Hunter took energetic steps to carry out the instructions which had been given him. The assembly of New York agreed to raise £10,000 with their quota of men.

* The Novena of the Roman Catholic Church. Nine days' special prayer, ceremoniously performed as ordained.

† 12th September. Hist. Doc. N. Y., V., p. 253.

Colonel Schuyler was sent to Albany to receive the levies there. New Jersey gave £5,000. At a convention held at New London, the numbers to be drafted were agreed upon; New York was to furnish 600 troops, Connecticut 300, New-Jersey 200, Pennsylvania 240. The troops were without delay levied, clothed, accoutred and victualled; the necessary *bateaux* and provisions were obtained. A settlement of Germans, called the Palatines, had been lately established on the Mohawk and it furnished three hundred men. Nicholson was in Albany early in August; and by the 30th, the forces were completed to the strength required. Ingolsby's regulars numbered 600, Schuyler's, 550, Whiting's Connecticut levies 360; making a total of 1,510. Of the Iroquois, 800 were present. On the 1st of September, news was received from Walker, sent from Gaspé; he asked for more provisions for fear of being obliged to winter in Canada. Hunter exerted himself to supply what was required. He had in his stores bread, beans, and rum. The frigate Feversham was in port, and he determined to load her with provisions and despatch her to the St. Lawrence. An unpleasant incident took place with regard to this frigate; her crew had become reduced in number and it was necessary to obtain additional sailors. In consequence of an appeal by the governor to the captains of vessels in port, several seamen of their crews volunteered, including some men of a brigantine from Bristol. Owing to the instigation of one Foy, the supercargo, the crew of this vessel, some of whom had been drinking, resisted the force sent to collect the men destined for the frigate; a tumult occurred, during which the man-of-war's men were attacked, and, when defending themselves, unfortunately one of the brigantine's crew was killed. The matter was taken up by the courts, and, on insufficient, one-sided evidence, the grand jury found the officer in command, and the soldier who fired the shot, guilty of murder.*

* N. Y. Col. Doc., V., p. 254-255. Governor Hunter to Secretary St. John, New York, 12th of September, 1711. "One of y^e soldiers being knock'd downe shott one of y^e crew, who dyed next day." . . . "Some time after y^e Grand

There was, even in those times, a bad feeling in New York towards the British government. Some concord and sympathy might have been looked for, in an expedition against the power of France, ever entertaining the project of destroying the North American colonies, and carrying the inhabitants into servitude. Hunter's remarks on this occasion, when considered by the light of sixty years later, call for attention. "There is here, he said, "a body, politic, co-ordinate with, (claiming equal powers) and consequently independently of ye great Council of ye realm." It speaks little for the good-feeling towards the mother country, that when New York was required to aid in the despatch of provisions to a British fleet, sailing up the Saint Lawrence to subdue Canada, in the interest of the colonies, resistance should be experienced. Nothing should have interfered with the public sense of the magnitude of the effort made by the mother country. The news of the disaster was sent to Governor Hunter by General Hill * from the Saint Lawrence, with instructions to forward the intelligence to Nicholson; notwithstanding this exhibition of feeling, the Legislature of New York, after the failure of Walker, sent an address to the Queen praying her to renew the attempt.

In a letter to St. John, Hunter related how he had detained as prisoners three officers whom de Vaudreuil "had sent under the mask of 'flaggs of truce'—a pernicious custom in these parts—but really to spye." From them he had learned that Canada was not well prepared for an attack. The incident which Hunter related was the course taken by de Vaudreuil on receiving intelligence that there was increased activity in New York. He sent three officers, with a servant of Major Livingston, who had been left sick at Three Rivers with another prisoner, to ask the release of M. de Beaunny. On hearing that they had been detained, de Vaudreuil despatched an Indian to communicate with them, if possible, and to bring

Jury of this City presented and found guilty of Murder the said John Moore and Capt. Riggs upon the evidence of that Supercargo and some others of his crew, not having thought fitt to call for any other."

* 12th of November.

back what intelligence could be obtained. The Indian reported that the authorities were actively collecting *bateaux* and hiring canoes. Orders were immediately given for the militia to hold themselves in readiness, and the anxieties of de Vaudreuil increased. About this time de Longueuil arrived with six chiefs from the Onondagas; Joncaire came from the Senecas with some few of the tribe. They reported the English were exerting themselves to obtain the aid of the Iroquois, and to a great extent had succeeded; in these two tribes there were many devoted to the French. But generally the Iroquois tribes were strongly in the English interest, and, had the expedition been successfully carried out, a large force of them would have accompanied it. There were between four and five hundred Western Indians at this date in Montreal. The preceding year de Vaudreuil had taken steps to obtain their services, and they remained there during two months, when they were sent back. What other force de Vaudreuil could collect was concentrated at Chambly; with the troops and militia it amounted to three thousand men.

Although the attempt of Walker had failed, it made a profound impression in Canada; when de Vaudreuil appealed to the inhabitants to aid in the extension of the fortifications of Quebec, he obtained their ready assistance. He was the more listened to, as the report was current that a similar expedition would be soon again undertaken. Fifty thousand *écus* were thus collected. From France there was little hope, for the Minister wrote that he did not believe that another expedition would be attempted. It is not impossible that inability to render assistance may have aided in the belief. The French Government, however, was deep in the intrigue of separate negotiation with the English Ministry. The French Secretary of State knew that Harley's tenure of power depended on a treaty of peace with France, to obtain which he had shewn his readiness to sacrifice principles, for which the previous government of Great Britain had strongly contended.

CHAPTER VI.

In the west, the relations with the Indian tribes had become uncertain and the Outagamis or Foxes were in favour of entertaining relations with Albany. They occupied the territory on the western shore of Lake Michigan, their hunting ground extending towards the Mississippi. The position held by them was the more important, as they were domiciled along Green bay and Winnebago lake, into which the Nena or Fox river discharges, by the waters of which, the height of land is gained; the portage passed, the river Wisconsin, a tributary of the Mississippi is met. The Foxes therefore, were on the line of communication between the great river and Canada; Fox river having been known imperfectly as early as the days of Nicollet. For a quarter of a century other western tribes had been at war with the Foxes, but by stratagem and valour the latter had attained a formidable position. They were now attacking parties passing to the Mississippi, and for several leagues of route, made the passage of the French trader by canoe a matter of danger; moreover this tribe looked with great jealousy on the establishment of the French at Detroit.

Owing to contact with the Iroquois, they had had dealings with the English; to learn how much cheaper goods could be obtained from them than from the French, and how much more advantageously trade could be carried on with Albany. They desired to see the English trader enter their country, and it seemed to them that, preliminary to that end being gained, the fort at Detroit must be destroyed.

The commandant at this time was Du Buisson, who has left an account* of the events which took place. La Mothe Cadillac had been transferred to Louisiana in 1710. In order to commence hostilities against Detroit without risk of failure,

* Parl. Doc. MS., Vol. XI., page 326.

the Foxes, apparently with peaceful intentions, established themselves near the fort. They had formed an understanding with the Kikapoos and the Mascoutins to aid them in their attacks; the latter had arrived, and the Foxes were waiting for the Kikapoos to determine their future plans.*

While waiting for a favourable opportunity to act with vigour, news came of an Ottawa chief, named Saquima, with some Pottawatamies having attacked and destroyed one hundred and fifty Mascoutins. Such tidings were sufficient to call forth the strongest feelings of revenge. The Ottawas were the known allies of the French; the sentiment entertained of this relationship, blended with their former feeling of ill-will, incited the Foxes to commence hostilities. The garrison of Detroit consisted of twenty men; in the adjoining Huron and Ottawa villages, most of the men devoted to the French were absent on hunting expeditions. Du Buisson was fortunately informed by a Christian Outagami that the attack had been planned, and it was owing to this intelligence that the fort was not surprised. Du Buisson lost no time in informing the friendly Indians of the dangers they were exposed to in common with himself, and summoned them to his aid. His appeal was answered. During this interval the Foxes remained inactive, their own preparations not being sufficiently advanced, and they were unsuspecting of treachery among themselves. If they were to succeed in the attempt, it was in as short a time as possible; in a few weeks the fort would be re-inforced, and the tribes of the Lakes would join their enemies, in strength sufficient to enable them to act as assailants.

As the friendly Indians arrived, Du Buisson saw that the

* The Kikapoos and Mascoutins were kindred tribes with the Foxes, and had their hunting grounds in the neighbourhood of the Fox river. They were first visited by Père Dablon in 1669, and by Père Allouez in 1670 and 1672. They received Jolliet and Marquette hospitably in 1673 on their ascent of the river towards the Mississippi. The early missionaries found them tractable; [Rel. 1670, p. 100.] but at this date possessing strength and power, they entertained unfriendly feelings towards the French. The Mascoutins were also known to the French as the *Nation du Feu*. All these tribes were of the Algonquin family.

situation was changed ; in the presence of the Ottawas, the Hurons, the Pottawatamies, the Sakis, the Osages, the Malhomines, he felt that the danger was past. Furnishing them with provisions and ammunition, he prepared to take the field and attack the Foxes, who previously had assumed a threatening attitude. As the Foxes began more correctly to estimate their danger, they entrenched themselves to await the attack, according to the Indian mode of defence. As the fire from the besiegers became hot, they dug holes in the ground, and retired within them. Scaffolds of some twenty feet in height were therefore constructed, from which a plunging fire was poured upon the Foxes. The interior of the entrenchment was so thoroughly commanded, and the assault so continuous, that the Foxes could not obtain water without risk of destruction. They suffered equally from thirst and hunger. Nevertheless, their courage was not depressed ; rather it seemed to increase from despair, and making flags of their red blankets, they hung them out, exclaiming that their death would be revenged by their English white father. But the force brought against them was too powerful to be resisted, and they asked permission to send three chiefs to consult with Du Buisson. The few French conducting the operations were sustained by so many of the Lake tribes that Du Buisson felt it advisable to submit the proposition to them. The latter were all of opinion that, before any negotiations could be entered into, the release of three female Huron prisoners should be exacted, and this intimation was made.

When morning came, it was seen that the red flags had disappeared, and a white flag was flying from the Indian stronghold. A Fox chief, Pemousse, with two warriors, presented himself before the French camp, and asked for a parley. He commenced with the customary ceremony of presenting a belt, and afterwards returned some prisoners, ending with a formal demand for peace. Du Buisson informed him that no negotiations could be commenced until three Huron women held as prisoners were returned ; the rest of the day was granted for the consideration of the demand, and Du Buisson

undertook that, if no attempt were made during that time to relieve the Fox fort, there should be no attack by firearms, or in any other form. In two hours the three Huron women were given up. The request was made that the Foxes, with their wives and children, should be allowed to retire. Du Buisson answered that the decision on this point must be left to his Indian allies. An Illinois chief was the spokesman; he declared that there could only be absolute unconditional surrender; and that if these terms were not accepted so soon as the Fox deputies had regained the fort, the attack would be re-commenced.

As by the surrender of the Huron women the Foxes had hoped to obtain favourable conditions, their disappointment on receiving this notification was extreme. They returned to their camp depressed, but with the resolution to defend themselves with desperation. They commenced to fire arrows with lighted tinder into the French encampment, and such was the danger of fire, that the tents had to be covered with bear skins and other furs. The obstinacy of the defence depressed the French Indians. They began to lose all hope of success, and gave signs of a desire to abandon the contest. The French plainly told their allies that, if left unaided to defend the fort, they would depart from Detroit and proceed to Michilimackinac, leaving the French Indians to the mercy of the Foxes. At a council summoned by Du Buisson, he pointed out that their courage and efforts were on the eve of attaining success, and, if they would persevere, they would be for ever delivered from a desperate enemy. Presents were distributed, and, as some of the leading chiefs were impressed with what was said, it was resolved to persevere in the attack. The assault was again vigorously made; the Foxes saw that their only hope lay in the acceptance of the terms offered them. They had lost eighty of their men; the stench from the dead bodies, which they could not remove, was infecting the camp. They were tortured by hunger and thirst, and again they sent to the French, asking for terms of surrender. They obtained a reply in no way more favourable; the answer which they

had received was repeated, and they were called upon to consider it.

The siege had lasted nineteen days. The hard terms offered to the Foxes literally cut off all hope, and their only salvation was to be found in an abandonment of their position. A stormy night gave them the chance of escape; they crept out of the fort by stealth, eluding the notice of the besiegers. They ascended the river, and entered Lake Saint Claire, to entrench themselves on a peninsula about nine or ten miles above where the waters of Lake Saint Claire enter the Detroit River, now known as Grosse Point. The Foxes succeeded in escaping observation. When in the morning the attack was resumed, the fort was found to be abandoned. Not an hour was lost by Du Buisson in following the Foxes to their new entrenchment, where the defences had been prepared with Indian skill. In the hope of being able to force the defences, the attack was made without due caution, and twenty of the assailants were killed, or placed *hors de combat*. The siege was, accordingly, commenced in due form, Du Buisson bringing up artillery for the attack. After four days an unconditional surrender was made. Every man bearing arms, or capable of bearing them, was massacred. Some hundred and fifty were spared, who, with the women and children, were divided among the Indian captors as slaves. The tribe of the Foxes suffered greatly by this outbreak; their loss has been estimated at the large number of two thousand men. Their power for a time ceased to be formidable, and years passed away before their strength as a tribe was re-established. But their power was not entirely broken, while their reverses, and the ruthless treatment which they received, made them more than ever the enemies of the French. They continued to hang about Lake Michigan and the routes to the Mississippi; and three years later it became necessary to organize another expedition against them.

Disputes, which in this case had assumed the character of open warfare, principally arising from the hostilities of tribe against tribe, were disadvantageous in every way to French

interests. Accordingly M. de Vaudreuil sent de Louvigny with several officers of experience, among the western Indians, to quiet feelings of discord, and, if possible, to obtain the whole trade exclusively for the French. The attempt in the former direction was to some extent successful, for the fate of the Foxes enforced such a policy. It was seen that the side which the French would take must prevail; and as the fate of the Fox captives, left to the mercy of the Indian victors, had been to undergo the sternest and most merciless treatment, the tribes were made to feel that, if they were worsted in the struggle, they could only expect the most cruel reprisals. The principle of French rule was to consider only the end to be attained; it was rarely they interfered between the Indian and his prey; there were some stray occasions where such was the case, but, as the fate of the Foxes showed, the decision was one of expediency solely, and there was no cruelty, which they held advantageous to practice, from which the French shrank. In the matter of trade the envoys failed; the western tribes had learned the advantages of commerce with Albany, and they could not be induced to abandon them.

While the French unhesitatingly carried out their policy with clearly defined views of what they were attempting to attain: to hold possession of the country of the lakes by the influence which they could exercise over the tribes inhabiting it, a striking contrast to this untiring energy was to be seen in the British provinces of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia. New York confined its efforts to the maintenance of friendly relations with the Iroquois. Every attempt on the part of the governor and of the able men who saw the true interests of the province of New York, and who laboured for the adoption of a sound policy, was neutralized by the coldness and indifference of the House of Assembly. Pennsylvania is prominent in the history of the continent by her incapacity to understand the obligations it was her duty to accept, and when called upon to fulfil them, of ignobly avoiding their performance. Had a determined and well considered line of action been followed to gain possession of

the west, the French would not have been able to secure the foothold which, for a time, they possessed, and which they owed to their ability and enterprise. The western tribes had formed relations with the British traders through the Iroquois, and little was wanted to give them political consistency; but no attempt was made to establish permanent relations, and the French, without molestation, retained the country around the western lakes in their interest.

On the 31st of March, 1713, the treaty of Utrecht gave peace to the northern continent of America. In another place* I have endeavoured to relate the several stages of negotiation by which the terms of the treaty were settled. As one of the most important events which affected the future relations of Canada and British America, it must be considered in connection with the political issues, which agitated Great Britain in the last years of the reign of Queen Anne. I have shown in a former chapter the extent to which these changes influenced the history of this continent, in the failure of the expedition against Quebec in 1711. I am convinced that every student of history who dispassionately examines the intrigues, and want of statesmanship, which characterised British diplomacy on this occasion, must perceive how incapably the negotiations of that peace were conducted, and the extent to which the advantages on which the allies might have insisted, were causelessly sacrificed. I must here, however, content myself with narrating the conditions of the treaty affecting this continent.

Great Britain obtained the Isle of Saint Christopher; the country around Hudson's Bay, with the restitution of the forts held by the French, from which merchandise alone was allowed to be removed; Nova Scotia, otherwise called Acadia, conformably to its ancient limits; likewise, the country occupied by the French, including Placentia in Newfoundland. Permission to fish was granted to French fishermen, with power to dry their fish. The French retained Cape Breton, with the right to fortify it. The inhabitants of Canada and

* Vide Appendix.

other subjects of France were bound to cease molesting the "Five Nations," who were recognized as having submitted to Great Britain, and other nations friendly to that power. The British colonists were bound to act similarly with regard to the Indian races attached to France.

During the negotiations France made great efforts to retain Nova Scotia. She offered to cede the islands of Saint Martin, Saint Bartholomew and Saint Christopher in lieu of Acadia, with the Saint George as the boundary between the English and French Colonies. The proposition of St. John* was that Cape Breton should be enjoyed in common by the two countries, neither to construct fortifications. The proposal was immediately rejected.† The French statesmen, well informed of the value of Cape Breton, clung to its possession. They knew the facility which it offered for influencing the French population of Nova Scotia, and that it was the place from which efforts might be made to regain the territory they were ceding.

When the determination was formed on the part of Great Britain not to give up Acadia, it is astonishing that the possession of Cape Breton was not likewise exacted, especially as the French would not part with the right to fortify it. The abandonment of the island to France could only be the source of future contention. The specious pretext that the French required an island at the entrance of the Saint Lawrence, and that island, Cape Breton, should never have been listened to. The true character of the demand, however, was not understood by the British negotiators. A few years only were required for Cape Breton to become the focus of intrigue, to make the Acadians the dangerous population they became.

The view which the treaty expressed with regard to the Five Nations was not accepted by them. Many of the Onondagas and Senecas, owing to the presence of the missionaries, had strong sympathies with the French. The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church, in connection with the conduct of the missionaries living among them, and devoted to their

* 24th of May, 1712.

† 5th of June.

interests, exercised great influence on their personal feeling. The efforts from Albany in this direction had never been of importance. There is little to assure us that the Protestant missionaries in any remarkable manner exerted themselves to obtain the religious sympathy, or the political good will of the Five Nations.

During the next twelve years of de Vaudreuil's government, which was to close with his life, there was peace in Canada. In 1713, the population was 18,119 souls; of this number 4,400 males were between the ages of fourteen and sixty. At the death of de Vaudreuil, in 1725, the population was between twenty-eight and twenty-nine thousand. The year following, 1726, the census reports it to have been 29,396. During this interval the arts of peace received the first consideration; but, except in the case of the higher officials, the whole labours of the inhabitants were devoted to satisfying their material necessities. De Vaudreuil by no means limited his energy to this object. He clung to the hope of regaining Acadia; and what he wanted in strength and legitimate ground of attack, he supplied by intrigue. His unceasing policy was to prevent the Abenakis making peace with New England, and he unfailingly encouraged their attacks on the outlying settlements. The narrative of his proceedings in this respect will be related with the events appertaining to Acadia.

For the five years succeeding the loss of "La Seine," both the men and women of the population had been busily occupied with the production of coarse cloth, and in preparing deerskin, which they had learned to dress without oil, so that it could be used as cloth. In 1710, the young Raudot was recalled to France; the elder Jacques Raudot, the Intendant, in 1711, was replaced by M. Bégon, who did not arrive in Quebec until September, 1712. He had been director of stores at Rochefort, in which position he had shewn much ability. In Canada he exerted himself to the utmost to develop the industry of the people; he early understood that there was much which Canada could profitably produce. The want of

money, and the dearness of every article imported from France, were powerful incentives to enterprise and effort. Bégon reported that, there were not fewer than twenty-five different branches of trade connected with the production of druggets, cloths and linens. The Sisters of the Congregation commenced to make bunting (*étamine*) for their own dress, with black serge for the *soutanes* of the priests, and blue serge for their pupils: fabrics, the manufacture of which is to this day carried on commercially, if discontinued in the convents.

Although the towns were small, and police regulations could without difficulty have been enforced, there was little regular observance of the rules by which health is preserved. There was no provision for drainage, no sanitary regulations. From time to time the small-pox appeared, to prove a terrible scourge; and during the last year of Raudot's presence in the country a disease broke out at Quebec, known as "*le Mal de Siam*," by which many persons died. It is not unlikely that it was a species of cholera. The priests and nuns who attended the sufferers in many instances were themselves afflicted with the disease and became victims to it; and it is stated that as many as twelve priests perished, with some nuns.

A taste had grown up, especially at Montreal, which has been retained to this day in full force among the French-Canadian population. There is scarcely a people to be found with whom the love of the horse is more deep and genuine. It pervades all classes, and in the management of the horse in harness the French-Canadian is unrivalled. No visitor of Quebec, but must have remarked the skill shewn by the carter in ascending and descending that city of hills. As horsemen the French-Canadians are not remarkable. The general attention was directed to the breed of horses, and it was considered that it was given to the neglect of animals necessary for food; oxen and sheep. The possession of the horse had been followed by his employment, and in winter the sleigh was replacing the snow-shoe. Hitherto the necessities of Canadian winter life had exacted the use of the snow-shoe. The ease with which the Canadian youth could march in

winter, had been fully tested in the expeditions to the Mohawk territory, and to the northern New England settlements. It was their skill in this respect which had enabled them to surprise the inmates of sleeping villages, on nights so stormy that it was thought no human being would have found it possible to exist in the woods without a fire. Like much in life, this excellence was only attainable by use and habit. The attention of the Minister was called to this change of custom, and orders were given in the King's name that discontinuance in the use of the snow-shoe must be prevented.

The consequence was that an ordinance * was issued, enacting that no *habitant* should possess more than two mares and one colt. He was allowed to the seeding time of the following year to get rid of any animal owned beyond this number, after which date, any unsold were to be killed. The ordinance sets forth that, the inhabitants of Montreal do not know their own interest, in encouraging the breed of horses to the exclusion of other cattle, as they drew no profit from the horse that lived on the forage with which cattle could be raised. Nothing was said of the neglect of snow-shoeing and the necessity of maintaining it.

Such was the power of the Intendant; indeed, it penetrated into every department of life. His ordinance established the customs' duties; he regulated the current value of money, he gave authority for a market to be held, with the days of sale and the contingent by-laws; he laid down the gradients of the streets in Montreal; he called upon the inhabitants to furnish carts and men to remove the irregularities of the ground; many of these heaps arose from the construction of houses, the excavation having been thrown into the street, and left there.† The inhabitants were held to keep the streets in such condition that they could be travelled; they were to be

* 13th of June, 1709. Edits et Ordonnances, II., p. 273.

† "des buttes de terre qui se trouvent présentement dans les dites rues qui proviennent des décombres et des immondices qui y ont été jetés lorsque les habitants y ont fait bâtir." Edits et Ordonnances, II., p. 259.

kept clean; footwalks to be formed; carters driving on the footwalk were to be fined; no filth was to be thrown into the roadway; houses were to be built on a line; neither pigs nor cattle were to be allowed in the street; no liquor could be sold without a license; and, to prevent provisions being bought up by hucksters, the latter were not allowed to make purchases before eight o'clock in the morning. In the country, all the inhabitants were obliged to do their share in the work of clearing land held as a common.

On the settlement of the Côte des Neiges to the north of the city of Montreal taking place, the concessions* had been granted, on the condition that no liquor should be furnished to the Indians, under the penalty of the confiscation of the grant. An appeal was made on the subject to the Intendant. An ordinance was passed declaring this clause invalid. A clause introduced into the concessions in the Island of Montreal, giving the right to the Seigneur to take from the property the timber required for purposes of construction, or for firewood, was similarly declared to be void. It was ordered that one *arpent* in sixty should be so reserved for the Seigneur. A difficulty arose as to the payment of rent, owing to the boundaries of land not being determined; it was settled by ordinance. Two tanners only were allowed in Montreal; and the butchers were held to divide their skins between them, and the skins could only be sold in the market to the tanners. The latter could only have in their employ, to work for them, three shoemakers and an apprentice. The missionary of Contrecoeur, Saint Ours, Sorel and Verchères, complaining that neglect was shown in conveying him to these places, the inhabitants were ordered in turn to attend on him, and to pay him his *dîme*;† they were forbidden, except in cases of absolute necessity, privately to baptize their children.

One source of quarrel arose from trapping; many of the habitants placing traps on lands not their own, it was ordered that no such traps should be placed except on the trapper's

* A perpetual lease on payment of certain dues, called the "cens et rentes."

† The tithe.

own land. The Sisters of the Congregation were forbidden to make religious vows or be cloistered, and such vows made in future were declared to be invalid. It was equally forbidden to the Frères Charon to take this course, and to wear a religious dress. The inhabitants were called upon to contribute to a bridge or parsonage ; the material nearest to the locality could be taken, and the inhabitants in the neighbourhood were bound to aid in obtaining it. Every one was called upon to make fences around his property. Slavery was recognized ;* Negroes, and Panis Indians of a western tribe, sold to settlers in Carolina who found their way to Canada, were declared to be full property of those that purchased them. The position of the captains of Militia in the processions ; the order in which the consecrated bread was given ; the points of precedence in Church were established by ordinance. An order was given that no quarries should be opened in the neighborhood of the fortifications of Quebec. In cases of disputed title it was the Intendant who ordered the production of papers. On one occasion, a notary having delivered a document marked by irregularity, an act of concession unsigned, the Intendant interdicted the notary for two months, and warned him to behave better for the future. The mode of leaving the Church door was prescribed ; it had been represented that accidents frequently happened owing to the rapid pace with which *Carioles* were driven, and to the smart gallop of the mounted men. We may learn by the last remark, that it was then far more the practice than in modern times for men to ride to Church ; they were allowed only to walk or trot, for the first ten *arpents* † from the Church door before they increased the pace.

On the 19th of June, 1721, there was a serious fire in Montreal, where many buildings were destroyed. The Royal Engineer, de Lery, reported that the opportunity was offered for improving the burned portions of the City ; the new houses

* 13th of April, 1709. "En pleine propriété à ceux qui les ont achetés comme étant leurs esclaves." Edits et Ordonnances, II., p. 272.

† About one third of a mile.

were to be erected in line, and a new system of construction adopted. An ordinance was issued directing that roofs should be framed on purlins.* Framed wooden buildings were forbidden; new structures could only be built of stone, including the second floor; no garrets were permitted; no shingles could be placed on the roofs, which were to be covered with slate or tiles, and until the latter were procurable, the roofs were to be covered with a double tier of boards; new buildings must follow the alignment given; if the owner was able at first only to raise the building one story, he should be bound to complete it to two stories in three years.

An attempt was made to establish porpoise fisheries below Quebec for the purpose of obtaining oil; fishing for eels was forbidden in the waters where this industry was being carried on.

To show the power of the Intendant, the case of Madame Delage may be named: she was ordered to pay the fees of interment to the parish of Charlesbourg, although she had seen fit to have her son buried at Beauport.

This legislation, to some extent, furnishes a description of Canada during the last days of de Vaudreuil. There was no habit or custom free from the supervision, or beyond the control of the Intendant. There was, doubtless, the attempt to render substantial justice, and the regulations in force were dictated by the desire of the common benefit: but all arbitrary government must rest on the disposition and capacity of those who administer it, modified to some extent by the prevailing public sentiment. However theoretically such legislation may be formed on sound principles, its working to no little extent is determined by chance. The errors of popular government, especially on this continent, are neither slight nor unfrequent; but the feeling is imperishable that free institutions will take care of themselves, and that in reality they present the least danger when apparently most fraught with mischief. It is then

* 8th of July, 1721. The purlin is a piece of timber laid longitudinally over the principal rafters directly to sustain the roof.

that a revulsion of thought takes place, and amendment commences. Possibly with only a small beginning, it makes rapid progress, eventually to command the support of the majority. Such a result must follow with a healthy state of public opinion, when patriotism, honesty, and dignity of character will prevail, to exclude the charlatan and the knave. The excesses of popular government must, in the end, lead to their rectification. What would be the feeling of the modern French-Canadian, reared in the healthy freedom of British institutions, if he could be brought back to the "*institutions et lois*" of the rule of the Intendant?

When the newly-appointed Intendant, M. Bégon, arrived, he was accompanied by his family. As was the custom, he took up his residence in the Intendant's palace. It was situate outside the present palace-gate, and surrounded by a garden. The front, down to the Saint Charles, consisted of meadows, the property of the Jesuits, and the view must have been very pleasing. Some ruins of the structure yet remain. M. Bégon himself was a man of wealth, and but shortly before had been married to Mademoiselle de Beauharnois. Her brother François had held the position of Intendant in Canada; her brother Charles de Beauharnois was subsequently Governor-General; it was a younger brother of the family that was the ancestor of the first husband of the Empress Josephine. Madame Bégon had brought from Paris the latest dresses, and her jewels were both the admiration and envy of many of the higher official womanhood. M. Bégon had also a suite of attendants. It was in the Intendant's palace that the meetings of the Conseil Supérieur took place.

A fire broke out on the night of the 5th and 6th of January, 1713; it burned with such rapidity that the Intendant and his wife with difficulty escaped in their night-dresses. Two of her women were burned. The Intendant's valet, in an attempt to save some property, was also lost. The secretary, in his anxiety to preserve important papers, greatly exerted himself; and, not having been able to put on his shoes, was so severely frost-bitten that he died in the hospital a few days afterwards.

The losses of the Intendant were set down at forty thousand crowns; all the jewels and the artistic wardrobe of Madame Bégon were consumed. The building was immediately rebuilt by Bégon, and, when Charlevoix arrived in the country, the palace was completed, and he describes the view as presenting a most attractive landscape. The new edifice was destroyed in 1775, in the attempt of the revolutionary colonial force to take Quebec.

When Madame de Vaudreuil sailed for France, in 1709, she had unfortunately taken passage on a vessel which was captured. She was treated with distinction by the officer in command, and sent to France. Mme. de Vaudreuil was born on the Saint John, in the earlier days of Acadian settlement, in 1673, and was the god-daughter of de Frontenac. She must have been then in the pride of her beauty, thirty-six years of age. She attracted great attention at the Court of Versailles, and acted at the same time with prudence. That she was deficient neither in wit nor manner, is proved by her having impressed the cynical Saint Simon. Madame de Vaudreuil had passed her youth in Acadia, and her experience of good society had been obtained in Canada, furnishing one of the many proofs that social success is greatly the result of quick observation, and natural gift of manner.

After the peace, M. de Vaudreuil obtained leave of absence to proceed to France to join his wife, and left Canada in the King's ship, "Le Héros." During his absence M. de Ramezay was appointed commandant.

It was during this period that M. de Saint Vallier, on his return to his diocese, gave his attention to the appointment of *cirés* throughout the province. Fourteen were permanently named. It was urgently asked by the Minister that, when possible, the other parishes should have their limits defined, and priests should be appointed to them.

On the 1st of August, 1714, Queen Anne died. She had reigned thirteen years, and was only in her fiftieth year. She was succeeded by George I. without opposition, the Jacobites confining their disloyalty to doggerel rhyme and petty tumult.

The new Parliament met on the 5th of January, 1715, when the Whigs had a large majority.

On September the 1st, 1715, Louis XIV. died, having reigned seventy years. Indeed, there were but three French monarchs on the throne, during the century and a half of French rule. Within two years after Champlain had made choice of Quebec as the place of settlement, the dagger of Ravallac destroyed the *Grand Henri*; Louis XIII. died in 1643; Louis XIV. in 1715; the peace of Paris was signed in the reign of Louis XV.

The government of Canada under Louis XIV. may be divided into three epochs: to the death of Cardinal Mazarin, in 1661, when the King became his own minister; from this date to the abdication of James II. in the revolution of 1688, when his ambassador was ordered to leave London; and from this period to his death, during which he was opposed by the formidable hostility of the British nation.

From the commencement of the second period, every matter in Canada was referred to France, and, no doubt, the King believed that the machinery of government was directed by himself; it was the perfection of bureaucracy, with the addition that every official of rank was invited to calumniate those with whom he was acting. Like all men making great pretensions to power, the King was easily dealt with and managed by those who knew his weaknesses and humored them.*

His principal service to Canada was the emigration directed

* "Louis, en effet, malgré ses prétentions à ne recevoir ses inspirations que de lui-même ou du ciel, et malgré son active et jalouse surveillance sur toutes les parties de l'administration, était très-susceptible de se laisser gouverner et fut toujours gouverné jusqu'à un certain point; plus fort par la volonté que par le génie, il recevait, la plupart du temps, l'impulsion qu'il croyait donner; seulement, on y devait mettre beaucoup d'adresse; on était perdu, s'il s'apercevait qu'on visait à le dominer, et il finissait ordinairement par s'en apercevoir. C'est là l'explication de cette *inconstance* qui lui a été reprochée envers ses ministres, et aussi de la faveur qu'il finit par accorder à des hommes que leur médiocrité mettait à l'abri de telles ambitions. Une seule personne garda sur lui, jusqu'à son dernier jour, un pouvoir, sinon illimité, du moins inébranlable; mais cette personne était madame de Maintenon, et la vie entière de Maintenon fut le chef-d'œuvre de l'esprit de conduite."

Histoire de France de Henri Martin, Tome XIV., p. 4.

by him between 1665 and 1672 ; the impulse which he gave to agriculture, by sending out horses and domestic animals ; and the establishment of "Le Conseil Souverain," which, imperfect as it was, was the means of administering justice. His constant endeavor was to retain the population to the east of Montreal. He opposed settlement at Cataraqui ; Detroit he looked upon with disfavour ; he disallowed the project of constructing the fort at Niagara ; and, though for a time he listened to the proposed settlement of La Galette (Prescott), no steps were taken for its establishment. Michilimackinac he desired to see limited to a fort ; every attempt of the *coureur de bois* to make a home for himself around the western lakes was doomed to be thwarted by the monarch, whose desire was to keep the population as far east as possible, in connection with France.

The King's continental wars prevented him from giving aid to Canada ; and it was entirely the exhaustion of the kingdom, which led him to entertain proposals of peace. The conditions of treaties he held of little weight. When Acadia was ceded by the treaty of Utrecht, intrigues to lead to its repossession by France were immediately begun. The misdirected French inhabitants that remained were urged to attack the traveller, the new settler, or the soldier of the garrison who strayed from the cantonment ; there was no safety a mile from the fort gates. The Acadian was encouraged to entertain undying hatred to the British as enemies of his race and church ; all compromise was to be rejected ; all consideration received, to be ignored ; all offers of friendliness to be refused. This system of hostility was persevered in to bring terrible retribution on the unhappy population, who would listen to no terms of accommodation.

The misery, desolation, personal suffering and destruction of life which Louis caused on this continent, never cost him a thought. He was directly responsible for the miserable raids on the New England frontier, and the slaughter of the settlers. As he expressed it, he desired to make their results more profitable to the Indian, than hunting.

The influence which he exercised over Canada was the nominal revision of the course submitted by the officials from the province; but no principle of government can be traced to show that he knew the requirements of the country, and was desirous of establishing the system most capable of advancing its interests. If Louis XIV. had a policy with regard to New France, with the exception of the determination, if possible, to turn the British Colonies into a wilderness, we search in vain for evidence of the fact.

What does French Canada owe to the long career of Louis XIV.? Nearly half the period of her political being! He failed to develop her commerce; he embroiled the country in war; he was the cause of limiting the population by his bigotry; he prevented the extension of settlement; his colony was always on the verge of bankruptcy; he allowed the people no part in the government; the law was the mere arbitrary opinion of his officers; he permitted neither personal liberty, freedom of commerce nor freedom of conscience. It was from his impulse, that the institutions under which Canadians lived had no vitality. There was no encouragement for any merit but that of the partisan leader; and when, the shock came, and the might of Great Britain was embarked in the contest, and the British colonists learned to concentrate and discipline their strength and courage, a few months shewed how frail the tenure of French power was in America. Forty-four years after the death of Louis XIV., his whole system of government on this continent collapsed, in the days of his dissolute and contemptible successor.

The funeral of Louis XIV. on the 9th of September may be named as a warning to absolutism. It was characterized by a want of ceremony even to the absence of what was decent, and was greeted only by taunts and jeers from the crowd. Let Voltaire describe the scene: "*J'ai vu de petites tentes dressées sur le chemin de Saint-Denis. On y bunait, on y chantait, on y riait. Le jésuite Le Tellier était la principale cause de cette joie universelle. J'entendis plusieurs spectateurs dire qu'il fallait mettre le feu aux maisons des jésuites avec les flambeaux qui éclairaient la pompe funèbre.*" [Siècle de Louis XIV., chap. XXVIII.] This was the end of the half century of "glory," which to this day dazzles the imagination of even sober-minded Frenchmen.

THE CONSTITUTION "UNIGENITUS."

In 1713, the celebrated Constitution "Unigenitus" was promulgated in Canada. This remarkable declaration against Jansenism calls for mention in this history. The title is derived from the opening words, "Unigenitus Dei Filius;" the propositions were one hundred and one in number, against the doctrines contained in Père Quesnel's book on the New Testament. It was the work of the remorseless intriguer Le Tellier, and the Jesuits who sustained him.

The *Mandement* of the 8th of September, 1713, which made it known in Canada, is incomplete,* both in the Archives of the Seminary and the Hôpital Général of Quebec. The concluding words of the document are, "without in any way changing the terms in which it [the Constitution] is conceived. We notify you that the Church—" Here the document ends, plainly mutilated by design, and so remains.

The suppression of any opinion, given at this time by Bishop de Saint Vallier, is not difficult of explanation. The publication of the Bull was the cause of great discord in France. Forty bishops accepted it, but, for the most part, appended a series of explanations, to be looked upon as so many apologies, which were unfavourably received at Rome. Cardinal de Noailles, the Archbishop of Paris, with seven bishops, protested against it, and addressed a letter to the Pope, asking for explanations as to the meaning of the text. The King, prompted by Le Tellier, refused to forward the document, and caused the bull to be registered in the parliament of Paris. That body did not conceal its dissatisfaction, but dared not resist, and the registration was made with some reservations. On the death of Louis XIV., the ecclesiastical party opposed to the bull came into power. But in 1720, the Regent, hard pressed by Rome, obtained its recognition from de Noailles. From that date the Jansenists, as a party, ceased to exist.

The narrative of Saint Simon [XIII., p. 293], throws some light on the event. It is stated on the authority of M. Amelot, then ambassador at Rome, that Pope Clement, terrified by the disorders which had arisen in France, expressed his regret that the bull had been published, and said that he had acted solely on the conviction that there would be no opposition to the will of the King; whereupon Amelot asked him why the curious number of one hundred and one propositions had been condemned. The Pope commenced to weep. "Eh, Monsieur Amelot, what would you have me do? The *père* Le Tellier had said to the King that the book contained more than a hundred censurable propositions. He did not wish to be accused of falsehood, and I had their foot at my throat for me to set down more than a hundred, to shew that he had told the truth; and I only added just one more to the number."†

Le Tellier, whose memory will ever remain one of the most despised and hated in French history, was a Jesuit priest, who, on the death of Père La Chaise, in

* Mandements, Lettres pastorales et Circulaires des Evêques de Quebec, 1887, Vol. I., p. 487.

† "On m'a tenu le pied sur la gorge pour en mettre plus de cent pour montrer qu'il avait dit vrai, et je n'en ai mis qu'une de plus."

1709, succeeded him as the King's confessor. In this capacity he became, as it were, the political representative of his church.*

The public distress of the winter of 1709, the insurrections of the Cevennes, the misery suffered by the people during the long war, the absence of success in the war, the exhausted condition of the kingdom, during the later years had obtained some toleration for the Protestants. They had not been forced to send their children to the Roman Catholic schools; indeed, many schools had been closed from the want of means to keep them open; moreover, the Protestants had occasionally met together without persecution. Even on signing the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, Louis, at the request of the Queen of England, engaged to release the Protestants sentenced to the galleys on account of their religion. Thirty-six only obtained their liberty. Many had died, and, on the pacification of the Cevennes, several had been set free; nevertheless, two years later, in 1715, there remained many such prisoners. But, prior to this date, when the peace negotiations had taken such a form that the King felt assured of their favourable termination, the persecution of the Protestants was re-commenced. Before the treaty was signed, in March, 1712, an ordinance appeared, enacting, under heavy penalties, that physicians attending a sick bed, in case of danger, should insist on their patients confessing; and that on the third day of the illness the physician should demand the certificate of the priest, that confession had been made, and if not produced he was to decline to give further attendance. The same year, the King had been called upon to declare as illegitimate all children not born from marriages performed in the Roman Catholic Church. Louis was dissuaded from so acting by the elder d'Aguesseau. The Chancellor Pontchartrain preferred resigning his place in the Council to entering into disputes with the dominant party. Voisin, then Minister of War, to which position he had been preferred through the influence of Madame de Maintenon, succeeded him. There was no longer to be any truce with the Protestants. On the 8th of March, 1715, the Edict of the 29th of April, 1686, which had been allowed to fall into disuse, was renewed. It was then declared that, as the pretended reformed religion had been abolished, those who had remained in France were Catholic, for otherwise

* "La Chaise, qui, sauf quelques éclipses de faveur causées par ses différends avec madame de Maintenon, avait été une sorte de ministre des affaires ecclésiastiques, était mort en 1709. Son successeur Le Tellier le fit bien regretter. C'était un fanatique après un politique, un esprit de violence et de scandale après un esprit de tempérament, de modération et de prudence mondaine. Le fanatisme de Le Tellier était de la pire espèce, de celle qui prend sa source non dans les passions exaltées, mais dans les passions haineuses, et qui joint l'hypocrisie des moyens à la conviction du fond, si l'on peut appeler conviction un aheurement farouche et aveugle. Par un contraste singulier, ce persécuteur avait débuté par être, sinon persécuté au moins maltraité par Bossuet et le cardinal de Noailles, pour avoir défendu la tolérance et la philosophie dans l'affaire des *cérémonies chinoises*; il se dédommagea aux dépens des protestants et des jansénistes de sa charité envers les Chinois; dans l'un comme dans l'autre cas, il n'eut qu'un même but, l'intérêt de sa Compagnie, objet de son forcené dévouement."

Henri Martin. Histoire, XIV., p. 598-9.

they would never have been tolerated. Although not so expressed in words, the conclusion followed, that those not married in the Roman Catholic church were not married at all, and the children born of such marriages were held to be bastards; and those dying without accepting the sacraments were to be treated as atheists, and buried at a cross-road without the slightest religious service. The remarkable falsehood of this statement is apparent from the fact that, after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the Protestants were forcibly prevented from leaving France. Moreover, as late as September, 1713, an Edict had been issued renewing the denial of the right to leave the kingdom, in the case of subjects of the King of the religion *prétendue réformée*, a proof of the existence of numerous Protestants, in 1715 declared to be non-existent. "The Edict of March, 1715," powerfully writes one of the first of modern French historians, Henri Martin, "extorted by a wretch from the enfeebled old age of the *Grand Roi*, was truly the masterpiece of that spirit of falsehood which France has baptized with the name of Jesuitism. We do not believe that so great a national defilement is to be found in our entire ancient legislation. The most infamous tyrants have imagined nothing worse than this combination, which branded with infamy at one and the same time an entire population, in the cradle and on the death-bed, and which created a tribe of Pariahs in the France of the eighteenth century." *

In connection with this crusade, a *mandement* was issued in Canada on the 24th of May, 1717,† by Bishop de Saint Vallier against *marriages à la Gaumine*, the term then given to civil marriages, from the *Doyen Maître des Requêtes*, at the time of the Fronde named Gaumine, who had been married by civil contract. The *mandement* threatened with excommunication all who should dare to contract those detestable marriages, those wicked enough to advise them, all the hired witnesses, and the notaries who drew up the deed. I believe no civil edict sustaining this prohibition exists.

From the Protestants, Le Tellier turned to the Jansenists. Some years previously the Père Quesnel‡ had published "*Reflexions morales sur le Nouveau Testament*." The work had passed through several editions: according to all accounts, on its appearance the Pope and Père La Chaise had given it their approval. The edition of 1693 had received the countenance of de Noailles, then Bishop of Chalons. But numerous objections were urged against its teaching, as enforcing Jansenist principles. In 1699, de Noailles, then Archbishop of Paris, caused the work to be revised. But the clamour against it continued on the part of the extreme Jesuit party, and was persevered in, to obtain from the Pope the condemnation of the book. But the decree prohibiting its use was not published in France, nominally on account of some defect in form. In reality, the prohibition was an attack on the Archbishop. In the meantime, in 1709, Père La Chaise died, to be succeeded by Le Tellier. One of the first proceedings of this man, in November of this year, was the destruction of the monastery of Port Royal. The

* Vol. XIV., p. 601.

† Mandements et Lettres Pastorales, I., pp. 492-4.

‡ Quesnel was the personal friend of the celebrated Arnauld, and upon his death had been considered the head of the Jansenists. Quesnel died in exile at Amsterdam, in 1679.

place was forcibly entered by the police, under the orders of d'Argenson. The nuns were placed in carriages, to be driven to prison. Madame de Remicourt was kept for two years in solitary confinement, in a cell lighted and ventilated only through the chimney ; without fire, society or books. The superior, Louise de St. Anastasie Mesnil de Courtiaux, could not have been subjected to greater rigour if she had been a felon. The building was destroyed to the foundation. Workmen, lashed up by drink to the outrage, broke open the graves of the buried nuns, amid scenes of revolting brutality, and the bones were thrown into a pit in the neighbouring church of Saint Lambert.*

Le Tellier's next step was to denounce to the King, Père Quesnel's book, and he succeeded in obtaining from Louis a formal demand upon the Pope for its condemnation. Nearly two years elapsed before the Bull "Unigenitus" was issued, on the 8th of September, 1713. Writers on this Constitution have pointed out that it not only condemns the teaching of Saint Augustine, but even assails the very words of Saint Paul. It is the complete triumph of Jesuitism in opposition to the general spirit of all theology. The doctrines condemned require only to be set forth to prove this assertion. Among them were "Neither God nor religion is present where there is no charity." "The reading of the Scriptures is for all men." "The Lord's day ought to be sanctified by Christians by the perusal of Holy Scripture." "It is hurtful to deprive mankind of Scripture." "The dread of unjust excommunication ought not to prevent us doing our duty." It was teachings of this character which were declared to be heretical, and conducive to a bad life.

I give this imperfect account of this well-known Constitution, owing to its introduction into Canada. The incomplete record of the document establishes that a portion of the *mandement* issued on the occasion of its promulgation, in explanation of the doctrine which the Bull contains, has been deliberately expunged ; whether by Bishop de Saint Vallier himself, by subsequent authority, or by some private hand, must ever remain a mystery.

On his accession to power, the Regent Orleans sent into banishment the brutal persecutor Le Tellier, the cause of so much misery and suffering, and of such dissension in his Church.

I deem it proper to append some of the propositions condemned in this bull : a condemnation which, several of the French Bishops, headed by the Archbishop of Paris, refused to accept.

* I beg leave to refer my readers for the narrative of this scene, to the touching description of it by the late Sir James Stephen, in his life Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge. It is to be found in the *Edinburgh Review* of 1841. I venture to quote the closing words : "In that spot, however, may still be seen the winding brook, the verdant hills, and the quiet meadows, nature's indestructible monuments to the devout men and holy women who there nurtured affections which made them lovely in their lives, and hopes which rendered them triumphant in death. Nor in her long roll of martyrs, has history to record the names of any who suffered with greater constancy or in a nobler cause, for their conflict was with the very church they most profoundly revered, and their cause was that of devotedness to sincerity and the abhorrence of falsehood."

- II. Jesu Christi gratia, principium efficax boni cujuscumque generis, necessaria est ad omne opus bonum; absque illâ, non solum nil fit, sed nec fieri potest.
- II. The grace of Jesus Christ, the effectual principle of every kind of good, is necessary to every good work, without it not only nothing is done, but nothing can be done.
- XVIII. Semen verbi, quod manus Dei irrigat, semper affert fructum suum.
- XVIII. The seed of the word watered by the hand of God always brings forth its fruit.
- XXVI. Nullæ dantur gratiæ, nisi per fidem.
- XXVI. No gifts of grace are given but through faith.
- XXVII. Fides est prima gratia et fons omnium aliarum.
- XXVII. Faith is the first gift of grace and the fountain of all others.
- XXXVIII. Peccator non est liber, nisi ad malum, sine gratiâ Liberatoris.
- XXXVIII. The sinner is not free, unless for [the commission of] evil, without the grace of the Redeemer.
- LVII. Totum deest peccatori, quando ei deest spes; et non est spes in Deo, ubi non est amor Dei.
- LVII. Everything is wanting to the sinner when hope is wanting to him, and there is no hope in God where there is no love of God.
- LVIII. Nec Deus est, nec religio ubi non est charitas.
- LVIII. Neither God nor religion is, where there is no charity.
- LXXIII. Quid est Ecclesia, nisi cœtus filiorum Dei manentium in ejus sinu, adoptatorum in Christo, subsistentium in ejus personâ, redemptorum ejus sanguine, viventium ejus spiritu, agentium per ejus gratiam, et expectantium gratiam futuri sæculi.
- LXXIII. What else is the Church than a communion of the children of God, remaining in His bosom, adopted in Christ, subsisting in His person, redeemed by His blood, living in His spirit, acting through His grace, and looking for the grace of future life.
- LXXVII. Qui non ducit vitam dignam filio Dei et membro Christi, cessat interius habere Deum pro patre et Christum pro capite.
- LXXVII. He who does not lead a life worthy of a son of God and a member of Christ, ceases to have within him God for a father and Christ for a head.
- LXXIX. Utile et necessarium est omni tempore, omni loco, et omni personarum generi studere et cognoscere spiritum, pietatem, et mysteria sacræ Scripturæ.
- LXXIX. It is useful and necessary in all time, in all place, and for every kind of person, to study and to become acquainted with the spirit, the piety and mysteries of the sacred Scriptures.

LXXX. Lectio sacræ Scripturæ est pro omnibus.

LXXX. The reading of the sacred Scriptures is for all people.

LXXXI. Obscuritas sancta verbi Dei non est laicis ratio dispensandi se ipsos ab ejus lectione.

LXXXI. The holy obscurity of the Word of God is not a reason for the laity neglecting its study.

LXXXII. Dies dominicus a christianis debet sanctificari lectionibus pietatis et super omnia sanctorum Scripturarum. Damnosum est velle christianum ab hac lectione retrahere.*

LXXXII. The Lord's day should be kept holy by Christians in reading works of piety, and, above all things, the holy Scriptures. It is hurtful to desire to withdraw Christians from this reading.

LXXXIV. Abripere e christianorum manibus Novum Testamentum, seu eis illud clausum tenere, auferendo eis modum illud intelligendi, est illis Christi os obturare.

LXXXIV. To take violently the New Testament from the hand of Christians, or to hold it [the book] closed, taking away the means of understanding it, is to close the mouth of Christ to them.

LXXXV. Interdicere christianis lectionem sacræ Scripturæ, præsertim Evangelii, est interdicere usum luminis filiis lucis, et facere ut patiantur speciem quamdam excommunicationis.

LXXXV. To forbid Christians the study of the sacred Scriptures, especially of the Gospel, is to interdict the use of light to the sons of light, and to make them suffer a species of excommunication.

XCI. Excommunicationis injustæ metus nunquam debet nos impedire ab implendo debito nostro : nunquam eximus ab Ecclesiâ, etiam quando hominum nequitia videmur ab eâ expulsi, quando Deo, Jesu Christo, atque ipsi Ecclesiæ per charitatem affixi sumus.

XCI. The fear of unjust excommunication ought never to prevent us performing our duty. We never go out of the Church, even when by the wickedness of men we appear to be expelled from her [fold], so long as we remain attached to God, to Jesus Christ, and to the Church itself through charity.

* The printed text, Vol. 21, p. 572, "Bullarium Romanum," gives "retrabere." There is also an error in the Præmium, "ovium velleribus obvolventes" is printed "obvolentes."

CHAPTER VII.

On the accession to power of the Regent, a change took place in the administration of affairs. Hitherto the Governors had written long despatches, containing a general history of the year's events. Orders were now issued that matters were not generally to be related in one letter, but that each subject should be specially treated in a separate communication. The system of writing directly to the Secretary of State by subaltern officials was discontinued; they were instructed according to their position, to make reports to the Governor, the Intendant, or their immediate superior.

One great difficulty experienced in Canada was that of the currency. The specie coming into the country immediately found its way back to France, in spite of the attempt to keep the current coinage in the Province by assigning to it an artificial value. It has been always found that any such advantage is imaginary, and that money, like any other commodity, has only its market value; and that to rate a coinage one-third higher than its actual worth simply causes the price of commodities to rise proportionately with this increase. The French silver *écu*, worth two and a half *livres* in France, was rated at four francs in Canada, more than it was actually worth, even by the standard of the day. In 1635 de Meulles had introduced card-money, and for thirty years it had been the currency of the country. It was not like a modern bank-bill, representing gold on demand: but a bill of exchange on the national treasury in France was obtainable for the amount of card-money deposited with the government, previous to the departure of the autumn vessels. So long as these bills were regularly paid, the value of the card-money was maintained, but, for some years previous to the peace of Utrecht, France was so exhausted that the bills

could not be met. In 1709, an unfavourable season had produced a famine. The letters of Madame de Maintenon to the Princesse des Ursins, who represented French interests at the Court of Spain, show the deplorable condition of France, and the extent of public misery. In this general ruin Canada was involved. The drafts drawn by the colonial government were dishonoured, and the monetary condition of the province was consequently thrown into confusion. Virtually repudiated by the French government, the value of the card-money rapidly depreciated. The treasury bills unpaid were either sold in France at a great discount, or returned protested to Canada, and when the colonial government was called upon to meet its obligations, nothing could be done, for there was no money.

In 1714, the population of Canada was under 19,000 souls. It is difficult to name the amount of card-money in circulation at this date; it is probable that no account had been kept. It has been estimated, however, that it reached the value of two million *livres*. If such is the fact, it shows the reckless character of the issue, as one half of that sum would have sufficed for the currency of the country. The consequence was that much embarrassment was felt. Several Quebec traders, suffering from the non-payment of the bills of exchange on France, and from the difficulty of obtaining money to remit for their purchases, made a proposition to exchange the card-money at half its face-value for bills on France, on the express condition that they should be paid. The offer was accepted, as it reduced the debt in Canada one-half, to the extent that the remedy could be applied. From time to time, specie was likewise sent in small amounts to redeem card-money, on the basis of half-value; and this arrangement lasted until 1717, when a decree was issued on the subject.* After recording the irregularities arising from the issue of this currency, it was declared it should be withdrawn; but that an issue should be made to meet the expenses of the last six months of 1716 and the first six months of 1717, the last occasion when this

* Edits et Ordonnances, Vol. I., p. 370, 5th of July, 1717.

paper currency was to be resorted to. Such currency, old and new issue, was only to be received at half its face-value in the colony; in France two *livres* Canadian would be held to represent one *livre* ten *sols*; consequently, in France the card currency only passed for three-eighths of its nominal value.

In 1718 a supplementary ordinance was made with regard to debts contracted since 1714.* The right of paying them with card-money, according to its face-value, was granted, seeing that the transactions had been made on that basis.

The principle of redemption laid down was that Bills of Exchange on France for half value would be drawn, to be due on the 1st of March of the years 1718, 1719, and 1720. After the ships left in 1718, the bills given were to fall due in 1719 and 1720. After that date the card-money was to be held worthless and was ordered to be burned.

Card-money passed out of use to be reissued in 1729 under M. de Beauharnois. The destruction of the first issue must have been thoroughly carried out; examples of it are exceedingly scarce.† The specie in circulation in the colony was insufficient; and from 1719 to 1726 edicts were issued to regulate the currency. Canada was seriously affected by the financial difficulties of France. The year 1720 saw the collapse of Law's system, in spite of every effort to maintain it, and he had fled to Italy with but little money.‡ The misery which followed in England and France, the reckless spirit of speculation which

* Edits et Ordonnances, Vol. I., p. 393, 21st March.

† The writer, during 1887, exerted himself to obtain some specimens for a friend. Except about a dozen examples held by known numismatists, he was unable to hear of the existence of any such money; even the knowledge that it was ever in use was confined to a few students of history.

‡ It does not appear that Law carried any wealth from France, and he had brought a large fortune into the country stated at upwards of a million and a half of livres. All that he managed to retain was some precious stones of moderate value. At Brussels he was met by an agent of Peter the Great, who had followed him from Paris, the bearer of an offer to be director of finances at Russia; which Law refused. He died in Venice in 1729, a poor man, retaining to the last the hope of returning to France and renewing his operations.

had affected nearly all, who could obtain money, proved the ruin of many families. Banking was then in its infancy, and a redeemable currency unknown. Canada was involved in the crash, not from having participated in the stock jobbing madness of the time, but from the inability of the mother country to pay the debt incurred for the necessary expenses of government. Had a limited amount of card-money been put in circulation, it would have supplied the want of the colony. The danger appears to have been that when the issue was made, it was confined to no limit; as was proved by the immense amount of the second issue authorized in 1729, in circulation at the period of the conquest, thirty years afterwards.

It was after the peace of Utrecht that exportations of the products of Canada commenced. Canadian wheat, fish, and fish-oil, and leather found their way to France; they were not admitted free, but were subjected to a tariff. Shortly after this date Gen-sing became for a time an article of commerce. In 1712, Père Joseph François Lafitau arrived in Canada, and was immediately sent to the mission of the Sault above Montreal. He remained at this station for five years, during which he devoted himself to the study of the manners and customs of the Indians, which led to the publication of a work by him, still referred to. *

In the autumn of 1716 he discovered the plant of Gen-sing. Having been in Quebec in 1715, he read a letter of Père Jartoux, who had seen the plant in Tartary in 1709, and who gave a description of it. Père Lafitau learned its value as a medicinal drug in China to be equal to its weight in silver. Seeing the advantages to be gained by its introduction as an article of commerce, Lafitau made inquiries concerning it from the Indians, and personally examined the country in the hope of its discovery. †

* *Mœurs des Sauvages Americains, comparées aux Mœurs des Premiers temps.* Paris, 1723.

† Gen-sing is one of the family of the *dicotyledonous araliaceæ*, and is held by the Chinese, Japanese, and Tartars, to be a panacea in all cases of sickness. It was from this plant that Lafitau founded one of his arguments that America

The discovery led to the plant being gathered, dried and culled. When first introduced, the price at Quebec was from thirty to forty *sols* the pound, and any one was permitted to sell the plant. But, as it increased in value, the Company determined to exercise its rights, and, in 1751, claimed to exclude all others from the trade. The price rose to twelve *livres* the pound; it is said that thirty-three *livres* were paid. As the demand for the plant increased, the care with which it was obtained and prepared was relaxed. It was gathered out of season, dried imperfectly before it was ripe, being placed in stove ovens. There was no knowledge in Canada of the proper mode of treating the plant. Even in this imperfectly prepared state it fetched twenty-five *livres* the pound. In 1752, Gen-sing of this character, to the value of 500,000 *livres*, was exported, and the company took steps to obtain the plant at its maturity, and to have it properly cured and dried. The Gen-sing, however, sent to La Rochelle remained unsold; finally, by the channels of England, Holland and Spain, it found its way to China. It was the inferior Gen-sing, unripe and improperly cured, which caused the plant

had formerly been joined to Asia, to the north of China. The meaning of the Chinese word "*Gin-seng*" and the Iroquois word "*Garent Oguen*," the Indian name of the plant, is the same "a man's thigh," from the supposed resemblance to the human thigh, a coincidence Lafitau could not consider to be fortuitous. The theory of Lafitau was that the Indian population of America had originally come from Asia. According to M. Verréault the botanical name is *panax-quinque-folium*.

I have to acknowledge my obligations to the treatise of the learned Abbé Verréault on this subject. Montreal, 1858.

Père Lafitau reappears in history in a different character to that of the advocate of Gen-sing. He retired from the order of Jesuits and became Bishop of Sisteron. He was one of the active defenders of the "Unigenitus" Constitution; and was likewise the historian of its promulgation: he published also the life of Pope Clement XI. He is principally remembered in modern history as having been the agent in Rome of Dubois, then Archbishop of Cambrai, in the attempt of the latter to obtain the Cardinal's hat. Much of the correspondence remains. Clement XI., with cunning equal to that of Dubois, managed to evade the request until his death in January, 1721. The honour was, however, afterwards obtained, on the election of Cardinal Conti as Pope Innocent XIII. Dubois came Cardinal the 16th of July, 1721.

from Canada to be held of little worth. As it could not be sold, its export ceased.

At the time when the plant was held of value, it was considered more profitable to undertake the search for it, than to cultivate the farm. In many localities agriculture was neglected; the entire attention of the inhabitants was given to its collection; the result was, that in some parts of Canada the plant entirely disappeared. In modern times, however, it is occasionally to be seen in the neighbourhood of Montreal. In two years after the trade was at its maximum, in 1754, the value exported was only thirty-three thousand *livres*, and, as the Company ceased to purchase the plant, the trade entirely disappeared. All that remained of it was a proverb among the people, when speaking of some matter having failed, that it had come to nothing, as the Gen-sing.*

Ship-building now commenced to be more general at Quebec. Four vessels were launched. For one hundred and sixty years it was to remain a settled industry of the city. In modern times, the use of iron has superseded wood in the construction of vessels, and in consequence, ship-building in Canada is confined to narrow limits. Furs remained a great staple of trade, and, as the western tribes were brought into relationship with the French, manufactured goods from France were more introduced, but English competition was sensibly felt. It was from the furs that a portion of the revenue was obtained; one-tenth of the moose, and one-fourth of the beaver skins, went for the expenses of the government. There was also a tariff of ten per cent. on wines and spirits, and five *so/s* on a pound of tobacco.

The attempt, by means of companies and associations to develop the commerce of Canada had been marked by failure. In 1664, the original "Cent Associés" were replaced by a company known as the "Compagnie Occidentale," but, in 1665, the trade in furs in the Province was transferred to a Canadian combination of the inhabitants, on condition of the

* "C'est tombé comme le Gen-sing."

annual payment of a million pounds of beaver-skins for the enjoyment of the privilege. The rights which the company reserved were confirmed by de Tracy in 1667. For some period much activity was shewn, and the company annually employed one hundred vessels in their operations. As they assumed the responsibility of meeting much of the expense of the government, the trade of Tadousac was retained by them. In 1674, this company became bankrupt, and was suppressed. On Colbert's recommendation the debts, amounting to 3,523,000 *livres*, were assumed by the King, and the shareholders were paid the amount of their investments, 1,297,000 *livres*. The monopoly was transferred to the Oudiette Company, which undertook to pay the same contribution for the support of government, and the tax on the commerce of the country remained unchanged. All furs were ordered to be brought to the stores of the company, the skins being arbitrarily valued at four *livres* ten *sols* each. It was, however, discovered that there are different qualities of fur; eventually they were divided into classes one, two and three, "*cache-gras*," "*demi-gras*" and "*sec*." Charlevoix tells us that the term "dry beaver" was applied to skins which had not been used, and that "*cache-gras*" had been worn by the Indians, after having been treated on the inside with the marrow of animals, to render it pliable. Several skins were sewn together to form a robe, which, during winter, was worn next the skin, never to be removed. The consequence was that the long hair was worn off, and the fur that remained, obtained the appearance of what is now known as "plucked beaver." Fourteen or fifteen months were necessary to obtain this result. In 1675, Oudiette retired. Two companies were successively formed, each of which accepted the conditions, on which Oudiette had declined to continue his operations, each in turn to be ruined. They were followed by the *fermiers généraux de France*, who gathered a number of skins, but could find no market for them, and a million skins remained unsold in their stores. In 1700, another company was formed in Canada. France, however, could purchase only 150,000 skins, and the

company was not allowed to send the furs elsewhere, from fear of injuring the business of the Paris hat-makers. In 1706, this company became bankrupt; its debts amounted to 1,812,000 livres. The monopoly was then given to Aubert, Neyret and Gayot. In 1715, they failed.

It was not from her own misfortunes that the colony was suffering. Owing to the vicious commercial system which was followed, the ill effects of Law's operations in France reacted on the Saint Lawrence. Law had killed a man in a duel and sought refuge in France, where his schemes had gained the confidence of the Regent. The Bank of England, established in 1695, in the reign of William III., had been of great service in obtaining money during the crisis of the war. The Regent believed that he was creating a source of material wealth by the formation of a similar institution. By Edict* an order was given to those charged with the State moneys, to receive and pay the notes of this bank without discount; it was principally by this privilege that the bank was enabled to pay seven and a half per-cent interest.

Since the conclusion of the war, a spirit of speculation had grown up in the northern part of Europe; and as at this date France was almost bankrupt, any scheme of relief attracted attention. Law had, accordingly, little difficulty in forming a company which should possess the monopoly of trade in the country of the Mississippi, and should develop French colonization in North America. He obtained the concession of the territory of Louisiana. Foreigners were permitted to hold shares; and the Government bills, which had been at fifty per-cent discount, and often of less value, were accepted in part payment for shares. The country was represented as a second Peru, where gold was plentiful; and the story was everywhere believed. The Parliament of Paris readily registered the edict. When, in 1718, the company of Aubert, Neyret, and Gayot, came to an end, their charter was transferred to Law's company, with the privilege until the last of

* 10th of April, 1717.

December, 1742, of receiving beaver-skins in Canada to the exclusion of every one else. Except the company, no one could purchase a beaver-skin to send to France; and the discovery of one beaver-skin on board a vessel was sufficient to lead to her confiscation. In connection with this legislation Illinois was joined to the government of New Orleans.

The company immediately endeavoured to control the trade, but it had still to contend with the disadvantage that better prices and better goods were obtainable from the British; and it was not only in Canada that difficulties were experienced, the manufacturers of Paris refused to receive the dressed beaver. In order to countermine the English influence with the Western Indians, their jealousy and dislike of the Iroquois had been successfully appealed to. The canoes from Lake Superior and Lake Michigan again passed down the Ottawa, avoiding the Saint Lawrence. On their arrival at Montreal a fair was held, at which the furs were exchanged for goods. At Three Rivers, the same course was followed with regard to the Indians who descended the Saint Maurice. So long as the advantage of trading with the British was imperfectly understood, this system could be carried on, the price of the goods being raised to meet the high prices asked. But, since the peace, many of the *coureurs de bois* without licenses, had proceeded to the north-west, and many young men connected with good families had commenced trade with Albany. It was the effort of the company to stop this intercourse entirely by preventing English goods being smuggled into Canada. The company asserted that it was a national necessity that the practice should be put an end to; and they asked that the right should be given to their officers to enter any house, even that of any ecclesiastic, to examine whether foreign goods were concealed there. The request was not granted; the Council decided that such inspection could only be made by the officers of justice under authority of the Commandant or Intendant.

In 1718, several young men were prosecuted on account of their relations with Albany, carried on through Lake Cham-

plain. One of them, M. de la Découverte, had made himself remarkable by bringing back a negro slave,* and some silver ware. One of the New York Livingstons resided in Montreal, and was generally the intermediary in these transactions. On the other hand, de Contrecoeur was stationed at Lake Champlain to prevent this irregular trade being carried on. In 1722, the name of the company of the west was exchanged for that of the company of the Indies.

In 1714, de Vaudreuil made a proposition to the Court, which, it was fortunate for Canada, was not accepted. After stating that Canada had but 4,484 males between fourteen and sixty capable of bearing arms, and that the twenty-eight companies of marines maintained by the King amounted only to 620 men, scattered over a hundred leagues, he pointed out that the British colonies had sixty thousand men capable of bearing arms, and there could be no doubt that on the first quarrel they would make an attempt to seize Canada. He instanced that meetings had been held in the city of London, calling upon members of Parliament to ask the Government why Canada and Cape Breton had been left to France.

He recognised the difficulty of sending men to Canada, owing to the then small population in many of the provinces of France, and the disordered state of the national finances. In order, therefore, to increase the population of Canada, he recommended that the fraudulent dealers in salt, working out their sentences at the galleys, should be sent to Canada at the rate of one hundred and fifty annually;† that the Farmers General should furnish for each man one hundred and fifty *livres*. On their arrival, each man was to receive fifty *livres*. The new comers would be distributed among the inhabitants;

* This negro must have been among the first brought into Canada. In 1689, on the representation of de Denonville and de Champigny, their introduction had been approved in Versailles. I have alluded to the Edicts of Raudot in 1709, by which the slavery of the negro was recognised.

† “Il y a tous les ans un nombre considerable de Faux-sonniers condamnés aux Galères dont le Roy a peu de besoin & qui deviennent inutiles pour la culture des Terres : leur dépense est payée par les Fermiers Généraux & le Roy pourroit

and bound to work for three years; after which period they would be free men, but without liberty to return to France. The one hundred *livres* remaining would be placed in the hands of the masters, who would be bound at the end of three years to give each man fifty *écus*.

In the same letter he dwelt upon the necessity of preventing the Abenakis accepting the friendly offices of Massachusetts. He stated that with de Saint Castin the missionaries were making wonderful attempts to lead them to refuse these offers, but as Père La Chaise informed him, "Grace frequently required human assistance, and temporal interests sometimes act as a vehicle of faith."* It was, therefore, necessary for steps to be taken to preserve the alliance of this people, who in the last two wars had given the French the superiority over the English colonies.

This, it must be remembered, was in the year after the peace.

It had been hoped that the reverses suffered by the Outaganis or Foxes in 1712 would have restrained them in their enmity to the French; it had the contrary effect. Those of the tribe, who had escaped to reconstitute it, became more hostile than ever. Occasionally, they were joined by the Sioux and Iroquois, when they made communication between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi a matter of great danger. They attacked parties proceeding to the Mississippi, and now that Louisiana had passed under French rule, it was indispensable that the connection between the two countries of New France should be undisturbed.

The course taken by the Foxes caused great embarrassment, and, accordingly, de Louvigny, then commandant at Quebec, received instructions from de Vaudreuil to undertake their chastisement. With a party of French and Canadians,

en accorder à la Colonie du Canada cent cinquante tous les ans." Charlevoix, II., 403.

The modern spelling is "faux-saulniers." Persons engaged in the illegal traffic of salt in contravention of the Royal authority.

* "La grace a souvent besoin de la co-operation des hommes, et que l'intérêt temporel sert quelque fois de véhicule à la Foy." Charlevoix II., p. 404.

he proceeded to Michilimackinac, where he gathered his Indian allies. His force amounted to eight hundred men, all in good spirits, the Indians being determined not to cease the contest until the last Outagami was destroyed.

The Foxes had entrenched themselves in an Indian fort surrounded by three tiers of oak palisading. Five hundred of them had been gathered together, with three thousand women and children. De Louvigny brought with him two field-pieces and a mortar, and proceeded with caution to the attack. His men, protected by fascines, advanced to the palisading, which they successfully undermined, and de Louvigny was on the point of firing the mine laid by him, when the Foxes proposed to capitulate. They asked for peace, and engaged to return their prisoners, or to supply their place by slaves taken from other tribes, and to pay in furs the expenses of the war. De Louvigny's orders from Quebec were, to obtain the submission of the Foxes, without driving them to extremity. He had sufficient influence with his Indian allies, to lead them to agree to these terms. A promise was made to send deputies to Montreal to ratify the treaty, and their country was ceded to the French. Pamoussa and two of the chiefs died from small-pox in Montreal. In 1717, de Louvigny was again sent to Michilimackinac to execute the treaty, with instructions, on his return to bring some of the chiefs to Montreal; and he was specially called upon to induce the *coureurs de bois* to return to the civilized portions of Canada.

Personally, he was kindly received by the Foxes; but they were far from being satisfied, and continued, with the Sioux and Chickasas, to attack the French when on their route to the Mississippi. A small number only of the *coureurs de bois* were influenced to return with him. The majority passed over to the Mississippi, and there established themselves: misappropriating the merchandise which had been placed in their hands, they definitely abandoned Canada, taking with them what property they had gathered, at the expense of the Montreal traders who had trusted them.

In 1716 de Vaudreuil returned to Canada accompanied by

Madame de Vaudreuil. During the last years of his government this lady obtained great influence, which she did not hesitate to exercise. She had lived in Versailles, the atmosphere of which had impressed her with the power attainable by feminine effort and tact. Canada was in the enjoyment of peace, and the province could quietly develop its resources so that its interior life might advance in prosperity. The hostilities with the Foxes in the west, and the intrigues to re-obtain possession of Acadia had little influence on the family quiet of Montreal or Quebec. Among the higher classes, the society was remarkably good; Charlevoix, who was in Canada in 1720, in his letters to the Duchesse de les Diguieres, draws a pleasant picture of the life at Quebec. With a master hand, he describes the contrast between the English and the French colonist, "There is," "he says," a wealth in New England, from which, it appears, those living there do not know how to draw profit; and in New France, a poverty concealed under an air of ease in no way studied. Trade and the cultivation of the plantations give strength to the former; the industry of the *habitants* sustains the second, while the taste of the nation gives to their relations an inexhaustible charm. The English colonist amasses wealth, and enters into no superfluous expense. The French enjoys what he has, and often makes a show of what he does not possess. The former labours for the benefit of his family; the latter leaves his heirs in the difficulties which he has himself experienced, to extricate themselves from any emergency as may be possible. The English Americans do not desire war, for they have much to lose. They in no way show consideration to the Indians, for they do not believe that they have any requirement for them. For contrary reasons, the Canadian youth detest peace, and live with the aborigines of the country, from whom they easily gain esteem in war, and friendship at all times . . . Everybody here has enough to live upon; little is paid to the King; the *habitant* does not know what a tax is. Bread is cheap, meat and fish not dear; but wine, clothes, all that comes from France is expensive, The most to be pitied are

the men of birth, (*gentilhommes*), and the officers who have only their appointments, and have their family responsibilities. The women, for a dowry, generally, only bring to their husbands much *esprit*, tenderness, fascination, and great fecundity.* God extends to the marriages of the country the blessing he was wont to give to those of the patriarchs; in order to be able to sustain these numerous families, the life led by the patriarchs should be followed; but that time has passed."

In 1721, Burnet was appointed Governor of New York. One of his first acts was to address de Vaudreuil on the subject of the post, which Joncaire had influenced the Senecas to allow him to construct at Lewiston, seven miles above the junction of the River Niagara with Lake Ontario, the place where La Salle had established himself when he commenced the building of "Le Griffon." It was a block-house, enclosed by palisades, with port-holes. It was constructed in 1719-20. The place was visited by Charlevoix in May, 1721.† He there met de Longueuil, with the Marquis de Cavagnal, de Senneville, and de la Chauvignerie, who were returning from a mission to the Onondagas. Charlevoix evidently records the opinions which he heard expressed; that the claim of the English over the Iroquois to extend their possessions to Lake Ontario, if practically enforced, would be to establish themselves in the centre of the French colony, or at least would absolutely ruin its commerce. Joncaire, who had been adopted by the Senecas, had not built the block-house as representing the French, but as a special permission to himself. The British had complained of this step, and having obtained the support of the other tribes, asked that similar privileges should be accorded to them. They were refused, on the ground that it would lead to war. Charlevoix records the opinion of the day, when he dwells upon the importance of this position,

* "Les femmes n'apportent ordinairement pour dot à leurs maris que beaucoup d'esprit d'amitié et d'agréments, et une grande fécondité."

† Charlevoix's Letters. Letter III., page 80. 26th May, 1721.

from which the united power of the British and Iroquois would be unable to drive them, while by its means the French could control the trade, and prevent the furs being carried to Albany, which was daily being done with impunity. The block-house itself, in a few years, fell into decay, and must have been abandoned, for in 1727* de Beauharnois proposed to the Home Government to reconstruct it. The recommendation was approved, with orders to rebuild it the following autumn.

Burnet complained of the establishment of this block-house, on the ground that it interfered with trade with the Indians, which the treaty of Utrecht permitted equally to the French and English, and that as the sovereignty of the Five Nations had been ceded to the British, the French had no right to establish themselves on the territory; that the British had the better title to the ground; and as the boundaries had not been established, the French were not justified in taking possession of disputed territory. A French Governor was never at a loss to sustain any claim made by him, and in this case he could refer to the block-house built by de La Salle on the site fifty years previously, and to de Denonville's fort at the mouth of the river.

The protests of the New York Governor had no influence on the policy of the French. Accordingly, Burnet determined to push forward settlement on Lake Ontario. In 1721, a company of ten persons started, under Major Abraham Schuyler, to establish themselves at Tirandaquet Creek, now known as Irondequoit Bay, a place "indisputably in the Indian possession, and lies very convenient for all the Indians to come on account of Trade, from which the French at Niagara will not hinder them." . . . "This, my lords," wrote Burnet, "is the beginning of a great Trade, that may be maintained with all the Indians upon the Lakes, and the cheapness of all our goods, except Powder, above the French, will by degrees draw all that Trade to us, which cannot better appear than by

* 29th April.

the French having found it worth while to buy our Goods at Albany to sell again to the Indians." *

That practice found no countenance with the New York authorities, however willingly the merchant accepted contraband trade with Canada. Burnet saw that the true policy was to deal directly with the Indians, and not to furnish goods to the Canadians to enable them advantageously to compete with Albany. There were other considerations to be held of account. It seemed as if the struggle for boundary might take a form beyond any peaceful solution, and it was now beginning to assume that phase. Private interest never ceases its self-assertion ; so the relations between Albany and Montreal in opposition to the interests of New York, remained uninterrupted. To prevent its continuance, Fort Lydius, on the Hudson, subsequently known as Fort Edward, was commenced in 1721.†

In 1724, Burnet resolved to establish himself at Chouaguen, the modern Oswego. The information was soon carried to Quebec. Although the French claimed the country, on the ground that it had always been held to belong to France, it was by the right of priority of discovery only. But the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht, recognizing the sovereignty of England over the Five Nations, were as certain an abandonment of any rights they had put forth to the territory, as their cession of Acadia. De Vaudreuil saw the difficulty with regard to Niagara, foreshadowed by the policy of Burnet. That post in its present form was not safe from attack ; so

* Governor Burnet to the Board of Trade, New York, 16th of October, 1721, Doc. His. N. Y., I., p. 444.

† I visited the site of this fort in 1883. There is no trace of its existence, although its site is perfectly identified. It was then occupied by a few buildings of an inexpensive character, and a small sum of money would have converted it into a public square. It played an important part in the wars of the succeeding sixty-years ; its memory is worthy of preservation, and its identification by some monument would lead many tourists to visit the town. Burnet writes, 16th October, 1721, "to break that Practice [trade with Canada] more effectually, I have placed a sufficient Guard of Soldiers on the Carrying Place to Canada and built a small Block-house there." The distance to Lake George is fourteen miles ; the road follows the route then taken.

the old influence of intrigue was appealed to. But the Iroquois were on the side of the English, and the proposed settlement at Oswego was being made with their approval. In order that some protest should be placed on record, de Longueuil influenced the Christian Indians of the Sault, and of the Mountain, to send deputies to Albany to represent that they would not suffer any establishment at Chouaguen, and that they would declare war if it were attempted. The threat was ridiculous and contemptible as coming from themselves, but as influenced by the French it was not without significance. De Vaudreuil proceeded on the ice to Montreal, where he arrived in March, and he there heard that steps had been taken to commence the settlement. The Sault and the Mountain Indians returned from Albany without having obtained the slightest recognition; de Longueuil was accordingly despatched to the Onondagas to induce them to interfere, or, if they were disinclined to take any active part, to remain neutral and grant permission to the French for the erection of a more solid building than the block-house on the Niagara river. He was directed also to proceed to Chouaguen and to order the English settlers established there to withdraw, and, if necessary, to use force.

De Longueuil subsequently reported that on the river Chouaguen, some four leagues from lake Ontario, he was met by one hundred Englishmen and six canoes, who made him produce his pass; and they showed him the order of the governor of New York, that no Frenchman should go by without a passport. De Longueuil nevertheless continued his journey to the Onondaga village, and obtained the consent of that tribe for the erection of the fort at Niagara. He met more than one hundred canoes engaged in carrying peltry to the British, which were also bringing back rum; among them were several canoes of the Nippissing and Sault Indians from Lake Huron.* So enterprising were the British at this date that they had carried their operations to within a league and

* New York, His. Doc. IX. p. 953.

a half of Fort Frontenac, and seriously interfered with the trade of that place and of Niagara.

These proceedings were reported to Versailles by de Vaudreuil, with the additional information that some of the English from Carolina had established themselves on the head waters of the Wabash. De Vaudreuil pointed out the indispensable necessity of expelling the English by open force from Chouaguen, and of putting to death, in case of resistance, those established there. He asked for authority to be given him, with positive orders on the subject, as delay was fraught with mischief.

In 1725 the fort of Niagara was commenced by Chaussegross de Léry, on the spot where the wooden structure of de Denonville formerly stood; it was built of stone, and completed in 1726. By this date de Vaudreuil was no more, and de Longueuil was administering the government. De Longueuil wrote to France that he had sent his son to lake Ontario, and had directed him not to return until the Dutch and English, who, to the number of three hundred, had been at Chouaguen, had retreated; and that he had instructed them if he met any New York canoes on the lake, to plunder them. The young man in September wrote that there were no such canoes at Chouaguen, and he undertook to plunder any he met.

This statement was singularly untrue. Burnet's letter to the Board of Trade the following year * reports that there were at Chouaguen two hundred traders, armed as militia. In the spring, he had sent up workmen to build a stone house of strength at a place called Oswego, at the mouth of the Onondaga River, having obtained the consent of the Five Nations. As a party of ninety men were to be present at the French fort at Niagara, he had sent up sixty soldiers, with a captain and two lieutenants, to protect the Oswego fort. One of the earliest acts of de Beauharnois was to protest against its construction.

In 1725, the last year of de Vaudreuil's life, occurred the

* 9th of May, 1727. Doc. His. N. Y., I., p. 447.

wreck of "Le Chameau," within two leagues and a half of Louisbourg. No one person escaped. The vessel contained several of the first officials of the colony: M. de Chazel, the newly-appointed Intendant, appointed to relieve M. Bégon; the son of de Ramezay; de Louvigny, lately appointed Governor of Three Rivers. Many officers and ecclesiastics were among the passengers. The ship contained also much which was required in Canada of the annual stores sent by the government. The loss in every respect was very serious.

On the 10th of October, 1725, M. de Vaudreuil died. He had been twenty-one years Governor, during which he had performed his duties with unflinching zeal. He possessed a clear perception of the true interests of Canada. He had lost much of his vigour before his death; the change having been apparent after his return from France. He had arrived in Canada in 1687, so he had been thirty-eight years in the colony; he had distinguished himself at Valenciennes ten years earlier. He was now a man of eighty years of age, by no means retaining his force of character. He sank under much mental depression, and became incapable of effort. Both de Vaudreuil and Bégon addressed letters to the Regent, independently of those which they signed in common. In these letters, de Vaudreuil occasionally expressed his disapprobation of what he had officially accepted, explaining that, to avoid quarrels and disputes with Bégon, he had signed the letters, through not agreeing with their recommendations. He therefore took this mode of expressing his views.

Madame de Vaudreuil has preserved the reputation of possessing great energy of character. During the last years of her husband's life she was his adviser, sustaining him by her courage and counsel. A few weeks after his death she returned to France where she had made many influential friends, and was held in high respect for her talents and character. By the influence of Mme. de Maintenon, on her first visit, she was placed in charge of the education of the Duc d'Alençon, and, on the death of her pupil, his father, the Duc

de Berry, begged of her to remain to take charge of the other children.

On her re-appearance at court, she was still kindly received, but Mme. de Maintenon was no longer a power and had retreated to Saint Cyr. Mme. de Vaudreuil died in Paris in June, 1740, and her memory is preserved as being zealous on all occasions to assist her Canadian countrymen in any form she was able.*

* "Mme. de Saint Simon fit donner la place de sous gouvernante à Mme. de Vaudreuil, qui étoit une femme d'un vrai mérite. Cela étoit fort au dessous d'elle. Son mari étoit de bon lieu et gouverneur général de Canada, mais elle avoit peu de bien, beaucoup d'enfans à placer, puis à pousser, qui se sont depuis avancés par leur mérite, et avec beaucoup d'affaires qui l'avoient fait revenir de Quebec." (1712.) Saint Simon. Vol. IX., p. 397.

APPENDIX.

THE TREATY OF UTRECHT.

The treaty of Utrecht forms an epoch in Canadian history, separating the period of undisturbed, if not unassailed, possession of Canada by France, from the final years of struggle, which closed with the conquest. Thirty years of peace followed; when war broke out in 1743, sixteen years only were to elapse before French power disappeared from the north of the American continent. I feel myself, therefore, called upon to relate the history of the negotiations of which the treaty was the consequence; and, to do so satisfactorily, allusion is necessary to the political events which preceded them in Europe.

The study of the campaigns of the great duke of Marlborough establishes his commanding genius in war and diplomacy. Not the least of his victories was his triumph over adverse circumstances. He received strong support from prince Eugene and Heinsius, but in the mixed councils of the allies he obtained only imperfect co-operation. At one time the Dutch field-deputies exacted that all operations in the field should be submitted for their approval; a hindrance often more disastrous than the enemy's movements. The margrave Louis of Baden, the elector of Hanover afterwards George I., the elector of Brandenburg Frederick I. of Prussia, were all incapable of doing justice to the breadth and wisdom of Marlborough's views. The embarrassments he experienced seemed only to draw forth his inexhaustible resources; and he triumphed over all opposition, and overcame obstacles which to other men would have proved insuperable.*

* On one occasion, at a court ceremony, Marlborough held a napkin for the king of Prussia. After this important event, less difficulty was experienced with that monarch. When, in 1707, Charles XII. of Sweden, after the conquest of

The campaign of 1704, brought to a close by the victory of Blenheim, conceived with genius, and executed with vigour never surpassed even in the most brilliant campaigns of Napoleon, created for the duke enemies as bitter, as the expression of national favour was undoubted. The jacobite party regarded him with dread, as a formidable opponent to their cause; and it has been said that the conqueror was more blamed in England, than the general who lost the battle was censured in France. Marlborough was denounced, as exceeding his powers in going to the Danube; the victory itself was depreciated as useless, while the loss of the French king was spoken of "as no more than to take a bucket of water out of the river." "If," wrote Marlborough, "they will allow us to draw one or two such buckets more, I should think we might then let the river run quietly, and not much apprehend its overflowing and destroying its neighbours."

The victory of Ramillies, in 1706, was equally decisive. It encouraged the Dutch to change their views from the hope of defending, to the desire of extending their territory; a policy of which Marlborough saw the impracticability. The disasters of this campaign were so momentous, and the distress in France so great, that indirect offers of peace were made by its ruler. Louis offered to withdraw the pretensions of his family to the crown of Spain, conditionally on a kingdom being found for Philip in Italy; the queen of England's title to be recognized; the establishment of a barrier to the Dutch republic to be conceded; and great commercial advantages given to the maritime powers. This

Poland, established his quarters near Leipsic, every inducement was offered by Louis to lead him to take the side of the French. On the part of the allies, the endeavour was to induce the Swedish king to remain neutral, for, from his antipathy to the emperor, they could not hope he would take their side. Marlborough was selected to wait upon Charles. After presenting an autograph letter from the queen, Marlborough stated that, if it had not been for her sex, she would have crossed the sea to look upon a prince admired by the whole universe, and, on his own part, he expressed a wish that he could serve some campaigns "under so great a General as Your Majesty, that I might learn what I yet want to know in the art of War." This extraordinary compliment was accepted as an ordinary remark. Marlborough accomplished what he had in view; his visit led to the king's neutrality. Shortly afterwards, Charles crossed the frontier, to carry into Russia the war which ended in his ruin.

was the first step in the negotiations, which terminated in the final settlement. The offer to open a conference was not accepted. The conduct of Marlborough on this occasion has led to the accusation that he was opposed to terminating the war, from a desire to profit by it: a charge repeated even in modern times. His private letters distinctly establish that during the whole of this period he was desirous of peace and quiet in his family, and would gladly have accepted retirement. One of the causes, which had encouraged his desire for wealth, had ceased to influence him, owing to the death of his only son, the marquis of Blandford, at Cambridge, in 1702, which removed the hope of male succession to his honours. However strongly the love of money may have been entertained by Marlborough, that it led him to advocate the continuance of the war is disproved by his private correspondence.

On the 3rd of November [N. S.], 1707, the first parliament of Great Britain met. During the year the unfortunate battle of Almanza had been fought in Spain, and the attempt upon Toulon had failed. Nevertheless, the majority of the house of commons were against the terms of peace proposed in 1706. Resolutions were passed, affirming the policy of not permitting the power of the house of Bourbon to be extended over Spain, and both houses pledged the country to the continuance of the war.

The campaign of 1708 was marked by the battle of Oudenarde, when Marlborough and Eugene defeated the French under Vendôme; and the conquest of Minorca was made by lord Stanhope. Prince George, the queen's husband, died on the 8th of November of this year. It is a curious illustration of the manners of those days, that, on the 28th of January, three months after the death of the prince, the two houses sent up a joint address, "that she [the queen] would have such indulgence to the hearty desires of her subjects as to entertain thoughts of a second marriage." The queen replied, that the care she had taken to secure the protestant succession was a proof how much she had at heart the happiness of the kingdom. She continued: "The subject of this address is of such a nature that I am persuaded that you do not expect a particular answer." It was from this date that the hopes of the party of the pretender became more sanguine. The tory party,

intent on gaining office, ready to seize every occasion for censure, and every opportunity to create dissatisfaction, gave countenance to this sentiment of disloyalty, that it might be turned to their advantage, although the great majority among them, owing to the religion of the pretender, in no way favoured his pretensions.

In 1709, France, reduced to great distress, again made overtures for peace. The first months of the year had been visited by a continued frost, in its severity entirely unknown in that latitude. The fruit trees throughout the kingdom suffered great damage. In Normandy the orchards were seriously injured; in the south, the vines and olive trees to a great extent had been destroyed, while the cornfields of the central plains were so blighted that the hope of a year's harvest passed away. The cold was so intense that the Rhone, one of the most rapid rivers in France, was frozen. Along the coast, were to be found fields of ice, as in the polar seas. The courts of justice, the theatres, the *salons* of fashion, the places of business and pleasure, were closed. Social life was sensibly affected, in accord with the depression of nature. The people, without experience in a trial of this character, could make no preparation to meet it. It is related that entire families were found frozen to death in their cottages, and in the garrets of the cities.

In March, Louis, through M. Ménager, a merchant of Rouen, again made indirect proposals for peace; Ménager obtained the aid of M. Pettekum, the minister of the duke of Holstein at the Hague. The Dutch declined to enter into any separate negotiation, laying down the principle that what discussion took place must be carried on with the whole of the allies. They, however, went so far as to submit the preliminaries on which a proposal of peace could be discussed. M. de Torcy, then Secretary of State for France, accepted the basis of negotiation, and asked for passports for two French representatives; one in the name of Bergheyck, who had been Intendant for Spain in the Low Countries. This passport was refused, a slight the king of France, a few years previously, would have thought impossible. The second, in favour of M. Rouillé, president of the parliament of Paris, a man marked by much diplomatic address, was sent. His instructions were to

make the best terms he was able, in order to obtain a suspension of hostilities.

Rouillé was not allowed to proceed to the Hague, but was requested to establish himself at Moerdyke; he afterwards went to Worden, at which place two deputies, Buys and Vanderdussen, delegated by the United Provinces, met to confer with him.

This offer, on the part of France, was responded to in the British parliament by an important vote. The preceding year, 1708, an expedition in favour of the pretender had sailed from Dunkirk, with the design of effecting a landing in Scotland: an attempt that entirely failed. It was accordingly considered that additional conditions should be exacted in any treaty of peace. The resolutions carried, set forth that it was incumbent upon Louis to acknowledge the queen's title and the protestant succession; to engage to send the pretender out of France; and to demolish the fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk. With such instructions Marlborough and lord Townsend were appointed plenipotentiaries at the Hague.

The allies asked the abandonment of the province of Alsace, including the city of Strasbourg; the duchy of Luxemburg; the cession of ten fortresses on the frontier to form a barrier for the Dutch; among them Tournay, which France still held, and Lille, which had been taken. No Italian possessions were definitely promised to Philip, in the form of indemnity, on his abandonment of the crown of Spain.

Conditions so onerous, and beyond the powers of Rouillé, were referred by him to his court. They were submitted at a meeting of the council, when the king, the dauphin, and five councillors, were present. Stern and exacting as they were, it was resolved to accept them. De Torcy undertook the duty of proceeding to Holland, empowered to conclude a treaty with the least possible delay, and to accept peace almost on any terms. The only passport on which he could travel was that of a courier, and in this character he reached the Hague. He went directly to the house of Heinsius to state his business, to the pensionary's great surprise.

We owe to the memoirs of de Torcy the history of these nego-

tiations. He has left on record that he was instructed to offer Marlborough money to influence his conduct. Marlborough's dishonourable correspondence with James was known to the French court, and, in the early negotiations, allusion had been made to it, in the hope of paralyzing any opposition he might offer. De Torcy was now instructed to offer the duke two millions of *livres* if Naples and Sicily, or Naples alone, could be secured to Philip; or if Strasbourg could be retained by France, and the demolition of Dunkirk avoided. Four millions would be paid, if all these objects could be accomplished.

De Torcy has related the result of these conversations. The colour mounted to Marlborough's face; he calmly changed the conversation. He declared his desire for peace, to retire to his home, and live in quiet; and, while advocating the other claims set forth by his Government, he stated that he had positive orders from the queen to insist on the cession of Newfoundland.

Marlborough, as usual, was most courteous.* He spoke respectfully of the king of France. He had learned, he said, the art of war in France; but, whatever personal feeling he entertained, it would not be possible to cede Naples and Sicily to Philip: no English minister could listen to the proposition. He admitted, adds de Torcy, the necessity of peace to his nation, but he was silent regarding the political agitations by which it was then affected. He spoke kindly of the pretender as the son of his old master, and pointed out that it was the prince's interest to leave France. "Where can he go?" asked de Torcy. "Wherever it may please him" replied Marlborough, "to any other country where he would enjoy freedom and security." He expressed even a desire to serve the so-called prince of Wales; but the perusal of these negotiations, as given by de Torcy, establishes Marlborough's fidelity to his country.

More than this feeling is also apparent: he endeavoured to obtain peace, and de Torcy was greatly aided by his advice. The French secretary was prepared to cede every demand. The negotiation failed on the condition of the abandonment of French pretension to the crown of Spain. What de Torcy offered was,

* "La politesse regnoit dans ses discours."

that Louis should make known to Philip that he would withdraw all aid from Spain, and recall his officers : but he would undertake no more. He would withhold all assistance, and leave the allies to drive Philip out of Spain. The consequence would have been that, while the allies were engaged in war, sacrificing men and money, France would have recruited her strength and re-formed her army. During the negotiations, de Torcy, speaking of continuing the contest in Spain, quoted Marlborough as saying that it would be a petty war. "Certainly," replied Marlborough, "but it must be brought to a close." The difficulty with the allies was want of belief in the good faith of Louis, who had never hesitated to abandon a treaty when it accorded with his policy ; and it was feared he would act similarly in this case. What the allies were willing to accede to, was, a treaty of suspension of arms for two months from the 1st of June ; that within this period Louis' grandson should retire into France with his adherents ; and, if he failed so to do, Louis should join the allies in enforcing this course.

The terms forwarded to France were submitted to the Council to be unanimously rejected. Rouillé was ordered to leave Holland. Louis acting on the advice of de Torcy, issued a declaration to the French people, appealing to their patriotism. This course was as unexpected as it was unusual. The circular, addressed to the governors of provinces, related the immense sacrifices proposed by the king to obtain peace, and that all that had been offered to France was a temporary truce. He, therefore, called for support in a war necessary to the national existence ; its prosecution had become inevitable. The appeal with all classes obtained immediate response. The king, himself, sent out his gold plate to be coined into money ; most of the nobility followed his example ; the patriotic feeling of the people was thoroughly aroused, and an army again took the field in defence of the country's ancient renown.

In September, 1709, the battle of Malplaquet was fought, concerning which, there is strange perversion of the facts in English history. It is described as fought by Marlborough without purpose, for his personal ends.* French historians express no such

* Even "Murray's Hand-book of Northern Germany" [p. 195] represents this battle as a murderous conflict and useless victory.

view ; they record the battle as an event incident to the presence of two large armies face to face, and as a consequence of the plan of operations of the allies. For the latter not to have assumed offensive operations, would have been to act in accordance with the policy of Villars, who was desirous of saving Tournay and Mons, and avoiding every trial of strength.

Marlborough and Eugene, with an army of one hundred and ten thousand men, had invested Tournay, which city Villars, with Marshal Boufflers, was endeavouring to relieve. But Villars was out-generalled by Marlborough, and Tournay was taken. On the very day of the capitulation, a division of the allies was detached to invest Mons, and the whole army marched towards that place the following day. Villars made an attempt to anticipate this movement ; but he advanced only to find Eugene and Marlborough between him and Mons, in the country south of the Haine, at its junction with the Trouille. Villars, consequently entrenched himself in his position at Malplaquet, as he was too weak for offensive operations. The battle became inevitable. The French were attacked in their entrenchments, and driven out, with a loss of fourteen thousand men. The loss of the allies was twenty thousand.* That the action was bloody† and undecisive is not an argument that the attack should not have been made. It was the last important battle of the war ; and while in no way it affected the strength of the allies, the forlorn condition of France in the following year showed to what extent this reverse impaired her national resources.

It was not owing to the plan of attack that the allies suffered so severely, but because the orders of Marlborough and Eugene were not observed. The losses were chiefly on the Confederate left. Eugene, on the right, was to advance from the wood of Sart ; Marlborough directed the attacks of the centre and left. On the left, the Dutch regiments, with some Scotch battalions, were under the command of Prince Frison of Nassau. This force was advanced and halted, so to remain until further orders were given.

* Coxe's Marlborough. Vol. II., p. 459. (Bohn's Edition).

† "Ce fut la plus grande, et la plus sanglante bataille de toutes les guerres de Louis XIV." Henri Martin, XIV., p. 524.

The command of the prince was shared by marshal Tilly, and the division was to be sustained by Withers, who had arrived from Tournay with nineteen squadrons and ten battalions.

When the sun had cleared the fog from the ground, at half-past seven on the 11th of September, the battle was commenced by vigorous attacks on the right and centre. On the left, a powerful demonstration only was to be made. Unfortunately, the prince of Nassau was possessed by the ambition to be named stadtholder, and he was desirous of capturing public support by some daring act of gallantry. Marshal Tilly, partaking the command with him, was an excellent officer, but politically opposed to the pretensions of the house of Orange. The prince, however, had the support of all the young officers of the army. Withers' corps had been moved to the Folie hamlet on the right. Half an hour after the commencement of the battle, without consultation with Tilly, and unsupported by Withers, the prince gave the order for the attack. Two lines of entrenchments lay in his front, defended by heavy guns, and strong masses of infantry. The first line was carried. At the second, the attack of the prince was received with a storm of shot, and he was forced to retire. The prince showed desperate gallantry, leading his men onward; but after a few moments of success he was driven back, leaving behind him his cannon and several standards. In this ill-conceived movement 2,000 men were left dead, and upwards of that number placed *hors de combat*; one-fourth of the losses of the day. It was only Marlborough's presence that retrieved the disaster.

On the confederate right and centre, after a temporary check, the French were driven back by Marlborough and Eugene. In the allied advance, some divisions painfully waded across a morass considered impassable, and from this cause sufficient to offer an impediment to any attack. The French were driven from the woods to the plain, where the confederate cavalry took ground. It was in the endeavour to remedy the disorder in the French ranks, that Villars, personally advancing at the head of thirty battalions, was wounded in the knee, and carried fainting from the field. The French centre being thus weakened, Marlborough directed against it a mass of infantry. The centre was forced and penetrated, the

communication between the wings was broken, and the retreat of the French was ordered.

Had Marlborough at the proper time received the reinforcements for which he had asked, and had his orders to the prince of Nassau been obeyed, the result would have not been the "murderous, useless victory" it is the fashion to represent this battle to have been. If, notwithstanding the disasters experienced by the allies on their left, the result ended in their favour, and the object of the battle, the capture of Mons, was attained, what would have been the result, had proper generalship been shown by the prince of Orange* in the place of mere reckless daring, and with a reserve powerful enough to continue active operations? Would it not have been that the confederate army would have entered France, and have terminated the war on such conditions of peace as the allies felt to be necessary?

Marlborough, believing that the preparations which were being made in France for this campaign, were almost final in their desperation, at the opening of active operations had asked for reinforcements.

With ten thousand additional men, the battle and the subsequent events of the campaign would have borne a different impress. The French retreated unmolested. The event was spoken of in England by those opposed to the administration, as proving the inexhaustible resources of France; and consequently, the impolicy of continuing the war. The cry was repeated that the war was being carried on for the advantage of the allies, without any benefit to Great Britain; the cost being mainly borne by the British nation, who paid the allies large subsidies in furtherance of their own interests.

In 1710, the negotiations for peace were resumed. The Dutch agreed to the renewal of the conferences of 1709, on condition that the cession of Spain by Philip should take place within two months of the signature of the treaty; a proposition certainly not rejected by the French king, for he undertook to submit an equivalent which should be satisfactory. The plenipotentiaries met at

* The prince was accidentally drowned in 1711. His unfortunate fate doubtless favourably influenced contemporary criticism.

Gertruydenberg, France being represented by the Abbé, afterwards Cardinal de Polignac, and Marshal d'Huxelles. Although Louis offered further engagements to effect the abdication of Philip, the difficulties which had been insuperable the preceding year, again proved the stumbling-block to settlement. Louis was prepared to bind himself to recall by edict, all Frenchmen from Spain, and even engaged to pay monthly subsidies for the prosecution of the war to force Philip's retirement. He would not, however, accept the condition, that positively within two months Philip should leave Spain. The allies could only perceive the unfavourable side of these conditions. The Dutch and British, however, commenced to entertain the policy of inducing Philip to resign the crown of Spain, by a promise of that of Sicily. But the house of Austria forwarded a memorial to the Hague, declaring that Austria would never consent to any portion of the Spanish territories, even outside the peninsula of Spain, being ceded to the house of Bourbon. Thus, the allies, on this point, were not in accord among themselves, a fact which the French soon learned.

Marlborough, during these negotiations, exerted himself to obtain peace. It was well known throughout Europe that his influence at home was greatly lessened; a fact, of which no one was more sensible than himself, and which exercised restraint upon his conduct; for, from the knowledge of the unfriendly feeling of the ministers, he acted in all respects with great prudence and caution. It soon became understood that no result could be attained. The conference, nevertheless, was prolonged until July, when the plenipotentiaries separated. As no arrangement had been reached, the operations of the campaign were recommenced.

The fall of the whig Ministry, in 1710, had great influence on the fortunes of the French and British provinces in North America. I have related the circumstances of the dismissal of Godolphin.* Had he remained in power, there would have been no such miserable collapse as the failure of Walker's expedition, and the conditions under which peace would have been discussed would, in every respect, have been different. Great Britain would have remained the undisputed head of the confederacy; the

* Ante page, 453.

objections of Austria would not have had the same force. It was while these negotiations were being carried on that the queen insisted on the promotion of Colonel Hill, and Marlborough's son-in-law Sunderland, was dismissed; facts in themselves being a proclamation to Europe, that the ministry of Godolphin was tottering to its fall.

The opinions which I have stated as having been freely expressed in England after the battle of Malplaquet, to a great extent prevail in modern times. It is pertinent to examine the causes which have led to their acceptance. The main ground of the discredit attached to Marlborough's memory is the systematic abuse of Swift; and while his vituperation has been accepted as genuine and warranted, there has been little examination into the character of his philippics. To use a modern word, Marlborough had no "following" attached to him by liberal and kindly relations. Although most courteous in his manners, and perfect in his high breeding, he was not hospitable, he was not generous. In the army, his genius in the field had created him adherents; but in his private life, there was little to awaken in men that personal devotion which so many leaders have known how to create; while the terrible insolence of the Duchess of Marlborough repelled many from his side, and, in other respects exercised a disastrous influence on his fortunes.

A main defect in Marlborough's political character was the little value he attached to the support of able writers. He had no love of letters, no respect for literary ability, not the slightest reverence for learning. The advantages obtainable by political writing may have been a matter with which he did not actively interfere, leaving its management to Godolphin. The daily newspaper was now coming into use; caricature was becoming a formidable weapon; and public opinion was being moulded by what in these days we call journalism. Marlborough remained insensible to this engine of power, and little remains to us of any contemporary defence of his character. We have the surer evidence of his private letters to establish that, for years Marlborough yearned for peace and happiness within his family. Much stress has been laid on his desire to be appointed Captain General for life. The application

was made, when he felt that there was unfriendliness to him, especially on the part of the queen ; and he was desirous of guarding against the loss of his position. He had rendered great services ; and, as a reward for them, he sought to be maintained in his post. No one can deny that Marlborough loved the emoluments of office and desired to retain them ; but, although not an amiable feature in the character of this distinguished man, it cannot be made a matter of disgraceful reproach. The application was not a dignified proceeding ; but it cannot be condemned as criminal. It amounted to no more than a demand that his emoluments should be continued during his lifetime.

What are held to be virtues in other men are made a reproach to Marlborough. It is a strange feature in the estimate of his character, that his affection and devotion to his wife are seldom mentioned without a sneer. They have been compared to the attachment of Belisarius to the characterless Antonina. His prudence, economy and thrift have been stigmatized as a sordid and unconquerable love of money : even a woman with the worst of histories, was lured by Harley to accuse Marlborough of personal cowardice, and, to Swift's disgrace, the calumny received his countenance.*

Harley, on the contrary, was conscious of the advantages obtainable from the support of eminent writers ; and his good fortune threw him into association with a man of pre-eminent

* "Those maligners who deny him personal valour, seem not to consider that this accusation is charged at a venture ; since the person of a wise general is too seldom exposed to form any judgment on the matter : and that fear which is said to have sometimes disconcerted him before an action might probably be more for his army than for himself." "History of the four last years of the Queen," published as "by the late Jonathan Swift, D.D., D.S.P. D." p. 15. Both lord Macaulay and lord Mahon had doubts of its genuineness. The book did not appear until 1758, fourteen years after Swift's death, and it was not accredited by the name of a responsible editor. Johnson remarks, in his life of Swift, "I can only say that it (the history) seemed by no means to correspond with the notions that I had formed of it, from a conversation which I once heard between the earl of Orrery and old Mr. Lewis."

Whoever was the author, the book is a poor performance, and of little value in unravelling the history of the negotiations of the time. The "maligner" was the characterless Mrs. Manley, authoress of the discreditable book, the *New Atalantis*.

ability, prepared to consider as marketable the extraordinary powers he possessed. Few men have been distinguished by the genius of Swift, and it is this genius which has cast the halo over his opinions. It is not possible to trace in his support of Harley, any dictate of principle, any sentiment of sincerity, or of devotion to a cause he had embraced: Considering himself to be neglected by the whigs, he was willing to gratify his wounded pride by shewing them the power of the man they had ill-treated. He saw before him the reward which he trusted to obtain. To me he appears the greatest bravo of literature, having brought to his work the greatest ability. His affectation of independence with the men of rank with whom he associated was a sham ;* and this independence has been dwelt upon to enforce respect for his character and opinions.

Swift was in London in 1708-9, to urge some requirements of the Irish Church, when he was treated with neglect by Godolphin. He revenged himself by a satirical poem.† The tory pamphleteers had little ability. Prior, then on that side, the only name now recollected, was not a political writer of power. There was no one to answer Addison and Steele. In 1710, Swift was again in London, and it was in September of that year that he commenced the letters to Stella, known under the name of "the Journal." These letters were continued until 1713.

It has been pretended that, Swift's sentiments as a churchman were shocked by the latitudinarian principles of Godolphin and the whigs, and that, guided by these feelings, he determined to throw his weight on the side of the new administration, formed on the principle of sustaining the church. It was no ordinary weight ; his personal influence in politics has never been exceeded, and has

* Johnson remarks on this point : " No man, however, can pay a more servile tribute to the great, than by suffering his liberty in their presence to aggrandize him in his own esteem. Between different ranks of the community there is necessarily some distance ; he who is called by his superior to pass the interval may properly accept the invitation ; but petulance and obtrusion are rarely produced by magnanimity ; nor have often any nobler cause than the pride of importance and the malice of inferiority." *Lives of the Poets.* Swift.

† " The virtues of Sid Hamet the Magician's Rod." " Sid " is in allusion to Sydney, the family name of Godolphin. The " Rod " is the staff of the lord treasurer. Dated August, 1710, it is marked by all Swift's coarseness.

truly been compared to that of a new newspaper in modern times, started to sustain a ministry. It is not possible, however, to speak of Swift as an earnest high churchman. Sacheverell he despised.* He spoke of the high church party as the "Tantivies," the name given them in Queen Anne's day.† Lent he hated.‡ Who can read the "Tale of a Tub" and the "Voyage to the Houyhnhnms,"§ in which he satirizes transubstantiation, the disputes regarding music in churches, the adoration of the cross, and the rites and vestures of the Roman catholic church, but can trace opinions the reverse of those entertained by the class he himself called the "Tantivies"? There can be but one explanation for Swift's conduct; he thought Harley's the winning side.

He found an organ in the "Examiner." The earlier numbers had been written by St. John, Atterbury, Prior, Friend and Mrs. Manley. Swift took charge of the 14th, and carried it on until the 45th number.|| Not only in this paper was he the strongest supporter of the minister, but he produced poems and tracts and pamphlets with untiring energy. Swift knew no mercy in his cynical nature. Family history, personal defects, individual tastes, were coarsely assailed by him, without scruple, truth or justice. To destroy an opponent, was to him no more than for an Iroquois or Abenaki Indian to scalp his victim. One of his effusions raised

* Journal, Letter XL., 26th of January, 1712. "I once hardly thought I should be a solicitor for Sacheverell."

† Letter XXXII., 9th of October, 1711. The nickname given from a caricature, in which they were represented galloping "tantivy" to Rome.

‡ Letter XLII., 23rd of February, 1712. "I wish you a merry Lent. I hate Lent; I hate different diets, and furmity and butter and herb porridge; and sour devout faces of people who only put on religion for seven weeks."

§ "He asked me what were the usual causes or motives that made one country go to war with another. I answered, they were innumerable . . . Difference in opinions has cost many millions of lives; for instance, whether flesh be bread or bread be flesh; whether the juice of a certain berry be blood or wine; whether whistling be a vice or a virtue; whether it be better to kiss a post or throw it into the fire; what is the best colour for a coat, whether black, white, red or gray; and whether it should be long or short, narrow or wide, dirty or clean; with many more."

Gulliver—A Voyage to the Houyhnhnms, Chap. V.

|| 10th of November, 1710, to 7th of July, 1711.

him up an enemy* whose influence with Anne did much to aid in depriving him of the coveted bishopric. Harley and St. John were prepared to reward his services with any dignity, ecclesiastical or otherwise. Deaneries and bishoprics became vacant, to which other men were appointed, until Swift, seeing that no benefice was to be given him, determined to leave England. His last paper in the "Examiner" was written in June, 1711; but his pamphlets were continued with power and vigour to seize the public mind, and are still read for their force and argument. His reward was the deanery of St. Patrick, vacated by the appointment of his friend, Dr. Sterne, to the bishopric of Dromore; the object of his aspiration, an English bishopric, passing out of his hopes forever.†

The ministry of Harley and St. John, in a great degree owed to Swift the short lease of power it obtained. It was Swift's

* In his "Windsor Prophecy," Swift attacked the duchess of Somerset, who had succeeded the duchess of Marlborough in two of her offices, and, looked upon as a whig, was held to be unfavourable to the administration. The Duchess had red hair, and was a Percy.

Beware of *Carrots* from Northumberland.

* * *

Root out these Carrots, O *thou* (Queen Anna) whose name
Is *backwards* and *forwards* always the same;
And keep close to thee always that name (Masham)
Which *backwards* and *forwards* is almost the same;
And, England, would'st thou be happy still,
Bury those *Carrots* under a *Hill* (the maiden name of Mrs. Masham).

The political women of Queen Anne's day were not personally attractive. Mrs. Masham had a red nose, often alluded to by the whig party writers. Swift writes of her, 14th of November, 1711: "Mrs. Masham was with him [the lord treasurer] when I came, and they are never disturbed; 'tis well she is not very handsome; they sit alone together, settling the nation."

† In 1712, Swift expected the deanery of Wells; it was given to Dr. Brailsford, the chaplain of the Duke of Newcastle. "I can serve everybody but myself," he wrote bitterly, on the 8th of March, 1712. His next hope was the bishopric of Hereford, vacant by the death of Dr. Humphreys, the 20th of November, 1712. Again he experienced a refusal. Harley was then Earl of Oxford, prepared to sustain him; but the Tale of a Tub, and the duchess of Somerset, with Archbishop Sharpe, were powerful to influence the queen's mind, and Anne persevered in her objections to his elevation.

powerful influence on public opinion which led to the conclusion of the treaty of Utrecht; indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that it was greatly his work.

The policy of Godolphin and Marlborough had been to carry on the war, and obtain conditions of peace, which should permanently protect Europe against the aggressions of Louis XIV. The sieges of the towns on the frontier are not to be regarded simply as the conquest of French strongholds. France was surrounded by a triple line of fortresses, and it was to remove the protection afforded by them, that they were taken one after another by Marlborough. The policy of prince Eugene and Marlborough was one and the same; to advance into the heart of France, and dictate terms of peace.* French writers admit the exhaustion of France; Louis himself had contemplated desperately to make a last stand behind the Somme.†

Harley's views were peace on any terms, so that he could hold office, and, accordingly, it was Swift's purpose to write in favour of peace. His effort was directed to shew that war was unnecessary, and its prosecution injurious; that the country was being exhausted, and its future strength anticipated; that the valour of the troops had been called forth, and their blood shed, to no good purpose for Great Britain; that the war had been continued to secure the Dutch, and aggrandize the Emperor, without the least advantage to the national interest; that the allies had been paid to fight their own battles, and the war had been protracted by the duke of Marlborough in order that he might add to his hoards. These points were unceasingly repeated by Swift, with all the force of his wonderful ability.

One of the principal means of confirming Harley's power was

* "in das Herz dieses Konigreiches einzudringen." Eugene to Sinzendorf, 2nd of July, 1712.

† At the last meeting with Villars, before proceeding to take command in April, 1712, Louis said: "En attendant que vous me disiez votre pensée, je vous apprendrai la mienne . . . je connais la Somme, elle est difficile à passer; il y a des places: je compterais me rendre à Péronne ou à Saint-Quentin y ramasser tout ce qui j'aurais de troupes, faire un dernier effort avec vous et périr ensemble ou sauver l'Etat, car je ne consentirais jamais à laisser l'ennemi approcher de ma capitale.

the destruction of Marlborough's character on general grounds, previously to attacking his conduct during the war. In the early stage of Swift's attacks, Marlborough's fame as a general remained unassailed. Marlborough's thrift was well known, and it was an easy task to find cause of offence in his love of money. The transition to the charge that he was endeavouring to continue the war to gratify this greed, was too simple to be allowed to be passed over. It thus became the duty of Swift to heap invective after invective on Marlborough. The duke, indeed, formed the subject of a great part of the papers in the "Examiner." Swift continued the abuse in his political pamphlets, and carried on his attacks in rhyme,* which still astonish us by their audacity and remorselessness, and which were continued by him after Marlborough's death. It would appear as if Swift's malignity towards Marlborough was inexhaustible, and could not be satisfied.

It is this systematic, dishonest abuse of Marlborough by Swift, which, by a strange fatality, has clung to Marlborough's name in English history. There are causes why this view has been continued. Marlborough lived until 1722, perfectly retaining his

* "The Fable of Midas," 1712, one of the most powerful as it is one of the most discreditable productions of Swift. The closing lines to the conqueror of Blenheim, the upholder of British power on the continent, who maintained the ancient fame of the land in a manner which has never been surpassed, can only be read with pain by every student of history :—

" But gold defiles with frequent touch—
There's nothing fouls the hands so much ;
And scholars give it for the cause
Of British Midas' dirty paws.

* * *

And Midas now neglected stands (!)
With asses' ears (!) and dirty hands (!)

See also "A satirical elegy on the death of a late famous general, 1722," in which the duke's memory is infamously assailed. The concluding lines are

"Let Pride be taught by this rebuke,
How very mean a thing's a duke.
From all his ill-got honours flung ;
Turned to the dirt from whence he sprung."

faculties. His last appearance in the house of lords was on the 27th of November, 1721. The well known line of ~~Pope~~ Johnson

“From Marlborough’s eyes the streams of dotage flow,”

is only a continuance of the libel. He was seventy-two years of age at his death. The severity of his campaigns had told upon his constitution, but with unimpaired intellect he performed his duties of Captain-general and master of the ordnance to within six months of the time of his death. He had previously tendered his resignation of these offices, which George I. refused. One attempt to cast ridicule on his character is founded on his behaviour to the queen, in his endeavour to prevent the dismissal of the duchess from her official positions; it is contemptuously remarked that tears stood in his eyes. We are told sneeringly how he knelt before the queen and shewed great emotion. Marlborough, like all men who have habitual self-command, possessed strong feelings, and was sensitive to an extent which only his correspondence could have disclosed. It was customary in those days to kneel in an official interview with the Sovereign; an ancient ceremony not quite dispensed with in modern times. The refusal he met with, was not personal to himself. What he asked affected his wife, for whom his affection has been made a reproach. A rush of feeling must have passed through his mind. He had been devoted to the interests of the lady Anne, and as a subject he had remained a friend of the queen. He had been her adviser. He must have felt, in the cold refusal he had received, that all the past had disappeared as if it had never been. The queen’s hard manner had dissevered these ancient ties, and it must have forced itself on his mind that he was the victim of a base intrigue, with the irresistible impression how little his own services were held in account. To those sustaining the theory of the utter unworthiness of Marlborough’s character, the scene is too tempting to escape comment. To others, considering it with fairness and justice, the behaviour of the duke can only appear as a natural consequence of the harsh destruction of intimate associations.

The generation which succeeded Marlborough were not called upon to discuss his reputation. Political events multiplied to turn public attention elsewhere.

From 1743 to 1760 there was a chronic state of war with France. The vigour of Chatham's administration, and the splendid triumphs which it effected in the four years preceding the peace of Paris, turned the minds of men to the future rather than to the past. The troubles with the North American colonies succeeded, and the angry issues of Imperial politics after the death of George II. to the close of the century, allowed little thought to be given to the wars of Queen Anne.

In 1777, Johnson commenced his "Lives of the Poets." No man knew better the progress and character of our literary history. Is it a heresy to say, that he was only imperfectly acquainted with the deeper and hidden influences in our national political life? He did not probe beneath the surface to examine into Swift's bitter accusations against the whigs of that day. His own prejudices led him naturally to accept the view which favoured the high church and jacobite cause, and in his lives of Swift and Prior, he has adopted the opinions contained in Swift's libels and accepted the defamatory statements against the "Great Duke." The influence of the "Lives of the Poets," a book which yet keeps its place in literature, has done its part in affirming the opinion which has been prevalent with regard to those events.

Our subsequent national history, which includes the United States war of Independence, followed by the French revolutionary wars, in connection with the political excitement which prevailed after Waterloo, explain the cause, that the events of Queen Anne's reign have, to some extent, passed out of view. The treaty of Utrecht has come to be looked upon as a page of the past, the examination of which is a work of supererogation. Party sympathies have lent their influence to the acceptance of the policy of Harley and St. John. Tory politics were dominant to within the last sixty years, and it was a struggle against the opinions of men in power to ask public consideration of the mode in which the treaty had been obtained. The question really is, not what we gained, but what we failed to achieve, owing to our own intrigues. It is a passage in British history, painful to read; the record from beginning to end is one of national dishonour, the result of the trickery,

intrigue, and dishonesty of the men in power, and prominent in this roll of disgrace stands the name of Robert Harley, earl of Oxford.

After the dismissal of Godolphin, in 1710, Marlborough had one course to follow; he should have retired with the treasurer, and had he then given up his command, the step would have produced serious consequences. The public mind had not been prepared by Swift's abuse and falsehood for the duke's sacrifice. But Marlborough was cajoled by Harley's expressions of friendliness; in former years he had supported St. John, when secretary of war, and there was no indication that any attack would be directed against himself. When at the end of the year he returned to England, the parliament had met. Its majority was tory and high church. The usual vote to Marlborough for his services during the campaign, was withheld, on the ground that no exploit had been performed; the first blow to his prestige. There was still one condition on which Harley was willing to accept Marlborough's services, and to grant him full consideration; that he should set himself free from the whigs, and give the new administration the weight of his support in carrying out their policy.

A circumstance happened with respect to the army in Flanders which made clear to Marlborough the spirit of hostility against him. Three general officers, Meredith, Honeywood and Macartney,* at a convivial meeting, drank confusion to Marlborough's enemies. They

* General Macartney was afterwards lord Mohun's second, in the fatal duel with the duke of Hamilton. The rage of the tory and jacobite party at the duke's death, gave currency to the charge of foul play on the part of lord Mohun and his seconds. The evidence shews that the duel was perfectly fair, but fought with hate and bitterness. Both the principals were killed. Macartney had to leave England, but returned in the reign of George I., when the prosecution was abandoned. On this subject, see Boyer, page 609.

The charge was based on the evidence of Colonel Hamilton, the duke's second, before the Privy Council, "that he saw Macartney make a Pass at His Grace." "The Falsity of that horrid Imputation sufficiently appeared both from the several Depositions taken at the Coroner's Inquest and from the reports and Declarations of Two or Three eminent Surgeons," that the Duke's death had been caused by the thrust made by Lord Mohun. Colonel Hamilton "became so odious to all Men of Honour that he was obliged to sell his company in the Guards."

were removed from their posts, but allowed to sell their commissions. Cadogan, whose judgment and skill had been of such use to Marlborough, and who had performed such good service in the war, was recalled from his post of envoy to the United Provinces, and the earl of Orrery appointed; a man in all respects objectionable to Marlborough. Good service, to men of the type of Harley, is ever of small account.

Whatever his official reception, Marlborough on his arrival was welcomed by the people with enthusiasm, but, in order to avoid creating any tumult, he took a hackney coach and drove to St. James. The queen received him coldly, but expressed a wish that he should continue at his post. She requested him not to encourage the proposal of any vote of thanks, as her ministers would oppose it. On his side, Harley had resolved to proceed to extremities with Marlborough. His vindictive nature reverted to the time when he had been compelled to resign office from the course followed by Marlborough. The disgrace of the duchess was the first step to be taken; she received a peremptory demand to return her gold key, her badge of office. In the hope of averting this step, Marlborough asked for an interview with the queen, which was officially granted. On one knee, he presented the letter from his wife, and passionately pleaded his wife's cause, asking that she might be permitted to retain her position. The queen was inflexible, and replied that the key must be sent back within two days. Marlborough in vain asked for a delay of ten days. He rose from his knee, and complained of the dismissal of the three general officers of the army. The queen interrupted him; she would talk of no other business until she had the key. Of the three offices held by the duchess of Marlborough, the duchess of Somerset was appointed mistress of the robes and groom of the stole; Mrs. Masham, keeper of the privy purse.

If Marlborough had consulted his own feelings, he would immediately have retired from his command: every influence, however, was exercised to induce him to remain with the army. Godolphin, his friends in England, Heinsius at the Hague, prince Eugene, saw in the abandonment of his post the dissolution of the league and the triumph of France. Impressed by this appeal,

in an evil hour for himself, Marlborough consented to remain and serve in the next campaign. He received assurances from the Ministry that he would be fully supported, and left London in February, 1711, for the memorable campaign of that year. At the beginning of the month, Anne wrote the States General that she was in all respects satisfied with the conduct of the duke, and that, according to the desire which had been expressed, she would order him forthwith to go to Holland.*

Without a knowledge of these events it is not possible to understand the intrigues of the English ministry to obtain the treaty which exercised such influence on the Northern American continent. They were preliminary to the pernicious counsels of Harley† in opening negotiations with France, and aided in the development of his policy of abandoning the allies and making a separate treaty; a policy, as events establish, as devoid of political foresight as it was marked by bad faith.

When Marshal Tallard was French ambassador in London, a priest named Gaultier acted as his chaplain. This priest had remained in London, protected by the countess of Jersey, a Roman catholic and jacobite. A correspondence had been opened, by the means of Gaultier, with the French court. In these letters the leading men of England, and among them Harley, were represented as being in the pretender's interest, and the earl of Jersey had the dishonesty to advise how France could carry on war advantageously, so that peace might be concluded: the hope of the jacobites rested upon the basis of peace with France. Gaultier was named by lord Jersey as a fit person to send to Paris, to propose confidentially that negotiations should be renewed with Holland, and to inform the French court of the feeling of the English ministry. For greater security no written instructions were given. Under the name of Delorme, Gaultier reached Versailles in January, 1711, a few days before Marlborough started for the Hague, and while preparations were being made for the disgracefully conducted expedition against Quebec. Gaultier saw

* Boyer, p. 502.

† "A dark and tortuous course was at all times the most consonant to the character of Harley." Earl Stanhope.

de Torcy who has told us his surprise at an application for peace, the matter most anxiously desired, but of which there was not the slightest expectation. "To ask," said de Torcy,* "a minister of his Majesty if he wished peace, was to ask an invalid suffering from a long and dangerous disease if he desired to be cured." Gaultier only asked that de Torcy should write a letter to lord Jersey, to the effect that he was glad to hear lord Jersey was in good health ; it would serve both as a passport and for his credentials. Gratified as the French were by this announcement, with statesmanship in strong contrast to that of Harley, they returned a cautious reply. It set forth that Louis was offended by the hostile spirit shewn by the Dutch, and was disinclined, from a proper sense of his own dignity, again to apply to them : the king would, however, gladly accept the mediation of Great Britain, and would submit to the English such concessions as he was inclined to grant. If thought expedient, the offer could be made known to the Dutch. On the distinct understanding that perfect secrecy should be observed, Gaultier carried back to Versailles the reply of the English ministry, accepting this proposition.

At the end of April, Gaultier reappeared in London bringing an offer of peace from de Torcy. The conditions were set forth in six vague and indistinct articles. It cannot be made a reproach to France that plainer language was not used. The negotiations exacted the highest diplomacy. The knowledge of the political intrigues in England was working its influence at Versailles, and, although the genius of Marlborough was never more apparent than during the campaign of 1711, it was known throughout the continent that his influence was on the wane, and that the ablest man in Europe would be excluded from taking part in his country's councils.†

* "Interroger alors un ministre de sa Majesté s'il souhaitait la paix, c'étoit demander à un malade attaqué d'un longue et dangereuse maladie s'il en veut guérir." De Torcy : troisième partie.

† Swift writes in the *Journal* 21st December, 1712. "This day se'ennight after I had been talking at Court with Sir William Wyndham, the Spanish ambassador came to him, and said he heard that was Dr. Swift, and desired him to tell me that his master, and the king of France and the queen were more

These six articles promised securities for trade in Spain, the Indies, and the Mediterranean; a barrier to protect the Dutch; freedom of commerce; and reasonable satisfaction to the allies. The Spanish succession it was hoped might be regulated to the contentment of all parties engaged in the war.

These terms were sent to lord Raby at the Hague, with secret instructions to show them in confidence to Heinsius, and the Dutch ministry. Raby was told that Marlborough had no communication on the subject from England, and it was supposed that none would be given him from the Hague. The Dutch expressed a desire for peace, but asked for proposals in plainer language. Pettekum also wrote to France that, if Louis would re-open the negotiations in Holland he would be satisfied with the manner in which they would be carried on. As requested by the English ministry, Louis declined the offer; for as events were shaping themselves, it was to his advantage to conduct them in London. On the 29th of May, very probably with the view of shewing the French court the high favour in which Harley was held, he was created earl of Oxford.

In order to give a more direct character to the negotiations, Prior was officially sent to France. He was selected owing to the desire to keep the negotiation a secret; for the appointment of a man of higher rank would have drawn attention to the mission. His credentials were signed by the queen's own hand,* and consisted of a few lines, giving him power to communicate the British claims and receive the French reply. He was instructed to assure the French court that Great Britain had no desire to interfere with a member of the house of Bourbon sitting on the Spanish throne, provided the crowns were not placed on the same head, and full security given for this provision. He was to ask for the cession of

obliged to me than any man in Europe; so we bowed and shook hands &c. I took it very well of him." Well might the king of France own his obligations to Dr. Swift, for having by his calumnies removed the first genius from his country's service in the critical hour, when his experience and capacity would have proved formidable hindrances to French diplomacy.

* De Torcy gives the text. "Le sieur Prior est pleinement instruit et autorisé de communiquer à la France nos demandes préliminaires et de nous en rapporter les réponses. A. R."

Gibraltar, Minorca and Newfoundland; the demolition of the harbour of Dunkirk; participation in the trade of South America; a barrier for the Dutch in the Low Countries; and a barrier for the allies on the Rhine. In order to gain time, Louis took advantage of the limited powers given to Prior and proposed to send back Ménager to conduct the negotiations in London. The secret had been well kept, but the absence of Prior from his haunts attracted attention.* It was whispered about that he was engaged in peace negotiations; an accident revealed the fact. Prior, landing at Deal under a feigned name, was arrested as a smuggler and spy, and was only released on orders from London.

The French envoy was instructed to demand that the electors of Bavaria and Cologne should be reinstated, and the cities of Lille and Tournay be ceded to France, as compensation for the demolition of Dunkirk. These demands were left for consideration at the discussion of the final conditions of peace. On the 27th of December, Ménager signed eight preliminary articles: Anne was acknowledged as queen with full recognition of the protestant succession; a new treaty of commerce was to be entered into; Dunkirk was to be demolished, some special consideration being given; Gibraltar and Minorca were to remain with Great Britain; Newfoundland was also to be ceded with some fishing rights reserved; and the slave trade permitted to the British. The preliminaries signed, Ménager was received at Windsor Castle. Marshal Tallard, a prisoner since Blenheim, was allowed to return to France on *parole*. A different set of preliminaries were sent over to Holland, in which the claims favorable to Great Britain were omitted. It was stipulated that the crowns of Spain and France should never be united in one sovereign, and a barrier treaty was promised both to the Dutch and the empire.

The proposals were not acceptable at the Hague; and Buys was sent to England to urge the claims which the States General put forward. For the first time Holland was admitted to the negotiations; but Great Britain had virtually abandoned the side of the allies to take that of France. She had clandestinely accepted terms of peace which she was prepared to enforce, and had thus

* Swift, 24th of August, 1711.

virtually dissolved the coalition. There was for the future, to be no well considered policy, supported by every member of the alliance, distinctly enunciated. The interests, attainable by the peace, ceased to be united. Great Britain had set the example of dishonour and duplicity, and must be held responsible for the suspicion, jealousy and bad faith which arose. There was no longer a common object in view, Oxford's intrigues awoke general distrust, and led each state specially to advocate its own interest, regardless of the common weal and the future welfare of Europe.

After some hesitation, Utrecht was named as the place where the conditions should be discussed. The dissatisfaction felt by the emperor with the course taken by the English ministers was extreme, and it was expressed in strong language by de Gallas, his ambassador. The latter even published in the "*Daily Courant*" the papers relative to the treaty which had been sent to Holland, a copy of which he had officially received. This conduct was resented; de Gallas was forbidden to appear at court, and the emperor was called upon to send another minister to England.

The news of peace on these conditions, created great dissatisfaction in England; public feeling was strongly excited. The policy of the government was vigorously denounced in the pamphlets which appeared against it. To Swift's eternal disgrace, he, the coarsest and most unscrupulous of pamphleteers, became earnest in urging the prosecution of the writers, and exults in his own zeal in obtaining their punishment. In the heat of the excitement Marlborough arrived at Greenwich, on the 17th of November, 1711, Queen Elizabeth's birthday. Like the 5th of November, the anniversary of the gunpowder plot, the birthday of the great queen was then publicly kept; and sometimes energetic demonstrations and riots took place. To avoid the appearance of encouraging such manifestations, Marlborough did not reach London until the following day. Owing to the excitement on the subject of the proposed peace, unusual preparations had been made for the observance of the 17th of November. They were anticipated by the government; the effigies intended for the procession were seized, and steps taken to prevent any unusual demonstration.

Marlborough was accompanied by baron Bothmar, envoy of the heir-apparent the elector of Hanover, who was the bearer of a powerfully written memorial against the peace as proposed; this paper was printed shortly before parliament met. As the whigs still retained a majority in the house of lords, the ministry saw clearly the insecurity of their position, should Marlborough remain at the head of the army; for with the great body of the people he was still the victorious general who had maintained ancient English renown. On the continent, his influence was greater than ever, and Oxford became convinced that, for his own policy to be successful, the great duke must be struck down.

The duchess of Somerset had also awakened the fears of the men in power. Her position near the queen gave her great influence, which it was supposed she exercised in a manner unfavourable to the ministry. Oxford, with his intriguing spirit, endeavoured to remove her; but he soon discovered that the queen's objection to this step would prove insuperable, and, accordingly, he ceased to persevere in the attempt. On the other hand, Anne had shewn her determination to support the high church party, and to give her full support to those who flattered her sense of prerogative.

Anne frequently attended the debates of the house of lords, where she was supposed to be *incognita*. On the opening of the session, after the speech from the throne, and when her Majesty had taken off her robes, she seated herself in the place she generally occupied. The debate turned on the peace. Lord Anglesea said it might have been obtained after Ramillies, had it not been for those whose interests it was to prolong the war. Marlborough rose with great emotion, and bowing towards the bench where the Queen sat, said that he could appeal to her Majesty whether he had not constantly informed her of every proposal which had been made; adding, that he had always been desirous of an honourable and lasting peace, and, had been far from wishing to prolong the war. He was not able however, to support the terms of peace laid before parliament. The vote was 62 to 34 against the ministry.

Oxford no longer hesitated. Papers were laid before the house

of commons attacking Marlborough.* A deposition early in the year had been made by Sir Solomon Medina, a rich jew contractor for bread for the army: he stated that he had paid Marlborough 332,000 guilders, and his secretary, Cardonnell, 500 ducats. These papers had been sent to Marlborough, and he had replied that in receiving this money he had only followed the precedent of every commander-in-chief in the Low Countries, and that he had applied the money to obtain intelligence, and generally on secret service. The house of commons, elected after the Sacheverell prosecution, would admit no such explanation, and reported that they could find no precedent of this character. The report also set forth that Marlborough had received two-and-a-half per cent. on the subsidies paid to foreign powers. The utter unfairness of the conduct of the house of commons, is made plain by the fact that, no English general before Marlborough had held command in the Low Countries. Great efforts were made to prove that there had been an illegal disposal of commissions, but they utterly failed. On the subject of the two-and-a-half per cent. allowed by foreign princes on the subsidies received, the ministers, representing their courts, declared that it was the spontaneous gift of the sovereign princes themselves, with which the British parliament had nothing to do, and that it was an infringement of their sovereign rights to question their conduct. A fit comment on this persecution is, that when the duke of Ormond was appointed to succeed Marlborough, the same allowance was continued to him, which he accepted without a scruple of conscience.

History contains no more extraordinary record than, that without examination of the facts by any judicial tribunal, without fair investigation, almost without inquiry, without extending to the

* There is a curious note in Hallam as to one form of opposition to which Marlborough was subjected. "A contemporary historian, of remarkable gravity, observes: 'It was strange to see how much the desire of French wine, and the dearness of it, alienated many men from the Duke of Marlborough's friendship.' Cunningham, II., p. 220. The hard drinkers complained that they were poisoned by port; these formed almost a party. Dr. Aldrich, Dean of Christchurch, surnamed the Priest of Bacchus, Dr. Radcliff, General Churchill, &c. 'And all the bottle companions, many physicians, and great numbers of the lawyers and inferior clergy, and in fine the loose women too, were united together in the faction against the Duke of Marlborough.'" Chapter XVI.

great commander, who had raised British fame to the highest horizon of renown the justice shewn to the petty robber of a hen roost, Marlborough was summarily dismissed from all his appointments.* Many events in our history are painful to read, few more dispiriting than the record of the disgrace which the miserable politicians of the last years of Queen Anne brought upon the national escutcheon.* Even this exercise of power would not have sufficed to overcome the majority of the house of lords opposed to the conditions of the peace: in order to nullify the possibility of an adverse vote, the extreme step was taken of creating twelve additional peers.†

The vote in the house of lords was secured by these new appointments; and on Marlborough's removal, the duke of Ormond, fettered by instructions which made the presence of the British troops a mockery, was appointed to the command. As peace had not advanced beyond the submission of the preliminary conditions, a large army took the field on the side of the allies. Marlborough had hitherto held the supreme command of the whole force. The Dutch would not recognise the duke of Ormond in that position, and appointed Eugene to the command over their troops. The policy of penetrating into the heart of France remained unchanged. The fact is important; it establishes that Marlborough's

* The entry of the duke's dismissal in the records of the council is dated the 31st of December, 1711. "Being informed that an information against the Duke of Marlborough was laid before the house of commons by the commissioners of public accounts, her Majesty thought fit to dismiss him from all his employments, that the matter might undergo an impartial investigation." The queen communicated this resolution in a letter to the duke in her own hand, which is not extant. The duchess stated that, in his indignation, Marlborough threw the letter into the fire.

† Mr. Masham was included in the number, from the belief that the selection would be personally agreeable to the queen. The contrary was the case; Anne in no wise objected to use her prerogative to advance Colonel Masham to military rank, in opposition to the views of the Commander-in-chief; but she had no desire to elevate her waiting-woman to the rank of a peeress. "I never had any design to make a great lady of her," said the queen, "and I should lose a useful servant about my person; for it would give offence to have a peeress lie upon the floor and do several other inferior offices." The difficulty was obviated. My lady Masham consented to remain in the continuance of her duties, and so obtained her patent of nobility.

dismissal had no influence on the conduct of the campaign, and that the charge that the war had been continued principally by his influence is entirely without foundation. The statesmen of true ability of that day, on the continent as well as in England, acted upon the conviction that peace was not desirable unless its permanency were assured; and past experience had taught them that it could be only satisfactory, when it was the result of the irresistible power of the allies.

When joined by Ormond, the army of the allies amounted to 122,000 men. The political events which had taken place in England, led Eugene to confer with Ormond, as to the powers he possessed. Ormond answered, they were the same as those of Marlborough, and that he was ready to assist in attacking the enemy. Villars was in their front with an army of 100,000 men, ill equipped, ill provided, with little heart for the campaign. Its deficiencies in strength were more than supplied by the treachery of the English ministry. St. John, on the 10th of May, sent orders to Ormond "to avoid engaging in any siege, or hazarding a battle, until further orders from her Majesty. I am at the same time directed to let your Grace know, that the Queen would have you disguise the receipt of this order, and her Majesty thinks that you cannot want pretences for conducting yourself so as to answer her ends, without owning that which might at present have an ill effect if it was publicly known."

Acting on these instructions, Ormond entered into a correspondence with Villars, informing him that they were no longer enemies, and removing every feeling of alarm from the French marshal regarding the movements of the overpowering force before him.*

Prince Eugene, accustomed to the genius and loyalty of Marlborough, soon formed the opinion that the vacillation of purpose of the English general was not simply want of capacity on his

* "the Tongues of most People were very free with the Duke of Ormond: And to this Purpose we may take Notice that an Alehouse Keeper in *Westminster*, having either for a Jest-sake or out of mere Simplicity set for his Sign His Grace's Head, with this Inscription, the '*General of Peace*,' the Government order'd the same to be taken down." Boyer, p. 571.

part, but was the consequence of deep-laid treachery; he lost no time in putting his suspicions to the proof. The reports he received of the condition of the French troops, from the higher officers he had sent out to reconnoitre their camp, convinced him that it was open to assault, and, on the 28th of May, Eugene called upon Ormond to join in a united attack upon Villars. Ormond, to avoid any action on his part, asked that a delay of some days should be granted. Villars in the meantime made a retrograde movement, and the opportunity passed away. A cry of indignation was heard on all sides. The army was convulsed with emotion. Prince Eugene addressed expostulatory letters on Ormond's conduct to England. If Oxford and St. John were ready to gratify their love of power by treachery and wrong, the ancient spirit of the land was not dead. Public feeling was painfully excited, and eleven days after the event the matter was brought up in the house of lords. "The orders to the queen's general not to act offensively against the enemy"* were disclosed during the debate, and rarely has so inglorious a discussion been heard in the British senate. The dishonourable abandonment by Great Britain of every standard of right was dwelt upon, especially that "the allies who had relied upon the aid and friendship of the British nation, and expended so much blood and treasure, should be exposed to the revenge of that power, against whom they had been so active." An address was moved to the queen, setting forth the bad and dishonourable effects of the restrictive order to her general, beseeching her to recall the same, and direct him to act offensively, in conjunction with the other allies.

The motion was seconded by Marlborough. He expressed his opinion that the only way was to carry the war into the heart of France, and that, as it was impossible to execute this design unless the French troops were withdrawn from their position, and, as they could not be induced to retire from want of provisions, they must be attacked and forced.

During the debate, Lord Poulet remarked that nobody could doubt the duke of Ormond's courage, but "he was not like a certain general who led troops to the slaughter to cause a great

* Boyer, p. 571.

number of Officers to be knocked on the Head in a Battel, or against Stone Walls, in order to fill his Pocket by disposing of their commissions." Marlborough heard the remark with silent self-composure. When the house was up he sent lord Mohun* to lord Poulet, with the notice that he desired to have some explanation, and asked Poulet to take the air in the country. Poulet asked if it was a challenge? Mohun answered that his message wanted no explanation, and he was there to accompany the duke of Marlborough. Lord Poulet returned home "with some emotion," and, giving his wife a hint of what was threatened, she communicated the matter to lord Dartmouth, and the affair was not allowed to proceed further. The queen even personally intervened.

One passage in the life of Marlborough cannot be omitted. In 1712 he left England, not to return until the day of Queen Anne's death, the 1st of August, 1714. This step is difficult of explanation: but there are known facts to call for consideration. In order to insure the success of the peace negotiations of the government, it was desirable to remove Marlborough from the arena of politics. His correspondence with James II. was known to the French court, and in this crisis it may be assumed that it had been communicated to the English ministry. The ignoble letter relative to the Talmash expedition was included in these papers. If it be conceded that it could only be from some powerful motive, that Marlborough became a banished man on the continent, for his absence from England can be looked upon in no other light, is it an exaggeration to suppose that Oxford threatened him with an exposure of this treason-

* Marlborough's choice of lord Mohun was in accordance with his character. Lord Mohun had been mixed up in affairs of this kind, and was known to be in earnest when he acted; it was necessary to make lord Poulet understand that there was no child's play in the business. Some modern historians heap indignity on lord Mohun's name. On this point I refer my readers to Boyer, p. 610, in which place his memory is vindicated: Whatever the errors of his youth, . . . "he liv'd to be a great Example of Sobriety . . . my Lord Mohun . . . did wonderfully reclaim . . . and became a strenuous Asserter of the Cause of Liberty . . . and was no less regretted by the Whigs than the Duke Hamilton (*sic*) was by the other Party."

able document, to the extent of demanding his impeachment? Swift's Journal furnishes proof sufficient that Oxford could keep his own counsel. It was through Oxford the correspondence was conducted by which passports were obtained; Mainwaring was the medium of communication on the duke's side. There is undoubtedly mystery as to the cause of his departure. Lord Cowper has recorded in his diary that the queen said to the duchess of Hamilton, "the duke of Marlborough has acted wisely in going abroad." It may have been that Anne, while willing enough to remove Marlborough, stayed Oxford's hand, for she had always a regard for the duke in the "Mr. Freeman" of earlier years.

If this theory be correct, what a nemesis is here apparent. Does Greek tragedy anywhere furnish a more powerful representation of the pursuit of unrelenting fate than this painful spectacle of the greatest general and diplomatist of Europe forced as an alien from his native country, which, in the main lines of his life, he had served so faithfully and gloriously, not by the commission of a terrible crime, but by a petty mean act of perfidy, dictated by contemptible selfishness? Is there any teaching of the preacher more potent to awaken reflection on the ways of the transgressor? Was there ever a sterner retribution exacted for dishonour?

The ministry resolved immediately to withdraw the British troops and the auxiliaries on British pay from the campaign. The proposal, however, was first made to the allies to agree to an armistice, but it was not accepted. With a knowledge of these negotiations, Villars addressed Ormond asking to be decidedly informed, whether it was the intention of the British troops to serve in the siege of Quesnoy, which had been commenced. This categorical demand entailed on Ormond the necessity of acting according to his instructions, and he resolved, with the British troops, to march from the side of the allies; but neither the generals, nor the soldiers of the auxiliary force in the pay of Great Britain, would follow this disgraceful example. Under such circumstances, twelve thousand British troops were ordered to abandon the cause which they had so long and gloriously sustained. Never, before or since that day, have British soldiers evinced such a sense of shame and degradation. They were abandoning comrades by whose side they

had fought in an uninterrupted tide of success, to gain victory after victory, to take town after town, with only an ill equipped, disheartened army to arrest their further advance to conquest. The depression which came upon the troops, and the feeling of disgrace they attached to this unworthy proceeding, are recorded by a contemporary writer. "It grieved them to the heart to submit to the disgrace of laying down their arms after so many splendid victories. Some left their colours to serve among the allies, and others afterwards withdrew; and whenever they recollected the duke of Marlborough and the late glorious times, their eyes flowed with tears." *

Shortly after this event occurred the defeat of a detachment of the allies at Denain. A force of 8,000 men under the earl of Albermarle stationed to protect the lines at this place, and to insure the safe passage of supplies to the camp at Landrecies, was unexpectedly attacked, in a rapid march by Villars, and thoroughly defeated with the loss of 3,000 prisoners, prince Eugene not having been able to cross the Scheldt to come to their relief. This event had great influence in inducing the minds of the Dutch to peace. There is a letter extant from Oxford to Ormond, in which he literally gloats over the disaster; a scandal in the life of even such a man. †

I have related the conditions of the treaty as they affected Canada and British America; it is unnecessary to enter into

* Cunningham, Vol. II., p. 432.

† August 5, 1712: My Lord: No Pen nor Tongue is able to express the great Pleasure I took in your Grace's Successes. It was a very great Satisfaction to see so much done for the Publick; to see such an Example of steady Conduct in so great a Nobleman, and so courageous a Heart, is what has made you envy'd by some, dreaded by your Enemies, and applauded by all Men of Knowledge and Understanding. Your Grace's march to *Ghent*, &c., is a *Coup de Maître*; it is own'd to be so in *France* and *Holland*: And I must own, that I take a double Pleasure in it, because it is done by the Duke of Ormond, to whose Person I have so intire a Friendship and in whose Success I take so particular an Interest. Monsieur *Torcy* wrote a very just Compliment on the affair of *Denain*. *That the Allies might now see what they had lost by her Majesty's withdrawing her Forces, and what Value they ought to put upon a Nation which everywhere led Victory with it.* I am, &c., Oxford.

Boyer, pp. 593-594,

clauses which applied to the whole continent of Europe. After what has been said, it can easily be understood that no great difficulty would have been experienced with regard to the American possessions of either power. The real point at issue, the boundary line between the two countries, was left untouched ; while the mischievous retention by France of Cape Breton became one of the main causes of future dissension. As we read the history of these events, few can doubt that had the British negotiations been differently conducted, the conditions of peace would have been widely different. France, with extreme unwillingness, ceded Newfoundland, Hudson's bay, and Acadia ; but it was no feeling of their value, if we except Newfoundland, regarded as a nursery of the French navy, which led to the desire to retain them. It was the abandonment of territory which had been once French, which was painful ; and the consent of France was only extorted by the desperate circumstances in which she was placed. With Marlborough in command, all opposition to the advance of the allied forces into the heart of France would have been swept away. It is the taunt of some modern writers that Marlborough's victories led to no result. There is not entire truth in the phrase, for very important concessions were obtained : but the failure to obtain a more favourable treaty must be attributed to the ignominious intrigues of the English ministers with the French court, in which they sacrificed the national interests, to obtain for themselves a short discreditable tenure of power, and forever to incur the contempt of posterity. Among the altered conditions, is it an exaggeration to assert that Canada would have passed to British rule as one of the conditions of the peace ? The overwhelming force which in 1711 ascended the Saint Lawrence would, under competent leaders, have proved irresistible ; but apart from this consideration, there is much to show that in France, a strong feeling existed against Canada. There were many who felt that while the colony added nothing to the national prestige, it was a great source of expense and difficulty, and that its security was not based on unassailable conditions.

Similarly to what happened forty years later, no great efforts would have been made to retain what most French statesmen regarded as

a few acres of snow.* Voltaire's remark must not be looked upon as a mere epigram; it must be accepted as representative of a widely spread feeling in France; and the trifling allusion to the French American possessions in the treaty of peace enables us to form an estimate of the value, in which these possessions were held, in relation to the European questions which occupied the attention of French statesmen.

There are events in history which leave the impression on the mind that they were foreordained. One school of thinkers would class this result as one of fate; another, as an act of Providence. The last years of the reign of Queen Anne glide before us in the panorama of history, as if foredoomed by some irresistible power. The chief actors appear, to strut their brief hour, many of them to be heard no more; nevertheless, they aided to carry on the action of the drama to its *dénoûement*. Much had been battled for. With the exception of the withdrawal of the insolent pretension of the French King to control the succession to the crown of Great Britain, and the destruction of the overwhelming power of France which had hitherto paralyzed the whole continent, no remarkable result is apparent from the conditions of the treaty. These two modifications, however, in the political state of Europe, were of the highest importance. They were in themselves guarantees for the advancement of free institutions, and enlightenment; for the cause of the pretender was of importance in the eyes of the French king, inasmuch as by its success Great Britain could be reduced to the ignominious position she had held during the reigns of Charles II. and James II.

No other main disputed point had been definitely settled. But the recollection of the war, which, with some years of interruption, had lasted for a quarter of a century, was powerful to pre-

* The expression is to be found in *Candide*, Chap. XXIII. "Vous connaissez l'Angleterre; y est on aussi fou qu'en France?—C'est un autre espèce de folie dit Martin; vous savez que ces deux nations sont en guerre pour quelques arpents de neige vers le Canada, et qu'elles dépensent pour cette belle guerre beaucoup plus que tout le Canada ne vaut. De vous dire précisément s'il y a plus de gens à lier dans un pays que dans un autre, c'est ce que mes faibles lumières ne me permettent pas; je sais seulement qu'en général les gens que nous allons voir sont fort atrabillaires."

serve peace. When the generation, contemporary with the suffering and privations it had caused, had passed away, they were forgotten. After thirty years interval, the fires of national hate and fury were again kindled; all the bad passions of humanity were called forth, and Europe and North America once more became the scenes of bloodshed and devastation.

NOTE.—The late Earl Stanhope has on two occasions brought against Marlborough the charge of assisting the first pretender with money to aid him in his invasion of Scotland in 1715; in “The History of England, 1713-1783,” Ed. 1858, Vol. I., p. 105, and in his “History of the Reign of Queen Anne to the Peace of Utrecht,” 1870, p. 72. In the latter, the charge is advanced with less positiveness. At the time of giving this assistance the Duke of Marlborough was professing loyalty to George I., and in possession of a lucrative post in the army. I am impelled to express my dissent to the opinion that any money was given for such purpose, considering that it is not sustained by evidence.

The accusation is based on a passage in a letter from Bolingbroke to the pretender, dated Paris, the 25th of September, 1715. Speaking of the little secrecy observed in the pretender’s councils, he adds: “The Marquis d’Effiat told me the very sum Marlborough has advanced to you.” There is likewise a letter from the duke of Berwick to James, dated the 11th of March, 1714, in which the Duke of Marlborough is spoken of slightly. It runs: “Mr. Belly has received a letter from M. Malbrouck’s friend [Marlborough] . . . you will find little more than *verba et voces*, according to that gentleman’s custom.”

Saint Simon tells us [Vol. VI., p. 262] that after Oudenarde, in 1708, Lieutenant General de Biron, who had been taken prisoner, was invited to dinner by Marlborough, and, received with the perfect high breeding which distinguished the duke. During dinner he surprised de Biron by asking after the prince of Wales, who was serving under Vendôme, apologizing for so naming him; at that date, with the French, the pretender was looked upon as James III. “We will not dispute on that point,” replied de Biron, “for in our army he is only called the Chevalier de St. George.” He then spoke of James in terms of praise. Marlborough listened with much attention, and answered, “I am much pleased in hearing so much good of him, for I cannot help feeling great interest in that young prince,” and the conversation closed.

The theory of any such money having been given by Marlborough, must be, on the ground, that it was advanced from a selfish and ignoble astuteness to secure his own interest, in the event of the pretender’s success. No one would accuse the great duke, of want of judgment and foresight; but, if in this case the charge be admitted, the grossest folly and fatuity must be attributed to him; for no one could have better seen the slight chance of success of the pretender’s cause at this time.

A few dates will shew that if money were given it could have no connection with the events of 1715. Anne died on the 1st of August, 1714. George I. was proclaimed king, and ascended the throne without opposition. He arrived in

England on the 31st of the month. Immediately after the queen's death, before George I. reached England, Louis XIV. acknowledged the Hanoverian succession. Parliament was dissolved, to meet on the 17th of March, 1715, when there was a strong majority for the whigs.

News reaching London that a jacobite attempt was being organized, in September Sir George Byng, with a fleet, appeared in the roads of Havre, where it was reported the preparations were being made. Lord Stair, the British ambassador at Paris, demanded that certain ships, which he specified by name as being engaged in the service of the pretender, should be given up by the French government. The regent directed that they should be unloaded, and the arms and other cargo placed in the king's stores.

The pretender had great difficulty in leaving France ; it was only in December he landed at Peterhead ; and in February, 1716, he left Scotland sailing from Montrose for France.

It is not improbable that Marlborough may have been asked to assist the pretender in money difficulties, and that he so assisted him. It is but an act of justice to his political discrimination and foresight, to suppose that, if the money was given, it was in response to a request of the pretender in the pressure of some personal emergency.

If the slight evidence which we possess be accepted as proof of the fact, at least we should harmonize it with the undoubted good sense and unfailing judgment which characterized Marlborough. There was no man in Great Britain so little of a jacobite, and no man more persecuted for his political opinions adverse to that cause. He was then sixty-five years old, the first general in Europe, and little likely to compromise himself with a knot of men, many of whom were his personal enemies, and who, for the most part, he must have despised. Is there, indeed, any proof that money was really given to the pretender by the duke ?

MARLBOROUGH'S CONDUCT IN CONNECTION WITH THE
EXPEDITION TO BREST IN 1694.

The disgraceful fact is known that with many of the public men in England during the reign of William, Marlborough entered into correspondence with James II. when at Saint Germain. The reputation of Marlborough is further sullied, by the fearful accusation of deliberately informing James of the projected attack of Brest, owing to which information, the port was placed in thorough defence, and such preparation was made, that the English expedition was defeated with the loss of eight hundred men. This act was first brought to general notice by earl Stanhope in 1836, who, in narrating it in a few lines, adds, that no defence of it is possible, but that of the Roman, Manlius Capitolinus, who, when charged by the patricians with treason, pointed to the Capitol he had saved. It remained for lord Macaulay, twenty years later,* to bring the deplorable truth to almost universal knowledge, in my humble judgment, with marked injustice to Marlborough. Macaulay, who would at once have seen the fallacy of his own statements if made by any other writer, assigns the motive for Marlborough's conduct, not to have been the advancement of the jacobite cause, but the diabolical purpose of sacrificing Talmash, the one soldier in the English army liable to interfere with his career. It is always painful to record the evil deeds of a man of genius, and the character of the letter under any circumstances is simply ignominious. But to speak of Marlborough's jealousy of Talmash is unwarrantable.

There was no quality in Marlborough's mind more pre-eminent than his freedom from jealousy. He had no such feeling towards Cohorn or Slagenberg, Overkirk or Opdam; certainly not of his co-equal in greatness, prince Eugene. Their relationship can only be remembered to the honour of both.

It cannot be denied that Marlborough constantly wrote such letters. It would be a sad record against the honour of any man, and it must read doubly infamous when the crime is committed by the possessor of great powers. But had Marlborough any other design than to secure himself, in the event of a counter revolution? It was the belief of many who were anything but jacobites that the restoration of James II. was only a question of time. When Marlborough commenced this correspondence, in 1690, he was devoted to the interests of the queen's sister, the lady Anne, afterwards queen. Whatever the professions contained in these letters of his desire to advance the interests of his former sovereign, no one act of Marlborough's career can be adduced to show support of jacobitism. James II. has so complained in his memoirs; and immediately after one of these letters, Marlborough went to Ireland, to perform good service for William III. at Kinsale and Cork.

Lord Macaulay assumes that Marlborough had special means of information; but the fact is not proved, and the condition in which Marlborough stood with the court is not in favour of this theory. The object assigned is the destruction of Talmash. There was no certainty that Talmash would be killed, and his was a

* The publication of the III. and IV. volumes of the history took place in December, 1855.

character which would appear noblest in adverse circumstances. Moreover, the information given by Marlborough would not have proved of value but for extraordinary circumstances. The fact is admitted by lord Macaulay.* In the days of steam the warning would have been without effect. London was full of spies. The preparation of the expedition was the talk of the coffee houses. Several places were named as threatened. Is it possible to suppose that in the alarm caused by this general uncertain information, the important harbour of Brest would be neglected? The secret was remarkably well kept. In Marlborough's letter to James, he stated that Russell had declined to give information, and amid expressions of devotion to the exiled king, Marlborough warned James against Russell. Had it not been for the adverse winds which prevailed for a month, the English ships would have reached Brest as soon as Marlborough's letter was in James' hands. The jacobite cutters charged with treasonable correspondence were unaffected by the wind; they made their way to the French coast according to its direction; thus while the fleet was detained, the letter arrived. However disastrous the result, I cannot look upon the information sent by Marlborough as anything more than partaking the general character of his correspondence with James: the mention of Brest being a mere lucky guess, considered as being sent at a time when the information would be valueless.

There can be no vindication for this dishonest correspondence with the exiled court, especially on the part of those not devoted to his cause. To a certain extent this deplorable line of conduct may be explained by the lax dishonourable tone of thought which distinguished the "ignoble" reigns of Charles II. and James II. Selfishness, meanness, falsehood, low cunning, became the characteristics of many public men of that date, leaving an ineffaceable stain on English history.

* Promptitude was indeed necessary, for when Marlborough's letter was written, the preparations at Portsmouth were all but complete, and if the wind had been favourable to the English, the objects of the expedition might have been attained without a struggle. But adverse gales detained our fleet in the Channel during another month.

Macaulay, vol. IV., chap. XX.

MALBROUGH S'EN VA-T-EN GUERRE.

Mr. de Celles, librarian of parliament, permits me to use his name as an authority that the song of "Malbrough s'en va-t-en guerre" still holds its place among the songs of the *habitants* in the country parishes. There can be no doubt that it was brought to Canada by the French soldiers. The tradition is, that it was originally written by the nurses of the children of the duke of Bourgogne, the pupil of Fénelon; and, no doubt, verses have been added from time to time. It possibly was written after the battle of Oudenarde. Blenheim was fought on the 13th of August, 1704, for Marlborough's name to become a household word in France; Oudenarde on the 11th of July, 1708. The duke de Bourgogne had supreme command, but he was accompanied by Vendôme, in reality to be the guiding spirit of the campaign. The duke preferred to take the counsel of M. de Puységur, in modern history a mere name. The battle, as was usual in those days, was won by Marlborough and Eugene. Vendôme, alone in the council of war, was desirous of continuing the fight on the following day; moreover, he considered that the action had been lost from neglect of his counsel. The death of the young duke made a profound sensation in Europe. He had married Marie Adelaide of Savoy, remembered as throwing such a charm over the last years of Louis XIV. She died from fever on the 12th of February, 1712, in her twenty-sixth year; the dauphin, her husband, for such was his rank, owing to the death of his father, the only legitimate son of Louis, who had died on the previous 11th of April, died in his thirtieth year, six days after her death.

It was for their children the song was written. The eldest, also called the duke of Bourgogne, then five years old, died on the 8th of May, 1712. The second, the duke of Anjou, afterwards Louis XV., was then but two years old.

I am impelled to give the song entire, as now sung in Canada.

Malbrough s'en va-t-en guerre,
Mironton, mironton, mirontaine;
Malbrough s'en va-t-en guerre,
Ne sait quand reviendra. *ter*

(*Da Capo ad finem.*)

Beau page, ah! beau page,
Quell' nouvelle apportez?

Aux novell's que j'apporte
Vos beaux yeux vont pleurer!

Il reviendra z-à Pâques
Ou à la Trinité. *ter*

Quittez vos habits roses
Et vos satins brochés.

La Trinité se passe,
Malbrough ne revient pas.

Monsieur d'Malbrough est mort,
Est mort et enterré.

Madame à sa tour monte,
Si haut qu'ell' peut monter.

Je' l'ai vu porter en terre
Par quatre z-officiers.

Elle aperçoit son page,
Tout de noir habillé.

L'un portait sa cuirasse,
L'autre son bouclier.

L'un portait son grand sabre,
L'autre ne portait rien.

Chacun mit ventre à terre,
Et puis se releva.

A l'entour de sa tombe,
Romarins l'on planta.

Pour chanter les victoires
Que Malbrough remporta.

Sur la plus haute branche,
Le rossignol chanta.

La cérémonie faite,
Chacun s'en fut coucher.

On vit voler son âme,
Au travers des lauriers.

J'en dis pas davantage,
Car en voilà z-assez.

The songs of the French-Canadians, in their family gatherings, are identical with those sung a century and a half back by their ancestors during French rule. Many of them, however, have been somewhat expurgated ; at least they vary from the text retained in France, where they are still sung with verses which have been added or have been removed in Canada, for they are unknown in the country parishes of the Saint Lawrence. The latter most likely is the case, for the variations are not to be recommended by their decency. The change may have taken place at the time of the conquest, on the departure of the French troops ; the population was then small, and the tradition of the earlier generation may easily have passed away.

These songs are a remarkable feature in Canadian literary history, as much from the originality and gaiety of the airs as from their relationship to the early settlers of the country. They embrace the songs of childhood, many of which are extremely pleasing ; such as :

“ C'est la poulette grise
Qui pond dans l'église ;
Elle va pondre un p'tit coco
Pour le p'tit qui va faire dodo.”

Some of them are known over the whole world, as they have been sung at the camp fires of the Peninsular War ; in the campaign of 1812 ; in the Crimea ; and in India, where many members of the old French-Canadian families were present, some never to return. For example : “ Le fils du roi s'en va chassant.” “ La belle Française.” “ Par derrière chez ma tante.” Especially “ À la claire de la fontaine,” perhaps one of the oldest of these ballads, which has its origin in Normandy.

Several of the songs now sung are of comparatively modern date ; the most remarkable are those which have come down from the time of the French.

ROBERT HARLEY, EARL OF OXFORD.

The most prominent actor in these events was Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford. The treaty, indeed, may be described as the work of that spirit of intrigue which guided him, until his power of deception had developed into an art. By nature he was disingenuous ; he preferred to attain an object by indirect means when it was otherwise feasible ; he was known as "The Trickster." [Bohn's *Marlborough*, II., p. 35]. His mind was shallow, his intellect commonplace ; he was entirely devoid of true statesmanship, and his policy was to postpone every official act, until its performance became unavoidable. Characters, the most opposite, agree in this estimate of the man. Marlborough, Somers, Godolphin, Lord Chancellor Cowper, the duchess of Marlborough. Even "Jack Hill" presented Swift with a "gold studded snuff-box [Journal, 15th of September, 1712] for which the duchess of Hamilton made a pocket, on which Harley was represented as a snail.* Lord Cowper records in his diary a dinner given by Harley, when Harley and St. John, met Marlborough, Godolphin, Sunderland, Boyle and himself. He says : "On the departure of Lord Godolphin, Harley took a glass, and drank to love and friendship and everlasting Union, and wished he had more Tokay to drink it in ; we had drunk two bottles, good but thick. I replied his white Lisbon was best to drink it in, being very clear. I suppose he apprehended it (as I observed most of the company did) to relate to that humour of his, which was never to deal clearly or openly ; but always with reserve, if not dissimulation, or rather simulation ; and to love tricks when not necessary, but from an inward satisfaction in applauding his own cunning."

The duchess of Marlborough describes him as having "a constant, awkward motion, or rather agitation of the head and body, as betraying a turbulent dishonesty, even in the midst of all this familiar, jocular bowing and sinking, which always affected to cover what could not be covered."

On entering the House of Commons in King William's reign, by his readiness in debate, and his capacity for business, he obtained a leading position, and was ultimately elected speaker. As his career widened, he became identified with the tory party. He had started life as a presbyterian, but, as policy suggested, he merged into a high-churchman, or at least sought the support of the October Club.

* Swift acknowledged the receipt of the snuff-box in a characteristic letter, dated the 12th of August, 1712, and alludes to Hill's device at the bottom of the box :—

"My Lord Treasurer, who is the most malicious person in the world, says, you ordered a goose to be drawn at the bottom of my box, as a reflection upon the clergy, and that I should resent it. But I am not angry at all, and as his Lordship observes by halves ; for the goose there is drawn pecking at a snail, just as I do at him to make him mend his pace in relation to the public, although it be hitherto in vain. And, besides, Dr. Arbuthnot, who is a scholar, says : "You meant it for a compliment for us both : that I am the goose who saved the Capitol by my cackling, and that his Lordship is represented by the snail because he preserves his country by delays."

Zealous for no interest, and having in view chiefly his own advancement, he could adapt himself to all opinions.

The main element of Harley's character was unfathomable cunning, which he could enlist in any form for any purpose ; and he could assume a free, jaunty, mode of familiarity, which rarely failed to attract a certain class of those he desired to bend to his purpose.

When in Godolphin's government, his duplicity against the chief ministers led to his dismissal, for to such it amounted ; although, with his want of moral courage, he resigned to avoid this disgrace. He secretly continued his political intrigues with Mrs. Masham, and, by that woman was constantly introduced to private interviews with the queen. By flattering Anne's love of prerogative, and by encouraging her animosity against the duchess of Marlborough and by humouring every royal weakness, he became more advanced in her favour. Anne's sentiment towards the duchess had become almost that of hate, and she had reached the opinion that everything should be attempted so she could be rid of the duchess' presence. The first step towards this result was to remove the necessity for the services of the duke. In other words, that peace should be obtained. Under this pretence, Harley's intrigues first effected the dismissal of Sunderland, and afterwards that of lord Godolphin, finally to obtain the appointment of himself as lord treasurer and first minister.*

To obtain the peace he even cozened Louis XIV.; leading the French king to believe that he was engaged in the pretender's interest. To give a better colour to his possession of this feeling, he appointed as his secretary Erasmus Lewis, a known jacobite, who became afterwards an active agent in the events of 1715. Harley's failure to keep his engagements in this respect, and the doubt felt as to his future conduct led to his fall [Henri Martin, vol. xvi., p. 590] The duke of Berwick states in his memoirs, [vol. ii., p. 133] that the pretender, through the duke of Ormond, and Mrs. Masham made known to the queen the wish that Oxford should be removed, and we may fairly surmise that the recommendation was sustained by the French court. On the 27th of July, 1714, O. S., a few days before the queen's death, Oxford was dismissed from power. On the same day Lewis wrote to Swift "The Queen has told all the Lords the reasons of her parting with him, namely : that he neglected all business ; that he was seldom to be understood ; that when he did explain himself, she could not depend upon the truth of what he said ; that he never came to her at the time she appointed ; that he often came drunk, and lastly, to crown all, that he behaved himself towards her with bad manners, indecency and disrespect.—*Pudet hæc opprobria nobis, &c.*"

Swift wrote to Pope 10th January, 1721, O.S.: "I can never forget the answer he (Oxford) gave to the late Lord Halifax, who, upon the first change of the Ministry interceded with him to spare Mr. Congreve, it was by repeating these two lines of Virgil :

"Non obtusa adeo gestamus pectora Pœni :
Nec tam aversus equos Tyriâ sol jungit ab urbe."

* "Une revolution de cabinet, qui tendait à changer toute la politique de l'Europe, avait commencé par une révolution de ruelle. Henri Martin, XIV., p. 536.

The lines are found in the first *Æneid*, 567-8, and are met in the reply of Dido to the appeal of Ilioneus for hospitality. If Oxford ever read the fourth book he might have found a passage which at the close of his career had application to himself. It occurs in the desperate outburst of passion in Dido's curse of *Æneas*.

Nec cum se sub leges *pacis iniquae*
Tradiderat, regno aut optatâ luce fruatur;
Sed cadat ante diem.

—*Æn.* IV., 618-620.

[When he has treacherously abandoned himself to the conditions of a disadvantageous peace, neither that he enjoy power, nor the desired honour, but fall before his time.]





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